From Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin in The Washington Post, who have in general done some very useful and objective (at least, quantitative) work on geopolitical attitudes in Russia’s Near Abroad over the years.
Here is the key observation:
Overall, Belarusians in early 2020 appear content with their country’s slightly pro-Russian geopolitical position. The median value (7) on the scale does not change from the perceived actual placement (where Belarus is) to the preferred one (where Belarus should be). As some moved their preference to the West, an equal number wanted to link their country closer to Russia. What these numbers disguise, however, is a generational divide. Of the sample aged 18 to 40, 50.4 percent want to move toward the West on the scale and 23.3 percent want to move toward Russia. But for the over-60 sample, 14.7 percent want to move toward the West and 62.0 percent want to move Russia’s way on the geopolitical scale.
While allowances may be made for youngsters drifting towards more conservative positions with age, the divide is surely far too stark for that effect being canceled out by the younger cohorts being much more Occidentophile. This suggests that the opportunity for the (smooth) reunification of the Russian and White Russian people is time-limited by boomer lifespans (unless other factors, such as total Western soft power collapse, intervene in the meantime). And that settling for “conserving” the status quo would be a mistake, at least from the perspective of long-term Russian national interests.