

UPI's bureau manager in Saigon, who, while his stylistic gifts are limited, is a natural storyteller.

For the Common Defense. Andrew J. Goodpaster. Lexington, \$14.95. Well worth reading for the glimpse it gives into one of our better military minds.

Floating Exchange Rates and National Economic Policy. Stanley W. Black. Yale, \$12.95.

The Future File. Paul Dickson. Rawson, \$9.95.

The Giants: Russia and America. Richard J. Barnet. Simon and Schuster, \$7.95. "In the bizarre world of nuclear strategy," Barnet writes, "satire is impossible. The culmination of *Dr. Strangelove*, a 1964 movie spoofing the nuclear arms race, is a hysterical warning about the 'mine-shaft gap,' which will allow the Soviet Union to save more of its population in a nuclear war than the United States. Eight years later Pentagon officials held a briefing on the mine-shaft gap for congressional committees."

At the beginning of 1977, the United States had about 9,000 nuclear warheads aimed at the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union had about 3,500 aimed at the United States. That the vast majority of the weapons are superfluous in no way inhibits the continued build-up.

Nor do the arms control agreements. As against disarmament, where each side agrees to reduce its capability to conduct war against the other, "arms control" purports to remove the advantage either side would gain by starting a nuclear war. Arms control is a concept more acceptable to the military bureaucracies in each country, and both superpowers have used the SALT negotiations to improve their military capabilities; five years after the SALT I agreement was signed the stockpile of nuclear weapons had doubled. "Arms control negotiations," a former deputy director of the CIA noted, "are rapidly becoming the best excuse for escalating . . . the arms race."

The arms escalation upon which the prosperity of the military bureaucracies of both countries depends can be rationalized only by pointing to an "enemy"—and, in describing threats that justify bigger budgets. The Soviet and American military are not only "enemies" but also each other's strongest allies: "the madness of one bureaucracy," Barnet observes, "sustains the

other." In neither country, to be sure, have the political leaders effectively challenged the thinking of their military bureaucracies.

But, concurrently with the arms race has emerged another aspect of the Soviet-American relationship, those instincts for survival that peer out from under the mushroom cloud and find expression in the term "detente." Soviet leaders understand that their real problems—China, dissidents, the restless nations under their hegemony, the diverse national entities within the Soviet Union itself, low productivity—have little to do with the United States. Similarly, the American problems—the tenuousness of our access to raw materials, our diminishing control of the world economy, the runaway costs of managing our government—don't have much to do with the Soviet Union.

Positive realities impel the two giants toward closer ties. The Soviet need for Western technology has resulted in a growing web of economic arrangements, each new economic tie making inevitable the next.

Detente has, in fact, proceeded further than most Americans realize. The United States, says Barnet, has come to view the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe as a guarantor of the stability of the area. "No one in the upper reaches of the State Department," he writes, "likes to imagine what would happen if the troops pulled out." (It's one of the ironies of contemporary American democracy that we learn what our government *really* thinks only from non-governmental sources: if pressed, the State Department, which knows a political hot potato when it sees one, would have to declare its blue-eyed innocence of any such thoughts.)

Meanwhile, the time bomb—the increasingly volatile arms race—ticks on. In Barnet's view, unless the giants make a fundamental change in their military relationship and move from "arms control" toward comprehensive disarmament, it will explode.

—Leonard Reed

Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged. Christopher Lasch. Basic Books, \$15.

The Jews. Chaim Bermant. Times Books, \$12.50.

Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Michael Walzer. Basic Books, \$15. An eloquent and convincing statement of the case against war.

Justice and Older Americans. Marlene A. Young Rifai. Lexington, \$17.

The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States. Carlos Rangel. Ivan Kats, trans. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, \$12.95.

The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist's View of Survival. Garrett Hardin. Indiana Univ. Press, \$10.

The Limits of Health Reform: The Search for Realism. Eli Ginzberg. Basic Books, \$10.

Lost Frontier: The Marketing of Alaska. John D. Hanrahan, Peter Gruenstein. Norton, \$10.95.

The Luciano Project. Rodney Campbell. McGraw-Hill, \$9.95.

Medicare: The Politics of Federal Hospital Insurance. Judith M. Feder. Lexington, \$16.

Organized Medicine in the Progressive Era: The Move Toward Monopoly. James G. Burrow. Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, \$12.95. A detailed account of the professionalization of medicine in the early years of this century, far less hostile to doctors than its title makes it sound.

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 24: January-August 1912. Arthur S. Link, ed. with David W. Hirst, John E. Little. Princeton Univ. Press, \$25.

Persona Non Grata: An Envoy in Castro's Cuba. Jorge Edwards; Colin Harding, trans. Dutton, \$8.95.

The Picture of Health: Environmental Sources of Disease. Erik P. Eckholm. Norton, \$9.95/\$3.95.

Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems. Charles E. Lindblom. Basic Books, \$15.

The Professor Game. Richard Mandell. Doubleday, \$8.95.

Reluctant Regulators: The FCC and the Broadcast Audience. Barry Cole, Mal Oettinger. Addison-Wesley, \$10.95. Cole is a consultant to the FCC and Oettinger a veteran broadcasting reporter; the two teamed up to write the inside story of the agency, and the results are competent and complete if uninspired. The verdict on the FCC is negative, mostly for the standard liberal captive-of-the-industry reasons.

The Show and Tell Machine: How Television Works and Works You Over. Rose K. Goldsen. Dial, \$10.

Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises. Richard K. Betts. Harvard Univ. Press, \$5.

South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations. Ann Seidman, Neva Seidman. Lawrence Hill, \$10/\$4.95.

Stealing from the Rich: The Home-Stake Oil Swindle. David McClintick. M. Evans, \$10. "How in hell did you steal \$40 million?" an admiring prisoner asked Robert S. Trippet, who, awaiting sentencing the next day, was spending the night in jail. "I broke my ass to steal \$200 and I'll probably be here forever. You'll do a few months or a year . . ."

The prisoner, as we'll see, was no prophet.

Trippet, a Tulsa lawyer-businessman, was the genius who engineered and sustained for 19 years the biggest oil swindle ever. Between 1955 and 1974 the Home-Stake Production Company relieved investors of about \$140 million.

The scenario was old, modernized only by the tax breaks our laws offer the oil

The War Managers Douglas Kinnard



What did the American Army generals in Vietnam feel about that war? What did they think about the men they commanded, American politics, the South Vietnamese, their own roles? A retired Brigadier General provides a new look at that war, based on the frank responses to a detailed questionnaire he sent to the commanding generals. The result is a fascinating, often surprising, study that is at once unique military history and first-rate political science. "Full of fresh insights on that over-reported war."—*Publishers Weekly*. Published for the University of Vermont. \$14.00

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