

failure of the negotiations, in the course of which his business colleagues were imprisoned, Mr. Vogeler prepared to leave the country legally. At the border he was arrested by the Hungarian branch of the Soviet political police. He hoped to be charged only with sabotaging the planned economy, which would serve as excuse for expropriation of ISEC.

Only about a third of the material in this book has been published in magazine form. Mr. Vogeler's story of the Grand Guignol in which he was cast as villain is nightmarish, the more so because of his remarkable restraint. His very temperateness, in fact, makes it an unsensational sensation. Not that he was given the "water cure" or bastinadoed like Alex, the cellmate whose job it was to get Mr. Vogeler to confess. Alex, of peasant origin, was "uncultured." In the case of "cultured" prisoners, such psychological tortures were applied as would excite the imagination, break the spirit, and induce distraction and despair. Needless to say, the "cultured" American was held incommunicado, receiving neither news nor letters.

One of Mr. Vogeler's interrogators was the state prosecutor who had fabricated the case against Cardinal Mindszenty. Another inquisitor boasted: "If Mindszenty told me what I wanted him to tell me, so will you. . . . Even if Jesus Christ were sitting in your chair, He'd tell me everything I wanted Him to." During the three-day rehearsal of his mock trial, Mr. Vogeler discovered that the magistrates had to drug themselves with actedron in order to keep awake during the gruelling courtroom marathons. The Hungarian government refused to let their prisoner accept the proffered legal services of the famous American attorney, Morris L. Ernst, and cynically assigned a native stooge as "defense" lawyer.

It is the author's belief that Associated Press correspondent William Oatis is being held as his replacement in Stalin's campaign to destroy the last remnants of American prestige in the Russian-dominated area. Forcing the United States to ransom four captured American flyers was another move in the campaign. Mr. Vogeler recommends some specific measures—three, to be exact—for deterring Soviet affronts to our national honor. He speaks of the State Department without raising his voice, but you may have to watch your blood pressure just the same. He makes it all too clear that "I Was Stalin's Prisoner" constitutes a humiliating footnote to the history of our foreign policy.



## *Patriot, Rebel & Theorist*

*TITOISM AND THE COMINFORM.*

By Adam B. Ulam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 243 pp. \$4.

By LEIGH WHITE

THIS is the fifth of a series of volumes published by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University with funds provided by the Carnegie Corporation. The author, an assistant professor of government at Harvard, expresses the hope, which has certainly been fulfilled, that his book will "make a modest contribution toward the understanding of Communism in power." That it does little more than that is the fault, in my opinion, of his "scholarly" approach to a subject that simply does not lend itself to "scholarly" research. Mr. Ulam has spent three years studying the source materials on which his analysis of Titoism is exclusively based. He would have saved time and written a more valuable book, I think, if he had studied fewer source materials and spent a little time in Yugoslavia and, if possible, Poland and Russia—the three countries with which his book is principally concerned.

"It is often assumed," he writes, "that the 'real' story of Communist politics can never be learned or studied in the West, that the politics of an authoritarian regime provides suitable material for sensational exposes or queries, but never for a factual study." Never is a long time and, as one who shares the assumption that Mr. Ulam seeks to refute, I would

prefer to use "seldom" in place of "never." The fact remains, however, that his book will convince few readers that the assumption is wrong. For my part, I believe more strongly than ever, after reading Mr. Ulam's academic study, that the Russian Research Center and similar institutions will justify their existence only when their directors realize, as they have failed to realize to date, that Communism is a phenomenon that must of necessity be studied directly in the field.

This is not to say that Mr. Ulam's contribution is superfluous. In so far as Titoism can be understood from afar by a dispassionate political scientist who has never experienced life under a Communist tyranny, Mr. Ulam contributes to its understanding. But his contribution is unfortunately limited to what little knowledge can be gleaned from a judicious study of propagandistic source materials in which a very large percentage of fiction is inextricably interwoven with a very small percentage of fact.

Mr. Ulam, who writes warily and well, has done as good a job as could be expected within the limits of a "scholarly" tradition that prefers to study Titoism on the basis of what Titoists and Stalinists have said rather than on the basis of what they have actually done to the people who are victims of their ideological squabble. His errors, which are relatively few, are those so often made by persons who have never had their noses rubbed in the hideous reality of Communism in power.

A few months in Yugoslavia would have helped Mr. Ulam to understand why Tito's party still insists on merging its destiny with that of the so-called National Front. He would not have been allowed to visit Russia, in all probability, but any non-Communist veteran of Moscow could have told

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—United Press Photo.

Marshal Tito—"a new dictator."

him why Stalin, immediately the war was over, insisted on reducing the size of his own party from 7,000,000 to 2,000,000 members. Mr. Ulam to the contrary, there is nothing at all mysterious about Tito's refusal to follow Stalin's example. Stalin, an old dictator, was afraid of the neo-Communists whom he had been forced to admit into his party during the war; Tito, a new dictator, was utterly dependent upon his neo-Communists, and could not have survived his quarrel with Stalin if he had purged them as the *Vozhd* desired. It was nationalism and not ideology that saved Tito in 1948-51 just as it was nationalism and not ideology that saved Stalin in 1942-45. The secretive and conspiratorial nature of the Titoists, which so puzzles Mr. Ulam, is no different and, if anything, less pronounced, than the secretive and conspiratorial nature of the Stalinists. It is in the nature of a conspiracy to act like one, and Tito's conspiracy though different from Stalin's, is no exception.

But such insight, I fear, is not to be gained from any amount of "scholarly" research from a distance. It can come only from experience, which is to say from practical research in the field. I am still all in favor of scholarly studies of Communism, but it is somewhat less than scholarly, I think, for the members of the Russian Research Center at Harvard to confine their studies to the biased, fragmentary, and often contradictory source materials available to them in the United States. The proper laboratory for a study of Communist methods of government is one or another of the countries ruled by Communists. Any study of Communism that is not based on research in such a laboratory can be neither very scholarly nor very enlightening.

## Have We Failed Again?

### THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION.

By Sidney Lens. Boston: Beacon Press. 272 pp. \$3.50.

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

COMMUNISM, Sidney Lens well says, is the "counterfeit revolution." Yet the fact remains that this counterfeit revolution has exerted a powerful fascination upon some of the most ardent, talented, and selfless individuals of our time. The first purpose of Mr. Lens's book is to explore the reasons for this fascination—to show why it has been so hard for so many to detect the skull beneath the skin. Deeply disturbed by recent visits to Europe, Mr. Lens couches this exploration in the readable terms of a commentary on contemporary European history. In these terms he gives a vivid sense of the revolutionary dynamism of Communism, of the bitter realities of life behind the Iron Curtain, and of the confusions and perplexities of life in the free nations.

Mr. Lens's inquiry into the appeal of Communism, it must be said, is neither very systematic nor very profound. He operates in quite a different realm, for example, from Hannah Arendt in her recent book "The Origins of Totalitarianism." Yet, if his discussion adds little, it does bring the information together in a convenient and understandable way. Communism appeals, he says, to the "latent idealism" in man, the "inner desire toward martyrdom, toward helping the underdog"; it gives men a sense of mission, of being in tune with history; it mobilizes the best impulses of men toward the worst ends. "Like it or not, in the absence of proper competition, it is the most effective religion of our times." This is all true, though Mr. Lens's account may underestimate the sheer hypnotic effect of Communist power in a troubled and frightened world.

But he explains the success of Communism only partly in terms of its own appeal. It is not only the dynamism of the Communists; it is the failure of the democracies which must be taken into account. "Moscow appears radical to young idealists only because the rest of the world is so hopelessly conservative. It appears vibrant because the rest of the world is so steeped in lassitude. It appears hopeful because the rest of the world

is so hopeless." This leads Mr. Lens into a critique of our own policy—a critique which is occasionally sound and valuable but which in the end becomes so harsh and exaggerated that it destroys the effect of his more measured comments.

Our European policy, Mr. Lens would assert, has failed. The good in the Marshall Plan has been nullified by aid to Franco, by German dismantlement, by the failure of internal reform in the European countries. Mr. Lens feels that "not a nickel" should have been given to the present French or Italian governments on the present basis. The movement for European unification is "a dead letter." Our policy has, above all, failed abysmally to restore the European will to resist. "Give them all the guns, tanks, planes, and money possible—and they still will not fight. Their leaders will promise, cajole, implore, beg, threaten—but they will not fight."

Now this indictment is partly true (Marshall Plan benefits have not got down to the workers in France and Italy), partly ignorant (the movement toward European unity is far from "a dead letter"), and partly irresponsible. It is all very well for Mr. Lens to cry that not a nickel should go to France or Italy. But does he really accept the alternative? If the French and Italian governments refused to reform their tax systems overnight, if they refused to set their house in order (Mr. Lens's order), would he really call upon us to abandon them to Thorez and Togliatti? If he really means this, I am thankful that he is not Secretary of State. If he doesn't mean it, then why does he write in this way?

But this is just the beginning of his diatribe on our foreign policy. Our policy, he says, is fatally obsessed with anti-Communism. We are resting everything on establishing overwhelming military superiority. "Misunderstanding the essence of Stalinist technique and hindered by pressure from the right at home, [our policy] commits one blunder after another and binds itself to one useless measure after another." Our whole thinking is dominated "by the imprint of a status quo philosophy at home. Anything that smacks of change is ipso facto Communist." No American apparently (except Justice William O. Douglas) understands why Communism spreads and how we must fight it.

These are all strong words; and Mr. Lens's indictment is so broad and

(Continued on page 64)

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