

in her forties who waits on her. Bonnie and Garth are not willing to buy their happiness at the expense of others. As the story opens they are coming home from a brief honeymoon to the big old city-surrounded house in which they have already gathered their dependents. Here is an interesting and human situation filled with dramatic possibilities, and one feels both sympathy and real concern for the bold and blithe pair who have plunged into it.

There is technical skill here in the writing, an easy movement of dialogue and scene. The complications arise out of the clash of character and include such events as the young brother's marriage to a teen-age girl—he brings her home, of course—the father's loss of a job, the sister's dental troubles, the maid with two children, and the boarder taken in to pay for her. There is also a chance acquaintance's dying mother who is rescued from being thrown out by a cruel son-in-law. These things are smoothly handled by Miss Lawrence in the writing and by her heroine in the action of the book. How does Bonnie manage to do all this? Garth, the good and understanding, says: "She does it for love."

Now this is so right, so ideally the solution for all problems of personal or more general nature that one longs to believe in Bonnie and Garth. Often, thanks to their flashes of humor, one does. But the scales are overloaded. Practically all of Bonnie's friends are wrestling with parent problems.

In fact, the characters in this book can talk of little else, except perhaps their teeth and dentures. We can swallow the teeth because they are amusing; what we cannot swallow is the high incidence of parent trouble. Unity is an admirable thing in writing, yet if every character and incident is so obviously chosen to point the moral of the tale, all sense of proportion, of life as a whole, is lost. If one accepted as complete and entirely true this view from Miss Lawrence's picture window, he would conclude that the parent-child relationship is an unhealthy, an unnatural one and should be done away with at once, perhaps by euthanasia of all parents as soon as the eldest child reaches marriageable age.

Just the same, it is quite a readable book.

—CID RICKETTS SUMNER.

OTHER LIVES TO LIVE. By Herbert Lyons. Dial. \$3. Mr. Lyons proved himself an acid master of the light comedy of modern manners and morals in his first work, "The Rest (Continued on page 33)

U.S.A. & the World. *The ancient Romans were fond of calling the Mediterranean "our sea"; now, with air and naval bases burgeoning along its shores, some Americans are coming to regard it as their concern. Mediterranean lands are the subject of four books reviewed this week: The Near East of the Arabs and the Jews is discussed somewhat sensationally in John Roy Carlson's "Cairo to Damascus" and in solidly factual fashion in "The Near East and the Great Powers," edited by Richard N. Frye. The unhappy land of Spain is described in Gerard Brenan's "The Face of Spain," which is hostile to Franco, and Carleton J. H. Hayes's "The United States and Spain," which is inclined to be friendly. Not only the Mediterranean, but all theatres of American foreign policy, are treated in John Fischer's sbrewd "Master Plan U.S.A." Our policy in the Far East and its foremost critic, Douglas MacArthur, are the subjects of Rovere's and Schlesinger's "The General and the President."*

Conflict with Civil Authority

THE GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT. By Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Farrar, Straus & Young. 336 pp. \$3.75.

By JAMES M. MINIFIE

CONFLICTS with Presidents, actual and potential, are in the MacArthur bloodstream. A true MacArthur rares up at the drop of a Presidential hint like a Hatfield at a McCoy's footstep.


William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt share with Harry S. Truman the privilege of being parties to President-MacArthur feuds. The MacArthur allergy to the civil power was handsomely displayed in 1900 when Mr. Taft arrived in the Philippines during the rule of General Arthur MacArthur, father of Douglas. Mr. Taft came as

Civilian Commissioner invested with full authority by Washington. General MacArthur declined to meet him at the dock, assigned him a small, uncomfortable room, and ignored him. Mr. Taft reported back to Elihu Root, the Secretary of War, that the General's sense of humor was more limited than his self-esteem, and asked that the choice be made between the General and him. General MacArthur was relieved of his command.

He had not been home long before he made a public speech in which he cast doubt on the loyalty of German-Americans. This brought on him the wrath of Theodore Roosevelt, who declared roundly that he was unfit to hold a commission in the National Guard. It is not surprising that when Mr. Taft became President he passed over General Arthur MacArthur for the post of Chief of Staff.

There was thus a family tradition of feuding with the civil authority, combined with an inherited feeling of persecution, which was bound to make for trouble in a man of General Douglas MacArthur's gifts. Men who are abundantly endowed do not find their path easy. The heroic figure in a democratic state is apt to feel hemmed in. One or the other is usually reduced.

These are the essentials of the story brilliantly told by Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Among many curious things, it brings out the number of times the younger MacArthur has been in conflict with authority. He got away with much more



—Burck in the Chicago Sun-Times.

"The Great Knife-Throwing Act."

James M. Minifie is a member of the Washington staff of the New York Herald-Tribune.

than his father did. Theodore Roosevelt did not have the patience of President Truman or the tactful understanding of FDR.

But the effect of patience and understanding on a brilliant soldier with a persecution complex was to lead him very near to deliberate defiance and open challenge of the civil authority and national policy.

The MacArthur story is a fascinating drama on the classic theme of the destruction of a man by his greatness and its limitations. This is the first attempt to tell it in any language other than that borrowed from the radiant communiqués which always suffused MacArthur's headquarters with their particular light.

No man in American history has had to endure so exhausting an examination of his deeds, his ideas, and his ideals as General Douglas MacArthur during the forty-two days of the Senate hearings. It was not, however, exhaustive. It was conducted chiefly by men who were passionately his partisans, and who were seeking above all else the destruction of Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State. Had MacArthur been a stupid man it would have been possible to assume that he was ignorant of this design. Had he been the simple soldier of his pose he would have rejected it. Instead, he lent himself to it, and this was his destruction.

Those of the committee who were out of sympathy with him were anxious not to offer him martyrdom. But when the hearings were completed after six weeks and 2,045,000 words the MacArthur legend had been riddled. The result was so emphatic, the President, Mr. Acheson, General Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were so handsomely vindicated, that there was no need for a formal report. The judicious Senator Russell, who had presided with great fairness over the interminable proceedings, simply wound them up and told members they could say what

they liked individually. Some of the less judicious Republicans did so. Their more astute brethren declined to be associated with their animadversions. The question had been: Who was right, the General or the President? The answer was conclusive: the President.

A generation of command had led up to the incidents studied by the committee. Messrs. Rovere and Schlesinger fill in the earlier career—the young man who graduated with the highest record ever achieved at West Point; the youngest divisional commander in World War I (he went over the heads of his superiors to get his views accepted); the youngest Chief of Staff (his communique announced his approval of President Hoover's order to disperse the Bonus Marchers); the organizer of the defenses of the Philippines (his air force was destroyed on the ground nine hours after Pearl Harbor).

This study brings out the startling fallibility of MacArthur's judgment, the extreme means—even to the suppression of documents and the distortion of ascertainable facts—taken to conceal mistakes, and the almost psychopathic unwillingness to admit fallibility. Correspondents who covered MacArthur's campaign came back with bitter stories of censorship, favoritism, suppression, and outright misrepresentation of news at MacArthur's headquarters. The corrections are being entered on the historical record, but the communiqués shaped the popular picture.

MacArthur's characteristics, the great and the petty, were accentuated during the Korean War. Messrs. Rovere and Schlesinger observe that it is hard not to conclude that at some point in his differences with Washington he embarked on a deliberate course of provocation. The public record supports that view. Substantial sections of it are incorporated in the long appendix to the present volume.

U. S. Foreign Policy

MASTER PLAN U.S.A. By John Fischer. New York: Harper & Bros. 253 pp. \$3.

By EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER

AMERICAN foreign policy is the affair of at least a dozen Government agencies. Of these the most decisive is probably the National Security Council. The one most directly concerned—the State Department—has 19,941 U.S. employees (August 1, 1951). Intellectually these people are a microcosm of the American people. Among themselves they differ on foreign policy just about as widely as the rest of the population.

Moreover, the present foreign policy has been improvised since 1946 or 1947, when it became clear that FDR's "Great Design" of constructing a peaceful world on four or five great powers as pillars had hopelessly collapsed when support from the USSR was withdrawn.

Small wonder, therefore, that many, perhaps most, U.S. citizens—and obviously the vast majority of foreigners—are still not sure just what our present policy is.

John Fischer, one of our deepest students on world affairs, understands their difficulty. Being personally convinced that "American foreign policy is not as fouled up as it sometimes looks," he has written a book setting out just what he believes that policy is. In his hands it appears not only coherent but reasonably successful as well.

He has done an admirable job. Americans befuddled by George F. Kennan's recent criticism of the very "containment policy" which Mr. Kennan is credited with fathering [SRL Sept. 29] should turn to the book "Master Plan U.S.A." for the straight product.

Mr. Fischer has set down our present attitude toward the world—its basic postulates, its chosen instruments, its still untidy ends—as well as a flattering estimate of those most responsible for it.

Here is no space to describe that plan—it is much too complicated for that. All I wish to do is to send all citizens interested in the subject—and what intelligent American is not?—to this book. Now, admittedly, in this ad-



Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—"a fascinating drama."

Edgar Ansel Mowrer has been covering the European scene for American newspapers since World War I. His most recent book is "Challenge and Decision," a program for America.