

tiations do not generate a program; the reverse is true. In the absence of a clear purpose, negotiating tactics predominate over substance. This leads to the exaltation of "negotiability," which is often merely a way of trying to discover the minimum terms the Soviets will settle for. It produces the constant demand for "new ideas" which, while unexceptionable in itself, may only serve to prevent the Soviets from accepting any American proposal, since a better one may be coming along any minute.

No purpose would be served if we returned to the weary treadmill of proposals that have been repeated so often that their tired phrases seem to have become ends in themselves. We now have the opportunity to define what we stand for rather than go through a shopping list of Soviet demands in an effort to determine which of them may be tolerable. In particular, the best time to articulate our notion of a settlement in Central Europe is *before* another Berlin crisis is upon us and while the impetus of our action in Cuba still invigorates the alliance.

The desirability of lessening international tension requires no debates. But the prerequisite is that the Soviet leaders come to see the perils for mankind as well as for themselves of turning all diplomacy into harassment, pressure, and political warfare. We, in turn, have an obligation to make it clear that we do not propose to threaten legitimate Russian national interests. Responsible Russians should be given every chance to understand that the obstacle to coexistence is the Communist quest for world domination. On such a basis negotiations are highly desirable.

Prudence and Intuition

For too long the Western Alliance has been beset by doubts, recriminations, and uncertainty. In strategy and diplomacy it has failed to establish its priorities. The President's handling of the Cuban crisis has given us another chance to vindicate the leadership of the West. And here is where our greatest opportunity lies. The "great design" for Atlantic partnership still remains to be realized, but for the first time in years the moral basis for it exists. The

Alliance for Progress can also be pursued with greater mutual conviction. Even the uncommitted nations should have been shaken out of their complacency and shallowness by the concurrent shocks of Cuba and the Chinese invasion of India. There is now therefore a possibility for us to free our relations with the new nations from the inhibitions of a dialogue between opportunism and sentimentality.

Whether we can seize this opportunity depends on an intangible issue: the attitudes of our government toward the most difficult problem of policymaking, that of conjecture. The dilemma of any statesman is that he can never be certain about the probable course of events. In reaching a decision, he must inevitably act on the basis of an intuition that is inherently unprovable. If he insists on certainty, he runs the danger of becoming a prisoner of events.

His resolution must reside not in "facts" as commonly conceived but in his vision of the future.

The Cuban crisis raises some questions in this respect. The administration has demonstrated skill, daring, and decisiveness in dealing with a problem once it was recognized. A number of doubts remain about the time required to assess the nature of the Soviet build-up. This is not exclusively a problem of our intelligence setup. It is above all a question of the criteria of certainty by which a government operates. We shall not be able to wait everywhere for "hard" intelligence about Soviet intentions. Most situations will prove more ambiguous, most opportunities will appear less clear. The challenge, then, is to couple the prudence, calculation, and skill of a government of experts with an act of imagination that encompasses the opportunities before us.



Where Do We Go from Victory?

MAX FRANKEL

PITY the Washington Policy Maker. He is burdened, after Cuba, with new prowess, respect, and momentum and therefore with guilt. Unexpected challenge has suddenly turned into unwanted opportunity. But Policy Maker wants to be a gracious winner, to be loved, not feared. Initiative seems almost as unwelcome as it is unaccustomed. He goes to his analyst, the Kremlinologist.

For the Kremlinologist, as for any analyst, business is good when times are bad. He is trained to see danger, not opportunity. And he treats the

ailment, not the patient. He is today less concerned with what else Washington might do to the Kremlin than with what the Kremlin might now do to Washington. And with what Washington might do for the Kremlin.

Policy Maker, thy guilt is just, he says. For to the Kremlinologist, Communism is schizophrenic. Some Communists are better than other Communists, and the trouble with the Cuban affair was that Washington was forced to triumph over the better ones. So there is danger

ahead, he warns: either the better Communists will try to prove at our expense that they are as bad as the bad Communists, or the bad Communists will throw the better Communists out and go on to prove how much better (that is, worse) they can be.

The Kremlinologist does not deny that Khrushchev was pretty bad, or mad, to send missiles to Fidel's place. But that, he adds, was the Hyde in him. We ought to be grateful to the Khrushchev who had the prudence to get them out fast when caught, he counsels, and to be careful now not to injure the Jekyll in him.

And so the city that a few weeks ago shouted, "Help! Khrushchev!" now wonders, "Help Khrushchev?"

TO UNDERSTAND this state of mind it is necessary to master the essentials of modern Kremlinology. The entire science rests upon the theory of hard- and soft-line Communism, sometimes even called conservative and liberal.

Hard, apparently, is shorthand for harsh; hard Communism is normally defined as that variety which depends on brute force for domestic tranquillity and classic forms of naked aggression for external satisfaction. Soft, on the other hand, seems to be shorthand for subtle; soft Communism is normally defined as that variety which depends upon economic sanctions and psychological terror for domestic order and on unorthodox schemes of subversion, mercantilism, and blackmail for external advance.

Since Communists in general are generally recognized as politicians who seek to enfeeble other nations in the name of curing them, the difference between the hard and soft varieties would seem to be the difference between bludgeon and barbiturate. But a great number of the experts believe the distinction is very important and see it as one of their main functions to help us decide which we prefer.

The Kremlinologist opts for soft, and he believes that Khrushchev, except in his mad moments, is one of the finest softies we are ever likely to get. (Some advanced experts hardly believe Khrushchev to be a Communist at all; they say he is temporarily stuck on the wrong

side but would really prefer alliance with us against hard people like the Chinese.)

In any case, it is pointed out, Khrushchev clearly does not want to die and neither do we, and thus



we have something very important in common. If he nonetheless seems unruly, deceitful, and uncooperative, it is because he is not always master of his fort and because belligerence is a normal attribute of national adolescence. In the short run, it is said, he needs understanding. In the long run, if we are not all dead, his kind will become mature.

Codified, this becomes the theory of parallel but staggered development, by which all nations of similar industrial and demographic potential pass through identical patterns of behavior, like fathers and sons. And by this theory, it behooves the fathers to be firm yet lovingly forgiving until the sons have spent their aggressions and mellowed into ripe old impotence. A major dialectical peculiarity of the theory is that though Russia grows older, its coming men of power will be younger and more fearsome, and therefore we should not only value Khrushchev but help preserve him.

Some experts have demurred at times, but they have been quickly run out of their sophisticated profession. They have suggested that Khrushchev's soft-line reasonableness at home was really due to his discovery that Stalin's stick had just about broken the country and that

an occasional carrot was the only way to get results. And they have observed that Khrushchev's celebrated flexibility abroad has been practiced only to the extent that resistance forced him to practice it. Disrespectfully, these experts point out that it was Stalin, in 1952, who revived the concept of coexistence and that it was Khrushchev, in 1956, who butchered Hungary.

Just how useful the distinction is, even if it did exist, might be apparent from our own more familiar history. For were not Eisenhower and Dulles the American equivalent of the hard-liners? And yet their burning intolerance of Communism invariably provoked them to inaction in places like Hungary and Vietnam, and it was left to the soft-line Kennedys to go to war in Vietnam and to the brink in Cuba.

Khrushchev himself was on the verge of making such a mistake once. He came close to endorsing Kennedy for President in the summer of 1960, presumably because he believed Republican propaganda that the Democrats would be soft on Communism. But the shrewd Khrushchev caught himself in mid-thought. If they want to elect Nixon and the Republicans, let them, he said, because the Soviet Union had not done badly under the Republicans for eight years.

There is no doubt that Khrushchev is being assailed at home for the Cuba fiasco. But who assails him? The hard-liners who are said to have sent him on this disastrous adventure? Or the soft-liners who presumably urged him to accept retreat and humiliation?

Even if it were wise to "help" him in his hour of distress—out of fear that any other Soviet leader would be worse—how could we? By playing down our victory in the Cuba showdown until he is persuaded that he had ventured and lost nothing with his stealthy and reckless maneuver? Or by dismantling some western bases and devising other "compromises" that would allow him to argue that his Caribbean caper had been productive?

FOR SOME REASON, both Policy Maker and Kremlinologist here see mainly this choice. The distinction between soft and hard Communists

has so rent the western vocabulary that Washington is almost immobilized by its success, by the gnawing guilt that it may have seriously injured the very forces that have always advocated doing us in gently and politely.

There are a few old-fashioned officials who are urging more pressure, against the satellites and other weak spots, to force a Berlin settlement on western terms, to exacerbate the quarrels within the Communist bloc, to apply economic pressures that would tighten the squeeze on the Soviet economy and injure its capacity for foreign aid-and-trade warfare and further discredit Khrushchev's boasts and promises.

It is Khrushchev who has always maintained that the status quo had to guarantee the security of his world while everything else was up for grabs. Yet Washington, at the moment of its greatest cold-war triumph, speaks of preserving that status quo. Plainly uncomfortable with the chance to influence a future they have never imagined, the pioneers of the New Frontier wonder instead whether they had not better help Old Nik.

Who was it that described Khrushchev's policy as "What's mine is mine; what's yours is negotiable"? Not Khrushchev. The President.

And who, in the inaugural month of January, 1961, defined peaceful coexistence as "a form of intense economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena. . . . [It] helps to develop the forces of progress, the forces struggling for socialism, and facilitates in capitalist countries the activities of the Communist parties and other progressive organizations of the working class. It facilitates the struggle the peoples wage against aggressive military blocs, against foreign military bases. It helps the national liberation movement to gain successes"? Not the President. Khrushchev.

WASHINGTON would seem to have no right to complain of deceit, and yet in retrospect it is less amazed by what Khrushchev tried in Cuba than by the fact that he lied about it. This is especially peculiar, be-

cause the Kennedy administration, insecure though it may be in trading in futures, is known for its strong and nearly professional sense of history. Yet over only six years of history the chief problem has been whether Khrushchev lies more when he threatens war or when he threatens peace.

In announcing on September 11 this year that it was sending food, machines, clothes, and just a few little weapons to Cuba, Moscow itself cautioned us against interference by recalling its bold and peaceful threats during the 1956 Suez affair. Did not the threats of rockets raining upon London and Paris frighten the aggressors into retreat from Egypt? The threats of World War III, did they not keep the liberators of captive Europe out of Hungary? Did not bluster in 1958 force the Americans out of Lebanon? And force the unleasers of Chiang to keep him securely tied to Taiwan? Did not the "figurative" and "symbolic" warnings of rocket support for Fidel force the Americans to pull back their snouts at the Bay of Pigs?

More than a hundred times in the past few years, Khrushchev has lied about his readiness to begin a nuclear war and celebrated the apparent success of these lies. Nasser,

Nehru, Sukarno, and any would-be Latin Castro were to draw their own lesson: was there greater safety in American arms or in a Soviet embrace?

SIMULTANEOUSLY, Khrushchev has been exposed as a liar in what he told us he was doing in Cuba, in what he promised Cuba he would do to us with his missiles in Cuba, and in what he promised India he could do to prevent a Chinese attack. Nehru does not seem interested any longer in toying with his nation's security to help his erstwhile moderate friend in the Kremlin. Why then should we?

Almost neurotically, in the wake of a victory, Washington wonders where the next blow will come from; whether and how Moscow will try to recoup, by deception, humiliation, or negotiation. Anxiously the capital turns to the Kremlinologists and asks, is he up or is he down, will he be hard or will he be soft? Laos, Caracas, or the Berlin Wall—which is fairest of them all? Will he strike, subvert, or hesitate? No one asks, how do *we* retaliate?

The answer, also, is left to the analysts. And there is hardly a voice among them that says, the market is bullish, boys, buy.

One Time the Soviets Wish They Could Be Uncommitted Too

MARVIN KALB

ON NOVEMBER 5, when Trikoli Nath Kaul, India's new ambassador to the Soviet Union, presented his credentials to Leonid I. Brezhnev, president of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., he expressed his government's "gratitude" for Russia's "eager assistance" in developing India's economy, and Brezhnev expressed his government's "confidence" that India and the Soviet Union would "continue to co-operate successfully for the sake of peace on earth and for happiness and progress for the peoples of all countries."

Bowing more to the new delicacy in their state relations than to the usual requirements of diplomatic protocol, neither man touched on what was uppermost in his mind: the fighting along the Sino-Indian border, which has slowly but surely drawn the Russians to a crossroads in their relations with both the Chinese and the Indians. The Russians are now aware that full support of China would preserve the remnants of Communist world unity but only at the risk of irrevocably damaging "good friendly relations" with India, one of the main pillars of