

been stationed in Amman to keep watch over relations between Jordan and the U.A.R.

In August, 1960, the two nations had no sooner resumed diplomatic relations and restored comparative calm when two bombs exploded in Amman, killing the Jordanian premier, Hazza Majali, and eleven other Jordanians. Convinced that the bombs had been intended to kill him also, King Hussein publicly accused the U.A.R. and charged Nasser with prior knowledge of the attempt. Nasser's reply was an invitation to the Jordanian people to overthrow their king. Although the radio war between Amman and Cairo has recently stopped, it is hard to ascribe the virulence of Nasser's attacks on Hussein to any motive other than a desire to eliminate him once and for all.

Nasser and his top advisers apparently believed that any Jordanian government that replaced the king would be friendly toward Cairo, perhaps even to the extent of federation with the U.A.R. But in this

assumption Nasser apparently disregarded two factors—the probability that the Israeli Army would advance to the River Jordan should anything happen to Hussein, and the fierce loyalty of Hussein's Bedouin troops, who might well prevent any Jordan government from entering into close relationship with the avowed enemy of their beloved king.

King Hussein's response to this latest challenge was spirited. Apart from his contacts with Syrian officers and his massing of troops on the Syrian frontier after Majali's assassination, Hussein relied chiefly on Amman Radio, which kept reminding the Syrians of the "colonization" of their country.

The very fact that President Nasser pressed his attack as long as he did, even at the risk of exploding a still greater crisis in the Middle East, is a measure of his desperation. Colonel Serraj cannot control Syrian unrest indefinitely; and if Nasser is prepared to offer concessions to his junior partners in the north, he must find a way to offer them soon. «»

the assumption that the British force could continue to deter Russia, or that Britain was capable of shouldering the economic burden that this entailed. They demanded renunciation of the policy of nuclear deterrence either on the ground that it was morally wrong or on the ground that it did not add to the security of the United Kingdom but detracted from it.

In 1960, however, the British government abandoned development of the Blue Streak missile, on which the future of the British deterrent had been held to rest. On all sides it came to be questioned whether Britain was any longer capable of maintaining an independent deterrent or the economic effort involved in attempting to do so. The idea that Britain should abandon its independent nuclear force gained wide support among people who were fully conscious of the need for an American deterrent and for Britain's continued participation in NATO. This idea was adopted openly by the right-wing leadership of the Labour Party, and was implicit in the policy proclaimed by the government itself of equipping the British strategic nuclear force of the future with a missile purchased from America (the Skybolt). The unilateralists now found that the ground had been cut from under their feet. The policy that they had made their own at a time when military and economic arguments did not point to it was now one for which sound military and economic reasons were being given by the Establishment itself. Much of the emotional attractiveness of the idea of renunciation of the bomb had lain precisely in the absence of any military or economic justification for it.

NOR WAS THIS ALL. Abandonment of the British deterrent would not render Britain any less dependent on nuclear weapons for its security. The American nuclear umbrella remained the chief guarantee of Britain's independence; the presence or absence of a supplementary British force does not alter this fact. The moral stigma of dependence on the bomb would therefore not be removed by the scrapping of the British force. Those outside the unilateralist movement who favored the latter

The Many Sides Of British Unilateralism

HEDLEY BULL

LONDON
THE MOVEMENT for unilateral nuclear disarmament is stronger in Britain than in any other western country. Last October, it captured the support of the annual conference of the Labour Party. It includes in its ranks not only the hard core of the Labour Left but also some Liberals and Conservatives of long standing, such eminent figures as E. M. Forster, J. B. Priestley, and Bertrand Russell, at least four bishops of the Church of England, and six peers of the realm.

Only a small proportion of the British unilateralists are pure pacifists. Many of them favor the retention of conventional armaments, and a few, like the Oxford historian A. J. P. Taylor, even favor conventional rearmament. Their protest concerns only nuclear armaments,

and on this subject two propositions unite them. The first is that Britain should renounce, unilaterally and unconditionally, the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The second is that Britain should withdraw from any alliance that relies on the possession or use of these weapons: that is, from NATO.

How they came to add the second of these propositions to the first deserves some comment. The unilateralist movement got under way in 1957 and the campaign itself was launched in 1958. At that time the military and economic feasibility of an independent British nuclear deterrent was not doubted in Britain in any quarter. The famous White Paper published by Defence Minister Duncan Sandys in 1957 had expressed great confidence in its future. The unilateralists did not question

course frankly accepted Britain's continued dependence on the American deterrent. But they also held that Britain, as well as sharing the benefits of alliance with America, should continue to share its burdens and risks by maintaining Britain's contribution to the limited-war strength of NATO and by continuing to accept American bomber and missile bases on its territory. While the unilateralists demanded only the renunciation of Britain's bomb, they were open to the charge that they were prepared to enjoy the protection of America's bomb while shirking the risks that America took on their behalf. The only way in which the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament could attain a morally consistent position, and a politically distinct one, was by adopting withdrawal from NATO as part of its platform and ridding itself entirely of the taint of the bomb.

At Eastertime in 1958, the unilateralists staged a fifty-four-mile march from London to the atomic weapons establishment at Aldermaston, Berkshire. Each succeeding Easter they have marched in the reverse direction, finishing up with a mass rally in Trafalgar Square. They are united only by faith in a British gesture of renunciation. The majority of them are not interested in the detailed arguments by which a few of their number attempt to justify such a gesture. They regard arguments to the contrary as malevolently inspired sophistry.

The emotions on which they thrive are fear of nuclear war and moral guilt about it: feelings that are (or should be) present in all civilized men. But the marching and shouting of the unilateralists also expresses a sense of impotence. The nuclear age exists, and the clock cannot be put back. What they appear to be saying is, "Nuclear weapons do not exist!" The hysteria sometimes noticeable in their protests derives from a half-realization that the problem cannot thus be willed away. Perhaps the protest is brave; perhaps it is only pathetic.

Isolationism Again

Anxiety about nuclear war, however, is rife in all countries, and it does not account for the special strength of the unilateralists in Britain. This

arises in part from elements of British political life that are not intrinsically connected with protest against nuclear war and that would find some other outlet if this one did not exist.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is the inheritor of the radical tradition of dissent from British foreign policy. It draws support from those who enjoy dissent for its own sake, and who derive satisfaction from contrasting the guilt of the government with their own innocence. One section of the unilateralists comprises those middle-aged socialists who are hungry for the slogans of the Spanish Civil War, the simple moral contrasts of Left and Right, right and wrong, in terms of which they thought about politics in the 1930's. They see the unilateralists' movement as something that will restore to the Labour Party the moral enthusiasm and heroic spirit of its early days, the absence of which at present they regard as the cause of Labour's three successive electoral defeats.

The campaign is also one of the many expressions in British political life of the desire that Britain should play once again an independent role on the center of the world's political stage—a role that has been lost in recent years, when Britain has been more or less understudying the part of the United States. This ambition is as marked on the extreme Right of British politics as it is on the extreme Left, and it would be wrong to suggest that the movement for nuclear disarmament is the only movement in which it reposes.

It is ironic that the British nuclear deterrent, which the unilateralists hope to remove, was itself originally conceived (by the Attlee government) chiefly for the very same purpose of providing independence of the United States. For some of the British unilateralists, the word "unilateral" is more important than the word "disarmament." They see Britain assuming the moral leadership of the world, and by its act of renunciation shaming the rest of the world into following in its footsteps. They support Britain's withdrawal from NATO not only as something made necessary by the alliance's association with nuclear weapons but as valuable in itself. And they cherish

visions of Britain as the leader of a third force of neutral nations. Frank Cousins, the powerful leader of the Transport and General Workers Union, declared at the Labour Party conference: "If the mad groups in the world want to have a go at each other, let us have no part of them."

There is much in the new British neutralism that savors of the old American isolationism. Just as in the nineteenth century it was the power and the friendly disposition of the Royal Navy that provided the shield behind which Americans could pursue isolation and congratulate themselves upon their innocence of world politics, so at the present time it is the American deterrent that provides the context in which it is possible for a vocal minority of Britons to toy with the idea of neutrality.

THIS is the crux of the matter. The strength of the unilateralists in Britain arises primarily from the fact that so long as the demand for unilateral disarmament is addressed only to Britain, it does not seem obviously disastrous. Britain's renunciation of the bomb is sometimes seen as a means whereby Britain alone can achieve security in a world beyond redemption. It is sometimes seen as a way of prodding America and Russia toward agreed nuclear disarmament. But the British unilateralists have not yet committed themselves to the idea that America should abandon nuclear weapons while Russia retains them. Were this to become the basis of their policy, it would lose all the plausibility that now gives the movement strength. If unilateral disarmament is to be understood as unilateral *American* disarmament, then it is a policy of surrender and cannot attract a significant following in Britain any more than it can in the United States itself.

By demanding withdrawal from NATO, the unilateralists do not escape the dilemma that only America's nuclear strength makes their proposals plausible. It is true that countries like Sweden and Switzerland manage to remain independent without joining NATO. Britain might do the same if it were to join them; though if it did, it would have to increase armaments expenditure and would have greater need of a British nuclear

force than it has now, a point the unilateralists are prone to ignore. But in the long run, the security of the European neutrals is just as dependent on America's continued maintenance of the balance of power as is that of the European members of NATO.

The strength of feeling in the Labour Party in favor of disarmament is attested by the fact that only in terms of disarmament are the party's leaders able to make their policy of nuclear defense and alliances attractive to their following. Grouped around Hugh Gaitskell, George Brown, and Denis Healey, the right wing of the party is engaged in a determined counterattack to reverse the unilateralist decision of the last party conference. In this campaign they refer to themselves as "multilateralists": those who prefer internationally agreed disarmament to one-sided gestures. Like the unilateralists themselves, they are in favor of multilateral disarmament. Who isn't? But the policy that differentiates them from the unilateralists is their belief in NATO and nuclear defense; and this they are able to make palatable only by presenting it as an approach to disarmament.

IT WOULD BE WRONG to suppose that the unilateralist movement, colorful as it is, has made a deep impression on British public life or is likely to gain control of British policy. The latter it can never do, as it does not embody any coherent military policy but only vague, negative aims, closer definition of which must produce disagreement within the movement. The aims of the movement are likely to change as the strategic situation changes. If, for example, the United States finds it convenient to withdraw its nuclear bases from British soil, more ground will have been cut from under the unilateralists' feet. Even their grip on the Labour Party has an uncertain future. Labour's internal struggle over nuclear disarmament is difficult to disentangle from two other struggles going on within the movement: one over Mr. Gaitskell's leadership and the other over the party's socialist objectives. The success the unilateralists have had so far arises in part from a fortuitous conjunction of these disputes.

'A Little Extra Push'

MAYA PINES

A CITY like New York is full of children for whom school and home are equally bleak; their world is a narrow, overcrowded, and dangerous place, at times confined to a radius of a couple of blocks, with little to nourish the imagination and no one to pay much attention to them. A city like New York is also full of women whose children have grown up or are away at school, of young wives without children, of retired people who still want to be useful. More and more during the past four years, these two groups have been getting together.

Through the School Volunteer program, sponsored by the Public Education Association and the New



York City Board of Education, several hundred adults have gone into the city's elementary and junior high schools to give more than a thousand children the sort of direct and undivided attention for which their teachers rarely have time. Each volunteer gives at least one half-day a week to helping students with personal matters as well as various academic subjects; most important of all, the volunteers also impart their own knowledge that while the world is infinitely varied, each child is unique and infinitely important. To the children involved, this satisfaction of a craving for personal atten-

tion often means the difference between keeping up with their classes and drifting into delinquency; between believing that the adult world is full of enemies and realizing that some people want to help them, that many paths lie open to them if they choose.

Mrs. William B. Nichols, one of twenty-four volunteers at P.S. 158, at York Avenue and Seventy-seventh Street, helps children in primary grades with their reading. On a recent Thursday morning Mrs. Nichols was at her post, a small desk in a large room on the fourth floor. A bushy-haired youngster sat next to her, reading haltingly from a book called *Cowboy Andy*. As he stumbled on some words, Mrs. Nichols gently drilled him from lists she had prepared on index cards. A bell tinkled the warning that their forty-five minutes were nearly up, and the boy quickly turned the page to see how much of the book was left. "It's almost the last page!" he gasped. He hurried on with his reading. Other children at neighboring desks got up and left the room, but when Mrs. Nichols suggested he stop if he wanted to, the youngster said excitedly, "No, I want to finish." He read a few minutes more, and suddenly it was all over. His eyes glowing, he shouted, "I've read the whole book!" Mrs. Nichols congratulated him. "Do you want to take the book home and show your mother?" The boy nodded eagerly.

Only three months ago, Mrs. Nichols explained, the child couldn't get through a single sentence. "He was held back a year in school because of it. But now he can read whole paragraphs. This is more exciting than any other volunteer work I've ever done."

'Spread Yourself! Use It All!'

Just as the reading program tries to make children understand that books are an important and enjoyable part of daily life, the volunteers' art program tries to make each child aware of the forms around him and of his own artistic feelings. Two