

Chiang's Shadow Over Warsaw

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IT TAKES TWO to start a fight. And two are usually enough to make peace; but in the conflict over the Chinese offshore islands, it takes three. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles have qualified their willingness to negotiate with the Chinese Communists by a stipulation that has governed the ambassadorial discussions ever since they began in 1955: the United States will not be a party to any arrangements that "would prejudice the rights of our ally, the Republic of China." The United States and Communist Chinese ambassadors may meet in Warsaw, but the important participants in the negotiations include not only the shadows of Chou En-lai and John Foster Dulles but also that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The administration has said that

the ambassadorial negotiations offer an alternative to war. In his press conference on September 9 Mr. Dulles stated: "We hope that out of the talks will come as a minimum a *modus vivendi* which will assure that the issues will not be resolved by recourse to force."

WHAT CAN the *modus vivendi* be? The basic question all along has been whether the United States will concede the "right" of the Chinese Communists to "liberate" the offshore islands and Formosa and the Pescadores, by force if need be; or whether Peking will promise not to employ force to disturb the status quo, including our military relationship with the Nationalist régime. Even the most optimistic study of recent official statements from Peking and Washington discloses no essential change in the basic position of either party.

In sum and substance, the U. S. government wants a renunciation of the use of force in the area of For-

mosa and the China coast. In this light, there may be one matter that could be negotiated at Warsaw to the benefit of both Communist China and the United States: World opinion would doubtless applaud an American proposal that the Nationalist garrisons on Quemoy and other offshore islands be permitted to withdraw under safe-conduct. There are many who feel that the offshore islands belong rightfully to the Chinese mainland and that they are unnecessary for the defense of either the United States or Formosa anyway.


The successful evacuation of the Nationalist garrison from the Tachen Islands in 1955, under similar circumstances, confirms the feasibility of the proposed action. Not one Nationalist soldier need be lost in the operation, and an adjustment of the American position in that sector might enable us to enlist substantial international support for a different disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, where the legal foundation is more favorable to our stand.

Radio Peking and Mr. Dulles in the U.N. both stand pat. Yet it would obviously be to the advantage of both Communist China and the United States if a compromise could be reached in Warsaw. The matter should be a proper subject for negotiation. But what about Chiang Kai-shek? Would he give his consent, or would he apply the veto we have given him to a fair proposition promising general benefits—ultimately for Formosa itself?

Yeh's 'No'

It is obvious that Chiang is primarily concerned with his personal ambition to return to power on the mainland. He has said time and time again that he will not make peace.

The Nationalist position was affirmed as recently as September 12 by Dr. George Yeh, the new Nationalist ambassador, as he arrived in Washington. A reporter asked him whether, if the Communists accepted Dulles's proposal for a renunciation of force, the Nationalists would do the same. Dr. Yeh: "No, repeat, no." Was there the possibility of a negotiated settlement for the "neutralization" of the offshore



islands? "Ridiculous," said Dr. Yeh. Chiang's envoy also made it clear that his government would not agree to a withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Quemoy or Matsu. His proscription was comprehensive: "We shall neither be cowed into submission nor be persuaded by any third party to accept a political solution over any part of our territory."

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER has said that the Quemoy situation is a threat to world peace and should be negotiated in order to prevent the outbreak of war. But our Nationalist allies, who agree with the Communists that the dispute between them is civil war, say that the matter is not subject to political solution. The question then becomes: Would Chiang give in to American insistence if the sole alternative offered him were to face the Chinese Communist forces at Quemoy with only his own military forces?

History is suggestive. During the Second World War, Chiang attempted to force a billion-dollar loan out of the U.S. government with the argument that a decision to reduce the strategic priority of Asia in the war effort would have "repercussions . . . so disheartening" for the Chinese army and people that he feared China could not hold out much longer against Japan. President Roosevelt did not hand over the billion; neither did China surrender to Japan.

Similarly in September, 1947, when the Nationalists were trying to gain increased American support for their civil-war effort, Nationalist Vice-President Sun Fo threatened that China would seek an alignment with the Soviet Union if the desired political and economic help were not forthcoming, because "China, in the struggle between the Powers, must adapt herself where it is most advantageous immediately or in the long run." The Nationalist government shortly afterward proposed that the United States provide a fund of \$3 billion for aid to China. By the China Aid Act of the following April, it got less than one-sixth of that amount, but the Nationalist régime did not thereupon throw itself into the arms of the Soviet Union.



It is clear that Chiang will do everything he can to exact all possible political and military support from the United States; but he is not going to destroy himself and his government if he doesn't get what he demands.

The Generalissimo's Last Chance

Nevertheless, a major reason for the administration's present stand on the Quemoy matter is obviously a deep fear about the possible ill effects any retreat from the offshore islands would have on the Nationalists' morale. The Nationalist political structure is of course even weaker today than it was a few years ago. Would the Nationalist régime collapse if it were deprived of Quemoy and Matsu?

We should not forget the anti-American riots of May, 1957, at Taipei. But they were staged for the express purpose of dramatizing Nationalist dissatisfaction with our policy. Such "popular demonstra-

tions" might easily occur again, as they have on various past occasions, without actually signifying popular discontent. It is unlikely that the Nationalist régime would foster an "Americans, go home!" campaign over withdrawal from Quemoy. It is equally improbable that the people of Formosa, four-fifths of whom are native Formosans and have never set foot on the China mainland, would rise up to protest the loss of a few small islands that never belonged to them.

TO BE SURE, the morale of the Nationalist leaders is low; after all, their only hope during the past decade has been that of entrapping the United States into fighting a war to restore them to rule in China. The Nationalist morale would sink lower still if there were a withdrawal from the offshore islands—but only because it would mean the loss of what may be the last chance to draw the United States into war.



AT HOME & ABROAD

The Strategy Of Southern Resistance

ARTHUR S. MILLER

“ONCE OPEN the prospect that this thing can be licked, and it would be extremely dangerous. Opposition to desegregation would then no longer be the dying reflex of a vanishing way of life. It would become legitimate.”

The statement came from Harold C. Fleming, the man who heads the Southern Regional Council, one of the few Southern organizations working to improve racial relations. He spoke in the sparsely furnished cubicle he calls his office, situated in a church annex a few hundred yards away from Georgia's capitol buildings in Atlanta.

Fleming had spotted the key issue in the complex series of legal maneuvers to circumvent desegregation now being tested in the Federal courts. For it seems to be true that whatever form resistance to the Supreme Court decisions takes—and there are many forms—the basic strategy is simple: create and nur-

ture the notion that the decisions can be beaten back and then exploit the opportunity.

SEEN in this way, the legal maneuvers of Southern states have definite political overtones. As is normally the case in times of constitutional crisis, law and politics are inextricably intertwined—and neither can be viewed in isolation from the other. Tactics may and do vary from locality to locality, but the central concept of establishing doubt about eventual compliance is fundamental to the strategic plan. It is, in fact, *the* plan, which, if successful, will turn back the tide of the Negro drive for equality.

Thus, statutes are pushed through state legislatures with scarcely a dissenting vote. A drumfire of harassment to keep local sentiment whipped up rolls out from a hundred platforms. Delay through protracted litigation, the segregationists

hope, will help gain the time necessary to win the political battle. Through delay they think that eventually new allies will be gained in the North, particularly in cities where Negro migration from the South has been heaviest. They bank on the Northern custom of thinking only sporadically about the South and its problems and then placing the Southern stepchild in a closet, out of sight and mind. And they feel that Northerners today are beginning to tire of the Negro “problem” and want only an end to the legal and journalistic warfare.

Even the most die-hard zealots do not expect to win complete reversal of the Supreme Court's decisions. But they believe that success by evasion, or by what they prefer to call “legal avoidance,” is possible. They welcome President Eisenhower's “go slower” statement, and find in the outbreak of racial violence in England evidence of the rightness of their code of racial relations. Any victory, even such a partial one as District Judge Harry J. Lemley's go-slower order in Little Rock, seems to assume major significance.

The Tactics of Delay

Under the strategic plan, the attack assumes a number of forms. Some “honorable and lawful,” others of doubtful moral validity. A systematic campaign of vilification of the Supreme Court is carried out, designed to create disrespect for that