

necessity to compromise. They are openly and completely opposed to the Government. One of their leaders, Edouard Depreux, has stated their position: "It is clear that a reactionary majority is in power. . . . We are against a policy that has turned its back on the interests of the working classes."

### Danger to Foreign Policy

The French political situation is clearer now than it has been for several years. The Right is in power; the Left is in process of uniting to oppose it. This new situation presents a very serious twofold danger. The public may be led to think that France's foreign policy—Atlantic alliance—is a rightist policy. The parties opposing the Government's domestic policies may be led to extend their opposition to the Government's foreign policy. There is a cer-

tain irresistible momentum that works on parties when they are in opposition. They start out by opposing the Government on specific and precise issues; little by little a sort of psychological and demagogic pressure leads them to oppose the Government on just about everything.

That is what happened in Germany. The Social Democrats started by opposing Dr. Adenauer on domestic issues; now they oppose his entire foreign policy. It is what has been happening in recent weeks in Britain, where trade unions and federations have gradually been accepting Aneurin Bevan's position against rearmament and United States policy.

The same phenomenon is observable in France. Certain leaders of the Left who three months ago were Cabinet members and thus shared in the Government's Atlantic and European poli-

cies are now advocating a reduction in military credits, objecting to the integration of German forces within a European army, and urging a four-power meeting with Russia.

If across all Europe the Atlantic alliance has to be imposed by Governments of the Right against the opposition of the parties of the Left and the working classes, the alliance will lose greatly both in prestige and strength.

Fortunately in Paris today there are leaders both of the Left and Right who foresee and dread this possibility. They are working to maintain bipartisan support for the essential lines of France's foreign policy. They can succeed only if the Right that is in power does not plunge completely into reactionary domestic action and if the Left, in opposition, refuses to yield to the great temptation of demagogic vote-getting.



# Germany—the Allies' Great Gamble

THEODORE H. WHITE

**I**N MAY, 1945, Germany lay smoldering and paralyzed in defeat. Seven years later a German Government is quibbling over a peace treaty that gives their arms back to the Germans and makes them the allies of their conquerors. It is also haggling over—

*Item:* Whether Coca-Cola drunk by American troops in their regimental canteens should or should not be taxed by the German state.

*Item:* Whether the game and fish caught by U.S. troops should be weighed and counted, pound for pound.

*Item:* How much coffee and sugar American soldiers should be allowed to purchase at their post exchanges in Germany.

Such minutiae, coupled with questions of almost immeasurable portent, have gone into the negotiation of the general peace contract between the western Allies and the West German Republic.

### No Pomp, No Circumstance

Seldom has the settlement of a great war taken place with less pomp and ceremony, less glitter and emotion. Neither the passions of the Versailles Conference nor the gaiety of the Congress of Vienna has attended the Peace of Bonn. The greatest of wars has come to an end in the dry, buzzing drone of tired technicians' voices. "You can't spin suspense over a fifteen-act play," said one of the negotiators, "and this

play's been going on for fifteen months. We didn't dance, we didn't entertain; the only time the Germans asked our group out for a weekend of hunting it rained both days and we sat in the lodge and got tight. There weren't any major clashes or ruptures. It's been mostly a series of headaches; aspirin, not champagne, kept it going. You negotiated all day, you drafted all night, you came in in the morning with your draft, matched it with the German draft, and started negotiating all over again. When we got a day off we went home and played with the kids. The drama all happened before we started—or maybe it'll start now. We just filled in the dotted lines."

The real story of this diplomatic revo-

lution lies anywhere but in the sprawling gray building on the Rhine flatlands occupied by the United States High Commission, where the seventy-odd negotiators have finally succeeded in burying the bargain of peace under a mound of detail. The story began in the terrible winter of 1950, when the United States became convinced that no adequate defense of western Europe was possible unless Germany was armed. At the Brussels conference of the North Atlantic Foreign Ministers in December, 1950, the three Allied High Commissioners were, therefore, instructed to return to Bonn and inform Konrad Adenauer, the shrewd old West German Chancellor, that Germany should now step forward to be measured for a uniform. The meeting took place in the snowy-white hilltop mansion of the High Commission, the Petersberger Hof. It was the last formal summons to the hill for Adenauer, and the old man realized that history had reached a watershed. His terms were simple: Germany would supply troops for defense against the Russians, but not as mercenaries—only as allies, on a basis of full equality.

So it was settled, as had been agreed at Brussels, that the occupation of Germany would be ended. Since a peace *treaty* was impossible because of the division of Germany and the formal obligations of the Allies to the Russians, it was decided that a peace *contract* should be written instead. This contract would work out the details whereby simultaneously a war would be ended, sovereignty transferred, and a new alliance formed.

### Red Wax and Ribbons

Seventeen months and several hundred sessions later, four hundred mimeographed pages of detail have been signed, sealed with blobs of red wax, and adorned with ribbons, awaiting the approval of four parliaments. Whether or not these bodies ever approve the contract, it stands as a measure of the swift renaissance of the most dynamic nation in Europe.

The present peace contract and a twin document, the pact of the European Defense Community, serve best as mirrors of the position that Germany has today won back in the Atlantic world. The contract is a temporary document, which will serve only until Germany is unified again—or is strong

enough to demand revision. At its core lie two political decisions—the first on German sovereignty, the second on the nature of the military alliance.

By the contract, the occupiers give West Germany sweeping—but not total—internal sovereignty. All West Germans are now subject to its law courts alone, as are all aliens within its borders except uniformed troops of the alliance. West Germany will enact its laws with no foreign veto; it can make treaties and appoint ambassadors to any state in the world (including Red China) with the exception of the Soviet Union. There can be no increase in foreign troops stationed on West Germany's soil except with the Republic's consent. Its sovereignty is clipped here and there by what the Allies call "insurance clauses": West Germany agrees that in any eventual peace settlement with Russia, the three western powers shall (with Bonn's participation) negotiate Germany's unification; West Germany further agrees that in the emergency of a Nazi or Communist *Putsch*, the three western powers may intervene to preserve democracy; it accepts the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community; for a few months after ratification it agrees to accept the few remaining American trust-busting measures in the Ruhr—at least until the Schuman Plan comes into effect.

There is no guilt clause, as in Versailles, and only fleeting reference to the war gone by. Industrial restrictions are lifted. Arms restrictions are swept out of the German peace contract and included in the European Defense Pact signed at Paris. By the later agreement, West Germany is permitted to make any weapon or gun at the direction of the European Defense Commission on the same terms as France, Belgium, and Italy, except for poison gas, heavy bombers, atomic weapons, warships over 1,500 tons, and bacteriological weapons. These restrictions are softly worded—they forbid production in "strategically exposed zones," an elastic phrase which is now interpreted as "east of the Rhine," but which soon may be otherwise interpreted. Under the agreement, no restrictions exist on Germany's right to conduct educational or scientific research into such matters as, say, nuclear energy.

### The Military Terms

The military clauses embody a mutual guarantee. The western Allies guarantee the security of West Germany from invasion, just as West Germany guarantees full support to Atlantic defense. West Germany undertakes to raise and support twelve divisions to be incorporated into a European army at the disposal of the North Atlantic



Command and to defray some of the housekeeping costs of British and American troops stationed on its soil.

This is the paper agreement. What remains is to sell this deal to the contracting parliaments. Always chancy, ratification has become even chancier, for the document reflects in no way the vast and rapid changes that have occurred in Europe during the months of negotiation.

### Into High Gear

Of all these developments none is of greater moment than the tremendous surge of vitality now rising out of the furnaces and homes of the Germans. This surge strikes one as soon as one crosses the border from France to Germany. It is the tattoo of housing construction that has reached a rate of 350,000 units a year (Germany is the only country in Europe to match America's housing-construction rate); it is the contrast of old French barges with the new German Rhine barges, freshly painted, gleaming with brass, and loaded to the gunwales; it is the hustle in Germany's streets.

It is also a handful of unbelievable facts. Since 1948, West Germany has more than doubled industrial production. Agricultural production is up by sixty-two per cent and the average caloric intake per person is up by twenty-five per cent. The volume of West Germany's production now equals its best prewar years; employment is at an all-time high. Since the currency reform of 1948, Germany's exports have multiplied ten times; its dollar gap has decreased by two-thirds; its over-all foreign trade is in balance.

Some weak spots remain. Though employment in West Germany now stands at 15 million and is expanding by half a million jobs yearly, 1.2 million people (most eastern refugees) remain jobless. Germany is short of investment capital, and the government's tight-money policy keeps the boom checkreined on the edge of deflationary crisis. But these are minor blemishes—West Germany has recovered in spite of the vast and still abounding ruins.

No one knows where the ceiling of West Germany's recovery lies. A year ago, American experts figured that the upper outside limit of West German steel capacity was 14.5 million tons a year. This March, West Germany was producing at the rate of 15 million tons

a year. Two once-dismantled steel plants are about to go back into operation—the old Hermann Goering Werke at Salzgitter and the August Thyssen Werke in the Ruhr. American experts figure that these will give Germany a total of 17.5 million tons of steel capacity in eighteen months. But some German experts figure they can squeeze 20 million tons a year from this capacity within twelve months—more than was produced in West Germany either before or during the war.

This impressive resurgence strains at the newly drafted peace contract. The essence of the peace contract is Germany's inclusion in a European unity, and the essence of this union is the marriage of Germany and France. But the marriage proposed two years ago by the French and approved by the Americans was one in which it was assumed that France would lead and



Germany trudge docilely behind. The new Europe of 1952 seems to be one in which Germany, not France, will be the natural leader. The realization has given pause to both the French and German parliaments—the one fearing it has already given away too much; the other fearing it has received too little.

### The French Remember

The easiest way of explaining the divergence of the French and German attitudes is to say that the French look backward and the Germans forward.

For the French, the new treaties have meaning for the past as well as the future. As the settlement of a war, they are acts of unprecedented generosity and forgiveness—and they have evoked only the tiniest response of gratitude or understanding in many Germans. As the French point out, no nation has ever been let off so lightly after inflicting

so devastating a war on its neighbors. West Germany has given in reparations to all Allies together goods worth about \$500 million, most of which consists of the value of German assets seized abroad. (Bismarck wrung more than that out of France in 1871.) West Germany has received more than \$4 billion in aid from the United States and Great Britain since the war. It galls the French to be reproached by the Germans and Americans for industrial backwardness—which they acknowledge—when, in their view, so much of this backwardness is the work of Germany. The Germans looted eighty thousand machine tools from France during the war—they have given back fewer than eight thousand. French memories record also the fact that the death toll the Nazis exacted was expiated with fewer than 300 executions of Nazi war criminals at the hands of the western Allies, after trial. Fewer than five hundred war criminals are held in jail in Germany today and another three hundred are held in France. (The peace contract will set up mixed clemency boards by which, it is expected, more than half of these war criminals may be released.)

In a sense, the French are victims of their own diplomacy. They undertook the great adventure in European unity in the spring of 1950, when Germany and France were equals in weakness. The year before the Schuman Plan was launched, France and West Germany each produced 9 million tons of steel a year. By last year French production had crept up only to 10 million, while West Germany had reached 14.4 million. The various French Governments had persisted in their schemes for European unity, and had sold it to their Parliament through six successive Cabinet reshuffles. They have persisted simply because it was France's idea, a good idea, and the only idea that makes sense. But whether the French Parliament will now finally confirm or repudiate this policy is something else again. The French, as one American said at Bonn, are like a man who has struggled inch by inch through the snowdrifts to the top of a long ski slide and then is suddenly stricken with vertigo looking at the downward swoop.

### The Germans Forget

For the Germans, the contract reads differently. They feel that the partner-

ship agreement concerns not the last war but the next. In this partnership Germany must be the senior member. The French economy is sickened by inflation; the German economy throbs in expansion. German politics is not troubled by internal Communism or a dissident working class, while French politics is. The French Army is strained to the utmost by operations in Indo-China. If German plans materialize, in two years West Germany may have more combat-ready divisions than the French in Europe—better manned and officered ones, too. The Germans would prefer to enter the alliance as a national partner in NATO with a national army and a national flag. Most Germans have learned one thing from the last war—Germany must fight the next one with solid allies. For Germany there is only one solid ally—the United States. If the United States insists (as it does) that Germany pool its destiny with France before being admitted to alliance, the Germans accept the dictum. But if France proves, as one Bundestag member put it, “a swamp that can’t be drained,” Germany must reserve the right to appeal directly to the United States.

### Health and ‘Horst Wessel’

The German renaissance has brought with it also a vast, even if imprecise, change in the tone of German politics. It is as if for the first time in seven years, freed of the grinding, haunting worry of where to sleep, where to work, where to buy food, where to find clothes, the Germans can now turn a citizen’s interest to politics. In doing so, they all come fresh to the arena of debate in a manner that some of their leaders find embarrassing, and some useful. One member of Adenauer’s staff put it this way: “We’ve been working with the Allies for years and we know how much we’re getting; we know this would have been unthinkable four years ago. We’ve had fantastic luck. But the people don’t know—they never realized the extent of German rejection in the outside world. We know we’re getting back in—they’ve forgotten they were out.” A German Government public-relations officer made the same point another way. He was discussing with his Allied counterparts the program of publicity releases on the peace contract. He objected to some of the proposed phrases and wordings in the documents. “Don’t



you see?” he said. “Lots of Germans have almost forgotten they lost the war. This will remind them.”

The fresh awareness of politics in Germany has scotched some of the most worrisome bogies of democratic Germans and western Allies alike. Never since the war has the surface of German affairs appeared more pleasing to western ethics. The illness of Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher has sharply curtailed the activity of Germany’s most accomplished tub-thumper, and Adenauer dominates his country as never before. The Communists are a negligible splinter. The Nazi Right has failed to push any further those gains which in 1950 and 1951 so alarmed the occupation powers. It is true that Nazism flickers now and then—a post of the German customs guard is reprimanded for singing the “Horst Wessel Lied” in its barracks at night; a German town refuses to feed or lodge Negro students invited by the town’s university for an international students’ conference; the hard-core Nazi colony in Argentina seems to be in more intimate and direct contact with the hard-core Nazis in Germany. But these are, for the moment, fringe apparitions. The main avenues of German politics are dominated and almost monopolized, for the moment, by republican parties supported by an acquiescence that seems to grow as German well-being grows.

This healthiness of German politics is a solid matter for congratulation for the occupying powers. But it does not

mean that West Germany will be a docile partner in western union, or will be contented with the peace terms offered it. The methods of republican procedure do not erase the deep national aims and ambitions of a great people—they do not guarantee that the Bundestag will cramp these aims and ambitions simply to conform to the desires of other republican peoples. On the contrary—the wide-open parliamentary procedures at Bonn, with their constant appeal to the people (Bonn parliamentary sessions are broadcast nation-wide), have shown a deep split among the parliamentarians. All of them wonder whether the peace contract is a sufficient down payment to buy full co-operation in western aims from their constituents, whether the frame is big enough to hold the image of German greatness and primacy they cherish.

### The Socialist Line

The Socialists in the Bundestag, as chief opposition and nationalist party, are naturally and automatically committed to condemnation of the peace contract. They insist that if West Germany binds itself to the Atlantic alliance, it gives up forever the chance of reuniting the Soviet-occupied eastern provinces of the nation. The Schumacher Socialists believe, in essence, that Germany is strong enough to go it alone and would get better terms out of the Soviets as an independent balancing force in Europe than it would

by dealing with the Soviets as part of the western bloc. This line, the easiest to pitch for a mass audience, is the crudest, simplest formulation of Germany's basic choices.

Much more important than Socialist opposition, however, are the crosscurrents of opinion within the Adenauer coalition—the coalition that must be relied on to accept or reject ratification. If Adenauer could explain himself privately, which he cannot do, he might say simply: "What we are getting is more, much more, than we could have hoped for. We are getting back full control of our own citizenry and laws; reparations are to be forgotten; the armies that have occupied us are getting out—not in the flesh but in the spirit. The troops who will remain will be circumscribed by rules of our making and committed to our defense at the vast expense of others. We do not want them to go and leave us naked in the face of Russia anyway. It would have been nice to have got them cheaper, but we need them now. The clauses of European unity and emergency intervention are not, in themselves, bad either—for they protect us against internal *Putsches* while at the same time opening all western Europe to our enterprise."

### Wounds of Pride and Pocketbook

But Adenauer's two right-wing partners in the coalition—the Free Democratic Party and the German Party—as well as some of his own Christian Democrats see things differently. They see not the area of Allied concession but the zone of Allied restriction. Their opposition centers on two main areas of denunciation—roughly classified as the "optical injuries" and the "substantive burden."

The optical injuries are all those clauses of the contract which, however smoothly worded, scratch at German pride. Why, clamors the German opposition, must it be written down that West Germany must support west Berlin? Naturally west Berlin will be supported. It is insulting to put it in writing. Why do the war criminals have to remain in jail?—most were German soldiers, and if they did wrong it was in defense of and by the order of the state. Why, ask the businessmen, does this nonsense of decartelization have to linger for even a few months? "Why," asked a spokesman of the Free



Democratic Party, "should it be put in writing that the West can intervene in an emergency to preserve democracy in Germany? Why not have it written down also that we can intervene in a French emergency to preserve democracy in Paris?" These "optical injuries" may seem trivial—but the political emotions they arouse are hard facts. Next year is an election year, and no man wants to campaign on the basis of a peace contract that the Socialists will denounce as a "new Versailles." As Germany grows in power, some day even this contract may be rewritten. Why put one's name to a document, however generous, whose revision will be the new perspective of German politics in a few years?

The substantive burden is even more difficult for the German Bundestag to swallow. To have an army and to be partners in a European unity is fine. But paying for these ideals is something else again. The Germans, who thought that the end of the occupation would reduce the military costs of occupation, now find that their new army will absorb all the reduction and a great deal more besides. Up to now their recovery has been speeded by a lesser burden of arms and defense taxes than that of any other major country in the western world. Now, if the bargain goes through, they must pay heavily for their dignities and new forces.

NATO recommended in January that Germany's defense contribution should be 10.2 billion marks. The Germans have accepted this figure—what they have argued about is how much of this sum shall be allotted to Allied armies in Germany for occupation costs and how much shall go to their own German divisions. The Germans have insisted so stubbornly on paring their support

of Allied armies to a minimum that the British have threatened to withdraw one armored division from the front if the Germans get their way. At this writing, the division of Germany's payments is still unsettled—as is the even graver problem of who will pay the 20 billion marks (almost \$5 billion) for the heavy arms that the new German divisions will need and for which no allowance has been made in anyone's budget.

### 'Featherweight of Hope'

The atmosphere of Bonn, as one descends the echelon of negotiations from the High Commissioners to the technicians, increases in its quality of misgiving, doubt, and questioning. I can remember only a remote and distant phrase to summarize the general attitude of the working Allied negotiators. In the last week of the Second World War, when the Soviets invaded Manchuria, I asked one of the officials of the Chinese Foreign Ministry for comment. Said he, "China welcomes the entry of Russia as an ally with a heavy heart." So might be paraphrased the comment of dozens of negotiators at Bonn, "The West welcomes Germany as an ally with a heavy heart." All men involved in the negotiations recognize the enormous risks, but few would go back on the bargain. One American said, "This deal was written by a bunch of guys in whose minds just a featherweight of hope swung the balance *for* rather than *against*."

Each of the Allies has taken a separate and sharply individual attitude to the problem of German renaissance. The British attitude is one of total perplexity and confusion. Having fought Germany longer in this century than any other people in the world, the British have, to be sure, a deep interest in its future; but they lack any broad policy beyond a stubborn pounds-and-pence resistance to any shaving of Germany's contribution to the occupation armies. The British realize they lack a policy. "Put it this way," said a British political officer. "From the moment you Americans decided you wanted a strong Germany, it became impossible for us to have a policy. When we support you strongly, we antagonize the French; when we hang back to please the French, we offend you."

The French and American attitudes in Bonn are perhaps the most illumi-

nating in their divergence. For the Americans, Nazism was the original menace. Under John McCloy, the Americans have probably waged the most sincere and effective anti-Nazi campaign of all the occupying powers. With the industrial recovery, so largely financed and controlled by the United States through its critical years, has come a seeming political healthiness that has made Americans—at least on high levels—consider their policy successful. Americans have ceased to shudder at the words “Dachau” and “Prussian militarism”; they turn to face the greater immediate menace to the east.

The French attitude is different. Remove the Nazis, say the French, and you still have Germany. The term they use to describe what has happened in Germany since the war is one they borrow from the *avant-garde* German intellectuals: They call it the Restoration. What has been restored is the solid, meaty *bürgerliche* Germany of pre-Hitler days, where democracy functioned through interlocking systems of authority. In form, the German



trade unions are the most democratic in Europe; in practice, they are the most authoritarian and boss-ridden in the western world. The churches—both Evangelical and Catholic—rest on pyramids of authority, as in a lesser way do schools and families. The Restoration has restored, too, the sense of Germany’s latent greatness, the sense of *Deutschtum* that goes back a century. Germany has no borders today, and thus the Restoration mind preoc-

cupies itself with the question of borders. The French are certain that the Restoration mind will demand the return of the Saar; beyond that, say the French, the Restoration seeks Austria and the eastern provinces; and beyond them, perhaps Africa, unless the Schuman Plan proves a satisfactory outlet.

### The Great Gamble

The Americans in Bonn are inclined to agree with the French that this summer is the time of the great gamble. They disagree only on what the wager is. The Americans feel that the gamble is on Russia—the peace contract is a bet that the Russians will stand still while the West stops to pick up the prize for which the war was fought. The French feel that the gamble is on Germany—it is a gamble that Germany will not sweep its new allies into war for the recovery of lost territories; it is a gamble that German co-operation is permanent and will not be replaced by arrogance and dominance ten years hence. It is not easy to say which version is correct.

# Italy: A Fighting Chance

CLAIRE STERLING

**A**N HOUR after the urns were sealed in the recent Italian elections, Prime Minister De Gasperi left for Paris to sign the treaty for a European army. “No matter what happens,” he told reporters at the airport, “we will never take a step back.”

When he returned he found that some of his supporters were indeed contemplating several steps back—back from the Atlantic alliance and back toward the prewar past.

These were local elections for town and provincial councils, but they were regarded universally as a trial run for

the Parliamentary election next year. The vote, largely in central and southern Italy, confirmed and heightened a trend that had been registered in the north during a similar test last spring. The combined returns indicate that, although the Communists are still far from winning an absolute majority, they have been inching up steadily since 1948, when the present Parliament was chosen. In the face of this, the formerly powerful democratic coalition headed by the Christian Democrats is rapidly losing its strength: Large sections of its followers are turn-

ing to a neo-Fascist movement which, declaring itself “equidistant” from democracy and Communism, attacks the western powers with as much enthusiasm as it does the Soviet Union.

The neo-Fascist victories in three of the most important southern cities—Naples, Bari, Foggia (population of Naples alone: 1,029,805)—have given the impression that the right wing in Italy has now become the Third Force and that it holds the balance of power. This is not yet true; it can become a fact only if the Italian democrats and their friends concede defeat.