

A New Security Regime for Europe?

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WILLIAM T. LEE and RICHARD F. STAAR. *Soviet Military Policy Since World War II*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

HARRIET FAST SCOTT and WILLIAM F. SCOTT. *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

THE INTERNATIONAL security system in Europe, to which we have long grown accustomed, is rapidly breaking down. The roots of this security system can be traced back to the peace concluded after World War I. After the Western Allies had won that war, they failed to create a just and stable security system. The failure of the post-World War I security system led inextricably to World

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War II. A new security system emerged in the late 1940's, but it was based on a divided Europe and brought direct Soviet influence all the way into central Germany.

Perestroika and "new political thinking" in the Soviet Union and the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe have provided the opportunity to create a new security system in Europe. But the challenge in adapting to accelerating changes in the international security constellation centers on the degree to which Western observers can free themselves from existing intellectual constructs.

For an appreciation of the dominant role misperceptions came to play in framing the West's security policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the two volumes under review here provide valuable insight. To be fair, it should be noted that both works predate the most dramatic changes both in the USSR itself and in Moscow's relations with the rest of the world. Having noted this fact, it is equally fair to point out that on the fundamental issue of change, William T. Lee and Harriet Fast Scott consistently misunderstood the Soviet position throughout the 1970's and early 1980's as well.¹ Both argued that the "nuclear" revolution in military affairs was not simply a description of objective reality, but the

culmination of a military-technical revolution that led the Soviets to conclude that nuclear war was winnable, and, therefore, as a continuation of politics, was an appropriate instrument of state policy. Thus, the works reviewed here represent the culmination of a long history of these two authors' misperception and misrepresentation of the context in which Soviet security decisions were taken.

THE TITLE of the book by Lee and Richard F. Staar communicates the viewpoint of its authors only indirectly. Lee and Staar argue that the only change in Soviet military doctrine and strategy since 1960 is a 1964 modification allowing "for the possibility of a conventional phase in a superpower coalition war" (p. 29). This being the view of the authors, they would find no inconsis-

¹Although there have been concessions to the notion of "doctrinal modifications," the basic conclusion that "its fundamentals remain the same" may be found, for example, in the Scotts' *Armed Forces of the USSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1979. For William T. Lee as well, acceptance of the fact that "the Soviets modified their doctrine and strategy for war with NATO to allow for a conventional phase" never seemed to suggest any change in "their belief that such a war would escalate to massive use of nuclear weapons." See, for example, William T. Lee, *Understanding the Soviet Military Threat*, New York, National Strategy Information Center, 1977.

tency in presenting Soviet nuclear policy as Soviet military policy. However, as I will argue below, the perspective this title conveys is wrong because it equates Soviet nuclear policy with Soviet military policy as a whole.

Lee and Star describe much of the essence of Soviet military theory correctly. For example, they note the following: "war may begin under a variety of circumstances including . . . with either nuclear or conventional weapons" (p. 28); "pre-emption is the preferred option, but only on warning of an imminent Western attack" (p. 28); "because a nuclear world war would be so destructive, however, the USSR would not be justified in initiating it" (p. 27); "to fight and win a nuclear war it is necessary to have strategic air, missile, space, and civil defenses to limit damage from enemy offensive forces that survive Soviet counterforce strikes" (p. 167); "the capabilities of strategic defensive forces have lagged far behind requirements, primarily because the USSR has not been able to field the requisite weapons technology" (p. 136); and "the pattern of weapons system modernization continues to reflect the balanced emphasis on nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities evident since the mid-1960's" (p. 127).

Although as of the mid-1980's such an assessment of mainstream Soviet military thought was correct, the authors argue that "the existence of more balanced forces does not necessarily mean that the Soviets have ruled out nuclear escalation in a war with NATO" (p. 131). Improvements in Soviet conventional warfare capabilities since the mid-1960's are seen to have led "observers to overinterpret these improvements . . . as evidence of a shift to preparations for conventional warfare to the virtual exclusion of nuclear operations, in a war against NATO" (p. 131). The authors argue

that "aside from expectations of a longer conventional phase than anticipated . . . Soviet literature . . . does not support such a change" (p. 131).

In fact, "such a change" emphasizing conventional warfare occurred more than 20 years ago, and the evidence for it can be found everywhere in "Soviet literature." By early 1967, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had mentioned publicly that Moscow no longer considered general nuclear war to be the inevitable outcome of a European conflict.² If there should be any doubt that such a "public" rejection of nuclear warfare was only propaganda, it should be noted that in early 1970, a flag-rank officer on the Soviet General Staff wrote for internal consumption that "there is a real possibility of conducting a conventional war in Europe."³

Lee and Star do detect a "slight hint of a reduction in Soviet expectations that, if faced with defeat, NATO would escalate a conventional conflict to nuclear war" (p. 29), but they dismiss this issue with a footnote to the effect that "similar hints, however, had appeared at least a decade [1972] earlier" (p. 228). It never seems to dawn on the authors that not only did the potential for escalation make any use of nuclear weapons extremely threatening to the Soviet homeland, but that the possible use of such weapons would impose additional constraints on conventional offensive operations.

This assessment led Moscow to

enhance its ability to defeat NATO conventionally and to plan to use conventional operations to destroy as much of NATO's nuclear capability as possible in the early stages of a conflict. But this strategy would succeed only by deterring NATO's use of nuclear weapons to resist a Soviet thrust into Europe. Consequently, an absolute requirement for ensuring against NATO's use of nuclear weapons was the continued development of nuclear forces to at least match, if not exceed, NATO's nuclear capability at the global, theater, and tactical levels. Only the development of such capability would offer the Soviets any hope of restraining NATO's incentives for first use of nuclear weapons, as well as better enable Moscow to prevail in the event of escalation to a theater-wide or even global nuclear conflict.⁴

THE TITLE of the volume by Harriet Fast and William F. Scott encapsulates superbly the viewpoint of its authors. Soviet military doctrine is seen simply in terms of continuity, formulation, and dissemination. The authors do not accept the existence of such revolutionary changes as have occurred on either the political or the military-technical side of Soviet military doctrine.

Only a year after the publication of the Scotts' book, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff would argue otherwise:

The development of military art is now proceeding at a particularly rapid pace. Nearly all the tenets of strategy, operational art, and tactics are undergoing radical changes, under the influence of not only military-technical, but also political-military factors. Basically,

²Leonid Brezhnev, "From a Speech at the Conference of European Communist and Worker Parties—24 April 1967," in *Na strazhe mira i sotsializma* (On Guard of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p. 124.

³As quoted in John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock, III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945–2000: Implications for NATO," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Fall 1986, p. 123.

⁴For greater elaboration of this argument and citations of original Soviet sources in support of it, see *ibid.*, pp. 117–37.

a new theory of military art is being created.⁵

That the Scotts did not recognize the contemporary revolution in military affairs might be explained as inadequate forecasting; but it is not possible to explain away that they also failed to recognize even those fundamental changes in Soviet military art which had occurred during the 1970's and the early to mid-1980's.

Perceiving "confusion" among Western observers with regard to "the actual relationship between the party and its Armed Forces" (p. 171), the Scotts explain that "there is an intermarriage of party and military leaders" (p. 168) and argue that "each is seeking to make the Soviet Union the undisputed leading world power" (p. 167). The Scotts conclude, therefore, that Western planners must assume that the real reason for Gorbachev's *perestroika* "is to insure that the laws of war are kept in the Kremlin's favor" (p. 159). Gorbachev's goal of "limiting the military potential to reasonable sufficiency" is seen to be little different from programs introduced by his predecessors—Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko (p. 263). Thus, on the political side of military doctrine, the Scotts' book never considers the question of how a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union might attempt to bring about systemic change.

On the military-technical side of military doctrine, the Scotts recognize only the "nuclear" revolution in military affairs. Their book makes no mention of Soviet military theoreticians having argued that military affairs were in transition to a new stage. Although the Scotts do re-

peat the unclassified Soviet verbal formula that "troops must be ready to fight both with the use of nuclear weapons and without them" (p. 29), they leave unanswered the question of weapons preference. Furthermore, the Scotts give little credence to Soviet assertions that NATO exercises affected Moscow's expectations and, thereby, Soviet strategic planning (p. 90).

Internal Soviet military writings parallel Moscow's more public expressions about NATO's intention to employ nuclear weapons.⁶ Moreover, since NATO has repeatedly signaled Moscow on its determination to employ nuclear weapons to resist a Soviet thrust into Western Europe, the West should hardly be surprised that NATO's deliberately transmitted message affects Soviet planning as well as intent.

The Soviet verbal formula on this subject—classified until the early 1980's and repeated in the Scotts' book—suggests a fundamentally less sinister view of Soviet interest in the use of nuclear weapons: "any action conducted with only conventional weapons would be fought under the constant threat of the opponent's use of nuclear weapons" (p. 91). Since there is no evidence supporting the Soviet intention of first use of nuclear weapons from an offensive posture, Soviet references to nuclear war qualified with the phrase "should the enemy unleash it" cannot be dismissed as mere propaganda.

In the early 1980's, the Scotts and

Lee were in the vanguard of those who defended the "nuclear only" threat paradigm as articulated in Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy*.⁷ Ignoring the fact that this tome represented a collective work for which Sokolovskiy only served as general editor, and that he fundamentally disagreed with the proposition that a future war would be "nuclear only," the Scotts and Lee missed an entire stage in the development of Soviet military art. At the same time as this unclassified book was being published in its third edition (it appeared in 1962, 1963, and 1968), Sokolovskiy was coauthoring an article for internal consumption which argued that "the possibility is not excluded of wars occurring with the use of conventional weapons, as well as the limited use of nuclear means in one or several theaters of strategic military action [*teatr voyennykh deystviy*—TVD], or of a relatively protracted war using the capabilities of all types of armed forces." Sokolovskiy and his coauthor expressed the view that "at present [1968] military affairs are entering or have already entered the next stage of their development, and, apparently, it is necessary once again to introduce essential changes into military art."⁸

The long-term importance of the two books under review lies in assisting the understanding of the role of images in the struggle over "threat" definition. By studying these works, it is easier to appreciate how a large number of facts can be consistent with mutually exclusive "threat assessments." Such an

⁵See, for example, *The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials From the Soviet General Staff Academy, Volume I, Issues of Soviet Military Strategy*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1989. As noted by Raymond L. Garthoff on page 8 of the introduction to this "authentic and authoritative" volume, "the doctrine set forth in the 1973-75 lectures does reflect an important change that had begun in the mid-1960's . . . incorporating the possibility that nuclear weapons might not be employed, and the clear Soviet preference for keeping any war that might occur non-nuclear."

⁷See *Soviet Military Strategy*, edited with analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott, New York, Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1975.

⁸Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy and Major General M. I. Cherednichenko, "Military Strategy and Its Problems," *Voyennaya Mysl'* (Moscow), October 1968.

⁵Colonel General M. A. Moiseyev in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Feb. 10, 1989.

understanding is a necessary first step in the struggle to free Western security policy from the misperceptions accumulated over the more than 70 years of Soviet history.

As late as 1988, the Scotts were still convinced that "whoever may be the party's General Secretary, it is improbable that any change will alter the Marxist-Leninist goal of scientific communism: the overthrow of capitalism, which in the final analysis means any nation outside of the Soviet orbit. This objective will remain the basic thrust of Soviet military doctrine" (p. 264). For their part, in writing about how "abandoning the USSR war-fighting strategy or reducing the military's share of GNP are not among [the major innovations Gorbachev] has in mind," Lee and Staar identified the circumstances that would prompt a change in their assessment: "First there would have to be a revolutionary transformation in the Soviet political leadership. Second, the military burden on the USSR economy would have to create such adverse conditions that the current leaders would conclude that they must either change their military policies or risk loss of party control over the country" (p. 182).

THE FIRST condition set forth in the Lee and Staar book was established with the appointment of Yuriy Andropov as general secretary of the CPSU in 1982. As Raisa Gorbacheva was reported to have said to Mrs. Averell Harriman, "We owe everything to him." Early in his career, Andropov was a protégé of Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish communist with long experience in the Soviet party-state apparatus. Kuusinen had managed to recruit a number of such reform-minded party intellectuals as Fedor Burlatskiy, Georgiy Arbatov, Aleksandr Bovin, and Oleg Bogomolov to work for him in the Central Committee Secretariat. Gennadiy

Gerasimov, Nikolay Shishlin, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov joined Kuusinen's "consultants" to become the "Andropov circle," initially supporting "peaceful coexistence" and "democratization," and subsequently opposing the rehabilitation of Stalin that was initiated under Brezhnev in the mid-1960's.

What appeared at the time to be the "final blow" to the "Andropov circle" came with the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the years that followed, according to Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the principal author of the "Novosibirsk Report," they "all led double lives, not only scholars but a few progressive-minded politicians like Gorbachev . . . there was not a single one among us who could say we never made a single compromise."⁹

Andropov and his circle of party intellectuals embraced a "revolutionary pragmatism" prompted by mounting evidence of the magnitude of Soviet economic failure and by the view that the USSR's security would increasingly be dependent upon its economic power. Regarding security policy, what seems to have emerged was a non-zero-sum model of security emphasizing threat-reduction, unilateral restraint, and a cooperative stance toward traditional Soviet adversaries. Georgiy Arbatov, who is described as having become "a close friend of Andropov's,"¹⁰ described the new strategy as one of depriving the West of its "enemy."

In a 1978 speech, Andropov revealed the essence of what subsequently would emerge as a new security model for Europe: "Our position is clear, Europe must become a continent of peace and good-neighborly cooperation. Here,

in Karelia, we have to emphasize the significance of the Soviet Union's good-neighborly . . . cooperation with Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations today . . . represent the very kind of détente that makes for a more lasting peace."¹¹ Although Andropov had only 15 months as general secretary, and for much of his tenure was too ill to be effective, he did succeed in moving sufficient numbers of his supporters into key positions to ensure survival of the changes he set in motion. This is not to argue, however, that Andropov was a reformer. According to Bogomolov, "Andropov is being idealized now. If he had lived he probably would have changed things some, but he would not have touched the underlying structures of society."¹²

The revolutionary transformation in Soviet political leadership is directly related to the second condition for questioning the arguments of the books under review. Widening gaps with the West in technological progress, labor productivity, and living standards, in addition to inflation, ecological disasters, permanent shortages of many essential goods, non-competitiveness of the majority of Soviet manufactures, and a falling economic growth rate are indicative of the very profound and pressing nature of the economic crisis facing the Soviet Union. Since the USSR has "no choice other than a radical change of the existing social system," Bogomolov, now the director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, has argued that "a form of political pluralism, appropriate for the particular conditions and historic traditions of the [USSR], has

⁹Tat'yana Zaslavskaya as quoted in *The Washington Post*, Feb. 10, 1990.

¹⁰Zhores A. Medvedev, *Andropov*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1983, pp. 178-79.

¹¹Yuriy V. Andropov, *Izbranniye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p. 287.

¹²Oleg Bogomolov as quoted in *The Washington Post*, Feb. 10, 1990.

become an indispensable prerequisite" for successful economic recovery. This change in the political, social, and economic system is expected by Bogomolov to require "ten to 15 years and will be accompanied by an acute struggle of opinions and by conflicts between the old and new modes of action."¹³

THE PROCESS of revolutionary transformation of Soviet society prompted by the sense of crisis described by Bogomolov was initiated by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenums in March and April 1985, which, respectively, elected Gorbachev general secretary and adopted the program of *perestroika*.¹⁴ In turn, after nearly two years of discussions in the Soviet Defense Council,¹⁵ the decisions taken by the Central Committee in the spring of 1985 led to the adoption of a military doctrine consistent with the assessment that ensuring security would be increasingly a task for diplomats rather than soldiers. This new approach to security was to reshape relations between the USSR and the rest of the world.

In Europe, Moscow's new approach to security initially used Northern Europe as a "model" for the USSR's relations with its satellite states. The Soviets believed that a two-tier neutral zone comprised of "West-leaning" (i.e., Sweden) states together with "East-leaning" states that could confidently be depended upon to defend their territorial integrity (i.e., Finland) might be established. Such a zone might provide Moscow with greater confidence in the determination of Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Hungarians to defend

their respective states. Essentially, it was hoped by Soviet security theorists that they might be able to "Finlandize" states they could no longer control at an acceptable cost. In the case of Germany, this meant acceptance of eventual unification, but on condition of neutrality.

By late summer 1989, the transformation in the character of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries of Central Europe was said by the Soviets to be "already under way, and we understand and accept this de facto." Thus, "where Soviet foreign policy interests are not challenged, and an attempt is made to set up a market economy and a pluralistic system, the processes taking place in these countries can be correctly understood by the Soviet Union."¹⁶ Arguing that Soviet diplomacy toward the states of Central Europe "should undergo profound restructuring in essence, methods, and style," USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze explained to the Supreme Soviet in October 1989 that "new alternative forces are emerging on the political arena in some of these countries for the reason that this is what the people want."¹⁷ Rezső Nyers, chairman of the new Hungarian Socialist Party, supported Shevardnadze's characterization of the new environment: "certainly, in Eastern Europe one cannot conduct policy that is openly anti-Soviet," but, he said, "the Soviet Union has ceased to be an ideological power; it no longer regards itself as the avant-garde of world revolution."¹⁸

That at least some Soviet specialists believe Eastern Europe is much

less important as a buffer zone than it once was is probably less important than the recognition that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states share some common security concerns with the Soviet Union. For example, a Soviet participant in a 1989 meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies held in Frankfurt, West Germany, expressed the belief that "Poland has an interest in being in an alliance with a great power in a time of rapid and uncertain change."¹⁹ Soviet Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev concluded that even with a coalition government in Poland headed by a noncommunist, Poland's interest in "the stability of [its] territory and state boundaries" has "remained the same, to a significant degree."²⁰ Despite the "historic" changes sweeping through the NSWP states, Shevardnadze declared that "all these countries remain the Soviet Union's neighbors, allies, and friends."²¹

Although Moscow talks of the maintenance of both the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty organizations, the latter has ceased to exist as an integrated operational command because, for all intents and purposes, the Warsaw Pact command statutes are null and void. Authorization for the employment of Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian armed forces outside their respective national territories now requires approval of the governments of these countries, effectively negating Soviet control over these national forces through the Warsaw Pact operational command structure.²² Furthermore, by June 30, 1991, Moscow has agreed to withdraw all its troops from both Czechoslovakia and Hungary.²³ In

¹³Oleg T. Bogomolov, "The Origins of Change in the Soviet Union," *Adelphi Papers* (London), No. 247, Winter 1989-90, p. 28

¹⁴Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987.

¹⁵*The Washington Post*, July 13, 1988.

¹⁶Andranik Migranyan, "For Discussion: An Epitaph to the Brezhnev Doctrine. The USSR and Other Socialist Countries in the Context of East-West Relations," *Moscow News*, No. 34, 1989, p. 6.

¹⁷*The Washington Post*, Oct. 24, 1989.

¹⁸*The International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Oct. 14-15, 1989.

¹⁹*The Washington Post*, Oct. 24, 1989.

²⁰*The New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1989.

²¹*The Washington Post*, Nov. 1, 1989.

²²*The International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 16, 1990.

²³*The Washington Post*, Mar. 11, 1990.

a somewhat understated description of the new reality, the Soviet ambassador to the January 1990 NATO-Warsaw Pact seminar on military doctrine in Vienna, Vladimir Shustov, noted that "I imagine that military questions [in the Warsaw Pact] will now be discussed on a more democratic basis, taking into account the interests of each state."²⁴

The head of the Hungarian Institute for Foreign Relations, Peter Hardi, has written that "opposition groups in Eastern Europe never saw NATO as the equivalent of the Warsaw Pact."²⁵ Thus, as the former "opposition" assumes leadership in the NSWP states, both the relationship between the Warsaw and North Atlantic treaty organizations, as well as relations among the signatories of the Warsaw Pact, will be further adjusted to reflect the altered political reality in Central Europe. Soviet willingness to accept further adjustments is suggested by Marshal Akhromeyev's expectation that one or two of the Warsaw Pact states will "probably" leave the treaty organization.²⁶ The Hungarian deputy foreign minister has told Moscow that "no doubt . . . at some point in the future, membership in the Warsaw Pact will cease to be of strategic interest for Hungary."²⁷ According to the Hungarian chief of staff, "we are already redeploying some troops away from the western border" so as to "be prepared to defend ourselves . . . from any direction," since "we no longer have an image of the enemy formulated on an ideological basis."²⁸

THE conceptualization of a security model based on non-zero-sum cal-

²⁴*The International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 18, 1990.

²⁵*Ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1990.

²⁶*Defense Daily* (Washington, DC), Feb. 14, 1990.

²⁷*The Washington Post*, Jan. 16, 1990.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1990.

culations—which may be traced back to Andropov's appreciation for the advantages of Soviet-Finnish relations over the USSR's relations with its Warsaw Pact allies—would both overcome the division of Europe and bridge the Atlantic to maintain Europe's link with Canada and the United States. Moscow has also come to appreciate the contribution the North American states make to European stability. The vice rector of the diplomatic academy of the USSR Foreign Ministry, for example, has argued that "a certain presence of American troops—a limited presence—poses no danger" to Soviet security, and that since "some circles in Western Europe feel their security is greater with American troops [present in Europe], let them have it."²⁹ As Soviet foreign policy specialist Andrey Kokoshin stated during the US-Soviet summit at Malta, "we have no master plan, no desire to drive America out of Europe. In calling for a new Helsinki mechanism, we have chosen a framework that gives the United States and Canada legitimate roles in Europe."³⁰

Beyond the desire of some Warsaw Pact security theorists to retain NATO as an instrument for the restraint of a unified Germany, the Soviets expect West European integration to dilute German influence in Central Europe. The Soviets, French, and even the West Germans agree that incorporating a unified Germany and its army within a supra-national "West European Confederation" with its own military forces would resolve concerns over the maintenance of present borders. Under such a "mechanism" all "foreign" troops would be withdrawn from Central Europe, a proposal that has been frequently advanced by Moscow. This proposal would require only that American and British forces withdraw from western Germany as residual Sovi-

et forces withdraw from eastern Germany. The Bundeswehr would cease to exist, and, at least initially, the new supra-national army would probably be headed by a non-German commander. The presence of Belgian, Dutch, and French soldiers on German soil would further reinforce Polish and Soviet confidence on the territorial question.

As stated by former British Defense Minister David Owen, "it would not be impossible for NATO to accept that United States forces would not be deployed in a united Germany. The skill will come, however, in keeping American forces in Western Europe and in keeping a united Germany within the Western European security framework."³¹ US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has said that an agreement under which "the Soviets were out of Eastern Europe and the US retained a modest presence in Western Europe would probably be the ideal outcome."³² For his part, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has already declared that "our final goal is to have not a single Soviet soldier abroad by the year 2000."³³

Various regional groupings are expected by Soviet security analysts to facilitate economic integration while contributing to the stabilization of an all-European security system. The Italians, for example, have helped to organize a so-called Danube and Adriatic grouping in the south.³⁴ For Austria, Czechoslo-

²⁹*The New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1989.

³⁰*The Washington Post*, Dec. 3, 1989.

³¹*The London Sunday Times*, Nov. 12, 1989.

³²*The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Jan. 31, 1990.

³³*The Washington Times*, Jan. 17, 1990; see also *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Feb. 28, 1990, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 1, 1990, pp. 3-4.

³⁴"Mitteleuropa Tunes Up Once More," *The Economist* (London), Nov. 18-24, 1989, p. 73.

vakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, which are also participating in this regional grouping, membership in the European Community is the ultimate goal. The first meeting took place in Budapest during November 1989. Although Czechoslovakia was not a participant at that time, it hosted a second meeting in Bratislava in April 1990. During this latter meeting, there was resistance to suggestions that Poland join the grouping.³⁵

But whereas Moscow sees centripetal forces in action in the West, it is forced to contend with growing centrifugal forces in the East. Burlatskiy has observed that "there is an asymmetry between the disintegration of Eastern Europe and the growing integration of Western Europe." As a result, he fears that the Soviet Union could become "an economic appendage of the West, a supplier of raw materials." The only alternative, Burlatskiy argues, is the creation of "a common market on the entire European continent."³⁶

When asked, however, West Europeans question whether Russia is not too big, and too Asian, to fit in as a full member of the EC. Yet, as with Turkey, the potential political cost of exclusion is simply perceived as too high. The price of eventual associate membership Moscow will probably have to pay will likely be the independence of the Baltic republics. Inasmuch as the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians are determined to regain the independence illegally taken from them, West European politicians have no flexibility with regard to supporting

the self-determination of the Baltic republics.

Diplomats from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland have all indicated to the author the willingness of the Nordic Council to accept Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as members. Such action would undoubtedly be reassuring to Moscow since it would tend to restrain the penetration of German political influence into the Baltic republics. It also accords with Soviet conceptions of a European security regime based on the "model" of Northern Europe, which was discussed above.

OBVIOUSLY, the transition to a new security regime will involve a series of stages. Economic integration of the kind that now exists in Western Europe—broadened to include Central Europe and perhaps the Soviet Union as well—could provide a firm foundation for the new security structure. Toward this goal, the 12-nation European Community and the six-nation European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) began the process of forging an expanded free trade area and customs union in December 1989.³⁷ Integrating Eastern Europe into this scheme will, of course, be more difficult. But the establishment of a US\$12 billion East European Development Bank to assist Central and East European states in establishing market economies is an initial step toward all-European economic integration.³⁸

The transition to a new security environment will further expose So-

viet economic and political vulnerabilities. Soviet political analysts like Bovin admit such vulnerability when they explain that "Americans realize that the shifts in East Europe and the acute collisions and difficulties within the USSR weaken the positions and narrow the room to maneuver on the part of the Soviet leadership. So [the West does] have trump cards." Yet, Bovin also believes the West to be sufficiently sophisticated to welcome the Soviet Union as a permanent partner in constructing a new European security structure founded on economic integration. Thus, the United States and its allies will not deny Moscow its aspirations, because "the Americans consider it not in their own interest to undermine the forces advocating *perestroika* and the further evolution of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of new political thinking."³⁹

The implication of Bovin's statements is that tying the Soviet Union to Europe is every bit as critical for a just and stable security regime as is tying Germany to Western Europe. Such a scenario would require "new political thinking" on the part of the West and, in the process, jettisoning the misperceptions that have accumulated over the last 70 years of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

³⁵*The New York Times*, Apr. 10, 1990.

³⁶*ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1989.

³⁷*The Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 19, 1989.

³⁸*The Washington Post*, Apr. 10, 1990.

³⁹*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 7, 1990.

Breakdown and Reconstitution: Thinking About the Russian Revolution

Lars T. Lih

DONALD J. RALEIGH. *Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1986.

EDUARD BURDZHALOV. *Russia's Second Revolution: The February 1917 Uprising in Petrograd*. Translated and edited by Donald J. Raleigh, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1987.

S. A. SMITH. *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

DAVID MANDEL. *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

THE EIGHT books under review can be divided into two categories: those that deal with the Russian revolutions of 1917 (Raleigh, Burdzhakov, Smith, and the two works by Mandel) and those that deal with the civil war years (Broido, Burbank, and Sakwa). Or another possible division is between the books that are mainly sympathetic to the October Revolution and those that

DAVID MANDEL. *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984.

VERA BROIDO. *Lenin and the Mensheviks: The Persecution of Socialists Under Bolshevism*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1987.

JANE BURBANK. *Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986.

RICHARD SAKWA. *Soviet Communists in Power: A Study of Moscow During the Civil War 1918-1921*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

are mainly hostile to it. This division reveals a surprising fact: all the books on 1917 are sympathetic to the revolution, while all the books on post-October developments are hostile. But on further reflection, perhaps this result is not so surprising: whoever is in power always looks bad enough to make whoever is in opposition look good. But is there another approach that will allow us to overcome this division and to see 1917 and the following years as a unified historical process?

The search for this unity will take us back to the period before 1917 to consider the impact of World War I on Russia. Of the works under review, the one that tells us most about this subject is Donald Raleigh's *Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov*. Raleigh shows that nothing about the course of the revolution or its outcome can be understood without considering the all-pervasive influence of the war.

It is difficult to appreciate the sheer scale of the war's disruption of Russian society. For example, a crucial factor in the ultimate Bolshevik success was the support of the military garrison stationed far from the front in Saratov. Although the soldiers of this garrison were often called "peasants in gray coats," these uprooted people in the garrison were for the time being neither peasants nor gray-coats but a group of men not engaged in any useful activity while being maintained at great expense.

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