

Urban Policy in China

William T. Rowe

CHRISTOPHER HOWE, Ed.
Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

MARTIN KING WHYTE and WILLIAM L. PARISH. *Urban Life in Contemporary China*. Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984.

LAWRENCE J. C. MA and EDWARD W. HANTEN, Eds.
Urban Development in Modern China. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

*Shanghai is a non-productive city. It is a parasitic city. It is a criminal city. It is a refugee city. It is the paradise of adventurers.*¹

WHEN the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) moved in 1949–50 from the rural areas upon which the success of its revolution had been based into the country's major cities, its leaders faced wide-ranging and serious problems. They inherited localities with accumulated inadequacies of housing and supply services, as well as productive capacities devastated by years of invasion and civil war.

¹ *Jingji Zhoubao* [Economic Weekly—1949], quoted in Howe book under review, p. 46.

They needed a quick restoration and expansion of production in order to finance their continuing consolidation of domestic control and, very quickly, a new foreign war. At the same time, they needed to demonstrate at least some progress toward fulfilling their political promises of greater economic equality and a guaranteed subsistence for all citizens. In achieving these (quite possibly contradictory) aims they faced a number of special handicaps, including a potentially hostile, demoralized, and politically cynical urban class, and—as the above quotation illustrates—the parochial anti-urban attitudes of many influential party members themselves.

In the longer term, the Communists under Mao Zedong faced an even more formidable task. As each of the works under review argues, industrialization in virtually all societies has left an inevitable mark on the nature of urbanism, creating cities far larger than those in the past and replete with the social problems urbanologists often refer to as “alienation” and “anomie.” Clearly, the CCP sought the economic benefits of industrialization while sensing and seeking to avoid its related social problems. In the attempt to realize their new “Chinese model” of industrial urbanism, the Communists have displayed a remarkable fertility of invention in organizational forms

and mobilizational strategies, along with an equally notable willingness to backtrack and discard experimental forms according to evaluations of success and to shifting priorities. To what degree have they succeeded in achieving their ends, and what have been the effects (intended or unintended) on the lives of Chinese urbanites? These three books, all important contributions to the growing literature on contemporary Chinese cities, provide many answers.

ALL THREE BOOKS begin, as they must, with a consideration of the unique historical traditions of Chinese urbanism. In the view of the Communists, and indeed of many 20th-century Chinese intellectuals, this legacy was almost completely negative. There was, on the one hand, the older, indigenous tradition of the city as political-military control center for its surrounding territory and as residence of the landlord-literati class. On top of this had been superimposed in the 19th century a new level of predominantly coastal treaty-port cities, the locus of investment and

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extraction by agents of foreign metropolitan economies. Both urban types were seen as holding exclusively "parasitic" relations with the "real" China, that of the peasantry.²

Recent Western scholarship, however, has been kinder in its view of the legacy of Chinese urbanism. The indigenous tradition is now recognized as having generated at least certain urban centers that were truly productive sites of commerce and handicraft manufacture, and spawning grounds of progressive social change. Moreover, as Martin Whyte and William Parish point out, Western scholarship now tends to acknowledge the potential benefits enjoyed by China, relative to other developing nations, as a result of the even spatial distribution of urban centers and the unusually fluid and penetrable rural/urban continuum bequeathed by the late imperial hierarchy of administrative capitals.³

The treaty ports too have come in for reevaluation. In the volume edited by Lawrence Ma and Edward Hanten, for example, Lynn White offers a provocative argument that the heritage of cities such as Shanghai was an unusual degree of urban societal self-reliance (or "nongovernmentalism") that, while it undoubtedly made mobilization for political campaigns more difficult, offered corresponding advantages in effi-

²Perhaps the classic statement of these views appeared in the work of the non-Communist intellectual Fei Xiaotong. See especially his *China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1953, based on Chinese originals in 1947-48.

³In late imperial times, capital cities, usually walled, were assigned to each of China's roughly 1,000 counties, as well as to higher level administrative units such as prefectures and provinces. For a concise discussion, see G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in Skinner, Ed., *The City in Late Imperial China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1977, esp. pp. 301-7.

ciency of administration. Marie-Claire Bergère's path-breaking essay in the Christopher Howe volume, furthermore, demonstrates that the "other" China of the coastal cities represented a tradition smaller and more recent than, but every bit as real as, that of the countryside, and contributed a capable and cosmopolitan population that was persistently there for communist authorities (such as the current leadership) to draw upon when necessary.

DESPITE these positive legacies, the CCP saw itself as inheriting a disequilibrium between the more Westernized coastal centers and the interior, and recent scholarship generally confirms the validity of this perception.⁴ The expanding Communist urban-planning repertoire, then, was developed largely to resolve two key problems: (1) to strike the proper balance between large and small settlements, and between coastal and interior, without faith in the trickle-down effect of socioeconomic benefits; and (2) to fix upon the optimal levels or spans of authority *within* the cities for the carrying out of various administrative or mobilizational tasks. In the party's efforts to overcome these shortcomings, the three goals of stimulating productivity, achieving efficiency in control and delivery of services, and promoting socioeconomic equality have continually been at the fore, although the relative priority accorded each of the three has often shifted. The goals of maintaining maximal levels of personal freedom and representation in decision-making for urban residents, which Westerners might see as strongly affected by choices regarding or-

⁴See especially Rhoads Murphey, *The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1977.

ganizational levels, have clearly played little part in the Chinese planning process; on the other hand, the goals of preventing social isolation and fostering participation in collective affairs have by no means been absent.

While situations and nomenclature have varied, most large cities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have had four levels of organization: the municipality (*shi*); the ward or district (*chu, xiang*); the neighborhood or precinct (*pai*) of several-hundred households; and the street (*jie*) of about 25 families. In the cities the Communists occupied during the civil war (1945-49), the CCP set up "self-government" organs at each municipality, ward, and neighborhood level, emphasizing the last of these in their early effort to bring about a sort of grass-roots democracy. Street-level "residents' committees" followed soon thereafter, as the new rulers sought to affix responsibility for self-reliance as closely as possible to what they saw as the natural community. However, as early as Liu Shaoqi's famous inspection tour of Tianjin in April 1949—during which he devised a strategy calling for a more disciplined, centralized political organization—the goal of increased productivity began to take precedence.⁵ In order to streamline the chain of authority and to make maximum use of scarce cadre resources, Liu initiated a policy vesting greater power in the municipality level, transforming formerly "autonomous" ward and neighborhood offices into mere branches of city governments and stripping them of many of their regulatory functions. Input from the grass roots was in theory to

⁵See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980, pp. 7, 42-52.

come primarily through the hierarchically structured mass organizations: labor unions, women's and youth associations, and the like. Shortly thereafter, though, with the revival of emphasis on class struggle during the Three-Anti Five-Anti Campaign of 1952,⁶ the pendulum swung back toward decentralization; ward and neighborhood autonomy was gradually reinstated, and the street-level residents' committees took on the expanded range of functions (for example, firefighting, care for the aged and children) that they have generally exercised since that time.

THE REAL beginnings of a coordinated urban policy date not from these preliminary experiments but from the First Five-Year Plan of 1953–57. This of course was the period of highest Soviet influence, with stress on urban-located heavy industry, and policy was generally favorable to large cities. "New Industrial Districts" such as Zhabei in Shanghai were planned in the slum-ridden heart of older cities; considerable new housing, transport facilities, water and sewage systems, and parks were constructed; and Soviet-style monumental halls and great revolutionary public spaces (Beijing's Tian An Men Square being merely the most famous) were carved out of old city centers. At the same time, however, concern for the dispersal of industry led to a new development of suburban areas and the revival of archaic interior cities. Semi-autonomous "satellite towns" such as Shanghai's Minking and

⁶Ostensibly designed to combat corruption in business and government, the Three-Anti Five-Anti campaigns were in reality the first stage in the socialization of urban industrial and commercial enterprises. See Lieberthal, *op. cit.*, chap. 7; and John Gardner, "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969.

"new villages" like Beijing's Baiwan zhuang and Shanghai's Caoyang xincun were laid out as combined industrial, residential, and community service centers at the fringes of existing large cities. Special emphasis was placed on the industrialization of "key-point cities" (*zhongdian chengshi*) such as Lanzhou, Xi'an, Taiyuan, Baotou, Wuhan, Shijiazhuang, Luoyang, and Zhengzhou—inland, medium-sized administrative centers favored by new or existing transport systems. These cities saw remarkable growth; Henan's cotton textile center Zhengzhou, for example, more than quintupled its population in the decade prior to 1958.⁷ Finally, "New Industrial Cities" like Yinquan in Ningxia and Yumen in Gansu were created virtually *ex nihilo* in frontier areas.

In order to populate these various urban projects and to curtail the population growth of the largest cities, party leaders relied on the *xiafang* ("sending down") process—the forced relocation of urban youth, introduced by Zhou Enlai during the First Five-Year Plan.⁸ Thus the Plan in essence created not only the strategic repertoire but also most of the vocabulary that was selectively drawn upon in later periods. In fact, as Clifton Pannell and David Buck separately point out (in the Ma and Hanten volume), this era marked the beginning of the long-term

⁷Zhengzhou's population was estimated at 150,000 in 1948, and 785,000 in 1958. See David D. Buck, "Policies Favoring the Growth of Smaller Urban Places in the People's Republic of China," in the Ma and Hanten book under review, pp. 122–23.

⁸Zhou put forth the notion of *xiafang* in his report to the 8th Party Congress of 1956. Though originally conceived of as a way to streamline the cumbersome Chinese bureaucracy, the *xiafang* process, owing to its early success and to Mao's injunction that rusticated cadres "share in the masses' suffering," became in 1957 a major developmental approach. For a detailed study of *xiafang*, see Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

trend toward the smoothing of China's rank-size curve of urban places, with the growth of the largest coastal cities proceeding more slowly than that of interior smaller cities (*xiao chengshi*)—a deliberate and successful reversal of an older trend dating from the rapid intensification of foreign trade in the mid-19th century.

If this is so, the trend certainly accelerated in the period following the Plan, that of the Great Leap Forward (1958–60), when Soviet influence was formally denounced in favor of the "Chinese model."⁹ Policies of this time were oriented toward narrowing the "three great differences": those between mental and manual labor, between industry and agriculture, and between urban and rural. Almost all big-city construction projects came to a halt, in part out of the hope of decreasing the incentive for rural-to-urban migration. The policy of "urbanizing the countryside" could be seen on a small scale in market towns like Hongqi (near Beijing), where hinterlands were gobbled up and local cities grew in their place, and on the larger scale in Shanghai municipality, where surrounding counties were incorporated into the metropolitan area during the course of 1958.

Yet not all Great Leap urban policies were so pragmatic. The most utopian innovation was the ill-fated "urban commune." Organized around a factory or other production unit, urban communes were to combine worksite and residence

⁹According to Roderick MacFarquhar, in a speech at the Chengdu conference in March 1958 Mao attacked the Chinese "slavish copying of Russian regulations and system" as lacking the "spirit of creativity" (*Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 2: *The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 35). MacFarquhar notes that Mao himself traced the beginning of his efforts to "emancipate China from the thrall of the Soviet economic model" to his April 1956 speech "On the Ten Great Relationships" (*ibid.*, p. 39).

organization, local administration and production-unit leadership, and worker-resident ownership of the means of production much more completely than had the "new villages" or other previous experiments.¹⁰ The ideal of chopping up large cities into a number of smaller communities, each as nearly as possible self-sufficient in food production, meant a greater emphasis on administrative decentralization to the ward or precinct (now "commune") level than at any time since prior to Liu Shaoqi's 1949 reforms. But, as is well known, the urban commune movement was one of the most notorious failures of the generally disastrous Leap. The simultaneous goals of rapid collectivization and increased production proved less compatible than anticipated; the total integration of worksite and residence was more feasible in theory than in practice; and experiments in dormitory living and large mess-hall dining constituted too great an assault on the basic Chinese family system for even Maoist rhetoric to make palatable.

A more practicable attempt to combine urban and rural lifestyles also had its genesis in the Great Leap, but was further developed in the post-Leap retrenchment of the early 1960's. This was the creation of "city regions," large administrative units integrating city and countryside. In 1958, 58 City Region Governments were established, the most notable being those centered on the country's three provincial-level "special municipalities" (*tebie shi*): Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. According to Ka-iu Fung (in the Howe volume), these regions represented both a complete departure from the Soviet model

¹⁰Janet Salaff, "The Urban Communes and Anti-City Experiment in Communist China," *China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1969, pp. 82-110.

and a true Chinese contribution to the solution of global urban problems. Jane Jacobs's recent work in fact underscores the appeal of this approach to some Western urban theorists;¹¹ yet, as both Fung and Lynn White (in Howe) point out, the "rural-urban symbiosis" traditional to Chinese urbanism quite possibly made the regional development solution uniquely practicable in the Chinese case. Throughout the early 1960's, the city region model was applied to smaller as well as larger urban places, often, as in the case of the national-model Daqing (in Heilongjiang), newly planned and constructed as self-contained industrial agricultural complexes.

But the city regions created new social tensions of their own. During the period of retrenchment the goal of productivity once more became paramount, and as in the past this seemed to demand greater centralization of authority. In most cities, municipal governments once again arrogated to themselves powers only recently farmed out to the ward/urban commune levels. In cities with Regional Government arrangements (now sometimes dressed up as huge, "new-style" urban communes) there seems to have developed a pattern of enacting policies favorable to the industrialized urban cores at the expense of rural peripheries. As John Lewis earlier demonstrated in his study of Tongshan¹² and Raymond Wylie again shows in his fine, detailed analysis of Shanghai dock workers (in Howe), perhaps the most aggravating of these policies were those favoring permanent, skilled

¹¹Jane Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, New York, Random House, 1984.

¹²John W. Lewis, "Commerce, Education, and Political Development in Tangshan, 1956-69," in Lewis, Ed., *The City in Communist China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1971.

industrial workers over "casual" laborers, who were frequently drawn on a seasonal basis from suburban districts under the administration of the City Region.¹³ These tensions were to flare up into open fighting during the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution itself produced little in the way of urban policy, but did leave its mark on the cities in a variety of ways. Urban construction, recommenced for a period during the early 1960's, was once more brought to a standstill, and this hiatus seems largely responsible for shortages in housing and urban services today. On the positive side, the intensified drive for rustication of youth, combined with the shipping off of urban bureaucratic functionaries to rural May 7th Cadre Schools,¹⁴ led to the most restrained population growth of the major cities of any time since 1949. After almost complete breakdowns of authority, city administrations emerged from the Cultural Revolution even more centralized than when they had entered it. Dramatic-sounding local autonomous organizations such as "urban workers' militias" and the "Shanghai People's Commune" of 1967 (ostensibly modeled on the Paris Commune of 1871) very quickly gave way to city-level Revolutionary Committees, which despite their name were the most bureaucratized and arguably the most effective municipal govern-

¹³For example, short-term workers on the Shanghai docks in the early 1960's typically received 40 yuan a month, while permanent workers doing the same job received 70 yuan. Raymond F. Wylie, "Shanghai Dockers in the Cultural Revolution: The Interplay and Political and Economic Issues," in Howe, pp. 100-101.

¹⁴During the Cultural Revolution, "May 7" schools were set up to "reeducate" urban cadres in manual labor. By October 1968, 10,000 cadres from Shanghai alone had been shipped to such schools. See Janet Salaff, "Urban Residential Communities in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution," in Lewis, op. cit., pp. 302-3.

ments China had known since 1949—indeed quite possibly ever known.

The era of succession struggle from 1969 to 1976—that is, from the convening of the landmark 9th Party Congress to Mao's death—was nevertheless an uncertain one, characterized in urban policy primarily by an abrogation of national leadership and a call for local "self-reliance," epitomized in the revived model of Daqing and the new one of Xiyang, seat of the much-touted Dazhai brigade. But with the consolidation of the current leadership and promulgation of the current Eight-Year Economic Plan in 1978 a clear urban-planning approach has emerged that largely returns to the policies of the mid-1950's, with some selective use of successful later programs. The new regime has once more accorded priority to addressing the problems of large cities, with the goal of improved material conditions now sharing precedence with those of efficient management and increased productivity. Considerable inner-city renewal and construction of high-rise housing has taken place, and more is projected. This has been accompanied by revived construction of satellite cities such as Shanghai's Baoshan and Jinshan, along lines initially anticipated by the First Five-Year Plan. This clearly meets the approval of the authors reviewed here, especially of the geographers and planners represented in the Ma and Hanten volume.

However, policy shifts announced since the publication of these books may contain reversals that dampen the authors' enthusiasm. For example, the April 1984 proclamation of the "14 coastal cities" policy, allowing special economic privileges to Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and others,

seems to contradict the time-hallowed policy favoring development of smaller, interior cities.¹⁵ Rather than favoring urban heavy industry as under the Soviet-style five-year plans, this policy places emphasis squarely on promotion of foreign trade. Common to both eras, however, is a faith in the "trickling down" of economic benefits from larger to smaller settlements, which seems to be the antithesis of the Maoist approach that characterized the period from 1958 to the late 1970's.¹⁶ It is still too early to determine if this new policy will produce the political antagonisms and popular grievances that aborted earlier programs.

TO WHAT EXTENT have China's roughly 200 million city-dwellers been the beneficiaries of the prolonged and tortuous process of social experimentation? Materially, they continue to be better off than rural residents. As Lawrence Ma points out, the problems of inadequate sanitation, sewage, and electrical facilities, as well as squatters and pavement-dwellers, so frequently encountered in urban centers of developing nations have been essentially eliminated. While per-capita housing space has fallen since 1949 to its current inadequate level,¹⁷ the quality of this housing has greatly improved, and

¹⁵See "14 More Coastal Cities To Be Opened," *Beijing Review*, Apr. 16, 1984, p. 6; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Apr. 9, 1984, p. K/7.

¹⁶See, e.g., "Let the Coastal Areas Become Rich First," *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Apr. 4, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 13, 1984, p. K/13.

¹⁷Ma cites average figures of 6.3 square meters per person in 1949 and 3.1 square meters in 1960. He estimates that new housing construction may now have expanded the average to between 4 and 5 square meters per person, but notes that this contrasts unfavorably with the 7.84 square meters in Soviet cities and the 6.3 square meters in public housing in Singapore. Ma, "Urban Housing Supply in the People's Republic of China," in Ma and Hanten, pp. 244-48.

continues to do so. Subsistence guarantees have almost universally been provided, and, as Bruce Reynolds demonstrates in the Howe volume, urban real incomes have risen overall—if irregularly and very modestly.

But some problems remain. While job security for those who are employed is virtually absolute, the number of young people who have been unable to find permanent jobs has soared. In recent years, because the state-owned sector of the economy has proven unable to accommodate this new work force, the current leadership has authorized a rapid expansion of the collective ("neighborhood workshops" owned and run by precinct- or street-level residents' committees) and private sectors. Although youth unemployment remains severe (perhaps 10 to 20 million), this approach has been fairly successful. In Changsha, for example, nearly half of all 1979 school graduates entered this new collective sector.¹⁸ The new liberalization, which many scholars trace back to the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee of December 1978, has also had a positive effect on the availability of routine services to urbanites, services that began to fall off during the socialist transformation drives of the 1950's and became extremely scarce with the advent of the Cultural Revolution. Since 1978 the number of retail stores, repair shops, and restaurants in cities has mushroomed, about 80 percent of which have been in the private or "self-employed" sector.¹⁹

The more intangible areas of quality of life and of behavioral or

¹⁸David Bonavia, *The Chinese*, Middlesex and New York, Penguin Books, 1982, p. 23.

¹⁹*The New York Times*, Apr. 1, 1984. Official sources now place the number of "self-employed" Chinese at 7.5 million; see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1984.

attitudinal responses of the urban population to new conditions is a major focus of the Whyte and Parish book—for a nonspecialist audience certainly the most compelling of the works under review. Time after time, in evaluating the specific goals of the CCP's urban policy, the authors accord it basic or even complete success. Despite this, however, the authors repeatedly discover that the utopian predictions of Marxian theory regarding the end of social alienation have not been realized, and indeed that the very successes of CCP policies have had often unanticipated negative consequences for popular morale.

In one sense, *Urban Life in Contemporary China* is a perplexing book. It is a first-rate piece of research, and probably more focused theoretically than the authors' earlier companion volume on rural life (now deservedly the standard work on that subject).²⁰ Moreover, it is as comprehensive, objective, and balanced a treatment of city life in China as we are ever likely to get. And yet, despite their almost chilly tone of clinical detachment, the authors appear

²⁰William L. Parish and Martin K. Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978.

with surprising frequency to judge Chinese society by Western liberal standards. They lament that Chinese urban dwellers have "remained victims rather than masters of their own fate" (p. 295), that the political system denies "a direct voice in government for ordinary citizens" (p. 296), and that even today "much of the political system that once oppressed so many people is still in place" (p. 299). While most of their audience will no doubt share their preference for an open society and for pluralist political institutions, the authors' clear disappointment at China's failure to produce these seems a bit odd, especially when coupled with their recognition of the success planning has brought in areas such as economic equality and security, improvement in the position of women, and so on. Unquestionably, the People's Republic of China has been subjected to more than its share of political excesses but, given its low ratio of resources to population, certain hard trade-offs may have appeared unavoidable to Chinese leaders.

The most telling aspect of Whyte and Parish's critique comes in their chapter on "Crime and Social Control." Based on quantitative analysis of interview data, the authors determine, perhaps not sur-

prisingly, that a lower incidence of social deviance and a higher popular willingness to cooperate in the pursuit of communal and national goals were found in those periods in PRC history, and in those particular urban neighborhoods, in which the public's perception of "a predictable set of legitimate opportunities in life" (p. 234) was highest. They are thus led to support that school of urban social theory (identified by them with Daniel Patrick Moynihan²¹ and others) that emphasizes the need for unimpeded provision of such an opportunity structure for the achievement of social stability and productivity. Most evidence suggests, and Whyte and Parish agree, that the current Chinese leadership shares an appreciation of this logic. If Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues can continue to demonstrate sincerity and success in this area, they may be on their way to consolidating and extending the gains made since 1949 in achievement of a distinctly Chinese style of contemporary urbanism.

²¹Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty*, New York, The Free Press, 1969; see the discussion in Whyte and Parish, pp. 234–36.

Beijing and the Superpowers

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U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, GEORGE PACKARD, and ALFRED WILHELM, Eds. *China Policy for the Next Decade*. Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1984.

GENE T. HSIAO and MICHAEL WITUNSKI, Eds. *Sino-American Normalization and Its Policy Implications*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983.

HERBERT J. ELLISON, Ed. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*. Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1982.

AT THE CHINESE court during the ancient Zhou dynasty, diviners, invocators, and sorcerers were employed respectively to forecast the future, prescribe courses of action in accordance with ritual, and implore divine assistance. Although no one has tried to forecast the state of Sino-Soviet-American relations using scapulimancy, geomancy, or similar techniques, con-

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DONALD S. ZAGORIA, Ed. *Soviet Policy in East Asia*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982.

DOUGLAS T. STUART and WILLIAM T. TOW, Eds. *China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

HUNG-MAO T' IEN, Ed. *Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy*. Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983.

temporary policy analysts, whose works are well-represented in the books under review, are in some measure the intellectual heirs to these ancient Chinese public servants. Those among them who have accurately forecast the evolution of these tortuous trilateral relations have done so more through luck or accident than through science or experience. Ever since consciousness of the so-called strategic triangle emerged in the post-World War II years, most analyses of Sino-Soviet-American interactions, not surprisingly, have been implicitly or explicitly policy-oriented.

From a historiographical perspective, the six books under re-

view are part of a Third Wave in postwar studies of the subject. The First Wave, inspired by the ill-fated Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1950, focused on whether this alliance could long endure, and on what were the implications for US and global security. The Second Wave, following hard on the first, explored the origins, scope, and implications for the United States of the Sino-Soviet conflict during the early and mid-1960's. Thereafter, serious interest in the seemingly frozen landscape of Sino-Soviet relations abated with the exception of a brief flurry of attention in 1969 at the time of the Sino-Soviet border clashes. The Third Wave has been generated by the sea change in international relations brought about by Sino-American reconciliation and diplomatic normalization in the 1970's. The actual and potential impact of Sino-American relations on the regional and global balances of power and, in particular, on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, are matters of ongoing controversy.

IT IS WORTH noting that all six works under review are conference volumes or edited collections. The popularity of these genres in recent years presumably reflects the view that collective wisdom is superior to individual wisdom and that the