

to economic development; but this is something that should be determined empirically and not by oversight.

Given both the similarities and differences between the current Tachai campaign and others which have waxed and waned in China, what tentative judgments can be advanced about the politics underlying present policies, and what predictions can be made about future developments in the current campaign? Since the present

campaign contains elements of programs previously advocated by "radicals," as well as components of "conservative" approaches to rural problems, we might speculate that current policies signify either consensus or stalemate between the two groupings described by Chang. It could also indicate, however, that the categories are not now (and perhaps never were) as sharply differentiated as he suggests. Regarding the future, it would be rash to assume that de-

velopments will closely parallel those of the 1960's as Baum describes them, but we should carefully consider if and why they might or might not. The precise nature of future developments and their impact on the politics of policymaking will, I suspect, depend more on the particular problems or successes associated with current policies than on any inherent tendency for PRC policy to oscillate between "radical" and "conservative" poles.

Mao, the Teacher Society, the School

By David M. Raddock

JOHN N. HAWKINS: *Mao Tse-tung and Education: His Thoughts and Teachings*. Hamden, Conn., The Shoe String Press, 1974.

THEODORE HSI-EN CHEN: *The Maoist Educational Revolution*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.

AS A FORMER revolutionary guerrilla leader who has remained at the helm of state for more than two decades since the triumph of the revolution that he headed, Mao Tse-tung has suffered from a confusion of roles, and this has in recent years led him to take concrete steps to try to prevent modernization from causing China to veer away from revolutionary goals. An important area of his efforts has been the ongoing ex-

perimentation since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) with the use of education as an agency for radical social change. The two books under review afford a basis to form some judgments about Mao's vision of social change and the practical attempts to implement this vision during the last several years.

As a preface to discussion of this theme, let us briefly survey the contents of the books. Drawing on the corpus of Mao's available works,¹ John Hawkins has traced

a continuum of Mao's pedagogical thinking and statements on education throughout his life—from his student days and his early formation of a self-study university in his native Hunan Province in 1921, through the Kiangsi Soviet and Yen-an periods, and then through the post-revolutionary epoch, culminating in the Cultural Revolution and its attendant re-vamping of the educational system. Hawkins contends that, in an almost unilinear fashion, Mao has been developing a mix of control and decentralization and of theoretical and practical work in education in order to arrive at an equation for the new socialist person—that individual who can combine spontaneity and initiative with conformity to the collective inter-

¹ Including the Japanese collection, *Mo Taku-to Shu* (Mao Tse-tung's Collected Works), Tokyo, Hokubo-sha, 1971; Jerome Chen, *Mao's Papers*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970; and other miscellaneous translations.

est and who can unite political "redness" with technical expertise. In tracing the development of Mao's thought, particularly since the 1940's in Yen-an, the author seems to place more emphasis on the opportunities that Mao seized upon in order to implement his ideals rather than on the objective circumstances that may have generated new ideas and reshaped old ones. While Mao may now perceive himself as "the teacher"—as he indicated in a 1970 interview with Edgar Snow²—an assessment of his capacity to continue to be a "schoolboy"—as he described himself in 1966³—would have been highly desirable.

Theodore Chen's *The Maoist Educational Revolution* focuses, in remarkable detail, on the concrete changes in educational institutions and procedures which have been implemented in the wake of the GPCR; it also furnishes the reader with a very useful appendix containing translations of relevant articles and directives in the Chinese press. The first chapter depicts the conventional modern school system that prevailed in China after 1949 and underscores the elitism that it bred, leading to disparagement of coexisting work-study and spare-time schools. (Strangely, however, Chen's lament in his final chapter over the disappearance of a sector of the educational system devoted to higher-quality education designed to produce broadly-trained leaders seems to overlook the problem of elitism in connection with higher learning in China.) The bulk of the book comprehensively describes the new work-study orientation of the entire school system at all levels and the pervasiveness of

political controls on youths, teachers, intellectuals, and cadres.

In essence, then, the two books are complementary. One provides an overview of Mao's educational purpose, and the other describes and analyzes current efforts to transform that purpose into reality.

THIS BRINGS us to the question of whether or not it is actually possible for China to produce Mao's brand of "revolutionary successors." Both authors seem to agree that the current innovations have had positive results with respect to the popularizing of education and the training of middle-level technicians, but only Hawkins appears to have unwavering faith in the realization of Mao's vision of the new socialist personality. Nevertheless, it may be swinging to the opposite extreme to argue that the continued inculcation of political values holds no prospect of success. Problems such as individual psychological defenses against group study at school and the large number of "drop-out" youths during the early phase of the Cultural Revolution in the schools might not, in the end, prove insoluble. To get a better feel for what the true outlook may be, we need to have a firm understanding of the difficulties with which the Maoists are trying to grapple.

Although some Western scholars thought that they observed a uniformity of socialization between home and school in China by the early 1960's,⁴ the Cultural Revolution exposed the contradictions between the two. In effect, the family often constituted an offi-

cially undesired negative focus of identification alternative to identification with the peer group (and its accompanying ideology).

Several factors entered into the explanation for this situation. To begin with, there was a conspicuous lack of personal coordination between socializing agents in the home and at school in the cities during the period before the GPCR—indeed, parents seldom set foot on the campuses of "regular" middle schools and universities. Second, on the eve of the GPCR, in the spring of 1966, an estimated two-thirds of the student bodies in "regular" middle schools in large cities like Canton were from families of nonproletarian class background,⁵ and a substantial portion of this group had probably been exposed to "politically backward" ideas in the home and had developed similar viewpoints. Third, the intensification of the schools' efforts to politicize students and to impose sanctions for resistance through in-group ostracism prior to the Cultural Revolution tended to force many youths into primary identification with their families. Parents and elder siblings who had suffered from attack in previous political campaigns because of questionable class background often urged youngsters to be cautious about political involvement. Youths who might have liked to "draw a clear line" between themselves and their families were frequently reluctant to do so because they could not be sure that they would be allowed to find alternate outlets through affiliation with the class-conscious Youth League at school. A number of youngsters

⁴ Lucy Jen Huang and Alan G. Hickrod, "Communist Chinese and American Adolescent Sub-Cultures," *China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1965.

⁵ Based on reports of respondents this reviewer interviewed in Hong Kong in 1971-72 and corroborated in a lecture by Professor R. Sinha at Columbia University, East Asian Institute, Spring 1973.

² *Life* (New York), April 30, 1971, p. 46.

³ "His Wish", in Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

could not find the psychological strength to make a total break with their families and hence, confronted with a conflict of loyalties, chose their families. Finally, children of the urban proletariat sometimes looked upon their families as protectors of their right to pursue values not totally in keeping with those of the regime. One such youth now in Hong Kong told the present author that he had attended a university in quest of the formal education that his father did not have (in Chinese literature, no less!) and had managed to avoid political participation by hiding behind the "redness" of his class background; however, when his worker father had appeared on campus after the GPCR as the new type of auxiliary, proletarian teacher, he himself had disgustedly withdrawn from school.

To the extent that the home and the school socialized youth in the same way, the result was often not a positive one from the regime's perspective. Both encouraged youths to pursue upward mobility and thereby to eschew the humility necessary not just to act *for* the masses, but to serve them in the literal sense and to identify with them emotionally. Many students found themselves aspiring either to intellectual or political position in order to be a "credit" to their families in the traditional Chinese manner.

NOW, the Chinese leadership is trying to meet the challenge of this general state of affairs by proletarianizing the whole educational system and "making all society into a school." One technique it has used has been the widespread establishment of *min-pan* (people-run or neighborhood) schools, which are patterned after the ideal decentralized educational model

employed in the prewar revolutionary base area of Yen-an (*not*, it should be noted, after the schools of the same name which were set up after 1949 and which subsequently fell into disrepute⁶). This approach to primary and secondary education is intended to make the learning process the cooperative responsibility of school, place of work, and neighborhood. All schools are tied into factory or rural commune work. Teachers, parents, and representatives of revolutionary committees, youth organizations, worker-peasant-soldier propaganda teams (who actually share in the teaching responsibilities at schools and universities), and party convene to plan a coordinated program of extra-curricular activities for the student. The student has a program of labor and political study mapped out for him even during vacations. Teachers bring students' problems to the attention of their parents and attempt to work out solutions. Thus, in these schools a major attempt has been made to eradicate the basis of the elitism of the past. According to one person whom this author interviewed in Hong Kong, ending up in a *min-pan* upper middle school after previously having attended "regular" schools was like "falling from heaven to earth."

The informal political education process extends to all areas of society. When educated youths in the countryside receive leave to return home for a holiday, welcome committees greet their ar-

⁶ After the Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland in 1949, a dual-track system of schools was established. This consisted of (1) "regular" six-year middle schools (lower and upper), admission to which was based on competitive examinations, and (2) various types of neighborhood, vocational, and spare-time schools. Qualifying for the former became a matter of prestige.

rival and hold symposia for parents and others to discuss the positive lessons of working in the countryside. And before peasants going to university in the cities leave their homes, they are given farewell rallies, the main point of which is to remind them of their origins. These experiments may be abhorrent to "bourgeois intellectuals," but they represent a unique plan for coordinating educational efforts in a single direction.

At the same time, there remains the question of whether human beings can be remolded so that the continued development of the self is not at cross-purposes with submissiveness and responsiveness to the masses. While the GPCR and the subsequent transfer of youths to the countryside for a lifetime of labor may be viewed as two aspects of a movement designed to combine individual spontaneity with submission to the authority of the people, some young people who left China after the GPCR could not resolve the contradiction between self-assertion and submissiveness: "If I could not fulfill myself in society, society was misdirected." If similar difficulties in psychological adjustment exist among youths to a greater or lesser extent in China today, new totalistic schemes of socialization like those described above may provide a corrective. As long as there is no perceived discontinuity between socializing agents and the grass roots of society, it is conceivable that self-improvement through formal education could produce a new socialist person who derives his social rewards from family, workers, peasants, and soldiers for his dedicated *service* rather than as a consequence of his *position*.

Still, one wonders whether the

dissociation of education from the desire for status in China is sufficient to forestall a general quest for position and a subjective feeling of superiority such as many youths now in Hong Kong recall so fondly from participating in the GPCR. While the majority of young

people throughout China qualify for the "Little Red Soldiers" (the present-day counterpart of the Young Pioneers), fewer are admitted to the older-aged Youth League, and still fewer to the party. As long as such a hierarchy continues to exist, there is always

the possibility that those on the *inside*, who have the power to decide in large measure which persons will be admitted, may abuse their power and positions. The mere existence of a hierarchical structure, in short, can foster self-serving ambition.

The PLA: Peacetime Model and War Machine

By Harvey Nelsen

GERARD H. CORR: *The Chinese Red Army*. New York, Schocken Books, 1974.

YING-MAO KAU: *The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building*. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973.

ANGUS M. FRASER: *The People's Liberation Army*. New York, Crane, Russak and Co., 1973.

WITH THE termination of hostilities in Southeast Asia, the American approach to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has shifted away from threat assessments and toward analyses of the military's domestic peacetime functions. The massive political use of the PLA during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the later power struggle between the former Defense Minister, Lin Piao, and Mao Tse-tung prompted a number of books and articles on party-army relations, internal PLA history, and the prospective role of the military in

the post-Mao period. A subsidiary topic, recently receiving increased attention, is the socioeconomic function of the PLA. Numerous foreign visitors to the showcase 196th Division have come away deeply impressed with its ongoing agricultural and industrial undertakings. Civil-military relations seem unusually close and harmonious at the grass-roots level, and young people are so eager to get into the PLA that the conscription system is in the enviable position of selecting only the most highly qualified and motivated candidates to fill the ranks of the world's second-largest military establishment.

Peking has gone to considerable lengths to convince the outside world and its own populace that the PLA approaches the ideal of the civic-action army. This review will try to distinguish some of the images from the realities. The perspective that must not be lost, despite the changed emphasis in Western scholarship, is that

the PLA remains first and foremost a fighting force. Two authors of the works discussed here remind us of this fact, and one of them raises interesting questions concerning the rates of modernization and improvement of capabilities of the Chinese military machine. These questions will be explored after a short introduction to the books under review.

GERARD CORR is a British journalist who worked for some years in the Far East. He correctly surmised that a book was needed which would introduce the general reader to the PLA. He has succeeded in writing such a volume, and therein lie the strengths and weaknesses of the book. It is doubtless the most readable work yet written on the PLA. Its scope is extremely broad, including discussions of origins and development, PLA campaigns since 1949, internal political roles, and capabilities in the 1970's. The author also provides praiseworthy treat-