

inate all remnants of the post-January reforms.

Thus, one can conclude that the demise of the Prague Spring resulted from two failures on the part of the Dubcek leadership, one preceding the August invasion and another in the ensuing months.

The first was the failure of Dubcek and his colleagues to convince Moscow that they still remained in firm control of the gathering forces of reform in the country. The second was the reformist leadership's failure to make the realities of the post-invasion situation

clear to its avid public following. Caught in the middle, Czechoslovakia's Communist reformers found themselves the victims of a lack of communication with those who would destroy them as well as those who would have seen them succeed.

Stalinism and Freedom

By Frederick C. Barghoorn

ROBERT H. McNEAL: *Bride of the Revolution: Krupskaya and Lenin*. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1972.

NAUM J. JASNY: *Soviet Economists of the Twenties. Names to be Remembered*. London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

STEPHEN F. COHEN: *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography, 1888-1938*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.

THESE THREE WORKS, especially Stephen Cohen's, make significant contributions to our understanding of the processes that shaped the Soviet dictatorship. Each tells a grim tale of the frustration, defeat, or destruction, under Stalin's regime, of individuals and groups who, in a political environment increasingly dominated by ruthlessness, demagoguery, and fanaticism, sought vainly to preserve some elements of compassion, personal freedom, and professional integrity. Taken together, they add substantially to our knowledge of the achievements and failures of

the first 15 or 20 years of Soviet rule. It should be noted, however, that Cohen is the only one of our authors who considers that the Soviet regime should be credited with substantial positive achievements, at least in the 1920's, which, he says, "brought a remarkable explosion of artistic ferment and creativity in every field" (*Bukharin*, p. 272). The tone of Robert McNeal's and, much more so, of the late Naum Jasny's books is bleakly negative, although McNeal offers qualified praise for the activities of Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, in the field of education.

NADEZHDA Konstantinovna Krupskaya, born in 1869, died in 1939. Like Lenin, whom she married in Siberia in 1898 after joining him there in political exile, she was a child of what today would be called upper middle-class parents. Her social position, however, might be characterized as "marginal." Her father, a civil servant of liberal and vaguely socialist persuasion, was dismissed from gov-

ernment service for taking the side of Polish workers against their employers. His dismissal resulted in hardship for his family, but Nadezhda was able to get a good secondary education at the exclusive Obolensky Female Gymnasium. McNeal appears to believe—although he never systematically develops the hypothesis—that Krupskaya's "loathing" for Stalin (*Bride of the Revolution*, p. 146) stemmed largely from a clash between the values of her intelligentsia culture and Stalin's crudeness. In 1890, after reading Marx's *Capital*, she experienced a "conversion" and became a dedicated revolutionary. As a revolutionary, however, she was not really outstanding, although as Lenin's wife, helper, and secretary she rendered valuable service to the revolutionary cause.

If McNeal had placed his account of the development of Krupskaya's political attitudes before she met Lenin in a theoretical context, perhaps he could have added to our knowledge of the sociology

or the psychology of revolution in a developing country, but in the absence of such a framework of analysis, Krupskaya's life as presented by him is of interest mainly for what her relations with more powerful figures—such as Lenin, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, and Bukharin—tell us about them and about the new political order they were building. *Bride of the Revolution* sheds considerable light on the tensions that developed in 1922-23—after a series of strokes had increasingly incapacitated Lenin—between Lenin and Krupskaya, on one side, and other Bolshevik political leaders, especially Stalin, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, who were hastening to fortify their power position against the day of Lenin's death. During this period, leaders such as Kamenev and Trotsky, whose help Krupskaya sought in her efforts to execute Lenin's wish to reduce the already great and growing power of Stalin, failed to support her and thus lost whatever chance they might have had to thwart Stalin's future power plays. In 1925-26, Krupskaya's criticisms of Stalin's and Bukharin's peasant policies, which she considered un-Leninist, were suppressed. Stalin himself threateningly defended the suppression of one anti-Bukharin article. In this and similar incidents, Bukharin and other top leaders, all of whom accepted the concept of the Politburo's infallibility, unwittingly helped pave the way for Stalin's subsequent dictatorship. While Krupskaya even subsequently showed her antipathy for Stalin by intervening—sometimes with partial success—on behalf of victims of terror and by other humanitarian acts, she for the most part lent the prestige of her status as Lenin's widow to the Stalinist "general line" of the party.

McNeal convincingly argues that Krupskaya's efforts to promote the right of party members to dissent from Politburo policies could not succeed because the very tradition of "Leninism," in the name of which she spoke, was itself supremely authoritarian. Bolshevik thinking, including Krupskaya's, not only reflected this tradition but was itself the product of a much older Russian authoritarian heritage. The author cites evidence (p. 195) that Krupskaya as early as 1919 saw in the old Tsarist bureaucracy a model for Soviet educational administration and "had a hand in the formation of the Soviet system of intellectual dictatorship" (p. 202). She was, for example, one of the architects of the elaborate Soviet system of censorship of libraries.

Yet, despite her limitations and confusion and despite her harsh experiences in Stalin's Russia, McNeal sees Krupskaya's life as "marked by . . . an integrity that is her own." He concludes: "Krupskaya was a pathetic figure at the end of her life—a puppet of the dictator whom she hated. . . ." (p. 295).

ACCORDING TO a "Publisher's Note," a draft manuscript of Jasny's book was completed before the author's death in 1967, but it needed "some clarification and systematization before publication." In Part I (pp. 1-57), which summarizes the history of the Soviet economy from 1917 to the early 1930's, Jasny focuses on the disastrous effects of Lenin's policy of "war communism" in 1918-20 and of Stalin's agricultural collectivization and coercive industrialization. He contrasts these policies, which he judges extremely irrational and immensely destructive, to the beneficial effects of the

semi-market economy of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which Lenin instituted after the uprising of naval forces at the important Kronstadt base in March 1921 and other urgent evidence had made it clear that without concessions to the starving masses Soviet power was in danger of rapidly crumbling. In this section, we are briefly introduced to several score of economists, such as Vladimir Groman, Vladimir Bazarov, the brilliant theorist Nikolai Kondratiev, the journalist Nikolai Sukhanov, and others. Unlike their better known (at least in the West) colleagues such as Julius Martov, Fiodor Dan, Rafail Abramovich, and others, these men—mostly of Menshevik (in effect, social democratic) persuasion but in some cases "neo-narodniks"—loyally and often brilliantly served the Soviet regime in the relatively favorable circumstances provided by NEP. However, although they had no organizational connections with exiled economists, they maintained ties with their former associates by correspondence and in some cases by personal encounters, and they never concealed their aversion to dictatorship and utopianism.

Not surprisingly, they became scapegoats for the "show trial" organized by Stalin's political police in March 1931, to which Part II of Jasny's book (pp. 60-89) is devoted. The author argues convincingly that this trial was a judicial farce—"an episode in the long train of show trials which were part of Stalin's increasingly bitter fight for the dictatorship" (p. 61). A point that Jasny might have made, but did not, is that the scapegoating technique characteristic of the methods used by Stalin against both non-Communist and later against Communist critics and op-

ponents had been employed much earlier by Lenin and Trotsky, notably in attempting to link the leaders of the Kronstadt uprising with "foreign agents" and "white guard" elements.

Part III (pp. 89-212) of the Jasny volume is devoted to accounts of the professional lives and contributions of Groman, Bazarov, Abram Ginzburg, and Kondratev, as well as of seventeen "other Mensheviks" and nine "other neo-narodniks and other names to be remembered." It is clear from these accounts that the economists tried in 1931 were victimized because they refused to bend their consciences and their high standards of professional competence and integrity to support the demands of Stalin, Kuibyshev, and other Stalin henchmen for fantastically unrealistic production targets. The adoption of these targets, Jasny shows, led not to increased but to diminished output, and entailed catastrophic costs in wasted talent and resources, including widespread death by starvation. For their honesty and devotion to high professional standards, Groman, who according to Jasny was the first economist ever to prepare a macro-economic balance sheet; Kondratev, whose genius was acclaimed by the famous Austro-American economist, Schumpeter; and others paid, in effect, with their lives. Some rotted in labor camps until their premature deaths; others were hastened out of this world by murder in prison. Their collective fate provides one of many impressive bodies of evidence on how circumscribed is the role—in a hegemonic, ideologically rationalized system—of what Robert Dahl calls the "criterion of competence."¹ The difficulties encountered in the contemporary USSR

by critics of aspects of official Soviet policy that still make it difficult for highly trained specialists to function with maximum freedom and effectiveness indicate that this problem, though not as acute as in Stalin's time, has by no means been completely resolved. It *cannot* be resolved, all the books reviewed here indicate, in a system in which political loyalty and ideological conformity tend to be valued more than professional competence and autonomy.

COHEN'S EXCELLENT biography of Bukharin deals with some of the issues raised, at least by implication, in the other works discussed here, but it vastly exceeds them in the scope and significance of its subject matter and in its depth and power of interpretation. Even a very long review could only suggest the extraordinary richness of the book's content. We shall be forced, in the relatively brief space at our disposal, to be selective and somewhat schematic.²

Perhaps Cohen's greatest achievement is his brilliant and skillful presentation of the thesis that Bukharin devised a viable alternative to his opponents' "voluntaristic" strategy for socialist development. To appreciate fully Bukharin's creativity and innovativeness, it is necessary to recall not only the difficult circumstances in which the internationally isolated, war-ravaged Soviet republic found itself in the early 1920's, but also the nature of the radical Trotsky-Preobrazhensky development strategy, which was the main available alternative to Bukharin's program. The isolation of the So-

viet state, coupled with the exhausted condition of the world economy after World War I, meant that Soviet Russia could not obtain from abroad the substantial capital necessary for rapid economic reconstruction and development, and after the experience of civil war and foreign military intervention, it was quite plausible to think that one or more "capitalist" states might again attack the USSR. The Bolshevik "Left" argued that the appropriate development strategy in this dangerous situation was to industrialize rapidly at the expense of the peasantry, which—in Preobrazhensky's model—was in effect, to be treated as a "colony." Of course, when Stalin later broke up the Stalin-Bukharin duumvirate of 1925-28, he was to adopt a program even more radical in concept and far more brutal in execution than the most extreme proponents of the Left's strategy could have imagined.

In conflict first with the Trotsky-Preobrazhensky school and then with Stalin's program for forced-draft collectivization and militaristic industrialization, Bukharin set forth his own model for a gradual, peaceful "growing into socialism." It featured cooperation between workers and peasants, extensive development of agricultural cooperatives and other "voluntary organizations," emphasis on economic incentives rather than coercion, and substantial use of market techniques and mechanisms. Bukharin built this program on the foundation of what he considered to be the spirit and implications of Lenin's NEP and of Lenin's last publications. His was not a "revisionist" program nor a "narodnik" one, as first some Left critics and later the Stalinists were to claim. However, it did bear sig-

¹ *After the Revolution?*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970.

² For a more extended treatment, see this writer's review in *The Washington Post Book World*, Feb. 17, 1974.

nificant resemblances to non-Leninist social democratic thinking, and these became more apparent over time.

Despite its claim to a good Leninist pedigree and its intellectual brilliance and coherence, the Bukharin model was politically vulnerable. For one thing, its complexity and sophistication rendered it unappealing, and even suspect, to many party cadres. Moreover, although it was compatible with the thinking of Lenin in his last years, it lacked the familiar militancy and dogmatism of the earlier Lenin. Finally, and above all, it was repugnant to Stalin's "warfare personality" and incompatible with the "heroic tradition" of Bolshevism to which Stalin appealed. In the "crunch," Stalin's appeal to the politically relevant elements of Soviet society was far greater than Bukharin's. In part, this was because Stalin, in his campaign to undermine Bukharin in 1928-29, cast himself in the role not of an "adventurer" but of a sober, centrist interpreter of NEP against "rightist pessimism."

Along with his gradualist, evolutionary model for economic development, and indeed integrally associated with it, Bukharin articulated, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly, a critique of the dictatorial tendencies inherent in unchecked, uncontrolled state power, whether "capitalist" or socialist—a critique that anticipated the "new class" formula of Milovan Djilas and much of the content of post-Stalin "socialist humanism." During the early 1930's, in his greatly reduced but still influential role as editor of *Izvestia*, Bukharin also displayed a much clearer understanding than Stalin of the menace posed by Nazi Germany to both Soviet socialism and Western democracy. In the new situation

created by the Fascist threat, he stressed the common interests of Russia and the democracies.

It may be one of modern history's major tragedies that Bukharin was reviled, rejected, and judicially murdered, while his ideas were neither given a fair trial nor, after farcical condemnation in 1938, made accessible to the Soviet public. They still remain inaccessible, though they were partially and indirectly aired while Khrushchev was in power. By his insightful, systematic, and lucid presentation of Bukharin's thought, set in a rich historical context, Cohen has performed a major service to the cause of historical truth.

PERHAPS THE greatest value of these three studies lies in their relevance to what is certainly one of the most complex and difficult issues of our century—namely, the problematic relationship between socioeconomic development and intellectual and political freedom. The politically powerless Menshevik economists, of course, could not play any role in shaping the structure of the Soviet system. However, they were actuated by what Barrington Moore, Jr. has called "technical rationality"³: they were committed to professional integrity and autonomy. Bukharin, as well as Trotsky, set much greater store by these values than did the ruthless pragmatist, Stalin. The same values were to be reaffirmed by European Communist reformers after Stalin's death. Presumably, if Bukharin and Trotsky had lived until the era of economic reforms in the Communist countries, they would have enthusiastically supported the reforms,

³ *Terror and Progress USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

although they probably would also have deplored their relative superficiality. This writer lacks the knowledge necessary to determine whether or not the economists of the 1920's influenced the economic reforms of the 1960's; however, economic reform is certainly one component of the loose aggregation of liberal ideas and proposals that contemporary Soviet and East European critical and dissenting thinkers include under the rubric of "democratization." In this sense, there is clearly an element of continuity between the Menshevik economists and today's dissent in Communist societies.

As for Bukharin (and the same applies, at least to some extent, to the well-intentioned but confused Krupskaya), he offered a spirit and approach—more important, in retrospect, than the specifics of his program—that contrasted sharply with what Alexander Erlich has called the "unique blend of creeping fear, exhilaration of battle, and *la patrie en danger* psychosis"⁴ that took hold in 1929, held Russia in thrall for some 20 years, and still permeates the dominant political culture of the USSR today, even if considerably weakened. One measure of the continued high degree of unfreedom still prevalent in the Soviet Union may be seen in the fact that even the relatively liberal Khrushchev, though he absolved Bukharin of criminal charges, was unwilling—or, more likely, as Cohen believes, unable—for political reasons to fully "rehabilitate" him. That would have involved implicitly challenging one of the pillars of Soviet political orthodoxy: namely, the methods and outcome

⁴ *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960. p. 181.

of Stalinist agricultural collectivization. Bukharin had denounced Stalin's policy in this field as the exaction of "tribute" from the peasantry and, in effect, as a revival of Tsarist "military-feudal" despotism. The present Soviet leadership has rejected even Khrushchev's partial rehabilitation of Bukharin and has revived, even if in less strident tone, the Stalinist interpretation of Bukharin's role in Soviet history.

It is highly probable that if the limited and unsystematic "democratization" begun by Khrushchev had continued instead of being partially reversed by his successors, Bukharin would today be regarded as a continuator of the Marx and Lenin traditions, and Stalin would be looked upon as a "revisionist." Certainly, full freedom to discuss Bukharin's ideas and a thoroughgoing reexamination of the historical record would have figured prominently in such a process. Instead of liberalization and reform, however, the incumbent Soviet authorities have—except in the scientific and technical spheres, where their record has been better in some respects than Khrushchev's—pursued increasingly repressive policies, especially since 1968.

This backsliding from the limited progress made under Khrushchev toward freedom of expression and protection of individual civil rights indicates how difficult it is in a one-party dictatorship to follow through on a program of liberalization. To some Soviet citizens, especially liberal intellectuals, the failure of Khrushchev, and still more so of Brezhnev and his fellow oligarchs, to implement the freedoms set forth in the Soviet constitution has been a frus-

trating and disillusioning experience. There is no doubt that this experience has helped many who had already been deeply stirred by Khrushchev's revelations regarding Stalin's abuses of power to begin to shake off the effects of the political indoctrination to which they had been subjected throughout their lives.

IT IS OF COURSE difficult to evaluate, let alone measure, the impact of this and other negative experiences, especially the post-Khrushchev tightening of control over historical, literary, and other nontechnical modes of inquiry and expression. However, it seems clear that these developments, especially since the beginning of the police crackdown on dissent in 1965 and even more since the intensification of that crackdown in 1968, have contributed to an acceleration of ideological erosion. In any case, a striking feature of recent Soviet dissent has been the tendency among critical Soviet intellectuals to reject Marxism, or at least Leninism (as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn clearly does in his *Gulag Archipelago*), and also Soviet "socialism (Andrei Sakharov is a case in point) in favor of either a non-dogmatic "scientific" approach to social problems or a universalistic or "eternalist"⁵ ethic—or, more frequently, some combination of both. There are exceptions, of course, as witness Roy Medvedev's Leninist "socialist democracy." But even Medvedev, though he tries hard to reconcile Leninism and democracy, is probably more democratic than Leninist.

⁵ See Lewis Feuer, "The Intelligentsia in Opposition," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1970.

It would be an exaggeration, at this stage, to conclude that the recent tendency of some of the USSR's best minds, including some important non-Russian intellectuals, to reject or revise official Soviet "Marxism-Leninism" is indicative of a trend toward general acceptance of the concept of polyarchy in the USSR. However, this tendency may well be connected in a very significant way with the events described in the books under review. For it would appear that the consistent failure of the Soviet regime—as evidenced by the repudiation of Bukharin's relatively civilized version of Soviet Marxism and later by the rejection of Khrushchev's reformist course—to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of development and democratization, of modernization and freedom, is becoming increasingly apparent to Soviet dissenters (this is crystal clear in Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag*) as well as to non-Soviet analysts of Soviet affairs.

In conclusion, however, a word of caution is in order. Whatever their other messages may be, the books reviewed here provide abundant evidence of the depth and capacity to survive of Soviet authoritarianism. It would be fatuous indeed to ignore this phenomenon or the challenge it poses and can be expected to go on posing for the polyarchies of this world. Nor can we afford to overlook the fact that the fate of the Medvedev brothers, of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn—not to mention less well-known and less fortunate Soviet dissenters—is tragically similar to that of Trotsky, Bukharin, Krupskaya, and other protestors of the 1920's and 1930's, at least in terms of the implications for the character of Soviet power.

Through a Glass Sharply

By Abraham Brumberg

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE: *Chronicles of Wasted Time*. Vol. I: *The Green Stick*. Vol. II: *The Infernal Grove*. New York, William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1973 and 1974, respectively.

IS THERE ANYONE who doesn't know that Malcolm Muggeridge writes with a flare and brilliance perhaps unequaled by any English language writer on either side of the Atlantic? If there is, let him read these first two of a three-volume series (Volume III is due off the press in 1975). No doubt he will come to the conclusion, as did this reviewer, that if half of our journalists and scholars—and sundry permutations thereof—could write half as well as Muggeridge, a reader's life would be a joy rather than the benumbing ordeal it so frequently is. To be sure, style without substance tends to become tiresome, and if *Chronicles of Wasted Time* rivets one's attention from the first page of Volume I to the last of Volume II, it is because behind the well-turned phrases, the sparkling epigrams, the mordant wit and brittle humor, there lurk a sagacious mind, an infectious humanity, and an extraordinary ability to seize and retain the essence of any event, however trivial or horrendous.

Chronicles of Wasted Time belongs to the genre of biography (in this case autobiography) as history; and, as other reviewers have already remarked, it is probably one of the best this century has produced. Nearly fifty years of British (and not only British) life and politics unfolds in its pages: London and the English countryside in the early 1900's; World War I and the "twilight of empire"; England in the 1920's, Russia in the early 1930's, and India prior to World War II; the Blitz, the war, and finally the "illusory peace," as Muggeridge wryly dubs the end of the hostilities and their aftermath. Muggeridge's father was a genuine proletarian, a stalwart socialist (he eventually became an MP) with a touching faith in the perfectibility of man and society. This faith proved to be, in an odd sort of way, the shaping force of Malcolm's life, imbuing him at one and the same time with an affection for dreamers but an abiding suspicion of the stuff that dreams are made of and a withering scorn for the impostors who traffic in them.

Unlike his father, who held onto the same job throughout his life, Malcolm Muggeridge has always been restless, changing jobs and domiciles as often as some men change their neckties. After an ob-

ligatory and not too successful stay at Cambridge, he became a teacher in a small English college in India, then a budding editorial-writer for *The Manchester Guardian*. Next came brief terms as a newspaperman in Moscow, as a bureaucrat in the International Labor Office in Geneva, again as a journalist in India and London, and during World War II as a propagandist for the Ministry of Information, a volunteer in the Home Army, and finally a member of the British Secret Service (SIS)—first in Lourenço Marques (Portuguese Africa) and then, after the landing in Normandy, in Paris. The contacts he made during all these peregrinations produce a dazzling array of portraits: pompous politicians, hard-drinking newspapermen, impotent writers, eccentric generals, pimps, prostitutes, financial tycoons, police informants, intelligence agents, and government officials of one sort or another. There is a lethal description (or rather series of descriptions) of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, authors of that most dubious piece of scholarship, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*—a title from which, Muggeridge notes, the question mark was dropped "as Stalin got into his stride as the master-terrorist of his age." (Muggeridge married Beatrice