

real wages is almost certainly overstated, if only because the real scarcity of housing is not reflected in the price index and the housing situation is no better than it was three or four years ago. But it is consistent with the substantial improvement in the market supply of consumer goods, particularly of durable goods, which has struck the attention of foreign observers who visited the country both in 1956 and 1959.

Concluding Note

The economic experiments of the last three years were so deeply embedded in Poland's complex politics that they afford little scope for generalizations. Was it the nature of the Communist political system which militated against decentralization? Or did Gomulka wish to liberalize the economy but fail because his economic advisers could not develop instruments of remote control in time to keep the inflationary situation from getting out of hand? These arguments are equally plausible; just as it may also be urged that Gomulka originally had the intention of going ahead with liberalization, but that he was dissuaded from doing so by the representations of Soviet leaders intent on minimizing institutional deviations among the members of the Communist bloc. After all, party activists in Prague or Mos-

cow might find it hard to explain to the staffs of nationalized enterprises chafing under a centralized bureaucratic system that it was all right to have plant autonomy and active workers' councils in next-door Poland, but that such heresies could not be tolerated at home.

Finally, the changing balance of forces within the United Workers' Party may have had a good deal to do with the renewed emphasis on discipline and austerity. As the more liberal elements in the party—including such influential men as W. Bienkowski and J. Morawski—were gradually eased out of power and the party began to lose such credit as it had gained in public opinion during the events of October 1956, there was little recourse left but to rely on the hard core of martinets in the party apparatus, who were happy to substitute disciplinary measures and dictation for the weak incentives and the mild persuasion which had failed to bring out the maximum productive effort from the population. Only time will tell whether these old hands can steer clear of the "mistakes and excesses of the past"; the failure to build automatic controls into the economic system in the last three years and the arbitrariness of recent investment decisions, let alone the new drive for political conformity, hardly augur well for the future.

Hungary's Craving for Normalcy

By Paul Ignotus

MORE THAN THREE YEARS after the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution, the gulf between the Russian-imposed regime and the bulk of the Hungarian population is as wide as ever. But there is one thing about which the people see eye to eye with their rulers: in one way or another, all would like life to become

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"normal." The government is apparently haunted by the memory of 1956 and spares no effort to prevent a rebirth of the 1956 spirit, oscillating between tactics of greater leniency and administrative repression. The people, on the other hand, are simply tired of dramatic events, disappointed with frustrated hopes, and apathetic about politics. Their major concern has become making money, however possible, and enjoying the modest pleasures afforded by the return to a comparatively normal existence.

This craving for normalcy is reflected in the main achievements of the regime. All labor power possible has been concentrated on rebuilding the city of Buda-

pest and particularly on removing the traces of battle left by the "counterrevolution." Foreign observers have recently been struck by the tidiness and order of the city, or at any rate its central district.¹ One of the great buildings reconstructed and polished with care is the former Kilian barracks in *Ulloi ut*, the fortress of the freedom fighters led by Pal Maleter, since executed. Though it had served historically and traditionally as a military barracks, it has now been transformed into a block of flats.

Progress—toward Greater Inequality

Living conditions have unquestionably improved, though it is hard to measure the degree of improvement. Statistics, if not all completely faked, are so manipulated to fit propaganda needs that it is impossible to rely on them. Some of the regime's claims were enumerated by the Minister of Labor, Odon Kishazi, in a December speech summarizing the achievements of 1959:

The real wages earned by those living on wages and salaries . . . by the end of 1959 reach, and in some instances even exceed, the amount originally foreseen for the end of the Three-Year Plan in 1960. . . . Nominal wages have increased by 2 to 3 percent. The working hours of some 30,000 working people have been reduced.²

That a 2 to 3 percent wage increase does not mean very much, considering the very low income level on which it is based, was admitted by the Minister. He stated that there were other factors improving living conditions but did not make clear what they were; certainly prices have not been reduced.

Everyone moving about in the towns and villages agrees, however, that some modest degree of steady improvement has been noticeable ever since the consolidation of the regime. In towns this is evidenced most clearly by the comparatively greater choice of commodities in shopwindows (although more often than not of very poor quality) and by the large crowds patronizing restaurants, cafe-essposos, and the movie theaters. Every chance is granted to the public to be as "normal" in leisure pursuits as possible. Christmas in particular was used as an occasion to prove that normalcy had at last been achieved, as reflected both in the un-Marxist emotional atmosphere which prevailed and in the seasonal

¹ E.g., see Douglas Cameron, "As Seen by a Foreigner," and "Eyewitness Reports" by anonymous Hungarian correspondents, in the refugee journal *Irodalmi Ujsag* (The Literary Gazette, London), Oct. 15, 1959; see also photograph of Budapest by Michael Petho, *The Observer* (London), Nov. 29, 1959.

² *Nepszava* (Budapest), daily of the party-controlled trade unions, Dec. 25, 1959.

boost to commerce. Previous attempts to play down the importance of Christmas as a religious holiday were abandoned, and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Gyula Kallai, even celebrated "Our Christmas" in a headlined article, combining quotations from the Holy Gospel with such commercial data as the following:

This year on the Saturday and Sunday before Christmas, the turnover in the shops of Budapest exceeded by 14.9 percent that of last year. In [the provincial towns of] Gyor, the increase was 25.8 percent; in Debrecen, 21 percent; in Pecs, 23.4 percent; in Szeged, 51.4 percent.³

FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS are promised for the years ahead, on the basis of the Five-Year Plan adopted at the Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party (held in Budapest, November 30-December 5). The plan sets forth more reasonable goals than its predecessors, probably reflecting the regime's sensitivity to present popular feeling as well as to past planning blunders—in particular, the disastrous failure to achieve over-ambitious economic goals during the reign of Rakosi and Gero, despite their zealous slave-driving efforts.

The new plan may prove more successful by virtue of its caution. However, authoritative explanations of its provisions reveal that it has a strong tendency to neglect the interests of the average worker and consumer in favor of those serving the regime best. For instance, in an article introducing the plan to the general public, the economic weekly of the Kadar government states:

According to the directing principles, the per capita real income of workers and employes must be increased by at least 26-29 percent . . . and the real income of the peasantry to the same extent.⁴

However, after some fairly vague and involved descriptions of the step-by-step improvements in income to be aimed at during the next seven years, the article adds:

The continuous increase of wages must be tied to the task of introducing wage systems giving a greater incentive. . . . The principles adopted do not aim at increasing the low wages at a greater pace. . . . It is labor requiring greater skill, greater responsibility, etc., which should be better paid.

The article also makes clear that no price reductions of considerable significance can be expected. The im-

³ *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), the official party daily, Dec. 25, 1959.

⁴ *Figyelo* (Budapest), Nov. 17, 1959.

provement of living conditions—to the extent that it is achieved—will thus create a trend toward greater inequality, widening the gap between the living standard of the poorest elements and that of the better-paid layers of society.

Collectivization—Damoclean Sword

From a strictly financial and temporary point of view, rural conditions have been better since the crushing of the revolution than before; since the former system of compulsory delivery of produce has not yet been re-introduced, the peasant small-holders have fared quite well. They eat their chickens and spend their marketing profits more freely—but not in spite of feeling insecure; rather because of it.

That the forceful drive for "collectivization," though suspended earlier this year, will eventually be resumed on an all-out scale is deemed inevitable and awaited with dread. At the beginning of last year, 13 percent of the arable land was owned by state farms and another 13 percent by collectives. By summer the share of the collectives had increased to some 33 percent, leaving the farmers about 54 percent. By the end of 1958 the balance had turned: the collective and state sectors together constituted 55.8 percent of the land in late December and rose to 70 percent by mid-February.

The announcement in February that the collectivization campaign would be generally relaxed was probably motivated in part by the admitted shortage of tractors and other equipment necessary for cooperative farming (see cartoon on this page) and in part by the regime's need for peasant cooperation during the spring planting season. But the peasants can hope for nothing more than

a temporary respite. At the Party Congress in December, where problems of agriculture were a primary topic of discussion, the completion of collectivization was cited by Kadar himself as the "decisive task" confronting the party. And reports persist that party cadres are applying harsh pressure against smallholders on a piecemeal, region-to-region basis. One result has been an increased exodus from the land to the cities—about the only form of resistance left to the peasants—reportedly serious enough to have warranted administrative interference in some areas.


The method adopted to bring about collectivization is called "peaceful persuasion," supposedly distinct from the violent coercive methods used by the Rakosi regime, which is even today denounced as having been "out of touch with the masses." The "peaceful" violence of 1959 was no doubt less spectacular than that of 1949-52. All the same, it was rather frightening. It is reliably reported that party shock-troops raided one or another village by surprise, usually at dusk; they used such methods as cutting off the electric current and then visiting the farmers one by one; whoever was found milking his cow by candlelight was charged with risking fire and threatened with punishment—unless of course he was willing to join the cooperative. Despite the "peacefulness" of such persuasion, many farmers were seen with bleeding foreheads after their arguments with the shock-troopers.⁵ The theater of these scenes last year was mainly Transdanubia.

Although spokesmen of the regime have repeatedly denied any intention of reintroducing coercion, they have

⁵ See *Irodalmi Újság*, Oct. 15, 1959. Description of such methods are from sources whose reliability is considered beyond question.

Ez aztán a gyors-szervíz

Mészáros András rajza



— Ne búsulj, komám, itt hozom a pótalkatrészt!

FAST SERVICE

—Don't be sad, chum; I've brought a spare part!

—From Ludas Matyi (Budapest), Nov. 12, 1959.

announced with assurance that "by 1965 the number of those living on wages and salaries will have increased by 600,000, compared to 1958, as a result of the progress of agriculture on the road to collective farming."⁶ Apparently conversions through peaceful persuasion can be counted in advance.

The Convenience of Corruption

The main asset of the present regime seems to be that people, particularly in economic deals, do not observe its regulations. The authorities nonchalantly tolerate corruption in order to keep things going in a "normal" way. The data about increased turnover in shops and cafes may be correct; but such spending certainly does not tally with the far more modest reports of increase in legally-acquired incomes. What do people live on? "On what they get from abroad and on what they pinch," a visitor told me. Indeed, except for the two highly-paid elites—the professional intelligentsia, ranging from opera-singers to surgeons and plant managers, and the high-level bureaucracy of party secretaries, cabinet ministers and security chiefs—no one could possibly make ends meet without being helped either by the capitalist West or by home-made corruption. It is part of the lack of "dogmatism" practiced by the Kadar regime to fill high posts with persons previously labeled as "typically bourgeois racketeers," encouraging them to maintain trade links with the West and to get on as good terms as possible with Western industrialists. On the state and collective farms as well as in shops and factories, practically everybody is out for extra-legal gain through embezzlement, pilfering, and the like. Now and then there are show-trials to prove the necessity of vigilance against corruption,⁷ but most people risk arrest without hesitation.

Parcels sent to Hungarians by relatives in other countries have heretofore amounted to a very considerable proportion of the Hungarian national income, but the Kadar regime has adopted an increasingly stiff attitude toward them. At the beginning of 1957, every sort of help was welcomed, even individual aid from politically-tainted émigrés to so-called "counterrevolutionaries" at home. Later, duties were imposed on commodities sent in gift parcels, and subsequently raised to an almost prohibitive level. The aim was to force Western relatives of Hungarians to make greater use of governmental channels of aid, which enable the regime to get hold of hard currency. Under the official IKKA scheme, any-

⁶ *Figyelo*, Nov. 17, 1959.

⁷ E.g., see report on "Inefficient Supervision—Embezzling of Several Hundred Thousand Forints," *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1959.

one is allowed to pay cash for unlimited quantities of goods without charge for duty, but at prices which allow the Hungarian state to keep about 60 to 80 percent of the money paid in by the sender.

At the end of last year, a campaign was launched against the senders of relief parcels, accusing them of acting as agents of foreign imperialists whose aim is to turn the population against the Hungarian government. In particular, the well-known Social-Democratic leader Anna Kethly, Minister of State in the Imre Nagy coalition government, was accused of initiating efforts to undermine the Hungarian peoples' democracy by seeming acts of charity.⁸ Evidence suggests that Hungarians are politically indifferent to such propaganda though they may well feel fear that recipients of parcels will be blacklisted and eventually persecuted.

1848 and 1956

Politically, the Hungarian scene has consolidated, initiating a new phase of stale conformism. In the past there were rumors of internecine strife between the "Centrists" on the one hand, headed by Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich (respectively First Party Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers), and the "Leftists" on the other, including Antal Apro (First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and Arpad Kiss (Chairman of the National Planning Office). The latter group reportedly was trying to remove the former from the top leadership. It is difficult to guess what the precise differences were between them, since it was doubtless the Kremlin which dictated the prevailing policy of a "simultaneous fight against dogmatism and revisionism" (which in fact meant persecution only of so-called revisionists, since the dogmatists, defined as advocates of the Rakosi line, had long since ceased to declare themselves in public). The real difference between the two factions was perhaps one of degree: Kadar carried out Moscow's orders for repression obediently, but without showing any great pleasure in doing so, while Apro and his close circle seemed to favor repressive measures with a vengeance even while supporting the "anti-dogmatist" line.

In any event it seems clear that Kadar now has the firm upper hand within the party.⁹ His position has

⁸ "So They Betray the Fatherland," *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 25, 1959.

⁹ This seems indicated by some of the changes in top governmental personnel since the Party Congress (reported, *i.a.*, in *Nepszabadsag*, Jan. 16, 1960). Most important is the appointment of Gyula Kallai, considered a Kadar supporter, as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, making him in effect the successor of the aged Premier Dr. Munnich.

been immeasurably boosted by demonstrations of support from Moscow, manifested most recently when Khrushchev attended the Hungarian Party Congress.

The main aim of Khrushchev's visit, however, was far more interesting than his helpful hand to Kadar: he wanted to demonstrate Soviet-Hungarian solidarity in an effort to write off the issue of the Hungarian revolution, talk of which, as will be remembered, provoked his extreme temper while he was visiting the United States. The Soviet Premier's performance in Budapest started with a moderate, markedly statesmanlike and "coexistentialist" speech at the Party Congress on December 1, when he had a good word to say for all his Western colleagues except Dr. Adenauer. But the following day, when talking more informally to the workers of the MAVAG factory, he demonstrated his penchant for rash statements when he disclosed that at the time of the Hungarian uprising, opinion in the Kremlin had been divided about whether to interfere. This had always been suspected, but the admission came as a surprise and no one really knows what may have prompted the Soviet Premier to confirm the fact. The apologia he put out for the eventual Soviet intervention was certainly ill-advised if it was aimed at winning over Hungarian opinion. He said:

Comrades! At the time of the revolution of 1848, when the Hungarian people was struggling for its national liberation against the army of the Austrian emperor, Franz Josef, the Russian Tsar, Nicholas I, did not hesitate for a moment to interfere in the internal affairs of the Hungarian people. Seeing that the throne of Franz Josef was shaken, he sent his army to crush the Hungarian revolution. . . . How then could we, the working classes and the working people of the Soviet Union, whose troops were stationed on Hungarian soil under the Warsaw agreement, tolerate the annihilation of the Hungarian people's power. . . .?¹⁰

All that he added about the Fascist and imperialist character of the Hungarian "counterrevolution" was mere repetition of slogans; but in his extemporaneous analogy of 1956 with the Russian Tsarist interference of 1848-49, he offered a confirmation to be savored by those "whispering propagandists" who had always claimed that Tsarist and Bolshevik imperialism did not substantially differ.

The Course Ahead

The Congress caused great disappointment to many who had hoped for an announcement that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Hungary. Kadar's declaration

¹⁰ *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 3, 1959.

that this was out of the question for the time being and that "Soviet troops will remain in Hungary as long as the international situation requires" was a bitter pill to swallow. He added further gall by emphasizing that even after the withdrawal of the troops the present system of administration, with its strengthened and reorganized security forces, would remain unchanged.¹¹

Even more indicative of the political course ahead was the speech of Vice-Premier Kallai, who has come to be recognized as the "chief ideologist" in Hungary. While carefully refraining from attacks on the non-Communist great powers, he was harsh in blaming the Hungarian Writers' Association and Petofi Circle (of young intellectuals) for the "counterrevolution" of 1956. He welcomed the prospect of peaceful coexistence, but added:

In the period of peaceful coexistence, we must strengthen the fight against every manifestation of bourgeois ideology. . . . We must get rid of revisionist thinking in every way. . . . Art and literature must become party-minded. . . .¹²

The essence of the policy adopted during and since the Seventh Party Congress can be summed up like this: courtesy toward foreigners, tact toward conservative emotional tradition, leniency toward bourgeois money-making techniques, but unrelenting intolerance against any trends to liberalize communism at home, and perpetuated persecution of the "revisionist" intellectuals held responsible for such trends in the past.

New Palliatives

The reaction of the population to recent developments is one of contempt and hatred for the regime; but also one of an apathy mitigated, as far as possible, by a happy-go-lucky spirit. Many people try to save up money to buy a car or a television set, which are still luxury goods in Hungary, though not so entirely out of reach as before. Private ownership of cars was until recently a privilege for which permission was needed; the extension of this right to the public at large was a great concession by the government—or in official parlance, a battle won in its "fight against dogmatism."

Another such concession (or battle won) was to put an end to the persecution of church-goers. No far-reaching or solid settlement has yet been brought about between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, and the fact that Cardinal Mindszenty, an arch-enemy of

¹¹ Kadar's speech of Nov. 30, *ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1959.

¹² *Elet es Irodalom* (Budapest), weekly of the reorganized Hungarian Writers' Association, Dec. 4, 1959.

communism, is still enjoying the hospitality of the US Legation in Budapest cannot fail to remind party bosses and ordinary people alike of the deep cleavage that continues to divide the Kremlin and the Vatican. Nevertheless, anti-religious and even anti-Catholic propaganda has been conspicuously soft-pedaled in Hungary. The acting head of the Roman Catholic Church, Archbishop Grosz, and several other high-ranking priests have been awarded distinctions in recognition of their "services to peace"; and the "peace priests" proper, though on very uneasy terms with the rest of priesthood, seem willing enough to advertise the popularity of the latter—at least they have boasted of the "churches being packed" in talking to Western journalists.¹³

Broken Resistance

The writers and other intellectuals, whose refusal to toe the line has haunted and still goes on haunting the Hungarian Communist leaders, seem to have made such accommodation as most of them thought wise or unavoidable. On September 25, 1959, the Hungarian Writers' Association, banned after the reoccupation by Soviet forces, was reorganized on "party-minded" lines. Its "unanimously" elected Board was stacked, as could be expected, with an overwhelming majority of literary *apparatchiki*. Yet most of the important writers were induced, if not to attend the meeting, at least to send a telegram of greeting.

In a recent article this writer described the three modern trends in literature which have most plagued the regime and the efforts it has made to counteract them—to win over by threats and cajolement the "populists" or "folkwriters"; partly to bury and partly to expropriate the heritage of the "urbanizers," or the non-Communist Left; and to discredit the "revisionists" either by expelling them from cultural life altogether or by compelling them to deliver public "self-criticisms" in a manner sufficiently humiliating to destroy their prestige.¹⁴ Owing to the general atmosphere of apathy, these efforts have to some extent been successful.

A symbolic act from this point of view was the visit of the important and gifted "populist" author, Laszlo

¹³ See report in *The Observer*, Dec. 20, 1959. The "peace priests" are a relatively small group of clericals who since the early 1950's have given active political support to the Communist regime. Their defiance of a Vatican decree of 1957 proscribing priests' participation in political activities led to their excommunication the following year; nevertheless they continue to carry on clerical duties with the support of the regime, though they are unrecognized by the rest of the clergy.

¹⁴ "Hungarian Intellectuals Under Fire," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May-June), 1959.

Nemeth, to Moscow, during and since which he has paid several tributes to Soviet culture.¹⁵ The regime has given considerable publicity to such manifestations of faltering resistance. At the same time the Communist controlled trade-union daily, *Nepszava*, originally the mouthpiece of the Social Democratic Party, has started a literary supplement named *Szép Szó* (meaning "Beautiful Word" or "Argument") which before the war was the title of a literary magazine edited by "urbanizers," chiefly the late poet Attila Jozsef.

Some very few writers of these two groups, and far more from among the "revisionists," are still conspicuous for their silence. It is hard to decide where this is due to the writers' being blacklisted, and where to their carrying on with the "sit-down strike"; but that in some cases, at any rate, it is the perseverance of writers which bars them from reentering the literary arena can be seen from Kallai's remark in his speech at the Party Congress:

There are still some few writers—but no longer more than a very few—who have up to now lacked the moral courage to face their own past mistakes and who have thus expelled themselves from the living, alive, and healthily progressing [sic] Hungarian literature.¹⁶

A Case for Amnesty

The saddest aspect of the anti-revisionist nightmare is the continued imprisonment of leading authors, scholars and journalists,¹⁷ as well as of masses of nameless youth, mainly former students and workers. During the last half of 1959, numerous rumors reached other countries of executions either carried out or to take place in Hungary; many of these reports remain unsubstantiated but at least eight proved to be true. As long as the present system of security is in force, it would be futile to estimate their number. A British woman journalist, who shocked readers with some of her remarks favorable to the Kadar regime, wrote in this connection:

"Socialist legality" did not help me [in Budapest] to obtain answers to two plain questions I put to every senior Communist official I met: "How many people have been executed since 1956? How many political prisoners are still in jail?"¹⁸

¹⁵ E.g., his "toast" at the gathering of the Soviet Writers' Union, reprinted in *Elet es Irodalom*, Oct. 23, 1959.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1959.

¹⁷ E.g., the novelist Tibor Dery, the playwright Gyula Hay, the young writers Gali and Obersovszky. Among those who were not Communist Party members, there are the legal historian Istvan Bibo, the labor leader Istvan Erdei, and many others.

¹⁸ Nora Beloff, "Kadar's Hungary," Part II, *The Observer*, Dec. 20, 1959.

It was such acts of revenge and the practice of repression which seem to have prompted Sir Leslie Munro's report on Hungary, on the grounds of which the United Nations once again condemned the Soviet and Hungarian governments for their refusal to cooperate in the implementation of the UN Charter. Some persons reported disparaging remarks made by Hungarian citizens on that occasion, to the effect that "We have had enough of resolutions." But according to the writer's information most of them would add: ". . . though of course a resolution is still better than nothing."

Toward the regime, at any rate, the Hungarians' state of mind is likely to remain as it has been de-

scribed in this paper—an admixture of contempt and hatred tempered by apathy and indifference—unless and until repression gives way to a genuine effort to pacify the nation. A political amnesty would not be sufficient in this respect, but would be an important step in the right direction. April 4 of this year—the 16th anniversary of Hungary's liberation from the Nazis—will provide the next conventional date when the Hungarian government might, Moscow permitting, prove that it no longer fears the power of silenced writers and disarmed youngsters, the hapless prisoners who have now been kept under lock and key for some three years.

TRUTH AND CIRCUMSTANCES . . .

I wish to make it clear that all today's decisions by the Council of Ministers [to abolish the one-party system and reconstitute a coalition of democratic parties] were taken with the full approval of the Presidium of the Hungarian Workers' Party, and I would add that I am in complete agreement with the remarks just made by my friend Imre Nagy.—*Kadar as a member of Nagy's cabinet, Radio Kossuth, Oct. 30, 1956.*

In a glorious uprising, the people have overthrown the Rakosi regime. They have won for our country the freedom and independence without which there can be no socialism. We can assert with confidence that the authors of the uprising were drawn from our ranks. It was the Communists, writers, journalists, and students, the young people of the Petöfi Circle, the workers and peasants in their thousands, and the veteran militants unjustly imprisoned, who formed the spearhead against Rakosi's despotism and gangster politics. We are proud of you, for you took your proper place in the armed uprising. You were imbued with true patriotism and loyalty towards socialism. . . .—*Kadar announcing the dissolution of the old Communist Party and formation of a new one, Radio Kossuth, Nov. 1, 1956.*

In order to settle this affair, the Hungarian Government, in conformity with the proposal contained in the Yugoslav Government's letter to me of 18 November 1956, repeats herewith the assurance already given several times by word of mouth that it has no desire to punish Imre Nagy and the members of his group in any way for their past activities.—*Kadar in a note to the Yugoslav Government, quoted in The Truth about the Nagy Affair, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1959, p. 12.*

. . . Kadar and the October Revolution

The success of the counterrevolutionary attack was due to the treason of the Nagy-Losonczy group of renegades. Under cover of correcting errors, they tried to destroy the party and, by allying themselves with the forces of blackest reaction, they played into the hands of counter-revolution . . . by their work of treason and disintegration they paralyzed the forces of the party and the state, which were loyally defending the socialist cause.—*Kadar speaking in Moscow, Nepszabadsag, March 28, 1957.*

We are in complete agreement [with the Russians] as regards the role played by the traitors of the Nagy-Losonczy group.—*Kadar statement after his return from Moscow, Nepszabadsag, April 2, 1957.*

The judicial authorities have concluded the proceedings in the case of the leading group of individuals who, with the active cooperation of the imperialists, precipitated an armed counterrevolutionary uprising on October 23, 1956, designed to overthrow the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic. . . .

The court therefore sentenced Imre Nagy to death . . . [Three others were also sentenced to death, and five more to prison terms from five years to life. Losonczy died in prison.] The death sentences have been carried out.—*Communiqué of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice, June 17, 1958.*

Imre Nagy, the traitor to his country, and his group followed the road of factionalism within the party up to abandoning the workers' power and to soliciting the interference of the imperialists. We had to break radically with the traitors and level guns at them.—*Kadar at the Seventh Party Congress, Radio Budapest, Nov. 30, 1959.*

The "Classless Society"

EDITORS' NOTE: Among the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, and particularly since Khrushchev's assumption of power, two trends—seemingly contradictory, yet essentially complementary in character—emerge in sharp relief. One is the trend toward a partial lowering of the rigid social and economic barriers that separated the distinctly privileged from the distinctly unprivileged in Stalin's "socialist" society; the other has been the tendency toward gradual enhancement of the position of the Communist Party in all spheres of public life.

These two trends form the subject matter of the articles below. In the first, Mr. Feldmesser traces the progress as well as the limitations of the process of "social undifferentiation," and offers a provocative explanation of its causes. In the second, Mr. Bialer provides a somewhat different interpretation of recent Soviet developments in

this area (particularly with regard to agriculture); the bulk of his article, however, is concerned with the intricate relationship between the seemingly increased emphasis on egalitarianism on the one hand, and the simultaneous strengthening of what has come to be the ruling stratum in Soviet society—the apparatus of the Communist Party, the thin layer of political officials exercising unlimited power over the 200 million inhabitants of the USSR.

Elsewhere in this issue the reader will find other items relating to the general topic of Messrs. Feldmesser's and Bialer's articles: the book reviews (pp. 51-58), and the Notes and Views section, which features articles on the role of the Communist Party in education and journalism respectively. Future issues will carry further detailed reports on the current status of workers and peasants, as well as up-to-date surveys of the activities and prerogatives of Russia's new rulers.

Equality and Inequality under Khrushchev

By Robert A. Feldmesser

A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN written on the emergence of gross inequalities of wealth, privilege, and official honor in Soviet society. The process, fully described and documented, may be said to have begun with a famous speech by Stalin in 1931, in which he denounced "equality-mongering" in the wage structure and called

Mr. Feldmesser is a young American sociologist, formerly associated with the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, and now Assistant Professor of Sociology at Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. The present article is based on a larger study of social mobility in the USSR, which Mr. Feldmesser is currently writing under a grant from the Social Science Research Council, and which will contain, of course, fuller documentation than that provided here.

for a new attitude of "solicitude" toward the intelligentsia; it manifested itself in highly differentiated incomes, in a change in the composition of the Communist Party, in the establishment of tuition fees and other more subtle obstacles to higher education, in elegant uniforms and elaborate titles, and in a host of other ways. By the end of World War II, and particularly during the last years of Stalin's life, the trend was clear: The Soviet Union was well advanced along a seemingly irreversible course toward a rigid system of social stratification, in which the upper classes would remain upper, the lower classes lower, and the twain would rarely meet.

Yet the irreversible has now been reversed. With that breathtaking facility which so often startles us, the Soviet