

Trade Unions in Mao's China

By H. ARTHUR STEINER

CONTROL of the labor force is a *sine qua non* of the present-day Communist state. With rapid industrialization as its major goal, the Chinese Communist regime has imposed on its working population one of the most rigid sets of controls ever devised by a dictatorial system. Industrial labor has been harnessed to the point where it can be manipulated to serve the political and economic purposes of the state and the party. Intensive indoctrination has been employed to establish in the workers' minds a "correct Communist attitude toward labor." Disciplinary pressures to speed up production and improve its quality are aggressively applied.

The principal instrument for these purposes is the elaborate, party-controlled trade union apparatus. Trade unions in the People's Republic of China (CPR) are officially defined as "mass organizations of all manual and non-manual workers living entirely or mainly on their wages"; and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is designated as "the supreme leading body of the trade unions."¹ The total membership of the Communist-controlled trade unions has reportedly increased from 800,000 in 1945 to 12,450,000 in 1955, more than trebling since the establishment of the CPR in 1949.² The continuation

¹ Constitution of the Trade Unions of the CPR (May 10, 1953), Preamble and Article 12, published in *The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions*, Peiping, Foreign Language Press, 1953, pp. 127-141; also Hsü Chih-chen, "Report on the Amendment to the Constitution of the Trade Unions of the CPR" (May 3, 1953), hereafter cited as Hsü, "Report," *ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

Prior to May 1953, the Chinese name of the organization was customarily translated as "All-China Federation of Labor" (ACFL); thereafter, "All-China Federation of Trade Unions" (ACFTU) became the preferred translation. In this study, "ACFTU" is uniformly used as the English abbreviation of the organization.

² Figures from *Hsin-hua jib-pao* (New China Daily), Chungking, March 20, 1945; the annual report of the ACFTU, May 1, 1950, as translated in *Current Background*, Hong Kong, No. 24, p. 3 (hereafter cited as CB); Lai Jo-yü, in *Kung-jen jib-pao* (Daily Worker), Peiping, April 30, 1955, (hereafter cited as *Daily Worker*); and the New China News Agency's *Daily News Release*, Peiping, May 1955, p. 9 (hereafter cited as NCNA and DNR).

Mr. Steiner is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, California. He visited China in 1937, 1939-40, 1941, and 1948-49—the last time as Visiting Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at the National Cheng-chi University, Nanking. He is the author of *Maoism; A Sourcebook* (1952), *Chinese Communism in Action* (3 Parts, 1953), and other studies.

of present trends would produce about 14,000,000 trade union members by the end of 1957 out of an estimated total working force of 16,150,000.³

ACFTU membership includes, in addition to manual workers in the 23 principal industries, various staff employes—clerks, custodians, stenographers, typists and lower-level management personnel. The "proletariat" in Communist China would therefore be substantially smaller than the 12,450,000 membership in the trade unions. On the other hand, although the ACFTU often speaks for "the Chinese working class," many actual working-class elements are excluded from membership; (1) peasants and (2) small handicraftsmen, because they are not paid in wages; (3) handicraft workers, because "handicrafts are different from modern industry"; and (4) certain professional workers, because they are "non-working-class elements."⁴ This somewhat inconsistent pattern shows that the ACFTU is a special form of "mass organization" for those particular elements of the Chinese working class which play a critical role in the industrial policies of "the period of transition to socialism."

Needed: A Doctrine for the "Working Class"

AS a mass organization, the ACFTU seeks a large membership and sets minimal standards for admission; it is thus distinguished from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which safeguards its own distinctive character as the highly disciplined, elitist "organized vanguard of the Chinese working class." The actual number of CCP members in the ranks of the ACFTU is surprisingly small. At the end of 1952, for example, when the CCP had some 6,250,000 members and the ACFTU a membership of about 10,200,000, the ACFTU included only 450,000 CCP members.⁵ Not more than 7.2 percent of the CCP membership could then claim a direct affiliation with wage-earning workers; and only 4.4 percent of the

³ This calculation is computed approximately on the data given in Li Fu-ch'ün's report on the First Five-Year Plan to the National People's Congress, July 5-6, 1955, in CB, No. 335 (entire).

⁴ Hsü, "Report," pp. 90-91.

⁵ Data by Lai Jo-yü, NCNA, Peiping, April 24, 1953, DNR, April 1953, p. 171. Comparable data for later dates have not been released.

members of the workers' "mass organization" had been admitted into the "organized vanguard of the Chinese working class"! Since most of the CCP members within the ACFTU are concerned with administration and supervision of trade union affairs—as organizers, committee members and cadres in about 200,000 basic trade unions and the heavy administrative superstructures resting upon them—the statistics do not faithfully reflect the number of CCP members in the ACFTU who earn their living through productive activities. Small wonder, then, that the CCP calls itself the "party of the working class" rather than the "party of the proletariat"!

Existing class structures in Chinese society oblige the CCP "theoreticians" to engage in complex doctrinal gymnastics to keep alive the myth of proletarian leadership of a movement so few of whose members are actually proletarian. Official doctrine therefore conceives the "working class" to be comprised of proletarians, peasants, some petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, handicraftsmen, and "all sections of working people"; at the same time it denies that the CCP is thereby made a party of "worker-peasant alliance."⁶ The petty bourgeoisie and peasantry are considered "transitional classes" which will undergo in time a "process of disintegration" and become proletarianized.⁷

Effecting such "proletarianization" among the working people—that is, urban workers and employes—is a primary function of the trade unions. The Communists look upon the ACFTU as "the bridge between the party and the working class"; as such it must

... carry out constant education on Marxism-Leninism among the workers, ceaselessly increase the degree of their political consciousness and organization, and bring the initiative and creativeness of workers into full play in the endeavor to raise their productivity.⁸

This formulation embodies three principal themes defining the role of the unions, themes endlessly repeated in policy pronouncements of the mainland regime: (1) The trade union, at the mass organization level, is a specific instrument for the indoctrination and manipulation of workers. (In this respect, it is the labor counterpart of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, etc., and like them is called upon to rally support for any announced purpose or policy

⁶ Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party*, Peiping, Foreign Language Press, 1950, p. 19. This is the authorized translation of Liu's "Report on the Party Constitution" (June 11, 1945).

⁷ Liu, *loc. cit.*

⁸ From *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peiping, February 7, 1953 (hereafter cited as *People's Daily*).

of the party and government—whether this be to endorse Chou En-lai's declarations concerning Taiwan or to applaud the administrative reorganizations of Tibet or Sinkiang.) (2) Under party direction, the trade union must indoctrinate the proletariat in Marxist-Leninist mythology concerning the role of labor in a society moving toward socialization. (3) The trade union must contribute to the fulfillment of economic plans by increasing the productivity of workers.

The Preamble to the revised "Constitution of the Trade Unions of the CPR," adopted on May 10, 1953, (see footnote 1), provides some of the currently fashionable metaphors and slogans used to describe the function of the unions:

The trade unions of China led by the Communist Party have rallied the broad masses of the workers around the party and have thus become *transmission belts* between the party and the masses. Since the establishment of the people's democratic dictatorship, the trade unions under the leadership of the party have become a *school of administration*, a *school of management* and a *school of communism* for the workers.

ACFTU Structure and Legal Status

THE formal status of the ACFTU in public law is defined by the Trade Union Law of June 28, 1950, and by several administrative regulations dealing with such subjects as collective labor contracts, labor-capital conciliation procedures and the labor insurance system, which assign specific duties or responsibilities to trade union organizations.⁹ In addition, the ACFTU functions under its own constitution and house-law, some features of which are regarded as part of the law of the land.

For the administration of public policy in labor matters, the party and government use two separate structures: (1) the apparatus of the ACFTU, based upon the vertical organizations of 23 industrial unions, which are integrated or coordinated at local, provincial and national levels by various "trade union councils" and the central organs of the ACFTU; and (2) the apparatus of the government's Ministry of Labor, which operates through central organs and a dependent system of provincial and local "labor offices." Both structures are based on the principle of "democratic centralism," which insures that lower-level actions and policies correspond to directives

⁹ *The Trade Union Law and Related Documents*, Chinese People's Publishing House, Peiping, 1953; *The Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China*, Peiping, Foreign Language Press, 1950; *Labor-Capital Relations and Collective Agreements* (Chinese), Canton, Hsin-hua shu-tien, 1950. The Labor Insurance Regulations, in different texts and revisions, may be traced through CB, Nos. 30, 61 and 225.

issued by the highest level, and hence excludes the possibility of spontaneous expression of unauthorized attitudes by the rank-and-file. Coordination of the ACFTU and Ministry of Labor structures is a function of the CCP itself.

The trade union and government bureaucracies deal with similar aspects of labor, sometimes supplementing or duplicating each other; and in some respects they may be competitive. In general, the Labor Ministry deals with questions of labor supply, wage policy, labor-management, mediation, supervision of collective labor contracts and, until recently, supervision of the administration of labor insurance by the ACFTU. On the other hand, the ACFTU, as the "mass organization" of workers, has political and educational functions as well as the functions of "representing" labor in authorized negotiations with management; it may be said to be concerned chiefly with the management and manipulation of the labor force once it has been recruited, trained and brought to the bench, so that labor discipline will be maintained and labor productivity increased. The weight of both structures falls upon the worker—the proverbial "low man on the totem"—in such a manner that he loses all freedom for job movement (except as permitted by the Labor Ministry bureaucracy) and all freedom for the defense of his job interest (except as the ACFTU bureaucracy finds it useful or convenient to act in his name).

"Closed Shop" Communist-Style

ACCORDING to the 1953 Trade Unions Constitution, union membership is "voluntary." Economic, political and social pressures, however, have the effect of bringing all eligible workers in factories or shops of more than 25 workers into the union system. The worker's job status is determined by a collective agreement concluded for all workers, union or non-union, by the trade union executive; the non-union worker gains no advantage from withholding membership on this score. Management must contribute two percent of its total payroll for *all* workers and employes to the union fund, so that the non-union worker has a kind of investment in the social and educational activities of the trade union but is cut off from the use of libraries and reading rooms, recreational areas and other trade union facilities.¹⁰ More important, the "voluntary" abstention of a worker from the "mass movement" sponsored by the CCP can create political or personal difficulties for him. Furthermore, the Labor Insurance Regulations in force since March 1, 1951, positively discriminate

¹⁰ Trade Union Law, Article 24.

against the non-union worker: in certain situations, he may claim only one-half the amount of benefits payable to a union member¹¹ (by default, the trade union recaptures the other half for its own use since the mandatory three percent payment from payroll for labor insurance purposes applies to all workers or employes without regard for union membership). Finally, from its own revenues and from insurance fund surplus, the trade union maintains widely-advertised sanatoria, rest-homes, recreation areas, *etc.*, for use by union members. While Communist sources doubtless exaggerate the value or utility of these facilities for the average worker, their existence is probably a marginal factor increasing trade union membership. Considering these several pressures, it is no surprise that most workers take the path of least resistance, forfeiting one percent of their monthly wages for the trade union "admission" fee and dues thereafter.

"Welfare" vs. Anti-"economism"

THE trade unions are enjoined by their constitution "to show constant concern over the improvement of the material and cultural life and the working conditions of the entire body of workers, technical personnel and staff members" (Article 30-b). Such "concern," however, is offset by conditions binding union action. As Liu Shao-ch'i has put it, "the material and cultural life and working conditions of the workers will be improved *step by step* in accordance with the need and *as circumstances permit*," but only "on the basis of increased production."¹² The requirements of production take higher priority than the needs of workers; improvements and the supply of amenities are to be gradual; and nowhere does the suggestion occur that workers should determine "need" or "circumstance." Indeed, trade union cadres who may be preoccupied with welfare projects are subject to sharp criticism. ACFTU Chairman Lai Jo-yü, for example, condemned the unduly rapid expansion of labor insurance programs as "blind adventurism out of proportion to the practical requirements of the masses," warning that "in setting up collective welfare establishments . . . blind adventurism, over-ambitiousness and impractical approaches should be avoided."¹³

¹¹ Labor Insurance Regulations, revised as of January 1, 1953, Article 8, 18; translation in CB, No. 225.

¹² As translated in *People's China*, Peiping, No. 11 (June 1), 1953, Supp., p. 4. Italics supplied.

¹³ Lai Jo-yü, "Report on the Trade Union in China," in *The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions*, pp. 52-53 (hereafter cited as Lai, "Report").

Liu Shao-ch'i and Lai Jo-yü, in the passages quoted above, were reflecting Communist opposition to "economism" in the tradition of Lenin's policies at the turn of the century.¹⁴ The ACFTU's doctrinal journal recently defined "economism" as follows:

... [a deviation] in which improvements in material and cultural life for workers are undertaken without regard for actual increases in levels of productivity; or, when too much emphasis is placed on the provision of comforts and amenities for workers and too little attention is given to conditions of production; or, when wages are increased excessively without regard for actual levels of production; or, when short-term considerations are given higher priority than long-term considerations.¹⁵

In effect, the campaign against "economism" is an application to the industrial worker of the familiar attack upon "tailism"—the supposed tendency of some party cadres to show a soft attitude toward worker needs and demands. Where the wants of workers can be reasonably satisfied within the established contours of the party line, cadres are instructed to satisfy them; but where the demands of workers are inconsistent with the direction of the party line at a given time, the task of the cadres is to "educate" the worker to appreciate the "irrationality" of his demand for comforts or amenities and to accept the tightened belt as a substitute. The senior ACFTU cadres, who are also CCP comrades or cadres, must try to popularize Spartan-like policies of abstinence and restraint for the working masses at the present, holding them out as the conditions for bounty and abundance in the future.¹⁶

The party line of placing political considerations above economic considerations stems from the highest authority. As early as December 25, 1947, Mao Tse-tung warned the party Central Committee that an economic policy directed only to the "welfare of the workers" would be a "short-sighted, one-sided policy"—in fact, an "extreme-left, incorrect policy." Believing that that "kind of mistake" had been made during the period of the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931–1934), Mao pointed out that "repetition

¹⁴ In the early 1900's Lenin attacked a trend in the Russian labor movement known as "economism," defined as the attitude of those subordinated political aims to the struggle for economic betterment—higher wages, fewer working hours, improved sanitary conditions in factories, etc. Lenin held that such activity would divert workers from the primary task of struggling for the overthrow of Tsarism.

¹⁵ Wang Yung, "Trade Unions Must Give Attention to and Be Concerned with Wage Problems," *Kung-jen* (Worker), Peiping, No. 9 (May 12), 1955.

¹⁶ Li Fu-ch'ün, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, developed this theme in his report on the First Five-Year Plan, July 5–6, 1955. See CB, No. 335, p. 46.

... would necessarily injure the interests of the working masses and of the new democratic state."¹⁷ The urban proletariat was thus placed on warning that it should not read exaggerated promises into the revolutionary action of the CCP.

Mao's dictum became the keynote of propaganda for the following May Day (1948)—when wide publicity was given a special message prepared by Ch'en Po-ta, a member of the Central Committee close to Mao. Following Mao's lead, Ch'en insisted that the requirements of production receive higher priority than the claims of workers to high wages and creature comforts, and defined a "correct wage policy" as one which would "constantly stimulate the production enthusiasm of workers and staff employes." He spoke strongly against "equalitarian" tendencies in wage policy, advocating appropriate upward revision of wage scales for skilled workers according to the actual level of their production. Above all, he condemned "arbitrary, artificial, unprincipled, blind and irrational methods" of raising wages excessively, holding that such methods "could not raise the political consciousness of the working class."¹⁸

That a "welfare" attitude persists among some workers and cadres despite party exhortation is apparent from Lai Jo-yü's speech to the Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions (May 3, 1953):

The prolonged and persistent existence of this erroneous economist tendency is primarily due to an apolitical tendency in trade union work. The political and ideological leadership of many trade union organizations is weak, failing to carry out consistent and practical Communist education among the workers. Once there is a deviation from Communist ideology, the working-class movement will inevitably move toward economism.¹⁹

On the other hand, the trade union cadre is told that his failure to give suitable attention to the welfare of workers will lead to condemnation for violating the infallible "mass-line" of the party!²⁰ Beset by the pitfalls of "right" or "left" deviations, the trade union bureaucrat moves slowly and indecisively where worker amenities are concerned; the general temper of anti-"economist" propaganda makes it safer for the bureaucrat to spend his time thinking

¹⁷ *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*, (Chin.) Hong Kong, 1948, p. 12.

¹⁸ Ch'en Po-ta, "Labor and Tax Policy for Developing Industry," May 1, 1948.

¹⁹ Lai, "Report," pp. 66–67.

²⁰ Liu Ning-i, "Address to the Fifth Congress of the Tientsin Federation of Trade Unions," *Daily Worker*, Feb. 2, 1955; translated in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press*, Hong Kong, No. 989, pp. 23–6 (hereafter referred to as SCMP).

about the margins of personal safety than in acting affirmatively to obtain a better break for the trade union rank-and-file.

Labor Discipline

COMMUNIST doctrine preaches that the worker has an innate attitude toward labor that distinguishes the society which he assertedly dominates from the bourgeois society which exploits him. *Daily Worker* of January 16, 1955, expressed this teaching in typical fashion:

The Chinese working class [embodies] special characteristics possessed by no other classes in the country; unselfishness, organization, discipline, revolutionary determination, thoroughness, unity and friendly spirit.²¹

Evidently the Chinese worker has not been acting upon the implications of this doctrine, in spite of persistent efforts of the ACFTU to "educate and influence" him in the spirit of communism. First among the duties of a trade union member, according to the Constitution of the Trade Unions, is the observance of "laws and decrees of the state and labor discipline" (concurrently, he is enjoined to "take good care of public property" and to raise his "class consciousness and working ability"). Yet on July 10, 1953, the Presidium of the new Seventh Executive Committee of the ACFTU noted the prevalence of such breaches of labor discipline as "absenteeism, leave without valid reason, work evasion, slow-down, disobedience in assignments and transfers, and non-observance of working rules and safety measures," and directed "trade unions at all levels to take the consolidation of labor discipline as their regular important duty."²² Trade unions were to establish indoctrination schemes and, among other things, to employ "emulation campaigns" as devices for tightening labor discipline. In cases where persuasion failed to produce results, "recalcitrant elements constantly committing serious acts of breach of labor discipline should be properly punished."

Thus the groundwork was laid for the enactment of "The Outline of Labor Regulations for State Operated Enterprises," surely an astonishing revelation of the exploitive role of trade unions. The Outline was drafted in the higher echelons of the ACFTU, and was presented to the Government Administration Council on May 6, 1954, by Lai Jo-yü with a recommendation for their adoption. The Outline was enacted the same day.²³ While the enacting process exemplifies the official status of the

²¹ "Promote the Internal Unity of the Working Class." (Chin.)

²² Reported in *People's Daily*, August 27, 1953.

²³ For text of the Outline, see SCMP, No. 859, 1954.



At a Heavy Industrial Plant Woodcut by Yen Han

"JOY THROUGH LABOR" A LA MAO

—From *People's China*, Peiping,
Foreign Languages Press, May 1, 1953.

ACFTU, the Regulations themselves exemplify the nature of the Chinese Communist conspiracy against the Chinese working class.

The stated purpose of the Labor Regulations is "to ensure and consolidate labor discipline, correctly organize labor, fully and rationally use working hours, raise labor productivity and turn out quality products." Strict observance of the Regulations was enjoined on all workers as their "sacred duty." Seven "basic duties" of workers and staff members are defined principally as specific obligations of "labor discipline" (Article 8). Seven "basic duties" of management are also listed, including the "tightening of labor discipline"—this in Regulations drafted by trade union cadres! Ten of the 24 articles deal with punitive procedures; they authorize management to impose penalties administratively and to refer "serious cases" to the people's courts. Indeed, management is compelled to enforce such penalties or suffer punishment itself:

Workers and staff members, when proved to be in error by the management, shall be punished immediately . . .

Penalties shall be meted out to responsible administrative personnel failing to impose penalties within the [set] time limit. (Article 18).

The worker charged with a breach of labor discipline has a limited right of explanation, but nowhere do the Regulations even infer that workers may appeal through the trade union system or expect trade union cadres to intercede on their behalf. On the contrary: the Regulations imply that trade unionists should search out violations of labor discipline, report them to management, and then prosecute management for failure to punish workers. Although applicable directly to state-operated enterprises, the Regulations may be adapted to the maintenance of labor discipline in joint state-private or wholly private enterprises.

As in other instances, the trade union cadres soon found themselves caught in an ideological crossfire. *People's Daily* (October 22, 1954) noted "increasing breaches of labor discipline," and emphasized the need for a "firm attitude" to insure the punishment of offenders.²⁴ But *Daily Worker* (January 21, 1955) observed that "punishment of workers has become the principal method for consolidating labor discipline," and instructed trade union cadres to avoid "punitivism" while also avoiding the contrary evil of "tailism." The worker remained under the whip.

"Comrade workers' courts" (*t'ung-chih shen-p'an hui*), attached to the system of people's courts, have also been instituted to enforce labor discipline. The Communist press has featured the general "educational" benefits reported in the experience of 70 such courts established in state-owned industries up to June 1954. The trial of 33 workers and employees in the Anshan Iron and Steel Company during 15 proceedings in 1953 had the asserted effect of reducing absenteeism in a section-group of the Anshan plant from 20 percent to 1.2 percent.²⁵ Although *People's Daily* described "comrade workers' courts" as "mass organizations of workers for self-education," this description was belied by the suggestion that the courts ought to be composed of more ordinary workers than trade union officials.²⁶ The suggestion was also made that the "comrade workers' courts" might modify the punitive aspects of their practice by restricting their deliberations to cases presented to them by the administration of the enterprise.

²⁴ Translated in SCMP, No. 922, pp. 17-25.

²⁵ *People's Daily*, June 5, 1954, in SCMP, No. 836, p. 17.

²⁶ Sze Hsuan, "Points To Be Borne in Mind When Establishing Comrade Workers' Courts," *People's Daily*, June 5, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 836, pp. 18-20.

Labor Emulation

Trade union programs for stimulating an increase in labor productivity have centered not only on "the strengthening of labor discipline" but also on "the development of labor emulation." The latter term is a Marxist-Leninist equivalent for "labor speed-up," generally looked upon by the free trade unions of the West as a device used by unscrupulous management to overwork labor. Communist trade unions take an opposite point of view. The development of production, according to Lai Jo-yü, is "the most important task of the trade unions, and:

The fundamental method of the trade unions in developing production is to lead the masses step by step to take part in labor emulation; and, through emulation drives, to develop to the highest degree the activity and creative initiative of the workers, technical personnel, and other employees: to improve labor organization, production processes, equipment and methods of operating machinery, and thus to raise labor productivity

The general process of development of labor emulation is from shock work to regular methods of work, from a low to a high level. It is the process of continuously raising the ideological consciousness and technical level of the masses, and is also the process of raising the backward elements in production to the level of the advanced.²⁷

The Chinese Communist concept of "labor emulation" is closely related to that of "socialist emulation" in the Soviet Union. Lai Jo-yü has invoked Stalin as an authority to describe the "radical revolution" that emulation brings "to men's views of labor, for it transforms labor from a degrading and painful burden, as it was regarded before, into a matter of honor, a matter of glory, of valor and heroism [sic]." ²⁸ The January 27, 1954, directive of the ACFTU Executive Committee on labor emulation cited Stalin on the use of the "emulation drive" as "a Communist method by which millions of the laboring masses work with the greatest enthusiasm to build socialism."²⁹ These quotes reveal the dual purpose of labor "emulation" in the Communist view: while its concrete aim is to increase production, it is also considered an important means for "awakening the political consciousness" of the Chinese worker and for inculcating in him a "correct Communist labor attitude." In a sense, therefore, labor emulation is used as a method to reorient the urban worker toward official doctrines of society and production relations, as "reform through labor" (*i.e.*, forced labor) has been employed to reeducate other classes of

²⁷ Lai, "Report," pp. 56-57.

²⁸ Translated in SCMP, No. 922, pp. 17-25.

²⁹ *People's Daily*, April 11, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 794, pp. 36-39.

Chinese society. In the end, the post-Marxian "historical materialists" seek to evoke greater productivity from the worker by appealing to his loyalties to "state" and "class" rather than by appealing to his pocketbook and self-interest.

According to Lai, 683,000 workers took part in emulation drives in 1950; 2,380,000 in 1951; and 2,830,000 in 1952.³⁰ By 1953, the "emulation drive" had become a normal method for meeting the production schedules of the First Five-Year Plan. On January 27, 1954, the ACFTU Executive Committee directed that emulation drives no longer be based on spontaneous effort but be "organized and planned"; only thus could the drives "become a regular, permanent form of labor as distinguished from 'shock' labor." The trade unions were instructed to "raise the level of leadership over such drives" and to "work hand in hand with the management and organize emulation drives in a practical manner."³¹ Emulation techniques and objectives are now written into "collective labor contracts" negotiated by trade union cadres with managements of state and joint state-private enterprises; in some cases, they are written into contracts with private enterprise.³²

The ACFTU has embarked upon indoctrination programs designed to "help workers and staff members overcome their difficulties and dispel their ideological misgivings" about various speed-up and rationaliza-

³⁰ Combined from CB, No. 220, p. 20, and NCNA, Peiping, April 24, 1953.

³¹ See note 29.

³² "Trade Union Work and the Transformation of Capitalist Industry," editorial in *Ta Kung pao*, Tientsin, Dec. 22, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 963; and Liu Shao-p'ing, "Important Tasks of Trade Union Work in State-Capitalist Enterprises," (Chin.), *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* (New China Monthly) No. 2, February 1955, pp. 36-37.

tion measures.³³ To elicit rationalization suggestions from workers, the ACFTU proposed to the government Administration Council a scheme of financial awards, up to the equivalent of US \$20,000, which was adopted by the Council on May 6, 1954.³⁴ In the past year hardly a day has passed without some reference to "emulation," or some patriotic or financial incitement to "struggle" to surpass production norms and planning objectives.

Final Estimate

TO sum up what has been said, the labor scene in Communist China presents a sorry view of the lot of the workingman under Mao's regime. In state-operated enterprises, workers have become pawns to be manipulated by management, government labor offices and the ACFTU according to the political-economic objectives of the regime as fixed by the CCP. In joint state-private enterprises, the ACFTU works hand-in-glove with the state-designated management to achieve, in time, the exclusion or absorption of the private share. Spontaneous expressions of interest by individual workers are completely proscribed (except when worker complaints can be employed in the "criticism and self-criticism" of ACFTU cadres).

In short, the "labor movement" in Communist China has lost any resemblance to the free world concept of a workers' organization seeking economic betterment for its members; it is clearly and simply a tool of the Chinese Communists for the manipulation of labor to their own ends.

³³ ACFTU Decision, April 21, 1954; NCNA, Peiping, May 26, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 821, pp. 35-36.

³⁴ NCNA, Peiping, August 28, 1954, DNR, August 1954, p. 329; also, Lai Jo-yu, "On some Problems of Labor Emulation," *New China Monthly*, No. 7 (July), 1955, pp. 71-73.

Albania: A Communist Colony

By DANIEL NORMAN

TWO centuries ago Edward Gibbon, the English historian, described Albania as a country within sight of Italy, yet less known than the interior of America. Today this little country is still in large part an unknown quantity. There is virtually no trade between Albania and non-Communist countries, and while an increasing number of tourists have been allowed to enter other areas within the Soviet orbit, the Iron Curtain which surrounds Albania has been opened no more than a chink.

Reliable information about the "country of the eagles,"—as the Albanians have traditionally called their homeland—is thus hard to obtain. Official data concerning the status of the country and its economy are almost never released. Albanian daily newspapers reach the West very irregularly and the so-called official journal of the Albanian Communist Party, the counterpart of *Pravda* in the USSR, has not been on public sale since 1948; today it is virtually impossible for anyone other than members of the party and government hierarchy to obtain copies. As a consequence political and economic studies of the Communist countries have largely ignored this corner of Europe. Even the United Nations' *Economic Survey of Europe*, its *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, and its other specialized publications have been obliged until recently to omit studies of Albania or to base them on the haziest kind of information. At a recent session of the Economic Council for Europe (March 1955), while other Communist delegations were criticizing the "interpretation" of the data they had supplied to the editorial staff of *Economic Survey*, the Albanian delegate merely "regretted that the Survey did not mention the economic development of his country." He "presumed" that the documentation supplied by the Albanian government had "arrived too late."¹

In many ways Albania has been as remote from the Communist as from the non-Communist world. Since Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet camp in

¹ UN Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe, Tenth Session, *Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting* (held at Geneva on March 25, 1955), p. 19.

Mr. Norman, a British writer specializing in Soviet and satellite affairs, is author of *Marx and Soviet Reality*, Batchworth Press Ltd., London, 1955.

1948, Albania has been geographically isolated from the satellite bloc. Even Western Communists find it difficult to arrange a trip to Albania. Probably in part as a result of its exposed position, the country has never been accepted as a member of the Cominform. No "treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" of the kind signed between Moscow and her other satellites linked Albania with the Soviet Union until May 1955, when Albania was invited to adhere to the Warsaw Pact. And although it was assigned the dangerous role of "agent provocateur" in the Balkans, precipitating border incidents along the Greek frontier during the Greek Civil War (December 1944–September 1949), and along the Yugoslav frontier between 1948–1954, Albania had no formal guarantee of Soviet military assistance. The Soviet Union knows well that, although the Albanian people have always defended their country valiantly, its vulnerable frontiers leave it open to easy conquest. Left to herself, Albania is indefensible.

Tito: A Guiding Hand

RELATIONS between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and those of the satellites deteriorated immediately after the CPY was expelled from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. But the bitterness of the exchanges between the CPY and the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) refer little to this dispute; they stem largely from the nature of the interrelationship between the two parties, from the fact that by 1948 the guiding hand of the CPY had reached into every aspect of Albanian life. By 1948 Albania was in the anomalous position of being the satellite of a satellite.

This had been the situation from the very birth of the CPA; indeed the CPY was responsible for its conception. Soon after the German attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941 (Italy had established control over Albania in April 1939), two Yugoslav Communists, Miladin Popovic and Dusan Mugosa, succeeded in welding various factions into a united Albanian Communist Party—largely because they promised to obtain Comintern recognition for the new party. On November 8, 1941 the CPA was formed and a provisional Central Committee was