

continued to expand. The PCI was rapidly becoming a mass party for the first time in its history.

The successful termination of the popular insurrection against fascism, in which the PCI had played a directing role, had its symbolic epilogue in a message of greetings sent in May 1945 by the party leaders for Upper Italy to Togliatti, then about to assume his new title as Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party:

Let us mobilize the entire party for the democratic reconstruction and rebirth of the country. The line of unity, drawn by you, which we have used as a guide in the insurrection, will guide us also as head of the whole people in the work of reconstruction.¹⁷]

The Italian Communist Party, which proclaimed in these terms its ambition to play the leading role in building a new Italy, was thus far different from the party born at Leghorn 34 years earlier. At its inception, under Bordiga, it had been a small group of dedicated Marxist revolutionaries whose goal was the establishment of a workers' dictatorship in Italy

¹⁷ *L'Unita* (Unity), May 2, 1954.

through extra-parliamentary struggle. In 1945, under Togliatti, it all but renounced its origins as a "sect of agitators" and aspired to new respectability as a mass party championing the cause of parliamentary democracy.

In all the stages of its evolution, the PCI reflected the changing strategy of international communism, itself the reflection of changes in Soviet communism and of the shifting national interests of the USSR. The party of Bordiga's days thus mirrored the revolutionary zeal of the early Bolsheviks. Bordiga's leadership, however, became an anachronism as the Comintern's Russian high command sought to make the national Communist parties within its fold instruments of Soviet national policy. His defeat and the transfer of power to Gramsci and Togliatti signalled the subjugation of the PCI to this new concept and fixed the pattern for its future development.

The party's role as an arm of Moscow and the flexibility of its tactics in serving the interests of the Soviet Union have continued to characterize its action in the post-war period as the most powerful Communist group in Western Europe.

BOOK REVIEWS

Eight Views of the Chinese Colossus

Yuan-li Wu:

An Economic Survey of Communist China,
Bookman Associates, New York, 1956.

Richard L. Walker:

China under Communism: The First Five Years,
Yale University Press, 1955, 403 pp.

Michael Lindsay:

*China and the Cold War:
A Study in International Politics*,
Melbourne University Press, 1955, 286 pp.

A Nation Under Pressure

Ronald Hsia:

Economic Planning in Communist China,
International Secretariat,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, 1955, 89 pp.

B. N. Ganguli:

Economic Development in New China,
Indian Council of World Affairs,
Oxford University Press, 1955, 92 pp.

Reviewed by G. F. Hudson

THE five books listed above are diverse both in the nationality of their writers—an American, an Englishman, two Chinese and an Indian—and in their

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approach to the subject of Communist China. But one overpowering impression may be derived from all of them, the realization that the new Chinese nation has been goaded by its rulers into a condition of intense effort and extraordinary nervous tension. The purely economic studies of Hsia, Ganguli, and

Wu underscore this point less heavily than the other two books, which deal primarily with the political side of China's new order, but even in the former the frenzied accents of the high-pressure drive for heavy industry keep on breaking into the dry prose of economic analysis. The Chinese people are on the march, to the urgent, maddening rhythm of propaganda drums; the question for mankind is where the march is leading. As Professor Walker, who writes about China as an historian, remarks in the introduction to his book, "the cost of the tremendous task of remaking China in the Soviet image has been unbelievable in terms of human and of cultural destruction." Yet we are only at the beginning of the process.

Lindsay's book is perhaps the most interesting of the five because it is the work of a former admirer of the Chinese Communists who still retains a certain sentimental attachment for them, but who has been unable to swallow the grosser manifestations of Peiping policy over the last five years. Son of a former Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and married to a Chinese wife, heir to a tradition of left-wing humanitarian liberalism, Lindsay joined with the Chinese Communists in the guerilla war against Japan; he was a radio operator at Communist headquarters and was personally acquainted with the top leaders. He saw them as heroic champions of a popular national resistance against foreign conquest, and they seem to have played up to his idea of them; he never seems to have had any comprehension of their fundamental aims. Hence he has suffered a series of painful shocks as the outlines of a real Marxist-Leninist regime have gradually emerged in China, and he is at great pains to explain how it is that the Chinese Communists have become what they always were:

The best explanation of Chinese behavior is that the Chinese leaders may be subjectively sincere in wanting peace and Sino-British friendship but that they operate in a state of emotional and mental confusion in which various widespread influences that tend to make human behavior irrational are strengthened by a faith in the Communist dogmatic system.

It would surely be simpler to say that the "emotional and mental confusion" is inherent in the faith and that Communists everywhere show themselves in their actions to be influenced by what they profess to believe. Like so many other Western liberals, Lindsay took the Communists on the basis of their "popular front" tactical slogans instead of inquiring what was involved in the basic principles of their creed. Even now he indulges in curiously naive remarks such as:

I have not been able to obtain direct evidence about the motives behind Chinese Communist policy at this period

[1945-46]. Chou En-lai refused to answer my questions about it in 1949.

Lindsay's book is nevertheless an important document as the self-revelation of a sincere and earnest mind arriving at a reaffirmation of Western humanist values after a prolonged flirtation with a faith whose nature he never really understood.

Where Lindsay is concerned with theoretical arguments and propaganda themes, Professor Walker gets down to the day-to-day practice of communism in China, making extensive use of material drawn from the Communists' own press as well as of testimony of persons who have left China. He has produced one of the most readable, balanced and comprehensive surveys of Communist China that has yet appeared. Of particular value are his analyses of "psychological control"—the conditioning of future cadres—and of the technique of "drives" whereby the population is stirred up and directed toward particular ends determined by the party.

The economic sections of Walker's book are closely related to the political chapters, throwing light on the reasons for the sacrifice of everything else to heavy industry—the cardinal feature of the Chinese economic system, as it has long been of the Soviet. The picture given by Walker has thus a coherence and completeness which is lacking in the more expert economic studies of Wu, Hsia and Ganguli. For though such specialized investigations have their value, the separation of economic and political phenomena is itself a feature of a capitalist society and is hardly applicable where production and distribution depend neither on consumers' demand nor on expectations of entrepreneurial profit, but rather on the will of a political body disposing of the full coercive power of an absolute state.

Hsia's work particularly suffers in this respect; for example, he tells us that in China "as in the Soviet Union, economic welfare is not a top-priority short-run objective" and that, because the Communists are concerned "at this stage" with "developing a strong industrial base for independence and national power," they are "forced to maintain low consumption levels." Yet the fundamental question here is *why* the whole economy is being subordinated as it is to the attainment of "national power," and what the long-term effects will be if the regime continues goading the population to greater efforts with minimal economic rewards by preaching that China is in mortal danger of enslavement by "the imperialists." China could have had an industrialization along quite different lines, with a balanced economic development aided by Western capital, and without

the privations which must be inflicted in order that she may "starve herself great" (to reapply a phrase which was used of Russia's First Five-Year Plan).

The "heroic" type of industrialization nevertheless has a very powerful attraction for Asians, as is shown in Ganguli's study. In his comparison of Communist development finance with the methods by which a state at war sustains its struggle at the expense of its people's consumption, he approaches the heart of the matter: Communist governments use the techniques of "war finance" because they consider themselves to be permanently at war, and it is only under the psychological conditions of being at war that such an economic system can be operated. The whole economic policy of Communist China is indeed remarkably similar to that promoted not many years ago by the Japanese army under the title of "a high-degree defense state."

This comparison is borne out by the much more thorough and detailed survey undertaken by Mr. Yuan-li Wu, a Chinese economist now working at Stanford University. In the course of his text Mr. Wu remarks:

The theme that national defense is dependent upon industrialization while industrialization must give top priority to defense industries runs through all Communist declarations of policy.

Since China's economic development has started at a pitifully low level, there is little margin for raising the standard of living. Mao's subjects may hope for jam tomorrow, but there is very little jam for them today, and the impatience for improvement which the Communists promoted when they were organizing revolt against the Kuomintang is now branded as counterrevolution.

As Mr. Wu points out, such progress in the material conditions of the masses as has taken place must be attributed mainly to the restoration of peace and order after years of foreign invasion and civil war, with their concomitants of devastation, uprooting of the population, interruption of communications and runaway inflation. This fact is frequently overlooked by travelers sympathetic to the People's Republic, who usually attempt to contrast present conditions with those of the civil war period. If any comparison is to be made of living standards, it should only be with the China of 1937. In any case, satisfactory com-

parisons are extremely hard to make, for Kuomintang China never reached the stage of being able to carry out adequate statistical surveys on a national scale; though the present government probably has sufficient administrative organization for doing so, its general attitude towards factual truth renders all its figures suspect, and any independent checking of them is excluded, as Mr. Wu notes, by the law which makes disclosure of "vital" economic information a capital offense.

Today the regime's calls for "production-increase and austerity" do not attempt to offer the Chinese people prospects of prosperity in the near future; the Chinese worker is required to console himself for the lack of cheap consumer goods formerly imported from Japan and elsewhere by contemplation of new power stations and steel mills which will enable China to prevail over the "imperialist camp." Such a subordination of the living standards of the people to the increase of national power could, however, have been enforced, as it was in Japan, by a nationalist and militarist regime without fundamental interference with rights of property; what differentiates the Communists' program is the attempt to socialize production simultaneously with the endeavor to build up the armed strength of the state. The two ends are not necessarily in harmony; for example, the recently increased political pressure to eliminate the remaining sectors of private enterprise both in industry and agriculture appears to be in conflict with the government's purely economic aim of maximizing production.

Mr. Wu concludes from the evidence available that: **... increasingly ruthless control has tended to generate resistance, stifle initiative, breed inefficiency, and create a ponderous, overdeveloped administrative machinery which at times threatens to break down altogether.**

These were phenomena which were characteristic of the Soviet Union's First Five-Year Plan, but despite all the privations and unrest they did not bring about the collapse of Stalin's regime. Communist dictatorship is a system of government which can stand a vast amount of economic failure and discontent. There is nevertheless always the possibility that the strains and stresses of the party's economic policies may produce dangerous cracks in the edifice of the new Chinese state.

... *Plus C'est la Même Chose*

Father François Dufay:
L'Etoile contre la Croix
(Star Against the Cross)
Casterman, Tournai, 1954, 190 pp.

Father Jean Monsterleet:
L'Empire de Mao Tsé-tung
(Mao Tse-tung's Empire)
Casterman, Tournai, 1955, 210 pp.

Robert Magnenoz:
L'Expérience Communiste en Chine
(The Communist Experiment in China)
Les Iles D'Or, Paris, 1954, 306 pp.

Reviewed by Morvan Duhamel

EVER since the days of World War II, when Mao Tse-tung and his followers were often pictured in the West as simple agrarian reformers, there has been a certain reluctance on the part of many Western observers to recognize the fundamental identity between Chinese and Soviet communism. Mao's early adaptations of Marxist-Leninist theory were viewed as signs of the emergence of an independent, Chinese-type communism less virulent than the Soviet prototype. To such roseate views the record of the first five years of Communist rule in China, as the three French studies reviewed here demonstrate, deals a belated *coup de grâce*.

Father Dufay's *Star Against the Cross* addresses itself to one specific and important aspect of this fundamental identity: the Chinese Communists' war on religion. It is unfortunate, though natural in view of the book's authorship, that it limits itself to exposing the Mao regime's attempts to undermine Christianity, especially Catholicism, in China. Christianity, as an alien faith, has unquestionably suffered most under the Chinese Communist campaign of religious repression; but it is important to know that Chinese Buddhists and Taoists, who outnumber the Christians many times over, have suffered, too.¹ Communism proposes to stamp out *all* religion as the "opiate of the people."

Nevertheless, the book is a valuable contribution to more detailed Western knowledge of the systematic

¹ During 1950-1, the Mao regime unleashed a ruthless campaign to stamp out Taoist societies, executing many members as "counter-revolutionaries". A further anti-Taoist drive was carried out in

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manner in which the Chinese Communists are seeking to wipe out the influence of Christianity in China. Father Dufay, a missionary in China until the Communists expelled him in 1951, has based his book on the experience and observations of 150 Catholic missionaries, mostly French, some of whom were not released or expelled from China until 1954. The book is therefore both authentic and relatively up-to-date.

The insidiousness of the Chinese Communist offensive against Christianity emerges clearly in the Dufay account. Direct attack was avoided in favor of a subtler indirect approach. Two essential elements were the appeal to nationalism in order to isolate Chinese Christians from Western influence, and exploitation of Christian concepts of good citizenship and community service in order to bring the Chinese adherents of the faith "upon secular ground where intervention by the government is justified."

The main instrumentality for achieving the Communist purposes was the "Patriotic Movement." In all Christian communities "patriotic study groups" were set up under the leadership of "progressive" (fellow-travelling) clergymen and actually directed by Communist political agents. Group meetings were held two or three times a week, at which discussion was focused sooner or later upon the alleged role of Christianity as a secret weapon of Western imperialist aggression against China. At first, "they insinuate, soon they suggest openly, then they affirm, and finally they accuse. . . ." And once this insidious idea took hold in the mind of the Chinese Christian, his resistance to the Communist line was hopelessly compromised. To quote Father Dufay, the Christian found himself

... no longer free to refuse his support for "purification" of the Church. For the Christian who draws back is condemned by his own statements. On the one hand, he admits that the Church is rotten and harmful to China by reason of its infection with the virus of imperialism; on the other, he refuses to reform it. Hence he confesses that he himself is imperialistic and unpatriotic.

Thus, in a step-by-step process, many Chinese Christians were led to accept a Communist-conceived reformation of the Church!

... the patriotic study group changed into a committee on religious reform, then into a Church-directing "Soviet." By an imperceptible transition, the Church passed into the hands of Communist agents.

1953. The Buddhists have also been subject to sustained oppression, including the confiscation of temples for conversion into workers' "palaces of culture" and the seizure of monastery lands under the agrarian reform program. Richard L. Walker, *China under Communism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1955, pp. 187-9.