

she chose to do so. But the people demanded that he yield on this point. At least the leaders of public opinion seemed to think so. A cardinal of the church, an ex-President who thought himself a friend of international peace, and even Mr. Bryan cabled the President to yield. Have the liberal journals and the angry British critics of the President ever recognized or acknowledged what was then done?

But when the Treaty was finally laid before the Senate, the majority, always depending upon the vote of Mr. Newberry, now under judicial sentence, set about its work. One member of the Committee on Foreign Relations is reported to have said in the presence of several people at a dinner table in Washington that, if the President were to die, the Treaty and the League would be adopted without an amendment or a serious reservation. Why not? It was not a question of the justice of the work at Paris. It was simply a question of breaking a President of the United States. Any student of our history knows this to be true; he knows also that similar performances have been enacted in the Senate.

When Abraham Lincoln published his plan of reconstruction in the spring of 1865, he met with the same resistance. The stage was set for a similar war upon the President. The reason of the war was that Lincoln proposed a liberal peace, a "soft peace." Popular opinion did not favor a liberal peace. Only a wise leader deeply trusted could then have saved the country from the awful reconstruction that was carried through—a worse peace than that which has been laid upon Germany. For the South was compelled to part with private property assessed in 1860 at two or more billions. It was compelled to repudiate a debt owed to its own citizens amounting to two billions more. It was then compelled to assume its share of the Federal debt incurred in its own crushing defeat. Its most fertile districts had been wilfully laid waste by the marching of armies to and fro. Its estates were broken up as a consequence of the emancipation of the slaves. And a national tariff policy was laid that worked disastrously upon Southern industry till 1913. Never since the last Punic war has a people been purposely subjected to a more crushing peace than were the people of the South by the men who prepared in the spring of 1865 to break Abraham Lincoln and ruin his so-called "soft peace." I do not enter into a discussion here of the possibility of securing the results of the Civil War in any other than a cruel way. Perhaps what was done was the best thing. But it was not because it was a good policy that Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner drove their reconstruction programme through congress and forced it upon a defeated foe at the point of the bayonet. It was because Sumner and Stevens and their allies hated the Southerners far more bitterly than Americans have ever hated Germany, than any other of the European peoples, except the French, have hated the Germans.

In order to carry this policy the leaders of the Senate in 1867-9 bribed some of its members, declared seats vacant that were not vacant and suborned witnesses to swear to obviously false statements. It was the great day of Senatorial power. And President Johnson was impeached, although not convicted. The motive was hatred of the South. It was also a terrible fear that some of the money profits of the war would be lost if Southern delegates were seated in congress. It was a great and terrible struggle in which little thought was taken of the justice of the results.

The men who had the guidance of congress in those days

and years are no longer counted worthy of praise in American history. Not a historian of reputation in the country now ventures approval of their motives or their conduct. The people of the country as a whole regard reconstruction as one of those blunders that are worse than crimes. They do not like to remember the facts. They are ashamed of the facts. This is a terrible indictment. It is quite as much an indictment of the majority of the people of 1866 as it is of Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, the instruments of the popular folly and anger. In times of great excitement the masses of men seem unequal to wise determination of great policy. In 1865 there was a wise man who set up a better, if not a good, reconstruction programme. It can not be said that Lincoln's plan was a "soft peace." It was, however, not a vindictive settlement, and under it the broken South might have recovered before 1920!

Have we not been through a similar period? Was not Wilson's programme the only one that could have given peace to an angry and broken world? But public opinion would not have him try a peace of conciliation. Its leaders chose to break Wilson. And during the last two years they have behaved in the same spirit that characterized the leaders of 1865-69. Of course they do not recognize the fact. But historians will be compelled to recognize the facts. I venture the opinion that before ten years shall have passed Lodge, LaFollette, Borah, Johnson and the rest will be regarded by historians in much the same light as Stevens and Sumner. And within twenty years there will not be a historian who will defend their conduct. The whole world will read the earnest words of Wilson as the world now reads the kindly phrases of Abraham Lincoln in his second inaugural when he said, let us heal the wounds of the war, let us hold malice toward none, let us love one another. If that proves to be the case, what shall be the honors of the "irreconcilables" of 1919? Few of us could wish any leader such a place in history as they must have prepared for themselves. Twenty years from now no man will boast of being their descendants.

WILLIAM E. DODD.

Chicago, Illinois.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### Professor Clark Defends the Stock Dividend Decision

**SIR:** By all means let us have "an alert and informed public opinion" as to the work of the United States Supreme Court. I wonder, however, if you feel that you have aided in informing such public opinion by a superficial reference to the stock dividend decision. It seems to me your review only serves to gloss over the difficulties inherent in a system of taxation which must turn on a definition of what is income.

Such definition is made necessary by the wording of the sixteenth amendment. When Congress was considering that amendment, it was urged to submit a provision eliminating all constitutional restrictions upon the levying of direct taxes, and that would seem to have been the statesmanlike course to follow. Congress, however, insisted upon retaining such restrictions except as to taxes upon incomes from whatever sources levied. If a constitutional provision is to have any restrictive force at all, a tax upon

what is not fairly income is without the purview of the amendment. I realize the agitation for unrestricted power of construction by legislative bodies of constitutional provisions, but I do not understand that you have favored such a course which amounts to a discarding of a written constitution.

If it is then necessary to ascertain whether issues of stock called stock "dividends" are really incomes, the Court would seem not unduly "metaphysical" in resorting to its own previous discussion of the nature of stock dividends which was open to Congress long before the amendment was proposed, or in attempting a definition of income which as applied in the case accords with the most approved views of economists. Perhaps also the Court should resort to intuition as to the beliefs of "most people," bearing in mind, nevertheless, how such beliefs may vary when reported by different observers. Even on this test I submit the Court was correct. The ordinary individual is able to draw a working distinction between his investments and his income. Is it not clearly so that he would unerringly classify a stock issue among his investments rather than as his income?

The intuition of Justice Holmes is pretty sure, it is true, and yet he must be wrong in his basic guess that the amendment was designed to get rid of nice questions as to direct taxes, since that was just the course Congress did not choose to follow. This error has, I believe, colored his guess as to the view of "most people not lawyers."

It is no answer to say that a corporation may decide whether to issue a stock dividend or to pay a cash dividend while taking subscriptions for an additional stock issue, since the realization of income must necessarily be a matter of individual volition. A person owns a house which is generally believed to have appreciated in value. Has he any income subject to taxation until in the exercise of his own volition he converts the house into money or money's worth so that the amount of his gain may actually be measured?

Fears as to the great loss in revenue to the government from the decision fail to note the Court's view that gains on sale of the stock will be taxable as income to the seller. This point had previously been questioned and if it now may be considered settled, means a wholly desirable step in advance. This being so there is even a chance for the government, in certain cases, to gain by the decision. Assume a person receives a stock dividend from a corporation whose stock is increasing in value and a year or so thereafter he sells his stock. Taxing the stock dividend would divide the tax over two years, while taxing only the gain on sale throws all the tax into one year and this may raise the taxpayer's income in that year so that a higher surtax rate applies. Unless tax rates are to be lowered, it is hard to see how the government will lose in the long run unless the taxpayer holds the stock until he dies, and then taxes upon the privilege of succession may operate.

I have felt your criticisms of the sedition decisions to be entirely justified. So the present case may properly be criticised for the doubt which Justice Pitney unfortunately casts upon the validity of taxing the gains of personal service corporations as income to the stockholders. But I believe the decision itself to be necessary under all the circumstances. Its practical result in forcing Congress to differentiate between gains actually realized and unrealized speculative appreciations in value, is not entirely unfortunate. This, of course, does not mean that well reasoned arguments by those who believe otherwise are not highly

desirable both for the Court and for "public opinion." If, however, the real problems are submerged under derisive and sarcastic comment which fails to note what such problems are, neither the Court nor public opinion is aided.

CHARLES E. CLARK.

New Haven, Connecticut.

## Professor Corwin Does Likewise

**S**IR: You say, in your article entitled *The Supreme Court vs. The Supreme Court*, which appears in your issue of April 21st, "that the Supreme Court's power as the ultimate law giver puts too heavy a strain upon ordinary men." What is it that you propose to do—create some super-man on the spot? Or is it your idea that the matters falling within the Court's jurisdiction do not demand an ultimate law-giver?

You yourself admit, however, that the decision of the Court in the Steel Trust case did not represent the decision of an *ultimate* law-giver, but that the construction of the law upon which this decision rests is "remediable by future legislation." On the other hand, your criticism of the decision in the Pierce case implies that there is one field at least in which you would like the Court to extend its powers as ultimate law-giver very decidedly.

Your animadversions upon the "Stock Dividend Decision" invite several comments. Far from being very subtle, as you imply, that decision rests upon the very easily understood proposition that there is no essential difference between a corporate surplus against which a stock dividend has been issued, and one against which no such dividend has been issued, since in the latter case the stockholder benefits to approximately the same extent as he would in the former, by the increase in value of his original holdings.

In both cases alike, accordingly, the benefit is held to be not taxable till it is liquidated. Nor is there anything in this decision to imply that the government may not tax stock dividends by taxing the privilege of issuing them—its right to do which is clear on principle and analogy (See *Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co.*, 220 U. S.).

The Stock Dividend case is one of that class of cases which is always troubling courts—cases which fall so close to the line dividing the allowable from the unallowable that there is sure to be much honest difference of opinion as to their real location. Nevertheless, it is still true that the Court, far from ignoring what Justice Holmes asserts "was the known purpose" of the sixteenth amendment, "to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes," has rather done just the opposite. If anyone doubts this assertion, let him examine the decision in *Lynch vs. Hornby* (247 U. S.), in which the Court deliberately set aside in favor of Congress's power under the amendment the really fundamental distinction between augmentations of capital and current profits from the use of capital. The result was to confer on the government the virtual right to levy an increment tax, collectible, however, only at liquidation, and this is just what the government does by section 202 of the Act of 1918.

As I indicated above, the practical nub of your article is difficult to discover. Is it merely that the Court should not be regarded as "a sacred priesthood free from criticism?"

Of course it shouldn't. But perhaps it would be fair to exact of the critic something approaching the same

measure of intelligence and good faith that he demands of the Court. The fact is, that the Court has always been subject to criticism, and the further fact is that no part of the national government has, first and last, proved more responsive to the best thought of the country.

Princeton, New Jersey. EDWARD S. CORWIN.

## The Editors' Answer

[ (1) We regret that we did not render more obvious the simple purpose we had in mind in reviewing a series of recent Supreme Court decisions, namely to recall the nature of the public issues that are involved in the important cases before the Supreme Court. The public, as well as the legal profession, is laboring too much under the conventional notion that public law is like private law, that the same process of "law-finding" is involved, that the same judicial qualities are demanded from Supreme Court Justices when deciding a constitutional question as those which suffice to settle the simple controversy of *Smith v. Jones*. We sought to illustrate by extracts from the opinions of the Court what every student of Constitutional Law knows—that public law at bottom means statesmanship. It is all the more important to insist upon this vital fact because the same set of men are administering the law between man and man, affecting their ordinary individual rights, and the law controlling the exercise of governmental power, the whole relation of man and state.

(2) Accepting the existing theory of American Constitutional Law, we believe the center of gravity of its administration lies in the equipment of the judges. Surely Professor Corwin submits too readily to limited alternatives in suggesting the only relief from "ordinary men" are "supermen." There is a third alternative, able men, men of the calibre of Marshall and Moody, Hughes and Holmes. The problem of our constitutional system is to secure men adequate for the greatness of the task that the Constitution imposes upon our judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court.

We touch here the crucial difficulty of our constitutional system: that its successful working demands men of extraordinary intellectual disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitations in personal experience and imagination be interpreted, however conscientiously or unconsciously, as constitutional limitations. When regard is had to the complexities of modern society, to the necessary specialization and narrowness of individual experience, the capacity for tolerance and objectivity in realizing and respecting the validity of the experience and abilities of others becomes one of the most dynamic factors in the disposition of concrete cases.

(3) We used the stock dividend decision merely as illustrative. We recognize that the determination of what ordinarily constitutes "income" is a technical subject. Of course there are technical grounds for supporting the decision. But that, we submit, misses the entire point. It leaves out of account the guiding consideration to all constitutional questions, Marshall's famous canon that "It is a Constitution we are expounding." The question before the Court was not whether a stock dividend is "income." That is a question as to which opinion is bound to differ, the opinion of legal scholars like Professor Clark as well as of economists. But that, we insist, was not the question before the Supreme Court. That way of putting the issue forgets the vital fact that Congress had expressed its judgment; and so the question before the Supreme Court was the very much narrower issue whether Congress in declar-

ing that a stock dividend is "income," within the purport of the eighteenth amendment, went outside its constitutional boundaries. Such an issue is not to be decided by technical niceties. Not we, but four Supreme Court Justices (and we need not balk at the fact that in the minority were the most experienced, the most powerful minds of the Court) held that by a technicality the judgment of Congress was nullified by the Supreme Court.

(4) Of course the Court has throughout its history been criticized—and particularly so since its decisions have touched the great economic and industrial forces. But does Professor Corwin think the Court is always right, and that criticism of it is out of place? At least he has not always thought so. The Court has always been criticized and it should always be criticized when narrow minds predominate and when the Court has taken too narrow a view of the Constitution. We merely sought to give present-day application to the point of view of that great student and lover of our Constitution, James Bradley Thayer: "Petty judicial interpretations have always been, are now, and always will be a very serious danger to the country." To avoid that "very serious danger" is a problem that demands constant alertness and the work of the Court, as at present constituted, does not make the danger seem any the less serious.—THE EDITORS.]

## Amazement

SIR: I have read with amazement the more than four columns of testimony given by C. R. J. (New Republic, May 5th) concerning Public Opinion in the Middle West, gathered he says, or may it be she, during a "two weeks trip through seven of the most important of the states of the Middle West" from "contact with university people—students and faculty—by the hundreds, with editors, ministers, workers and common laymen," whatever these last may be.

My amazement is two-fold. First, that in a couple of days to a state (I assume an equal division of the eventful fortnight to the seven states) any human being could gather so vast an amount of specific evidence from "hundreds." It is surely a remarkable instance of one who runs may read. But, perhaps he flew. And, second, as a professor on the Faculty of the State University of Indiana, I am amazed at the kind of talk, evidence of conditions and opinion, which your Marco Polo met with. The old saying "important if true" comes to mind, the point being that I am amazed at the seemingly innumerable startling utterances heard, no approximate parallel to any one of which have I known of, or do I believe to have been given or, if given, to have been true during the past two years at my particular State University, reasonably to be supposed as among C. R. J.'s seven. But as your gatherer and publisher of opinion has followed the safe rule of "naming no names no offense can be taken"; in other words, avoided citing one single place or person, he does, to say the least, greatly lighten the weight of his evidence—and the force of his uncommonly loose arguments.

Bloomington, Indiana.

ALFRED M. BROOKS.

## Reciprocal Amazement

SIR: Your correspondent's "amazement" does not, I assure you, exceed mine. My idea of university professors has always been that they were the essence of calm cold logic.

To find this one all innuendo and sarcasm and no argument is shocking. In so far as he descends from exclamation to concrete statement his animus appears to boil down to two primary propositions and one of incidental character.

First:—He is not prepared for the ruthless modern fact that one may travel through seven states in two weeks (seventeen days, it was, to be exact) and yet have time to talk. The only way to test this, I believe, is to try it. It is true that on this trip I did come in contact with about one thousand college and university students and about a hundred and forty-five instructors (approximately one-fifteenth and one-eighth of the total membership of each of these groups in the institutions I visited). I also talked with and listened to conversations among many other people in ways and places which I mentioned. One who is at all used to traveling knows that this can be done easily, especially if one plans his contacts. With dozens of laboring men, "drummers," students and teachers I talked quite intimately and received the benefit of their observations as well as my own. I must confess that the people I met were to some extent selected in the direction of liberalism, but this I admitted by implication in my article. I deeply regret that I cannot cite names and places as proof of my observations and quotations. When there is such a thing as academic freedom and when your correspondent and others of his kind have shown their alliance with the instructors, rather than with the forces which throttle them, by joining a union, anonymity will not be necessary.

Second:—Your correspondent doubts me because he has heard no "approximate parallel to any one" of "the seemingly innumerable startling utterances" reported by me. However much I may regret this, I cannot help it. I know other people with good intentions who have little contact with what is really going on in the world. If my critic reads the Indianapolis papers this isolation should be all the easier for him, for the only startling things in these dailies which I saw was what Mr. Palmer's office sent forth—much worse, by the way, than anything I found and, I think, much less true to the facts. If, as I suspect, your correspondent's wrath is due to the arousal of his instinct in defense of the purity of his university, I can gladly assure him that I found no taint or corruption there. I was not nearer to it than thirty miles.

To turn to the incidental (but apparently important) question raised by your correspondent, I shall have to decline to satisfy his curiosity as to my gender. That is a matter which I never discuss with strange men, however chivalrous to the "fair sex" they may ordinarily appear to be.

C. R. J.

## Disagreeing with Mr. Brailsford

**S**IR: The number of *The New Republic* dated March 10th, 1920, having, by chance, come in my possession, I have read Mr. Brailsford's article on Enforcing the Treaty. I should like to express the reactions of one who has been doing work in France for the past two years and who, at the same time, has had the opportunity of seeing rather closely France's needs as seen from the inner circle of the government.

Mr. Brailsford makes two statements, in particular, which are worthy of being pondered over. Speaking of the condition in which Germany is placed by the Treaty he says: "One cannot conceive the initial miracle of restarting industry and restoring currency under the handicap of these fantastic indemnities, these hampering tributes of coal, these

uncounted mortgages, which paralyze energy and ruin credit." And further, speaking of the French desire of seeing the Treaty enforced, we find this: ". . . Their (the French's) main concern is with the payment of the indemnity. They tell us that they intend (as Millerand says in every speech) to exact the last pfennig of money and the last ton of coal. That means that a numerous and once formidable people must be kept for a generation at forced labor . . ."

Let us take the first of these statements. From it we gather that it is impossible for a nation to begin over again her economic life if she pays the indemnities levied on Germany and if she gives up the coal which is demanded of her. That may be so, but there is another side to the question. If it is impossible for Germany to survive economically if she gives up the stated amount of money and coal, may it not be equally impossible for France to survive if she does not get it? France is in debt to her Allies to the point that one wonders how she can ever get out of it; her most productive industrial district has been *completely destroyed* during German occupation and evacuation; her coal mines have in great part been purposely ruined. While Germany has not had any of her manufactures destroyed; has not had her mines ruined and has borrowed little from other nations. Thus, in spite of the fact that war claims have been heavy upon her, she comes out of the struggle with a better economic situation than her neighbor across the Rhine. Consequently, it would seem that of the two countries she could stand the loss of money and coal better than France.

In the second statement we are told that the French people are firmly decided to exact "the last pfennig of money and the last ton of coal." And this decision is deplored because it means "that a numerous and once formidable people must be kept for a generation at forced labor." Though this is undoubtedly an exaggerated statement one is truly tempted to ask: "What if it does?" According to our system of justice those who have robbed, who have killed, who have destroyed, are made to restore, when it is possible, what they have taken and pay an indemnity when it can not be replaced. Criminals are also kept at hard labor. If we think it right for individuals, why is it considered, by Mr. Brailsford, such a shameful procedure when applied to nations?

France has already paid 25,000,000,000 francs out of her own pocket in widows' pensions, in orphans' pensions and in reparation in the devastated regions. That money should have been paid by the one who has caused the necessity for its being paid—not by the one who has suffered. And though these 25,000,000,000 francs have been paid matters now stand as if a drop of water had been poured in an empty bucket. Thousands of widows have not as yet what should be coming to them; countless orphans would go hungry if it were not for American help; as to the north of France, those who go back to find what were once their homes are put to harder labor, I am certain, than any one across the Rhine? Is it strange that France wishes to be paid?

I wish this letter could be published in the *New Republic*, for statements as fundamentally unfair as those made by Mr. Brailsford should not be allowed to pass without a word. They are just the kind of thing which is doing so much harm to the Franco-American relations on both sides. Those of us who love both nations are sorry to see such mistakes made.

SIMONE BRANGIER.

Paris, France.

## Books and Things

UNTIL I began to read *The Letters of Henry James* (two vols., Scribner's) my imagination had refused to do much with their writer except to see him as an observer, endlessly curious for his art's sake, of human relations, and as an artist whose anxiety to inspire us with a curiosity equal to his own took too elaborate precautions. Hence my absurd relief at finding here and there in his letters signs that he was not exempt from everyday life, that he once smoked a cigarette and did not look forward to smoking another, that he once composed a telegram only seventy words long about a fire in his house at Rye, that he, too, could sit in his shirt-sleeves on a hot day, could take prizes—for which he honored his gardener—at a flower show, could forget his pyjamas and ask to have them sent after him. In spite of knowing better I had made the mistake of assuming that his life must have lacked whatever his art most ignores. Hence my philistine amusement over these few details which illustrate his exposure to the common lot. While we read we come now and then, too, upon an illustration of something quite different, as when we find him writing to his brother William, in 1901: "We here, on our side, have been gathering close round the poor old dying and dead Queen, and are plunged in universal mourning tokens—which accounts for my black-edged paper." We have, unluckily, no means of knowing what William James thought about this black-edged token of his brother's nearness to being in at so august a death.

Those among us who love Henry James's novels and stories have been reading these letters, I suppose, partly with a hope of getting a clearer notion of his nearness to and his remoteness from experience. "I met Zola at luncheon the day before he left London," he writes to Stevenson in 1893, five years before Zola began to play his noble part in the Dreyfus affair, "and found him very sane and common and inexperienced. Nothing, literally nothing, has ever happened to him except to write the *Rougon-Macquart*." What, beyond the writing of his books, ever happened to Henry James? His life was chiefly, in a phrase of his own, "the wear and tear of discrimination," but what kind of material did life put under his microscope? "We must know, as much as possible, in our beautiful art, yours and mine," so he generously says in 1913 to Mr. Hugh Walpole, "what we are talking about—and the only way to know is to have lived and loved and cursed and floundered and enjoyed and suffered. I think I don't regret a single 'excess' of my responsive youth—I only regret, in my chilled age, certain occasions and possibilities I didn't embrace." Well, excess, even in quotation marks, is a relative term, and one suspects Henry James's standard of excess, like Wordsworth's "standard of intoxication" in the story, of being "deplorably low." Even if we grant that his youth, long choosing and beginning late, may dutifully have achieved an excess or two, we are still justified in guessing that excess brought him no adventure which as an artist he could turn to account.

"I am," he writes to Dr. White in March, 1914, "a votary of the single impression and the imperceptible adventure, picked up by accident and cherished, as it were, in secret." This description of himself is what we return to, after we have finished the letters, after we have had time to forget the degree in which these two volumes are

an altar to friendship. Whatever else did not happen to him, we say as we read, friendship certainly did. To his friends he was not remote, not aloof and shut up in his art. He was generously and imaginatively sympathetic. With him affection at its deepest was a passion. "So I give you," he writes to Miss Norton when William James was dying, "our dismal chronicle of suspense and pain. My own fears are the blackest, and at the prospect of losing my wonderful beloved brother out of the world in which, from as far back as in dimmest childhood, I have so yearningly always counted on him, I feel nothing but the abject weakness of grief and even terror." He sounds the same note a week later, in a letter to Mr. T. S. Perry: "I sit heavily stricken and in darkness—for from far back in dimmest childhood he had been my ideal Elder Brother, and I still, through all the years, saw in him, even as a small timorous boy yet, my protector, my backer, my authority and my pride. His extinction changes the face of life for me—besides the mere missing of the unspeakable vivid and beautiful presence of him."

Such words are for the high moments of life, for the utterance of grief at its intensest, but in expressing the other shades of affection, even the humorous and the playful, Henry James gave of himself as abundantly, although with less unreserve. His lighter devotions, his hails and farewells, are, I think, with all their variety, too uniformly elaborate. A letter which ends like this—"my dear Bruce Porter, ever so clingingly and constantly yours"—is nothing to shudder at, but a procession of letter-endings conceived in the same spirit show a failure to appreciate the convenience, as a short cut, of the handy stereotype.

Now and then I have had, while reading these letters, a slightly irritated sense that Henry James was pinning knots and ribbons on his correspondent's bosom, and then patting them, not unarchly, into place. "Dearest Edward," he writes from Chicago to Mr. Warren, "this is but a mere breathless blessing hurled at you, as it were, between trains and in ever so grateful joy in your brave double letter (of the lame hand, hero that you are!) which has just overtaken me here." The rule seems to be that the more playfully he writes the more extreme is his elaboration. "Well," he says in a letter dated from Rye, "it all sounds delightfully pastoral to one whose 'stable' consists but of the go-cart in which the gardener brings up the luggage of those of my visitors (from the station) who advance successfully to the *stage* of that question of transport; and my outhouses of the shed under which my solitary henchman (but sufficient to a draw-bridge that plays so easily up!) 'attends to the boots' of those confronted with the inevitable subsequent phase of early matutinal departure."

This elaborateness that I rather complain of seems, however, from one end of Henry James's life to the other, never to have been used as an escape from an obligation to say what he thought and felt. I wonder whether a more truthful man ever wrote letters in such abundance, whether any other man ever wrote to his friends so exactly as he wrote of them? A rare virtue, which he missed but once, and then by ever so little, when he speaks of Mr. H. G. Wells to Mr. Gosse with a thought more severity than he turns, charmingly courteous as always, upon Mr. Wells himself. In these volumes we find Henry James, with a poetic that grew narrower, that shut more and more doors and made more and more exclusions as he