

Latin America needs another Zapata, yet, should he arise, he would not prove able to stem the decline of peasantry and the erosion of its economic bases. The future of the subcontinent as of that of all mankind will be forged in its urban centers, not its countryside. Capitalism is its fate, and the question is indeed how to "control" it. But controlling it does not mean to make it "democratic" and "open"; these are not attributes of a capitalist system but of political institutions. It means to limit the trauma it inflicts upon culture and psyche, and to speed the day when man's work harmonizes rather than conflicts with his spirit. In this, the peoples of Latin America must find their own way.

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Washington and Peking

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN CHINA, by A. T. Steele, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1966, 321 pp., \$7.50.

POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: VIEWS FROM SIX CONTINENTS, edited by A. M. Halpern, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1965, 523 pp., \$9.95.

AMERICA AND CHINA: A NEW APPROACH TO ASIA, by Chang Hsin-hai, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1965, 288 pp., \$5.95.

THE NEED FOR A NEW American policy toward China has long been indicated by serious scholars of Asian history and politics. Possibly no more ironic commentary on State Department attitudes is that what we have done is what the Chinese Communists have been most anxious for us to do.

Why should the Communists bear the onus for China's exclusion from the United Nations, It's much more convenient, for them, if the United States opposes the principle of a universal U.N., even though Communist China would almost certainly turn down an invitation

to take its seat in the world organization.

Why make the Communists admit that Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh want no end to the war in Vietnam? It's advantageous, to the Communists, that the U.S. bolsters Communist propaganda by escalating the bombing and giving the world the impression that we seek military victory rather than a negotiated settlement of the war.

And at the very moment when President Johnson suggests that we should try to establish better relations with China, Dean Rusk assures a grinning Chiang Kai-shek that we will never agree to Red China's admission to U.N.

The Council on Foreign Relations has published a series of belated studies showing that old policies and old attitudes toward China have become obsolete and that they harm American interests everywhere. A. T. Steele, in his *The American People and China*, uses public opinion polls to underscore the fact that most people are far ahead of both the President and the Congress in these matters. So, while Secretary of State Rusk enjoys Chiang's company and his politics, public opinion polls indicate that "to this day the Kuomintang and corruption seem inextricably linked in the public mind." While most Americans have either no interest in Chiang, or dislike him, Steele cites interviews showing that Chiang has strong support from the military and naval brass and the leaders of the American Legion. On such reeds does Rusk rest his policies.

Steele is a cautious man. Critical of McCarthyism for the shambles it made of American foreign policy, especially in Asia, Steele nevertheless feels impelled to present the "useful" side of McCarthyism. Its utility, he explains, was that it alerted the country to the dangers of Communist penetration. (Of course it did nothing of the kind. If anything, it gave the Communists, in a deep state of decomposition in this country, ammunition and reason for continuing their hopeless round of appointed tasks). Nevertheless, Steele goes on to make the point that the damage McCarthyism caused was incalculable.

"Many self-styled liberals discreetly buttoned their lips on the China question. Some State Department personnel stopped suggesting new and original approaches. Our China policy went into the deep freeze. For several years free and open discussion of China and our China policy was severely inhibited." Somewhat self-consciously, Steele adds: "And evidence of caution on the subject are still plentiful today."

Steele presents another most useful finding. The public, which surely does not receive adequate information about China, mysteriously shows a degree of sophistication on the China issue which is nothing short of astounding. Based on public opinion polls Steele notes:

"It is interesting that the consistently antagonistic attitude of the American public toward the Chinese Communists has been accompanied by an equally consistent desire for peace and harmony through negotiation of our differences. The overwhelming favorable response to the suggestion of negotiation with Communist China . . . follows a pattern of opinion that has remained virtually unchanged for a decade."

Apparently the public makes more intelligent distinctions than many in high office who compare China, sunk in the backwardness of a thousand years (even with its atom bomb!) and Hitler Germany, with respect to war-making capabilities.

Steele offers some valuable observations about the misinformation which well-meaning, sometimes starry-eyed, visitors to China bring back. Just as travelers, who went to China during the current cultural pogrom and came back without an inkling of what was going on, so too, some visitors went to China in 1957 during the One Hundred Flowers debacle, and came back oblivious of the enormous purge then under way. Not that today, or in 1957, such travelers had access to anything basic that was going on. But why come back singing about happy people who think that theirs is the best of all possible worlds? Steele makes a persuasive case for a balanced treatment of news

about China. And he calls upon those Americans who want a re-examination of our China policy to make themselves heard more clearly and more insistently; thus far the pressure groups favorable to the status quo have been better organized and speak with a louder voice in the nation.

IN PRESENTING VIEWS from all parts of the world—European, Asian, Latin American, African, Middle Eastern—A. M. Halpern makes a useful contribution to the discussion of the China question. He is objective enough to offer studies that are in sharp variance with his own views. For example the Indian, the British, the French—for that matter, most spokesmen for most countries—would scarcely go along with Halpern when he argues against seating China in U.N. His argument is all the more amazing because he rests his case on the fact that the Chinese Communists prefer narrower international forums than the United Nations. (Why we should accept the evil arguments of the Chinese Communists, and make them our own, is difficult to understand.)

The discussion of Japan's relations with China is valuable for the light it casts on the short-sighted policies favored by Secretary of State Dulles. While the Japanese stoutly opposed rearmament, Dulles, in his greater wisdom, sought to teach the Japanese the virtues of militarization.

The analysis of India's relations with China points up the costly blunder India made when it failed to press the Chinese for a categorical statement on the Chinese-Indian border, during the years when China was not yet prepared for a showdown with India. The Chinese Communists created the impression, without committing themselves legally, that there was no cause for worry about the border. Then the Communist armies came down the mountains and Indian-Chinese relations will never be quite the same again.

Any discussion of Indonesian relations with China, written even a few days before the attempted putsch of last Octo-

ber, will of course suffer from bad guessing. Thus, Arnold C. Brackmann writes about the likelihood of the emergence of a "national communist" regime after Sukarno.

Other countries and regions whose relations and attitudes toward China are discussed, include Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Malaya, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, Yugoslavia, Africa, the Middle East and Brazil. Halpern, unfortunately, is little concerned that the U.S. will overlook a more productive approach than sheer containment and that we will not seek areas of agreement with Communist China. Nevertheless, as indicated, he does present varied views on the subject which go a long way toward explaining why U.S. policy has tended to alienate us from our friends and allies.

PROFESSOR CHANG, ALAS, wears rose tinted glasses. Since the Chinese were so bad off in the past—as indeed they were—he feels that "personal freedom is not of much

weight" for the ordinary Chinese. Since he presents no evidence about how the ordinary Chinese feels on this or any other question, it's only a guess. Usually this is the kind of guess made by a white man about the majority of the human race which lives in squalor, when he argues that the people of the underdeveloped countries don't feel that liberty is very important since they are concerned only about sheer survival.

Professor Chang believes that the Chinese Communists have discovered a way of changing human nature. He says that, at least among the Communists, they have eliminated "personal jealousies, selfishness, ambition, greed, avarice" and, to top it all, even "the willing surrender to feminine charms." He sees the Chinese Communist revolution as a great spiritual transformation. All in all, Professor Chang is a very happy man, because in Chinese Communism he has seen the apotheosis of all the good toward which mankind has been striving for thousands of years. JOSEPH CLARK

A Valuable Contribution

PATTERNS OF ANARCHY; A COLLECTION OF WRITINGS ON THE ANARCHIST TRADITION, Edited by Leonard I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry, Anchor Books, Garden City, N.Y., 1966, 570 pp., \$1.95.

SERIOUS STUDENTS OF ANARCHISM have long been appalled by the abysmal ignorance that most people reveal when the word anarchy is mentioned. In the mind of the average man, anarchy is synonymous with social disorder and violence. Unfortunately, all too many political scientists share the general public's confusion regarding the essential nature of the anarchist idea. Until the last few years, in fact, it was professionally dangerous for a political scientist to reveal that he was serious about anarchism as a subject for research.

The anthology of anarchist writings which forms the subject of this review

comes as a welcome relief from this sad state of affairs. Perhaps the fact that one of the editors is a historian, while the other has been trained in philosophy, has helped them avoid the obsession with power which clouds the vision of many political scientists. In any event, their wide-eyed amazement upon discovering that "many perceptive social theorists have spoken in the anarchist tradition" is refreshing, even if it is a little naive. And when they candidly state that "we know of no anarchist who has celebrated chaos," anarchists all over the world will be eternally grateful that this simple truth, so self-evident to them, has finally been recognized.

Not only do the editors include selections from classical anarchist works such as those of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Tolstoy, Goldman, Stirner, and Kropotkin, but they have introduced the works of a number of less well known anarch-