

3. THE DOMINICAN DILEMMA



THERE IS A NATURAL TENDENCY for any American, reviewing the course of our Latin American diplomacy since World War II, to find excuses and explanations for its ineptness. In Cuba, for example, one can lay the blame for our blundering policy during the Batista years on our preoccupations in Europe and Asia, on Secretary Dulles' lack of interest in hemispheric affairs, and on the amateur diplomacy of Ambassadors Arthur Gardner and Earl Smith. The failure at the

Bay of Pigs can be attributed to wishful thinking, faulty intelligence work, and the inexperience of President Kennedy. And some critics of our armed intervention in the Dominican Republic have similarly called it a mistake, a hasty error that, in Theodore Draper's words, made "a mockery . . . of everything the United States supposedly stood for."

The first two months following the dispatch of the Marines and the 82nd Airborne to Santo Domingo certainly revealed a considerable amount of confusion. After initially expressing "relief" at the Dominican Army's crushing of the rebellion, we sent our troops in to save the tottering military regime of General Elias Wessin y Wessin from collapse. But, after an appearance on *Time's* cover as a "tough little brigadier general [with a] bleak, uncompromising hatred of Communism," Wessin y Wessin was dropped as too unpopular to be rammed down Dominican throats. Our policy-makers then turned to another Brigadier General, Antonio Imbert Barreras ("a Dominican national hero" according to *Time*), only to find that he was not to impose order either. While sporadic fighting continued Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, unofficial envoy John Barlow Martin, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy, and OAS Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, among others, tried to patch up some coalition acceptable to the US and to both the Dominican military and the constitutionalists. In view of the political vacuum left by the thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship and the additional four years of confusion and *coups*, our efforts to find a suitable care-

taker government were not successful. It began to appear as if our troops might remain in the capital city for a long time to come.

Such short-term uncertainty and changes of plan are understandable in the light of the complicated situation in Santo Domingo itself and the Johnson Administration's need to pay some attention to public opinion on the island, at home, and elsewhere in the world. Except in a wartime situation like that preceding the bombing of Hiroshima, our government has been unwilling, or unable, to undertake such brusque, decisive action as the attack on South Korea, the destruction of the Hungarian Revolution, or the building of the Berlin Wall. At the Bay of Pigs in 1961, in the missile crisis the next year, in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic today, we have held back from all-out action, from the commitment of all our enormous power to achieve a complete victory.

It would be wrong, however, to attribute the Dominican decision to panic, haste, ignorance, or physical exhaustion (in the case of John Barlow Martin). President Johnson and his advisers knew what they were doing, weighed the risks and drawbacks of a return to Big Stick diplomacy, and decided to go ahead anyway. The result was not an accident or an aberration, but a forceful example of what our Latin American policy has been for at least a decade, and will no doubt continue to be for the foreseeable future.

Lyndon Johnson, unlike his predecessors, cannot be accused of half-heartedness or inexperience in Latin American affairs. On June 22, 1954, four days after the CIA-sponsored invasion that was to overthrow the leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, he introduced a Senate resolution endorsing intervention. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 he favored an air attack without warning. Since coming to the Presidency, although conciliatory in disputes involving Mexico and Panama, he has taken a hard line when charges of Communist infiltration have been raised, recognizing Army juntas in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and backing an Army take-over in Brazil. The decision to send the Marines to Santo Domingo was his. He made it without hesitation. He involved himself deeply in its details (86 talks with McGeorge Bundy during the first few days), and he has vigorously defended it ever since.

Thomas Mann, recently promoted to the post of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, is equally tough and even more experienced in Latin American affairs. All but one of his twenty-three years with the State Department have been spent on hemispheric matters, all the way from Uruguay to Mexico. Counsellor to the US Ambassador in Guatemala in 1954-1955, he was a self-styled "activist" in the overthrow of Arbenz and one of the chief architects of the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961. During his service as Ambassador to Mexico (1961-1964) he made

no effort to rival his genial, 'simpatico' predecessor Josephus Daniels; he spent most of his time with government officials and wealthy businessmen, to whom he liked to give little lectures on free enterprise. If Mann also strongly supported the intervention, the breaking of a series of pledges and the precedent of thirty years, it wasn't because he didn't know any better or hadn't calculated the consequences.

William Tapley Bennett, Jr., our Ambassador to Santo Domingo, was the third key figure in the decision to intervene, the man under fire in the capital who called for troops. Like his superiors, Bennett is no novice and no fool. He is not a political appointee, but a Foreign Service officer with a quarter-century of experience in Panama, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Chile. His diplomatic career began in the Dominican Republic in 1941-3, and he had been serving as Ambassador there for over a year when the recent fighting broke out—long enough, certainly, to get a basic understanding of Dominican realities. Although he was out of the country on a routine mission to Washington when the trouble began, he was back on the scene in a few days, and it was his cable on April 28th that led to the largest commitment of U.S. troops in this hemisphere since Woodrow Wilson invaded Mexico half a century ago.

Johnson, Mann, and Bennett, then, were all aware of the drawbacks involved in their decision. To begin with, our action flatly violated the Charter of the Organization of American States. Article 15 of the Charter denies the right of any state or group of states "to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state"; Article 17 forbids military occupation "even temporarily . . . on any grounds whatever." Sending the Marines ashore to protect American lives might be excused on humanitarian grounds, and Johnson still insists that this was "99 percent" of the reason they were sent; but all the American residents were speedily removed (without a single injury)—and our troops remain.

Nobody expects a nation to adhere to treaty obligations if its existence is endangered, but the Dominican situation was certainly not that serious. And if we defend our action on Walter Lippmann's ground that "the Dominican Republic lies squarely within the sphere of influence of the United States," we are setting an awkward precedent. China could claim as much for all of Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union for Iran, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. Even Senator Ellender complained that he did "not know how we shall be able to explain this action to the world in view of what we are doing in South Vietnam."

MORE SERIOUS THAN THE VIOLATION of our treaty pledges is the conditioned reflex that the movement of Marines in the Caribbean triggers throughout Latin America. Because Cuba has been expelled from the OAS, and because so many of the remaining members are controlled

by military juntas, we were able to get the necessary 14 votes for an OAS force to give some legal color to our previous unilateral action. But Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, and Peru, the most democratic nations in Latin America, voted against us along with the Ecuadorian junta, and Venezuela abstained. Without the vote of the discredited Dominican representative we would have been defeated.

Latin America has been struggling for decades to win the U.S. over to non-intervention, and we have sacrificed much good will by abandoning it. The results may be far more serious than the usual riots in Caracas, Buenos Aires, and elsewhere. Shaky regimes in Argentina and Colombia have been further weakened by their backing of the U.S., and the Brazilian military have been making threatening noises about moving unilaterally against their "Communist-infiltrated" neighbor, Uruguay. As for the OAS force now officially in control of the Santo Domingo corridor, it is an anomaly; 22 policemen from democratic Costa Rica, about 1500 troops from military dictatorships in Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Paraguay, and 12,000 Americans. Such a body (like the famous 50-50 horse and rabbit stew that had one horse and one rabbit) will hardly convince anybody of our belief in democratic, multilateral action in the Americas.

A final reservation about our action concerns the flimsy evidence that has been given to support the President's assertion on television, on May 4 that

what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly... was taken over and really seized and placed in the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.

Juan Bosch, the deposed President in whose name the revolt was undertaken, is no Communist, and has never been called one except by the Dominican military. A poet, professor, historian, and novelist, Bosch spent 29 years in exile during the era of Trujillo, and won the Presidency in 1962 by a 2 to 1 margin in a thoroughly honest election supervised by the OAS. When he tried to cut down on Army grafters the next year, he was overthrown, with the usual charges of "infiltration," "Marxist-Leninist sympathies," and the like. Ambassador John Barlow Martin, who supported Bosch during his seven months in office and remains a friend, is blunt in his condemnation of the slander (*Life*, May 28, 1965):

The pretext was that Bosch was a Castro-Communist, or was handing the republic over to the Castro-Communists. I never believed this. I considered, and still consider, Bosch's overthrow a serious blow to Dominican Democracy.

General Francisco Caamano Deno, who acted as Bosch's lieutenant in Santo Domingo and assumed the office of President with his backing, has equally satisfactory non-Communist credentials. A midshipman in Trujillo's day, he went through the Amphibious Landing Forces school at Coronado, California, and spent six months with the Marines at

Quantico, Virginia. Certainly he must have been checked for ideological purity before being admitted to this country, let alone allowed to enroll in military training schools. If McCarthy were still alive he might insist on investigating the Marine Corps.

None of Caamano's advisers or appointees appears on the CIA's list of fifty-eight "leftist activists," "intellectual fidelistas," and men who have "close family connections" with communism. Caamano, moreover, is hardly a paladin of democracy. His father, nicknamed "the Butcher" was head of the so-called *Quarenta y Dos* (the Forty-two), the savage secret police of the Benefactor, and some of his followers are soldiers of fortune, ex-fascists, and out-of-control adolescents. But his support of Juan Bosch and the 1963 Constitution seems genuine enough, and his repudiation of the Communist label sincere:

I can't see how it is pretended that 53 persons can govern an entire nation when we military men are in control of the movement... The military... and the people want only one thing: the return to constitutionalism.

This sentiment from the top figures of the revolt is confirmed by almost all the reporters on the scene in the rebel-held district of the capital. James M. Goodsell of the *Christian Science Monitor* conscientiously tried to track down some of the 58 men whom the CIA charged were "decisively influencing the political leadership of the rebellion." Five of the names were dropped after it was pointed out to Embassy officials that they were duplications. Two others, one of them Dato Pagan Perdomo, supposed to be a top *fidelista* agent, had been jailed on March 9 and April 12, and hence could not have taken part in the uprising. Four others were arrested within two days of the outbreak of the revolution, i.e., before it was "taken over" by the Communists. Six others were not in the Dominican Republic at the time of the revolt, and did not return afterwards. At least half a dozen other names, some of them described in the list as "exhorting workers to support rebels," "armed," or "fighting in the streets" were deleted by the Embassy because they were not considered to be Communists. After exposing this "sloppy intelligence work," Goodsell sums up:

I tried to locate several of those whose names are on the list. I was not successful... I could find no evidence that they were anywhere in... key command positions... The top rebel command is in the hands of non-Communist elements who fiercely proclaim their opposition to communism.

Other reporters on the scene, almost without exception, also contradict the official American view of a revolution captured overnight by the Communists. The rebels, many of them students, lawyers, doctors, insist that they are fighting for Bosch and a constitutional government, not for Castro. American journals quote them as follows:

"We are not Communists... Why must we suffer like this because the Yankees don't want us to have a constitutional government?"—*Washington Post*

"I can't believe the Americans are on Wessin's side. We thought they would be for us."—*Herald Tribune*

"Believe me, these people are not Communists... We just want to live in freedom with personal security and with jobs."—*New York Times*

"We are not Communists. Wessin is killing us from hunger and taking our jobs. We can't compromise with a military dictatorship."—*National Observer*.

"Here in Santo Domingo there is no communism. What we are trying to do is regain our liberty... This is a movement for the restoration of the constitution with Juan Bosch as president."—*Copley News Service*

"A group of young rebels pleadingly told *Time's* representative, 'We are not Communists. We are active anti-Communists. We are fighting for the constitution, for Bosch. When the constitution is restored, we will keep the Communists out. We can handle them.'—*Time*

"The word of the President of the United States on the magnitude of the Communist threat here is not good enough for many, many Dominicans."—*Los Angeles Times*

Even the State Department hastily backed down from its charges that the Communists "dominated" or "controlled" the uprising; now it was said only that they had "joined" it, "were participating in the fighting." An intelligence officer in Santo Domingo told reporter William Giandoni that he knew "on very damn good sources" that Col. Caamano was Communist-controlled, but was unable to name those sources; Secretary Mann lamented that "the kind of proof the public demands involves breaking up your intelligence sources." In the absence of that kind of proof, and in the light of the concurrent escalation of our undeclared war in Vietnam, it is not surprising that Lyndon Johnson's reputation as a responsible leader was damaged. As Edmund Taylor reported from Paris (in *The Reporter*, July 1):

One encounters Europeans... who can find excuses for President Johnson's decision, or who honestly believe that it may turn out on balance to the advantage of the West, but this reporter at least has yet to meet one who believes that it was absolutely necessary or wholly justifiable.

With all these risks inherent in the operation, with some U.S. officials in the Caribbean afraid that "we were in danger of getting on the wrong side, against the people" (John Barlow Martin, in *Life*, May 28), why did we do it? Why did Lyndon Johnson, whose favorite quotation is from the Book of Isaiah, 'Come now and let us reason together,' who was already involved in an intervention in Vietnam that had long since turned into a disaster—why did he shed his caution and act as we might have expected Barry Goldwater to act?

The question is one that will be long debated, and the answer is no doubt not a simple one. But it is clear that to understand what happened we must go back beyond the events of April 24–28 of this year and examine the course of our relations with Bosch while he was in power, during the summer and fall of 1963. It was then that our attitude toward him and the movement he represented was fixed, and

the stage set for Johnson's seemingly hasty but actually long-considered and provided-for action.

WHEN BOSCH CAME INTO OFFICE on February 27, 1963, the first elected President of the Dominican Republic in a generation, he carried with him the hopes of the Latin American democratic left and the Alliance for Progress. The presence at his inauguration of Puerto Rico's Munoz Marin and Venezuela's Romulo Betancourt, along with Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, symbolized the great expectations his electoral victory had aroused. The Dominican Republic, for so many decades under the thumb of a brutal Caribbean *condottiere*, was to become a showcase of democracy; Ambassador Martin tells us he "did everything in my power to help (Bosch) give the ordinary Dominican people freedom and a better life."

But Bosch was no miracle worker, and his inability to carry out his campaign promises overnight disappointed many of his followers. More serious, because more directly dangerous, was the campaign against him begun by the Dominican oligarchy, by the military officials, the churchmen, landowners, the defeated politicians who wanted to preserve the social and economic status quo. Talk of "Communist infiltration," of Bosch's "stubbornness," his "vanity" began before his inauguration, and was encouraged by some American newspapermen and some members of the U.S. military mission in Santo Domingo. The Church attacked the new constitution on the ground that its provision for civil divorce ignored "the rights of God."

After Bosch proposed to establish government stores to lower living costs, challenged the legality of a Standard Oil contract granted by the previous regime, and ordered confiscation of the "excess profits" of the U.S.-owned South Puerto Rico sugar company, Ambassador Martin found him increasingly "ineffective," handicapped by "his own difficult temperament." Bosch was, indeed, "difficult"; he insisted on civil liberties, even for Communists, he refused to take advice from the U.S. Embassy, he tried to eliminate some of the Army's system of graft. Neither his scrupulous personal honesty nor his willingness to denounce Communism as "death, war, destruction, and the loss of all our blessings" and to work against it in a dozen legal ways could save him. After surviving a number of abortive coups, he told an Air Force General that he would not approve a \$6 million warplane purchase which contained \$1.2 million as a kickback; within a week he was out of office. And while the U.S. did withdraw its ambassador and suspend the aid program, the island's military masters, who had seen how hollow such threats turned out to be in Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador, were not overly concerned; very likely they had received

private assurances from our military mission, part of the "International of the Sword."

The U.S. did not, at any rate, bestir itself to rescue democracy in Santo Domingo. Our appeals and warnings were perfunctory; we sent no Marines (nor would Bosch have accepted their support) and we did not even order the fleet into offshore waters, a maneuver that had previously disposed of some of the Trujillo clan without bloodshed. After Johnson's accession he brought in Mann as his Latin American policy spokesman, and speedily recognized the military junta.

The truth is that, despite all our rhetoric about democracy and reform, we were not sorry to see Bosch thrown out. He was "unreliable"; you couldn't count on him to crack down on "communism" the way Trujillo had, the way Trujillo's heir General Wessin y Wessin would. Letting Communists operate in the open, stirring up the Dominican people with promises of reform was risky; as one observer put it, "Tom Mann is not a conservative. Tom Mann is a foreign service officer. A foreign service officer plays it safe."

Given our willingness to see the Army throw Bosch out in September, 1963, it is not surprising that we were unwilling to see the process reversed in April, 1965. And although Johnson declared that the movement to restore Bosch "began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice," there is considerable evidence that we feared and opposed it from the beginning, i.e., *before* the Communists allegedly took over three days later.

Tad Szulc reports that on April 25, the second day of the revolt, the State Department had decided that Bosch's return "would pose a threat of communism in the Dominican Republic 'within six months.'" Bosch says (in *The New Leader*, June 21) that on April 27 the 2nd secretary at the U.S. embassy shouted to leaders of his PRD party that "We will not consent to Bosch's return." Col. Caamano insists that when he tried to enlist Ambassador Bennett's good offices in bringing about a ceasefire, the American official "insultingly" demanded that the rebels surrender at once. When it seemed that the "popular democratic revolution" was defeated early on April 28, "Administration officials expressed relief over the apparent collapse of the insurrection" (John W. Finney in the *New York Times*, April 29). No effort was made to support or even to contact Bosch in his Puerto Rican exile, and his requests for a plane to return him to Santo Domingo were ignored. Democracy might be all right for the United States, but a military government would have to do for the Dominicans.

Only later in the day on April 28, when the revolutionary forces got their second wind and Wessin y Wessin's army fell apart, did Bennett, Bundy, Mann, and Johnson become concerned. Hundreds of civilians had been killed by Wessin y Wessin's planes on previous days,

but now the military themselves and perhaps American citizens, were in danger. Embassy officials, who had remained calm as long as the Army seemed to have things in hand, now circulated wild stories: ships loaded with munitions from Cuba had appeared in the Ozama River; rebels were rounding up anti-Communist policemen and beheading them; Col. Caamano had personally lined up a dozen Army officers and machine-gunned them; "stomach-turning atrocities" were being committed by the rebels. Our reporters, who circulated freely through the rebel-held sections of Santo Domingo (the only ones injured were shot by the Marines when their taxi driver got panicky and started to back away from a checkpoint), again punctured these stories:

[on the Caamano machine-gun story] "Not a single reporter has found concrete evidence of the episode, and there are now reports that one of the key men said to have been killed in that incident is alive, although wounded." (Bernard L. Collier, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 8.)

[American sources gave a] shocking, but exaggerated picture of 'blood fever, . . . Newsmen who subsequently passed through the U.S. lines to enter the rebel-held areas . . . soon determined the inaccuracy of many of the reports on the situation that were coming from Washington. (William Giandoni, *Copley News Service*, May 20.)

Many of these false stories so eagerly swallowed by Washington (Lyndon Johnson repeated one at his news conference on June 19) seem to have originated with Colonel Benoit, a representative of the Junta, who was simply attributing to the rebels the army's standard practices for the past thirty years. The only real evidence of the execution of prisoners, for example, turned up on the road to La Victoria prison, where General Imbert's forces held over 2500 men suspected as rebels; seven bodies of men dressed in civilian clothing, one with hands tied together, another with a rope around the neck, a third decapitated (Juan de Onis in the *New York Times*, June 22).

The basic decision to intervene, if necessary, to keep Bosch from returning to power thus appears to have been made before any Communist control of the uprising could be demonstrated. The actual cable from Ambassador Bennett to Washington requesting the Marines was sent in the afternoon on April 28, after Col. Benoit had requested it. The precedent is a disturbing one: would we send troops to rescue Haiti's Duvalier, Guatemala's Peralta, or Paraguay's Stroessner if they declared that they could not keep "order" as a result of a "Communist uprising"? Is it true, as Bosch charges, that "present-day American officials . . . do not believe there can be democratic revolutions"? If our actions in the Dominican Republic imply that we are going to land troops in any Latin country that might just possibly be in danger of going Communist, then we are in for a long tour of duty as voluntary—and hated—gendarme of the Americas.

ONCE HAVING MADE THE DECISION to go in and rescue the Dominican military from the consequences of their own unpopularity, we tried to maintain a pretense of neutrality. Again and again officials in Santo Domingo and Washington proclaimed our impartiality; and just as often newspapermen and television cameramen told the truth. Ambassador Bennett encouraged Colonel Benoit and on April 30 expressed his "belief [that] with determination your plans will succeed." In some places Marines went into action at the side of Wessin y Wessin troops, and at others they allowed them to move freely about the city while confining the "rebels" tightly inside their downtown area. Millions of dollars in U.S. funds were made available to pay civil servants, the checks stamped with Imbert's "Government of National Reconstruction." Imbert himself was flown out to the Aircraft Carrier Boxer to see if he met our qualifications, and his junta met at the Congressional assembly hall within the zone controlled by our troops. As Tad Szulc summed it up (*New York Times*, May 1):

There is no question that Washington is lined up with the three-man military junta which operates from the San Isidro base... The Administration views the junta as a means for ultimately achieving Dominican political stability.

Given Lyndon Johnson's determination to take a hard line and preserve our hegemony in the Dominican Republic by force, if necessary, one can understand his anger at the newspapermen who repeatedly interfered with his plans (he is reported by *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, May 31, to have said that "the whole problem could have been solved if we could have locked Tad Szulc up for three hours"). But Szulc and his colleagues, under great psychological pressure from the Embassy, and in serious physical danger from trigger-happy Marines, Dominican troops, and rifle-carrying adolescents, did a superb job, one which may have saved us from a disaster. Lyndon Johnson is not a moralist, but a pragmatic man, who does read newspapers and polls. Our reporters did not convince him that his plans were wrong, but they do seem to have persuaded him that they were impractical.

We have been brought around, as this is written, to playing a more nearly impartial role, to negotiating with Col. Caamano (whom we once scorned as a dupe of the Communists) and trying to get rid of General Imbert (whom we once hailed as a tried and true anti-Communist and CIA operator). In our three major postwar Latin American interventions (Guatemala, 1954, Cuba, 1961, Dominican Republic, 1965) we have so far avoided getting bogged down in a prolonged confrontation with inflamed nationalism of the kind that wore out the French in Algeria, the British in Cyprus, etc. Perhaps our luck will hold, and we can get out of the Dominican muddle with honor, and perhaps even some faint credit.

But the game we are playing is a dangerous one. If we persist in

it, if we regard every nationalist rebel as an agent or a dupe of Fidel Castro, we are headed for disaster. Perhaps we are so afraid of another Cuba in this hemisphere that we have not been sufficiently aware of the dangers of another Hungary, or Algeria, or Vietnam. One constructive use we might make of our narrow escape (if it is that) in Santo Domingo would be to re-examine what happened there, and to let Juan Bosch's warning about the counter-productive nature of sterile anti-communism sink in (quoted by Theodore Draper in *The New Leader*, May 25, 1965):

[Fidel Castro] rendered an incalculable service to the cause of World Communism, since after his declaration it became virtually and even totally impossible to make a democratic revolution in Latin America... Anyone who does not demonstrate in a satisfactory manner that he respects and will continue to respect the single established order in Latin America, that he will not touch a single hair on the head of the vested interests, and that, on the contrary, he will dedicate himself to defend them with body and soul, night and day, is transmuted into and suspected of being a secret Communist. A chorus of voices all over the Continent accuses him of being an agent of Moscow and of Fidel Castro... There is an answer to this accusation: When the youth of Latin America becomes indignant at the injustice committed against honest democratic leaders, they react by shifting toward communism. If the accusations comes from the most hated circles in the Hemisphere, the youth respond to it by taking a position against the accusers at precisely the opposite extreme. And so, day after day, the most audacious young people in Latin America, led by those from the upper and middle strata of the middle class, have been swelling the Communist ranks in all our countries.

We have, temporarily, stamped out the threat of an immediate Communist takeover in Santo Domingo (if, indeed, there really was one). But the long-run consequence may be just the kind of drift toward Communism about which Bosch warned us.

SAMUEL SHAPIRO, on the faculty of Notre Dame, author of numerous articles on Latin America is on the Editorial Board of *New Politics*.

Você que deseja ler uma revista diferente, que lhe dê um panorama literário, artístico e político do Brasil e do mundo tem um encontro marcado nas páginas de

CADERNOS *brasileiros*

Jul.-Ago. — 1965 No. 4

O CONCEITO DE LIBERDADE NA CIÊNCIA CONTEMPORÂNEA, Alair O. Gomes • A REVOLUÇÃO TEM FUTURO?, Richard Lowenthal • O PENSAMENTO POLÍTICO E SOCIAL DE JOSÉ BONIFACIO, José Honório Rodrigues
FIÇÃO • POESIA • TEMAS A VARIÇÕES

Assinatura anual (seis números) \$5.00

Número avulso \$1.00

Rua Prudente de Moraes, 129 — ZC 37 Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara Brasil

4. THE POLITICS OF METTERNICH



WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1965, was a tragic day in the sad and sanguinary history of the Dominican Republic and a crucial one in the history of the long and ambivalent relationship between the United States and its Latin-American neighbors. On that day the United States moved in military forces in order to strangle the Constitutionals' efforts to restore a constitutional and democratic regime in Santo Domingo as a successor to

the triumvirate imposed on that unhappy land some seventeen months previously by the military and civilian reactionaries who had ousted the legal president, Dr. Juan Bosch. At the same time, the United States made clear that it was prepared to drop its support for democratically elected governments and programs of fundamental reform as proclaimed in the Alliance for Progress and to reassume its traditional role of the wielder of the Big Stick, or, in its contemporary form, that of the "gendarme of reaction" throughout the world.

What led the United States which, in the words of Senator (then Attorney-General) Robert F. Kennedy, proclaimed itself the "leader of the democratic revolution" throughout the world to adopt a policy worthier of Prince Metternich than of Franklin D. Roosevelt? Why did President Johnson, who appears to be sincerely devoted to a policy of widening democracy at home, adopt a reactionary policy in the Dominican Republic? If, as this writer believes, he was deliberately misled by his advisors, how did this happen? What are the basic political and economic conclusions which can be drawn from the bitter tragedy which is being enacted even today on the island of Hispaniola, that natural paradise which Columbus rated as the fairest of all lands on which he ever set foot?

Before analyzing the causes of the Dominican disaster, it may be wise to unmask the deliberate lies with which the U.S. Government sought, during the first week of the U.S. intervention, to "explain" actions which were admittedly contrary to the Charters of both the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

The first misstatement was the allegation that the uprising in the