

The Nonpartisan League Defeated

By C. R. JOHNSON

THE tide of public opinion has turned and the Nonpartisan League, on the whole the most hopeful democratic movement in the Northwest for a generation, has gone down to defeat. The disaster was more sweeping than either friend or foe had anticipated. In Minnesota not a single State office was carried by the League in this election, although it has apparently held its own in the State legislature. In Montana and Colorado, where it had secured control of the Democratic Party, it was completely routed by the Republicans. In Wisconsin, its candidate, J. J. Blaine, was elected governor, but his election was due much more to the backing of Senator La Follette than to the League. In North Dakota apparently only the fact that the League held control of the Republican Party in a presidential year saved it from being wiped off the map. As it is, the League has lost three out of nine State officials and fifty per cent of its representatives in Congress. They have retained only a majority of one in the North Dakota Senate and at this writing appear to have lost control of the lower house.

The one conspicuous gain of the League was the election of a United States senator, President Ladd of North Dakota Agricultural College. Senator Ladd's ability and record of distinguished service will place him immediately beside La Follette, Borah, and other liberal leaders in the Senate. In him the farmers of the country will have for the first time a representative in Congress who is honest, who understands their problems, and who is scientific as well as sympathetic. The League might well trade all the rest of its national prospects for one spokesman of such promise.

It remains true, however, that even with Dr. Ladd elected, the League was defeated. Besides the unpopularity of the present Administration which brought about the Republican landslide, there was a strong bi-partisan combination against the League in those States where it was in control or seeking to gain control. Conservatives of both old parties combined cheerfully to beat the League as they did to beat the Socialists in New York City, with the result that in North Dakota, Governor Frazier was returned by a smaller majority than two years ago, although the women had increased the number of voters by more than half. Even if these handicaps had not existed the women's votes would still have defeated the League. Everywhere one hears the conservatives saying, "It was the women who saved the day." And the liberals are recovering sufficiently from their dream of rescue by the newly emancipated half of the human race, for whom they had worked so long, to admit that the joke is on them. The part of the women in defeating liberalism in the Northwest was not so obviously antagonistic, however, as this might seem to imply. It consisted very largely of the failure of certain groups of women to register in the primaries and to vote. In the country districts and the labor wards of the cities the women failed to take any adequate interest in the election, while in the country towns and the well-to-do districts of the cities they registered and voted shoulder to shoulder with the men. In the eighth ward, the most aristocratic in Minneapolis, 12,684 men and 12,803 women registered. In the first ward which is liberal

and radical 3,202 men and 1,396 women voted. Even the actual excess of men over women in the workers' wards, is slight in comparison with the excess in registration. And these figures may be considered typical. Then, too, suffrage workers remember that many of the women in the labor ward, mainly those of foreign birth, were not interested in securing the vote, and more often their husbands and brothers objected to their having it. Thus enough votes were lost through default on November 2 to turn the election against the liberals and the defeat has been so decisive that many friends of the League doubt if it can ever come back, even when there is no presidential campaign or obnoxious presidential program, like the League of Nations, to confuse the local issues. Moreover, the bi-partisan alliance between regular Republicans and Democrats against the League in the Northwest will grow stronger.

For the present the Nonpartisan League efforts at a legislative program must be confined to North Dakota and Wisconsin. The programs of the Republican Party in Wisconsin will show little identification with the League in name, however much there may be in spirit. Consequently the burden of keeping the League movement alive must rest upon North Dakota. Enough of the old organization remains in power in that State—especially the governor and the commissioners of agriculture and labor, who constitute a majority on the Industrial Commission—to maintain the present policy intact. The League majority in the State Senate will be able to neutralize the anti-League majority in the lower house in any attempt to legislate the League program out of existence. The future of the League depends upon how successful the present administration is in making the present program a success which will be recognized at home and abroad. If it wins the approval for its achievements, the League can hope to come back at the polls in other States in 1922. Two years is not a long period in which to mature a complicated industrial and social program, but it is perhaps not an impossible task to perform. And in the next two years the atmosphere will have cleared somewhat. By that time the reaction against Republican bourbonism will be in full swing. By that time possibly, the mass of newspaper falsification and innuendo will have betrayed itself in the light of counter-publicity. Also Townley may no longer be an issue. Perhaps—although this is a perennial hope of liberals, never fully realized—the public intelligence on economic and political issues will have improved to such an extent that it will be swayed less by innuendo and shibboleth and more by fact and reason. The League itself will have opportunity to become chastened by two lean years—if indeed it does not perish. It has been guilty of many political sins—borrowed from its opponents in self-defense, to be sure—but sins which have offended the popular conscience, which is ever more alert than the popular understanding.

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Our Failure in Haiti

By MEDILL McCORMICK

THE Haitian scandal is the fruit of that exquisite hypocrisy which has peculiarly characterized the present Administration, and of the canting inefficiency which has marked the conduct of the Navy Department during the last several years. We subjugated the people of Haiti and of Santo Domingo by force of arms. We might say we had conquered them, were it not true that they remain independent in law if not in fact, and that they made no united or effective resistance to the occupying forces of the American navy. There was no reason for the Haitians to resist. They had suffered too much at the hands of the native factions warring for the control of the Government to apprehend any worse government at the hands of a foreign power. They were powerless to resist if they had cared to do so, for they numbered only two or two and a half millions—primitive African peasants who have managed to live and to multiply despite the anarchy into which their country had fallen. I can no longer remember the number of forays—miscalled revolutions—by which the Haitian presidential succession is carried on, but I vividly recall the remark of Furniss, the able and intelligent colored American who once represented the United States as Minister resident in Port au Prince, that the Government of the Haitians, since the beginning of their independence, had not gone from bad to worse, but from worse to still worse. In the interior of both countries there were no roads, no effective police—no government, really.

It is the judgment of men more experienced and better informed than myself, that the island is the richest of the Antilles and that it will produce sugar in competition with Cuba, coffee in competition with Porto Rico, and cacao in competition with any country in the world.

My own opinion as to our duty in Haiti and in Santo Domingo, and our failure in the discharge thereof, doubtless differs from that of the Editor of *The Nation*. An inestimable benefit can accrue to the Dominican and the Haitian people from an American occupation, wisely conceived and developed in a spirit of generous sympathy with the people of the island. It is our duty to develop their political capacity and to increase their individual economic welfare. I do not want to pass judgment at this time on the action of the Marine Corps in Haiti. There should be a searching investigation of the charges made against the corps and individual officers, and prosecution should be instituted if the facts call for it. The policy or the want of policy of the Administration and the Navy Department is condemned already. We have seized control of Haiti and Santo Domingo and of their administration. Indeed, in Santo Domingo there is not even a Dominican president. The constitutional legislatures of the two countries are not functioning even by fiction, as the Egyptian Assembly was permitted to function under the British occupation. We took over the Government of the two countries but in return set up no responsible authority—responsible in law, responsible in fact—either to the peoples of the island or to public opinion in the United States. A government of anomalies, such as exists in Santo Domingo or Haiti, one which lives by the very contradictions of its being, one which asserts the present sovereignty of the quondam republics while it denies

its actuality, ought to be staffed by able and experienced men and guided by a definite political and economic policy. In Haiti we have a Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, and a fiscal adviser, Mr. McIlhenny, both of Louisiana, both socially attractive and personally charming, but how otherwise qualified to meet the difficulties of their posts I am not informed. There is beside, and independent of them, the Commandant of Marines. Who is responsible in Haiti, as Cromer was in Egypt, or as Wood and Taft were in Cuba and the Philippines, or as Lyautey was in Morocco? Who in Santo Domingo is responsible for a fiscal policy which in an era of eight per cent interest prefers to anticipate the payment of the national debt instead of reducing the burden of taxation and more especially the Dominican tariff? Who in Haiti is there who may be punished for authorizing the *corvée*, and severely punished therefore, because it was an error of judgment criminal in its consequences? Who was responsible for the want of any comprehensive agricultural policy in the two so-called republics, for the failure to take adequate steps to improve the live stock of the island or to increase the numbers of swine, cattle, and draft animals? There are officers in Haiti and Santo Domingo who have failed in their duty from incompetence or want of experience, and I am afraid there are others who have abused their powers. But the gross failure, the real culpability, is that of the Secretary of the Navy and the President of the United States, who together failed to vest in a single responsible officer in each of the countries the authority to speak for the United States in all matters, fiscal, military, political, or diplomatic. Theirs is the responsibility not only for the failure to appoint an officer with the necessary powers, but furthermore, for the failure to lay down such a policy as would conduce to the preservation of human life and to the assurance of civil peace through energetic development of the trade and the agriculture of the island.

We are there, and in my judgment we ought to stay there for twenty years. We ought to bear in mind that, now disgraced by our failure to make wise provision for the government of the island, and profiting by the bitter lesson of the British failure to attend to the development of political institutions in Egypt, we should formulate a truly constructive policy under a new administration. The island is very rich. While Haiti is thickly settled, the population in many parts of Santo Domingo is sparse. A plan must be worked out for their economic interdependence. There must be adequate provision to protect the people in the possession of the land. It is not enough to build roads for them. They must be taught to raise better crops. The admirable work which I believe has been done for the schooling of the Dominican children must be extended to Haiti so that in both countries a literate population may grow up to succeed the present illiterate generation. The American advisers necessary to the proper conduct of the several departments, and indeed all the American officers sent to the two countries, must be men who are keenly sympathetic with the purpose to develop the country, the Government, and above all, the civilization of the people of whom the overwhelming majority have African blood in their veins and who in Haiti are almost full-blooded Africans. They are a generous, courteous, hospitable people, Dominicans and Haitians alike, or at least, so I have found them. The Haitian peasant, among the West Indian Negroes, bears an enviable reputation as a laborer. They are poor and of some of them it