

"The social reforms of the last century have not been mainly due to the Liberal party; they have been due to the influence, character, and perseverance of one man—Lord Shaftesbury." "That," said Lord Salisbury, "is, I believe, a very true representation of the facts." The Duke of Argyll should have restricted his observation to the last "half century"; otherwise we may agree with Lord Salisbury that the Duke's words are in a general way a true representation of the facts. When Lord Shaftesbury began his political career, there were in existence both Tories and Reformers. The Tories, however, were opposed to all great changes, and were still under the influence of the reaction against Jacobinism. Peel was educating or misleading his party, but his followers of 1826 or 1827 agreed with the sentiment of George III., that the British Constitution was "the most perfect of human formations." The Reformers, on the other hand, were Whigs, or men influenced by Bentham. The reforms sought for aimed either at changes in the distribution of political power, or at the removal in all directions of impediments to individual freedom of action. One class of changes may be fairly represented by Lord Russell and the Reform Act, the other class by Cobden and the repeal of the Corn Laws. Lord Shaftesbury had, from position and turn of mind, little sympathy with either political or economical innovation. He opposed the Reform Bill, he disbelieved in the blessings of free trade. There was, however, one kind of improvement which enlisted his sympathies from his earliest years: from the beginning to the end of his career he aimed at protecting by the power of the State any class of human beings—such as lunatics, factory children, boys employed as chimney sweeps—who in his judgment could not protect themselves. To judge from his diaries, the force which impelled him along the path which he found or cut out for himself was compassion for suffering strengthened by a sense of religious duty. It is difficult to see that, when he began public life at least, he had any clear theory of the principles on which the relation of the State to individuals should be regulated. The only thinker who greatly influenced him was a writer whose works would hardly now be known, but for the fact of his having told the life of Nelson and the life of Wesley in a manner which makes it difficult for any one to tell these lives effectively again. Robert Southey's poetry is dead; his speculations on social or political questions are, it may be supposed, mainly known to the majority of readers through a slashing attack of Macaulay's upon 'Colloquies on the Progress and Prospects of Society.' But to judge from the testimony afforded them by more than one biography, Southey's character was far more impressive than his writings, and Southey's views of society, whatever their speculative merits or defects, anticipated ideas which at the present day exert an immense and acknowledged force. Southey, though a Tory, was never a Conservative; he might almost be described as a Carlyle without Carlyle's contempt for humanity and benevolence. His political creed appears to have been that while the educated ought to be the leaders of the people, the power of the State should be used for the benefit of the poorer classes.

A good deal of Southey's opinions was certainly assimilated by Lord Shaftesbury. He no doubt never advocated anything which he himself would have considered, or which could fairly have been represented, as Socialism. But he did altogether repudiate—in practice, at any rate—the theory of so-called *laissez-faire*. Hence he came into sympathy with much of the natural, as distinguished from theoretical, Socialism of the working classes. Men whose lives are passed in the midst of toil which, if under favorable circumstances it secures

tolerable comfort, cannot under unfavorable circumstances protect them from want, come sooner or later to feel that mere political or economical reforms do not meet their needs, and that the State ought at any rate to save them from evils (such as constant exposure for low wages to great risks of physical injury) from which they cannot, or think they cannot, protect themselves. Men deficient in education are the more certain to take this view, because they cannot see the indirect ways in which economical reforms, such as free trade, do in the long run alleviate physical misery. To artisans having these feelings, Lord Shaftesbury was a heaven-sent leader. He fully believed that law could do much to protect persons, such as factory children, who could not protect themselves; and, as already pointed out, he did not believe in economical reforms such as the introduction of free trade, the theory of which, it must fairly be admitted, he never seems to have studied with any care. Though much, therefore, is said, and rightly said, by Lord Shaftesbury's biographer and by Lord Shaftesbury himself, of the opposition with which he met, he was in reality, like many other reformers, carried along by a stream of feeling of much greater permanent strength than the current of opinion with which he struggled. Whatever judgment be passed upon the merit of the reforms which he advocated, no one can doubt that he really did introduce a fundamental change in the attitude adopted by the State towards classes who are, or seem, too weak to protect themselves in that struggle for existence which is known as competition. It is not too much to assert that every kind of factory, one might say every kind of workshop, has, through the efforts of Lord Shaftesbury, been placed under State supervision. For the theory that every one must take care of himself, has been substituted the theory that the State must protect any one who cannot take care of himself. The adoption of this view, due as it is mainly to Lord Shaftesbury's labors, is a far more important thing, both for good and bad, than his legislative triumphs, great though they were in particular cases. It is a far less important thing to have established machinery for protecting children from being overworked in mills, than to have established the principle that the due protection of classes who are helpless requires that the State should inspect all places where large bodies of laborers are employed.

The principle, indeed, has been given far wider extension than Lord Shaftesbury would at any part of his career have sanctioned. He certainly never contemplated that rule of inspectors which has already commenced and is every day extending its sphere. In practice he was inclined to restrict the intervention of the State to cases in which the persons who ask for protection were, like lunatics or young children, *strictly speaking*, incapable of guarding their own interests. Not only Lord Shaftesbury's deeds, but the whole language of his diaries, leads to the conclusion that he never meant to help any one who could help himself, or to hold that a man was not bound by a bargain simply because he entered into it at some disadvantage. But the effect of a reformer's action cannot be limited by his own intentions or wishes, and the effect of Lord Shaftesbury's efforts has gone far beyond the ends at which he consciously aimed. Hardly a year now passes during which the English Parliament does not pass acts for the protection of persons, such as sailors or tenants, who are presumed to be unable to manage their own affairs for themselves. The doctrine of benevolent State intervention holds the field; it has for the time almost banished the rival dogma of *laissez-faire*. The man whose efforts have mainly achieved this result was, for good or for bad, a revolutionist.

No person, it is true, would have detested the name of a revolutionist more than Lord Shaftesbury. He would have said, and with truth, that he was, from some points of view, a Tory of the Tories, and that no man more distrusted speculative innovation or was more loyal to the Throne and the Church than himself. And in saying this he would have said nothing more than the truth. It is, nevertheless, clear that the character of his mind, no less than his position, greatly aided his effectiveness as a revolutionary innovator. Like all practical men, his main idea was that it was always wise to deal directly with patent evils, without any great thought as to the speculative objections to which the particular mode of dealing might be open. He saw clearly that factory children suffered wrong, and he thought—and in this instance it would seem truly—that State interference with labor would diminish the sufferings of factory children. What he did not see—one may fairly say would not see—was that State interference with labor involved great evil, and that when once the policy of State intervention began, it was very hard to see where it would end. Lord Macaulay in this instance supported Lord Shaftesbury, and Macaulay was certainly not prone to treat with too much consideration views opposed to his own. But whoever will read his excellent speech on the Ten Hours Bill, and compare it with the tone adopted by Lord Shaftesbury about the same measure, will see the whole width of the difference which separates a man of thought from a practical reformer. Macaulay felt at once that the opponents of the bill might oppose it fairly and allege strong grounds for their opposition. It is hardly unjust to say that Lord Shaftesbury thought every one opposed to him guilty either of ignorance or of inhumanity.

From this restriction of view Lord Shaftesbury gained force as a leader, and this in two ways. He was able, in the first place, to treat opposition as a proof of selfishness; he was able, in the second place, to keep out of view the wide principles involved in the Ten Hours Bill. Now the English public are alarmed at principles, but they are pleased with anything which appears to be practical. Hence, at the very time when Maurice and his Christian Socialism were exciting nothing but alarm and meeting with little but denunciation, Lord Shaftesbury's factory legislation met with general approbation. Maurice, however, was a thinker, and thought, as every Englishman knows, is opposed to common sense. Lord Shaftesbury, again, gained weight quite legitimately from his position. How was it possible to suspect a Peer and a Tory of innovation? It was as easy to believe that the worthy clergymen who crowded Exeter Hall every May to hear Lord Shaftesbury read out the reports of half-a-dozen religious societies, were Jesuits in disguise. The disguise, moreover, in this case concealed the character of the man's work as much from himself as from his followers. "Innovation," says Burke, "is not reform." This maxim has long passed into a platitude, but reform is always, in truth, innovation, and Lord Shaftesbury's magnificent series of practical reforms have turned out a body of innovations amounting to a revolution. It is just because he did not see this that he was a successful revolutionist.

#### ADAMS'S PUBLIC DEBTS.—II.

*Public Debts: an Essay in the Science of Finance.* By Henry C. Adams, Ph.D., of the University of Michigan and Cornell University. D. Appleton & Co. 1887.

IN Prof. Adams's chapter on the industrial effects of public borrowing, he analyzes a class of facts extremely recondite, but of the highest impor-

tance in the financial administration of nations. Every country must pay its current expenses, whether for war or for any other purpose, out of its current production. Unless it borrows from other nations, it must pay all its yearly expenses, of whatever nature, from its yearly earnings. Issuing bonds and creating a debt does not absolve it from this necessity. Whether it spends a hundred millions or a thousand millions in a single year, the property must be created before it can be consumed. The accumulations of former years are mainly in the form of fixed capital, not adapted to the immediate purposes of the Government. A year's stock of consumable commodities, domestic animals and other movable things, may be on hand, but seldom more. This stock cannot be much reduced without causing immediate and general distress.

How, then, does it happen that the country is still paying the expenses of the war of 1861-5? If it paid these expenses at the time when they were incurred, is it now paying them a second time? To answer this question, let us ask what would have been the effect if Congress had levied in 1861 the taxes that were imposed in the later years? The proceeds of these taxes amounted in a single year (1866) to the sum of \$558,000,000, a sum greater by nearly \$100,000,000 than the expenditures of the year 1862. It is quite conceivable that the whole cost of the war might have been defrayed by current taxation, in which case there would have been no debt. To accomplish this, it would have been necessary that the magnitude of the war should have been foreseen, and that there should have been a general concurrence in the policy of taxation to meet it; in other words, that the state of the public mind regarding it should have been at the beginning, or rather a year before the beginning, what it was in 1863 and 1864. But this is what did not exist, and could not. Neither the machinery for efficient taxation, nor the disposition to adopt it, existed. Therefore borrowing must needs be resorted to.

What does borrowing signify? What does the use of public credit imply? Let us try first to imagine what would take place if there were no such thing as money, and if the business of the world were carried on by barter. The Government does not want money except as a means of getting property. It wants clothing, arms, ships, provisions, munitions, utensils, etc. Manifestly it must get these things first from those who have stocks of them on hand, and subsequently from those who have facilities for supplying them as fast as the existing stocks are used up—that is, from the possessors of circulating and fixed capital. It is convenient to obtain these things by borrowing money. We could hardly understand how it could be done otherwise in the complex conditions of modern life. But the intervention of money does not alter the essential nature of the transaction, which is the transfer of commodities from the citizen to the Government—commodities either produced before the war or while it is in progress. The reason why we appear to be paying the cost of the war a second time, although it was really paid while the war was going on, is that some persons—viz., the owners of circulating and fixed capital—supplied more of the means for carrying it on than would have been their share if taxation and not loans had been resorted to, and that this excess is now being returned to them. Various economic blunders, and especially the issue of legal-tender notes, served to swell the expense of the war to the taxpayers by nearly one thousand million dollars. This is conclusively shown by Prof. Adams on page 131. This excess of payment over actual cost—the cost being merely the quantities in bulk of property used and consumed—results from the alternate depreciation and appreciation of the standard of value. In

1864 the Government received only fifty cents' worth of goods for each dollar of securities issued. Seldom in the world's history has there been more improvident and wasteful financiering. Yet there has actually been considerable competition among statesmen since the close of the war for the honor of the invention of the greenback, and no little glorification of that instrument as a symbol of patriotism. Prof. Adams is fully justified in his contention that there was no need of legal-tender notes if correct views of finance had been held in the beginning. This brings us to the author's criticisms upon the management of American finances in the wars of 1812-15 and 1861-65; but before noticing these we remark that his subdivision of the industrial effects of public borrowing into three titles, viz., loans placed at normal rates, loans placed at high rates, and loans placed at rates abnormally high, appears to us to be an over-refinement, and not well sustained by the argument.

It will shock the feeling of patriotism to be told that both Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Chase and their coadjutors in Congress held radically wrong notions of the kind of financial administration needed for the carrying on of a war. Both were of the opinion that loans could be relied on, with only sufficient taxation to provide for ordinary peace expenditure plus interest on the debt. The plan broke down disastrously in both cases, although the calamity was more complete and decisive in the first than in the second, because in the latter case it was sooner abandoned, and because, also, the resources at command, when adequate taxation was finally resorted to, were proportionately larger. It is easy to say in defence of both these statesmen that probably nobody else in their time and surroundings would have done better. Nevertheless, Mr. Chase had Gallatin's experience before him, and Mr. Gallatin had a large assortment of financial disasters in the earlier history of the country to serve for his guidance. Therefore neither of them can be wholly absolved. The true policy of a finance minister in the presence of a war of unknown duration and magnitude is to support credit by taxation much greater than annual interest on loans, and, as the war progresses, to avail himself of the rising patriotism of the taxpayers to come nearer and nearer to, a realization of the maxim, "Pay as you go"; and this for a great variety of reasons.

In the first place, debt should be avoided altogether if possible; but if it is unavoidable, vigorous taxation enables the Government to borrow on the most favorable terms, and a high public credit thus conserved is itself a most valuable moral agency in stimulating the courage of the people and depressing that of the enemy. Our internal-revenue system did not get into fair working order until 1864. In that year it yielded \$110,000,000, in 1865 \$210,000,000, in 1866 \$311,000,000. If these sums could have been realized two years earlier respectively, "what a change would it have produced upon the financial administration. Its moral effect upon the South, working especially through her European sympathizers, would have brought the war to a more speedy termination, the credit of the Government would not have suffered as it did, while the advocates of legal-tender money would have been deprived of the argument of necessity." This it will be hard for anybody to gainsay. The following application flows naturally:

"The responsibility for the tardy flow of revenue from internal duties is traceable to the policy upon which the finances of the war were set on foot, and not to the inability or the reluctance of the country to pay. Secretary Chase denied the necessity of meeting any part of the war expenditure from war taxes, because the financial theory which he espoused deprecated the endeavor; and it required nearly three years of disastrous trea-

sure management to convert the Administration and Congress from this erroneous theory."

What should be the financial policy of a country after the debt has reached its maximum and the occasion for it has passed away? Should the revenues be applied, as the saying is, to the reduction of taxes, or to payment of the obligations incurred, or both? And what part of the debt should be paid first? There may be some taxes more burdensome than others, some more burdensome than a prolongation of interest payment would be. Such taxes should be removed, even at the expense of a prolongation of the debt; but it is to be observed that classes and interests will always be found insisting that taxes which bear directly on them are the ones whose removal is most conducive to the public good. Payment of the debt is what is really conducive to the public good, and all complaints of special interests against this or that tax should be viewed with suspicion. The first step to be taken, however, is to improve the public credit, in order that conversion or refunding of the debt from high rates of interest to low rates may be effected. To this end it is especially needful that specie payments should be restored, if they have been suspended during the crisis. Therefore irredeemable paper circulating as money should be first attended to. As the issue of such paper has swelled the debt beyond reasonable bounds, the redemption and retirement of it, or the bringing of it to par with gold, is the indispensable step towards reduction of the annual burden of the funded debt. This truth was realized by Congress in 1869, when it passed the "act to strengthen the public credit," but no measure was passed to carry it into effect until six years later.

Prof. Adams places a high estimate, but none too high, on Secretary McCulloch's contraction policy. This was theoretically sound, but politically impossible. The imaginations of the great mass of the people were opposed to it. The plan of Secretary Boutwell, to let the country grow up to the volume of the currency, involved contraction the same as Secretary McCulloch's, but it was not a contraction that could be seen. In point of fact, it did not advance the country perceptibly towards specie payment. Secretary Bristow's plan, to withdraw the legal-tender character of the greenbacks as to future contracts after three years' notice, and to fund them into interest-bearing bonds, was practicable and statesmanlike, but the author upon the whole prefers the plan actually adopted in the Resumption Act of 1875, the principal features of which were free banking, eighty per cent. of greenbacks to be retired simultaneously with the new issues of bank notes, the retention of as many greenbacks as would under no circumstances be presented for payment in specie, and the accumulation of an adequate gold reserve in the Treasury. There is certainly much to be said in favor of this plan, but if Secretary Bristow's plan had been adopted, we should have been spared the last legal-tender decision of the Supreme Court.

Prof. Adams discusses the Refunding Act of 1870, under which the present 4½ and 4 per cent. bonds were issued, and shows that it was based upon a serious miscalculation, resulting in an inexpugnable debt of \$738,000,000 running at 4 per cent. to the year 1907, not to mention the lesser one of \$250,000,000 4½s running till 1891. Here we find, on page 227, a single paragraph (and the only one in the volume) which we are unable to comprehend. It is this:

"It seems, then, that in 1896 the Administration must adopt some other method of paying the debt, or suspend for a term of years the sinking-fund appropriation. To adopt this second suggestion would be for all practical purposes to decide upon the maintenance of a debt of three-quarters of a billion, for taxes once remitted are with difficulty reimposed for the purpose of pay-

ing a debt. Still, it cannot be said that this is a serious criticism of the Act of 1870; the greater blame lies with those who now profess to manage the financial affairs of the country."

It seems to us that those who now profess to manage and who do manage the financial affairs of the country are concluded by the Act of 1870 and the funding operations settled in pursuance of it, having no option or discretion at all, and that no blame can be attached to them. Whoever the galled jade may be, their withers are unwrung.

We have indicated our high appreciation of Prof. Adams's work as a whole. We must dissent, however, and dissent strongly, from his argument in favor of Treasury interference with the money market in times of panic. The plan proposed or approved contemplates that the Government shall convert interest-bearing bonds into legal-tender notes at the option of the holders of the bonds, and to the extent desired by them in times of panic. It is consoling to know that such a plan if adopted could last no longer than the public debt lasts. The argument in favor of it is illustrated by the suspension of the Bank Act in England in the crises of 1847, 1857, and 1866—*i. e.*, the authorization of the Government to the Bank to issue notes over and above the legal limit, upon the invariable condition, however, of redeeming them in gold on demand. "It now stands," says the author, "as an unwritten law that the Bank Act shall be suspended whenever demanded by the exigencies of the market." This is surely very loose writing. That there is no such unwritten law is made abundantly clear by the fact that when an attempt was made a few years ago to pass such a law in Parliament, it failed. But suspension of the Bank Act is not the most important part of the proceeding. The question of greatest moment is whether the Bank will avail itself of the authority given. It declined to do so in the panic of 1866, for the reason, undoubtedly, that the condition of things in the panic quarter was thoroughly rotten, and neither worth saving nor susceptible of being saved, although the panic itself was tremendous. This leads us to ask what are in general the "exigencies of the market"? Was the recent Black Friday in Wall Street one of them? Was the panic that set in when Grant & Ward failed in 1884 the right kind of an exigency? Several banks suspended then, and the New York Clearing-house went extensively into the business of settling balances with certificates based upon mercantile paper. Failing to define an exigency or to produce anybody who can, we think that Prof. Adams has here run counter to his own excellent rule to deny everything that cannot be stated with some degree of clearness. The fact is, that exigencies are occurring all the time, and that under any settled plan of the kind suggested the determination of exigencies under every kind of pressure, personal, political, and financial, would wear out the life of any Secretary, and produce more confusion, ten times over, than it would allay. It would be easy, moreover, to show that relief would not be gained in the manner proposed, for the reason that the bondholders are not generally the class who want money in times of panic. The plan failed when tried in 1873, and for reasons quite different from those assigned by the author. "I believe," says the author, "that good government is more likely to be secured by increasing personal responsibility than by restricting the functions of the State within such narrow limits that only men of ordinary strength of character and inferior talent will be drawn to a public career." Now, the kind of character and talent needed in this case is simply superhuman. It is what no man living possesses or ever did possess. We presume that the author himself would hesitate to accept the appointment of

Appraiser of Exigencies or Chief Examiner of Panics—with permanent headquarters in Wall Street.

We have little space left to notice Part 3, relating to State and municipal debts, beyond saying that the treatment of these seems to us less satisfactory than the body of the treatise. The subject is too large to be dealt with as an appendix to National Debts. The tabular statements on pages 378 and 382, showing the constitutional inhibitions on State and local indebtedness, are very instructive, and, for purposes of ready reference, quite invaluable.

#### MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST.

*Memoirs of Friedrich Ferdinand Count von Beust*, written by himself. With an Introduction by Baron Henry de Worms, M.P. 2 vols. London: Remington & Co. 1887.

"MEMOIRS" is hardly a correct description of these two portly volumes. They are, rather, a series of desultory comments upon German history during the last half century. With the details of that history Count von Beust assumes that his readers are already acquainted; and in Germany, perhaps, such an assumption may be reasonable. In all other countries, however, it makes a demand upon the historical information of the "general reader" which assuredly it is quite incapable of responding to. Who but an erudite German professor is able to find his way through the trackless jungles of German domestic history? Who can recall the rulers or even the names of the petty principalities into which Germany was cut up, until the man of "blood and iron" appeared upon the scene? Not the least among the services rendered to humanity by the expulsion of Austria from the German Confederation, and the extinction of that body itself, may be reckoned the simplification of both Austrian and German history for all time to come. Count von Beust, naturally enough, does not appreciate the utterly bewildering character of German domestic politics when viewed by an ignorant spectator from the outside. He has trod those mazy paths till every inch of the ground has become familiar to him. He finds it as difficult to lose his way among them as an ordinary man on a straight road. And the consequence is that he almost always writes allusively. He mentions, without explanation or introduction of any kind, scores of German celebrities, who, for the world in general, are as unknown as the brave men who lived before Agamemnon. He refers familiarly to incidents which, outside of Germany, are as clean forgotten as the politics of the globe before the flood.

There is, however, another aspect in which these volumes are amusing and interesting enough. They constitute a remarkable revelation of the way in which a thoroughgoing diplomatist reads and understands the evolution of human history. At the beginning of his 'Memoirs' Count von Beust tells the following anecdote of Dresden court life:

"In the first years after 1830, even at court, old things had somewhat yielded to new; and among other innovations guests were allowed to appear at the court balls in trousers. After the marriage above referred to, severer rules were enforced and knee-breeches were revived. On this subject I once said in the presence of the Court Chamberlain, who was otherwise my friend: 'What a good time that was when we were allowed to appear at court in trousers!' He flew at me in a towering passion, and said: 'Trousers! I gave you credit for greater attachment to the royal family.'"

Count von Beust's work in the world was not connected with the regulation of court ceremonial, so he could smile at the spiritual significance discovered by this excellent Chamberlain in the wearing of silk stockings. His work was to draw

up conventions, protocols, identical notes—paper devices of all kinds, having for their object to stereotype for ever the state of Europe as it had been arranged by the Treaties of 1815; and the profundity of his belief in the efficacy of these devices is hardly less astonishing than that of his friend the Chamberlain in the sanctity of silk stockings. The war of Italian Unity, the campaign of Sadowa, the Austro-German war, are thought by ordinary people to have been due to a multitude of slowly converging causes, but mainly to the unnatural and artificial partitioning out of Europe by the sovereigns and statesmen of the Vienna Congress. Count von Beust, for his part, thinks that one and all might have been postponed *sine die* by a slight readjustment of those arrangements; but, unhappily, those directly concerned in these occurrences would not listen to his suggestions. And the reason why he holds this singular belief is, that the peoples of Europe are apparently, in his judgment, "une quantité négligeable." They are merely the counters by means of which kings and diplomatists play their games. The destinies of the world are decided by a very few men who meet in ante-chambers, give audiences, and hold confidential communications among themselves. That Count von Beust was a kind-hearted, good-natured, placable man, there are in these volumes abundant proofs; but sovereigns, statesmen, and diplomatists he would appear to regard as a privileged class, elevated by their position and the august functions which they discharge, into a region where no cold morality reigns. These distinguished creatures may commit blunders: they are incapable of crime. On the other hand, there is a certain satisfaction in learning from Count von Beust's unimpeachable testimony that statesmen and diplomatists are inspired by a genuine faith in the efficacy of their paper contrivances for healing the maladies of suffering humanity. If wars break out, they are not, according to our author, caused by the insufficiency of these paper remedies, but by the perversity of the "peoples," who, like a refractory patient, refuse to accept the prescriptions of their physicians.

The important parts of Count von Beust's public life extend over the years when he was Chief Minister to the last independent King of Saxony, and, after the battle of Sadowa, when, to his own great amazement, he was offered and accepted the post of Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. In both these positions circumstances forced him into an attitude of antagonism to Prince Bismarck. He was the able and determined opponent of the Prussian statesman's design for forcing Austria from the German Confederation, foreseeing, clearly enough, that the autonomy of Saxony was dependent upon the defeat of this policy. The Prussians were aware of this, and when the Prussian troops marched through Saxony, they did the Count the special honor of plundering his house and destroying his furniture, as an evidence of their sentiments towards him. Amid the lesser consequences of the Prusso-Austrian war, not the least gratifying to the victors was, without a doubt, the abrupt ending which it seemed to have inflicted on Beust's career as a power in German politics. He resigned office at the end of the war, in order to facilitate the resumption of friendly relations between Prussia and Saxony; but hardly had the Prussians ceased to congratulate themselves on the occurrence when they saw him rise from momentary eclipse to the brilliant position of Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. Their chagrin was great, and throughout his Austrian career the Count had the honor of being pursued by the invective and calumny of the Prussian official press.

Prince Bismarck figures, in person, in these pages, on not a few occasions. The notices of him are always interesting, and in entire agree-