

Contemporary Spanish Philosophy

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I. The Philosophical Legacy of the Nineteenth Century.

SPAIN, AT THE beginning of the twentieth century, lay in the grip of a profound spiritual crisis, the genesis and the anatomy of which has often been traced. Only the consequences of this crisis in the area of philosophical speculation is of interest here. In this area the spiritual crisis produced a loss of speculative confidence, a loss of speculative initiative, and led the Spanish mind to take refuge in elaborate constructions, borrowed from foreign sources or from history taken as refuge from the present, which did not rest directly on personal speculative initiative directed to the authentic thinking-through of the national crisis and the personal crisis it involved. Thus it was that the nation which had produced the great tradition of speculative thought of the second scholasticism and which, in doing so, has laid the foundations of modern international law, now took refuge in two baroque constructions, one historico-mythical, one systematic.

The first was the myth of a "Spanish Philosophy" taken in the strict sense. The chief architect of this myth was the redoubtable Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, and he delineated its definitive doctrine. It was to be a synthesis of the philosophies of Ramón Lull (Lullism) (1234-1315), of the great figure of the Spanish Renaissance, Luis Vives (1492-1540), and of Francisco Suárez (1538-1617). This "Spanish Philosophy" was offered as the particular expression of the collective Spanish soul and culture, of which it represented the spiritual depth and historical grandeur. It was the metaphysics, the historical metaphysics of the Spanish soul and nation. The second systematic construction in which the Spanish mind took refuge was of foreign importation: It was the strange, not to say bizarre, phenomenon of Krausism. The spirit of Spanish Krausism was extremely influential and it endured over a long period of time right up to 1936, according to the interpretation of Muñoz Alonzo. It engaged all the ranks of the intellectuals,

who took it as their point of departure in all their reflections and speculations. In its more formal aspect as a movement it was the brain child of two men in particular, Sanz del Río (1814-1869), who imported it from Germany, and Giner de los Ríos (1839-1915), who perpetuated it. Its history has been exhaustively recorded by Vicente Cacho Viu in his work, *La Institución Libre de Enseñanza*, and by Juan López Morillas in his *El Krausismo Español* (1956). Krause (1781-1832) was a minor figure in the age of German romanticism; his thought is mystical and obscure and little measures up to the firm speculative work of his great contemporaries, Schelling and Hegel. Yet it was his thought, rather than that of Schelling and Hegel, that del Río brought back from a period of study in Germany to make it the basis of a synthesis in which all elements of culture; faith and reason, religion and science, theology and philosophy, could be reconciled in a rational and harmonious whole. Spanish Krausism, it has been remarked, was less a philosophy than a cult; it produced a type of thinking which was, in McInnes' terms, "enthusiastic, grave, sincere and optimistic." Ostensibly, it was an effort to relate Spanish thought to European thought; this it could not do because Krause did not represent European thought in any way. But it is clear that Krausism satisfied something which the Spanish spirit in this period of confusion and crisis needed, a reassuring speculative structure.

At the same time, Spain was taking part in the revival of scholastic thought. This began with the historically and speculatively solid work of Balmes (1810-1848) and was to receive great impetus from the *Aeterni Patris* of 1877. As it developed, however, Spanish neo-scholasticism was to prove rather rigid and doctrinaire and did not seem to touch the living problems of the Spanish soul.

II. Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, and Eugenio D'Ors.

SPANISH THOUGHT was awakened from this lethargy and recalled from this land of illusion principally by the work of two men, Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset, and to a lesser degree, by that of a third, Eugenio D'Ors. It was, of course, inevitable that Spain should be so awakened, but even the awakening took a path particularly Spanish. Had Spain, during the nineteenth century, maintained a vital relation with the speculation of the rest of Europe, she would have undergone the pattern of subjection to positivism and subsequently also experienced the idealist revolt against positivism which was common in other countries. But because she had not followed that pattern but had taken a path of her own, her manner of shaking off the lethargy and illusion under which she lay was also distinctively her own, finding expression in the powerful personalities of these thinkers.

Unamuno. The thought of Unamuno has been studied more thoroughly, both within and outside Spain, than that of any other Spanish thinker and deservedly so. Our interest here is not directly with his thought—that is, with its method and content—but with the effect of his philosophic and literary activity upon the philosophical consciousness of Spain; even this effect, however, cannot be appreciated apart from his actual philosophical achievement, his conception of philosophy, and the substantive propositions he advanced.

Unamuno early gave evidence of his disdain for the illusions which held Spanish speculative thought spellbound and immobile. Spanish Krausism became the especial object of his barbed and ironic criticism. What he found most intolerable, perhaps, was its facile system-building, the airy abstraction of the edifice of ideas and

hopes in which it invited the Spanish mind and soul to sojourn. It may be said that Spanish Krausism played in the thought of Unamuno something of the role which the Hegelian system had played in that of the thinker whom he was to find most congenial, Kirkegaard.

He was equally opposed to the scholastics and their attempts to re-establish the reign of the perennial philosophy. If the Krausists repelled by their facile system-building, the scholastics repelled by their pedantry. Philosophy had become for them a pedantic process of commentating, of compilation and subtilizing a thought which had once been living but now belonged to the past. It is difficult to imagine any attitudes in philosophy more diametrically opposed than those of Unamuno and of the best representatives of Spanish scholasticism of the period, Urraburu or Cardinal Ceferina González, for example. Most offensive, to Unamuno, who was in the last analysis a religious thinker for whom the experience of God is the central and final experience to which everything else relates, was the pretention of scholasticism to the position of rational guardian of Christian revelation. The notion that criticism of their tight speculative system in some way represented a *lèse majesté* of Christianity and of Catholicism seemed to him the height of absurdity.

Finally, Unamuno showed himself equally the enemy of that fiction and myth of an indigenous Spanish philosophy. He was, by the deepest instincts of his soul, a cosmopolitan man, a universal man. All that was provincial was instinctively repugnant to him; and anything more provincial, spiritually, culturally, and politically provincial, than the creation of such national myths in the order of speculative truth could hardly be imagined. Most apparent was the futility of such constructions: their inability to perform the most basic office

of philosophy, that of illuminating man's spiritual and existential condition. But his opposition to this myth does not mean, as some have thought, the un-Spanish character of Unamuno's own sentiment or thought. Indeed it is difficult to imagine a mind or spirit more profoundly Spanish. But to be Spanish was not, for Unamuno, a form of escape from the common human lot. It was a special way of experiencing that lot, perhaps an especially agonizing way. As a consequence, the mark of a genuinely Spanish thought would be, to his mind, not exclusive and self-seeking provincialism, but that broad sense of common humanity which he felt so strongly in himself. It would be a thought which reached out in every direction to meet kindred strains and did not wrap itself in the cocoon of a national myth.

Unamuno's importance lay rather in the positive ideal of philosophizing which he exhibited in his own person and thought. This ideal is one which might well be set as a paradigm of philosophizing, alongside that other paradigm with which all are so familiar: the Socratic ideal. He rubricized this ideal under the formula of the man of "flesh and bone." This formula conveyed the message that the act of philosophy was the act of seizing the truth, the terrible truth (for the face of truth is not always benign to man), as it is contained in, revealed by, and relevant to the actual concrete reality of the living individual human being. In this ideal, Unamuno was profoundly Spanish, for it illustrates more clearly than anything else could, we believe, that *personalism* (as distinct from atomizing individualism) of the Spanish character which we noted above. To seize the truth in one's own person, this is philosophy; and Unamuno's life-long effort was devoted to this task and to discovering the method and technique of philosophy in this sense. This ideal of philosophy involves

the total commitment of the person to the quest of a truth which he carries in the concrete act of his own existence. Such a truth would not issue in bland conceptual statements, but in a living affirmation, a hope, a belief or faith or a despair. But independently of any truths he reached through this effort, the ideal of philosophizing in this sense was Unamuno's greatest contribution to the revitalization of philosophical thought in Spain. Individual propositions of his writings might be proven or disproven; what could never be belied was the vision of this man engaged in this quest and inviting every man to reenact that same quest in himself as the sole avenue of salvation open to him. Subsequent thought has retained this stamp of the spirit of Unamuno, and has adhered, in various measure, to this fundamental notion of the philosophizing act: an act, one might add, which man does not *choose*, but which is imposed upon him as integral to his destiny, by the very living act by which he is.

José Ortega y Gasset. In this process of the awakening of the contemporary Spanish mind, Ortega y Gasset forms the perfect complement to Unamuno; again, it is not a matter of propositions, statements, or doctrines, but the ideal of philosophy. Unamuno had contributed the notion of philosophizing as a profoundly committed act of the person. This very concentration of his vision imparts a certain spiritual intensity to Unamuno which robs him of urbanity. By contrast, Ortega represents the civilizing force of philosophy. This civilizing process of philosophy does not stand in contradiction to that depth-sounding operation of Unamuno's; it is its complement and completion. It reveals that the truth within man is not the terrible contradiction which Unamuno perceived (such as that embodied in the notion of immortal-

ty) but a rational élan of life. Ortega is at one with Unamuno in recognizing that the ultimate and basic reality is *life*, the living act. The truth is revealed primitively by the encounter of life with itself in the act of living. Life reveals itself to itself as its rational possibility, its possibility for an ordered realization of its possibilities. The determination of these possibilities is philosophy and their realization the philosophical life. Philosophy is a human need rooted deep in the act of living; but its ramifications are in the total deployment of the spiritual forces of life in the creative processes. This view made Ortega eager to examine all the dimensions which the possibilities rooted in the act of life opened to man. He let no facet of culture escape him; for in the world of culture, he sees the deployment of that creative force which man discovers to be the truth within him.

Thus between them, Unamuno and Ortega complete the cycle of the rejuvenation of philosophy in Spain, the one sending man into his depths, seeking *his* truth; the other inviting him to deploy the truth revealed there in the creation of an order and a realm of values, culture, under the aegis of vital reason, the great demiurge of the world of culture. Inevitably, with this view of philosophy and the philosophical life, Ortega y Gasset had to come to what one may consider the crowning concept of his philosophy, that of style. Philosophy is above all for Ortega the creation of a style of life. Style is the highest value of culture; it gives form to culture just as culture gives form to the possibilities rooted in the act of life. Style is nothing super-added to culture, to life. It is the most direct recognition of the primacy and authenticity of the concrete act of life, the fullest expression of its uniqueness in the numerically infinite subjects of life.

Eugenio D'Ors. The appearance of D'Ors (1882-1954) was announced as the com-

ing of a new Socrates to Spanish philosophy. This was in 1917 in a review of one of his early works. Muñoz Alonzo suggests that the appellation was not extravagant and still applies, if properly understood. D'Ors contributed to the revival of philosophy a sense of the dialectical form of the quest of truth. He took as fundamental the distinction between reason and intelligence. Reason is ruled by the principle of contradiction and of sufficient reason; it terminates in abstract concepts and their calculus. Intelligence is a creative force, a principle of inner organic creativity and harmony. Intelligence follows the subtle dialectical movements of life itself, in the creation of a world of human values. The philosophical act, as distinct from science, which corresponds to reason, consists precisely in following and organizing this creative play of life. Intelligence sends the spirit out into the world as to the theatre of its creative activity; but it also exposes the spirit to the suffering which is the weight of the world and its resistance to the creative movement of spirit.

The Ortegens. Unamuno had no disciples in the strict sense. Indeed, an "Unamunoan" is inconceivable in principle. Philosophy for Unamuno is such a personal undertaking, so much of the man of "flesh and bone" that each man must pursue it for himself, with the entire ardor of his person. In another sense, every thinker in Spain is a follower of Unamuno because every thinker there has felt the sting of his example. Ortega y Gasset, on the other hand, attracted a school quite naturally. The term "the Ortegens" comes quite naturally to one's lips. Nevertheless, it is not to be thought that the Ortegens form a school in any rigid sense. They form a category, rather than a group. Each member of this category pursues the Ortegan ideal in his own personal style: a trait of

Orteganism itself. The generation of Ortegens came to its productive years just when the dispersion took place, so that they may be divided into two groups, that in Spain, and that in other parts of the world.

Of the first group, the prince is Julián Marías (1914-). Marías has so absorbed the spirit of Ortega as to become, by natural right, his interpreter. But this does not mean in any way, his parrot. The closest bond between them lies in the notion of circumstance. Ortega had uttered the pregnant phrase: "I am I and my circumstances." Circumstances provide the field for the deployment of vital reason. But he left this insight relatively uncultivated. It falls as patrimony to Marías who was the first to apply Ortega's method to the domain of concrete circumstance. This endeavor may be said to absorb Marías, and, by his efforts, it has become clear how fertile Ortega's insight was. Marías' *Introducción a la Filosofía* (translated into English as *Reason and Life*), brings Ortega's thought to the most systematic form it has as yet assumed. Marías begins with an analysis of the human and personal situation before proceeding to a chapter on the vital function of truth, which turns out to be, at the same time, a manner of redefining truth to meet the exigencies of life. Excellent as this chapter is, one might argue that it should have followed, rather than preceded, the chapter on reason in which we encounter a clearer exposition of the notion of reason as rooted in and serving the ends of life than we find in Ortega himself. Marías' writings also include an impressive essay, *The Idea of Metaphysics*, which is now to be found translated into English, and a fresh approach to the history of philosophy in the *Biografía de la Filosofía*. His *chef d'oeuvre*, however, is no doubt his *La Estructura Social*; here he brings the Ortegan concern with the social to a new pitch of refinement.

The other Ortegans within Spain who immediately comes to mind is the sympathetic figure of Manuel García Morente (1886-1942). Although at one stage of his career García Morente was the closest adherent to Ortega's position, he still cannot be called simply an Ortegans. In his thought, he followed a personal star; his fidelity to this star was so great that it led him away from Ortega, first to existentialism and then to an adherence to Christian Spiritualism. This was his final position which he sealed by a personal act of fealty in embracing the Catholic priesthood in his last years. In this philosophical pilgrimage, García Morente overcomes completely that secularism and laicism which was from the beginning a mark of Ortega's thought and which Santiago Ramírez, in his careful analysis of Ortega's ideas and their implications, alleges as its most serious shortcomings.

The names of the Ortegans beyond the sea, who though laboring in far lands, maintained intact the insights of their teacher, are many indeed. We need mention only a few who have achieved work of permanent value: Edouard Nicol, who settled in Mexico, has only recently produced his chief work, *Los Principios de la Ciencia*, a mature and acute analysis of the contemporary state of science and metaphysics and their interrelations. In the United States, José Ferrater Mora has won a high degree of recognition for his thoughtful and penetrating books, one of which, *El Ser y la Muerte*, develops, in a way which reflects the new environment of his thought, that anciently central theme of Spanish reflection: death. In a review of a recent anthology of contemporary Spanish thought which I edited, José Gaos, now residing in Mexico, remarked that in his opinion the first place among Spanish philosophers now writing, which I had assigned to Xavier Zubiri (for reasons which I shall try to make clear presently), be-

longed, in his opinion, to Juan D. García Bacca. The importance of García Bacca is by no means to be underestimated. In addition to his continuance of the vein of Ortega's thought, he possesses an importance which springs from his studies in logic. In this effort he had contributed to the establishment of a relation between Spanish thought and the rest of European thought where the cultivation of logic was becoming once more, as it has been at the end of the middle ages, one of the chief concerns of philosophy. His specific aim in this field was the reconciliation of the classical Aristotelian logic with modern logistic theories, an effort which is paralleled by many philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

IV. *The Fictive School of Madrid and Zubiri, Aranguren, Lain, and Diez del Corral.*

WE HAVE HEEDED Muñoz Alonzo's admonition to look, in Spanish thought, to the reality, to thinking men and not to systems and schools. His admonition has not always been heeded and there have been attempts by such figures as Marias and McInnes to speak of a school of Madrid. The ostensible center and organ of this school would be the *Revista de Occidente* founded by Ortega and still in vigorous life under the direction of Paulino Garagorri. When one looks for the reality of this school, however, its ostensibly firm lineaments melt away. With the process of dissolution, however, there stands revealed a number of figures well worthy of study each in his own right. We shall consider but four of them, but those of the most significant—Xavier Zubiri, Lain Entralgo, José Luis Aranguren, and Luis Diez del Corral.

When one applies the rigorous canons of the history of philosophy to the contemporary scene in Spanish thought, one figure

which can rightly be said to possess European stature emerges above all others. That figure is Xavier Zubiri (born in 1898). Zubiri, by ordinary standards, has published little. But all that he has published has possessed such significances as to provide a solid basis for the esteem in which he is held. His first work *Naturaleza, Historia, Dios* appeared in 1944; and it was not until eighteen years later than his masterwork, the treatise *Sobra la Esencia* was to be published. A further work, *Cinco Lecciones*, which he disclaims as no book in any proper sense at all, followed shortly in 1963, and in 1965, in the *Revista de Occidente*, the remarkable essay, "El Origin del Hombre." Zubiri's effort has been the historic one of the philosopher: that of finding the intellectual formula which might illuminate the central problem of contemporary thought. According to Zubiri, the peculiar problem of contemporary thought has arisen from the "realistic" invasion by science of the domain of the intellectual convictions of man. This invasion has obscured and confused the role of philosophy and the kind of knowledge and wisdom it can give. It is far from Zubiri's intention to deny or minimize the role of science. Nor does he deny that the emergence of scientific knowledge in our culture imposes certain obligations upon philosophy. He is very much concerned with clarifying anew the nature of philosophy, as it is at once related to and different from science, as it brings another kind of knowledge, which, while not unrelated to science, is yet intrinsically independent of it. Philosophy has the capacity to penetrate the order of objects to the order of essence, to that order of rational necessity which constitutes reality in its permanent aspects, its *whatness*, as underlying and controlling even the processes of becoming, of reality as process and event, which concerns science more directly. For

this reason, *Sobre la Esencia (On Essence)* is Zubiri's chief work. This is not the proper place to enter into the formal analysis of this complex work; it is enough to note that it is an enlightened vindication of the basic insights of classical metaphysics; enlightened in the sense that it is conducted in full awareness of all that modern science has generated for the problems of metaphysics and in constant consultation with the evidences of science. What it concludes is that modern science, far from calling the insights of classical metaphysics into question, reveals the relevance of those insights for the very philosophical problems which science raises. In developing the theme of *Sobre la Esencia*. Zubiri displays a careful and minute knowledge of modern science, and an ultimate mastery of the masters of modern metaphysical thought, the phenomenologists, the existentialists, as well as of the modern schools of Thomistic realism.

More specifically, Zubiri has taken up the problem of God from the point of view of his analysis of the philosophical situation of modern man. His purpose has been to discover at what point the problem of the demonstration of the existence and nature of God might be inserted into contemporary philosophical dialogue. He discovers this point in a certain dimension of human nature and of the human situation. He discovers this dimension in participation in being, which does indeed characterize all beings which are finite but which reaches its formal actualization in man. It is through the formal analysis of man's own mode of participation in being that the notion of God arises. At this point, his relation to the thought of Heidegger best appears. He takes into account all of the characteristics of *Dasein*, which Heidegger had noted, to reach, however, a position opposite on every major point. He reverses the dynamism of human existence as par-

anticipated being from *the being for death* of Heidegger to the participation in pure act of which classical metaphysics spoke, from Heidegger's atheism, to a fresh affirmation of the theses of classical theism.

Pedro Laín Entralgo is the doctor-humanist, the doctor-philosopher. Trained in medicine and occupying the chair of the history of medicine, he has brought to the penetration of his discipline a philosophical mode of inquiry which has led him far beyond the bounds of mere professional competence and preoccupation. It is difficult not to believe that his remarkable book, *La Relación Médico-enfermo*, will prove one of the most original investigations to emerge from contemporary Spanish thought. The theme is the relation which should prevail between the two principles in this situation of illness and therapy. At first glance, this would seem to be a narrowly professional problem. But the humanist in Laín discerns quite other dimensions; it involves the interpresence and interaction of *persons* on every level. From the wealth of his historical knowledge, he establishes that the humanist tradition of the notions of sickness and therapy has always prevailed; that sickness has always been seen to involve the whole man and therapy, the work of man, and not in the former case, a merely organic phenomenon, or in the latter, the mere exercise of a technical skill. This relation, because of the nature of sickness, which in the human subject can never be merely a modality of his bodiliness, and of the nature of therapy, which is a *human act*, and hence involves the whole person, evokes, consequently, the whole range of the problems of the relation of the self to the other. Still, this special relation, patient-doctor, cannot for this reason be dissolved into the general *I-thou* relation which establishes human presence as human and as presence. It is an interpersonal

relation which possesses a special physiognomy all its own, determined by the special nature of human sickness and of the doctor's activity: cure. This involves Laín in two lines of speculation which complement each other: the general theory of the other and the dialectic of the modes of the other and the relation of self to other: friendship, etc.; with the explicit purpose of isolating that specific form of this relation which is the relation doctor-patient in its full human form. This is not purely a "speculative" problem; Laín has entered by the door of philosophical reflection into an area where speculation can indeed be subjected to fierce empirical test: the sick-room. Here is the testing ground of whether the viable doctor-patient relation has been established, with death in many instances the final arbiter. The doctor who relies merely on his medical skill and knowledge, whose relation to his patient is that of subject to object, in the cold light of a chaste professionalism must here be measured against the notion of a neighbor whose wounds must be bound up, the basic figure of which is to be found, not in the pages of a medical journal, but in the verses of the Gospel alone. In another, equally impressive, work Laín has extrapolated this basic problem of the other and of interpersonal relations in its full speculative range, without the controlling preoccupation with the special case of its residing in the doctor-patient situation. This work, *La Realidad del Otro*, reveals a close acquaintance with and ready control of the methods and techniques of modern phenomenology, tempered with a native insight into the essential of situations characteristic of the Latin mind. A final word might well be devoted to Laín's remarkable phenomenological study of two basic moments: expectation, waiting, and hope in the earlier work, *La Espera y la Esperanza*.

Contemporaneous with Laín is another remarkable talent expressing the Spanish spirit in our day: that of José Luis Aranguren. Aranguren is one of the most engaged and committed persons one might encounter. To this commitment Aranguren brings, not merely the intensity of a dedicated soul, but all the wealth of an extremely well-cultivated mind. His works are freighted with the insight and the wisdom of one who has been thoroughly schooled in the western humanistic and philosophical tradition; but they are the products of one who realizes that all that freight is mere baggage if it cannot be brought to bear upon the illumination and the spiritual amelioration of modern man. Of his works, we should like to mention only three. The first is the remarkable essay entitled, *Catholicismo y Protestantismo como Formas de Existencia* with which the *Complete Works* opens. This work reveals Aranguren as a precise analyst of the religious life, of what constitutes the basic and distinctive religious attitude (*talente*) and what principles must control the relative evaluation of the institutional and historical forms which it has taken. He isolates the religious attitude in its purity in order to study the two most important forms which this attitude has assumed in European and Western history. The details of analysis of this essay bear comparison with the analyses of Max Scheler. Aranguren's conclusion is at once expected and something which marks him out as something of a prophet. He does not relate these two forms by the law of contradiction, but by a dialectical law: it was historically and ideally necessary that Protestantism should emerge from and stand in opposition to Catholicism, in order to reveal dimensions of the religious attitude which lay latent in Catholicism and could be realized only by this process of dialectical opposition. Once this opposition

is worked out, it becomes apparent that the two forms or movements cannot stand in nude opposition to each other. They reveal the necessity of a higher synthesis to realize the values exhibited by the opposition. Aranguren, in pointing out the need and the form of this synthesis, establishes himself surely as the harbinger of the modern mood of Christian ecumenism. The second work of Aranguren which deserves mention is his *Ética*. This is a very able analysis and synthesis, in which two principles dominate: the principle of humanistic personalism and that of value deontology. On the one hand, Aranguren is clearly committed to the recognition and establishment of objectively valid norms of value; this is value deontology. There are objective values and not merely the values that men value. At the same time, this deontological order of values is dependent for its realization on the spiritual forces of the human person, his intelligence, his emotions, his will. His attitude toward these values cannot be the merely formal one of duty, nor can it be that Protagorean one whereby man becomes the measure of value and the value of value. It must be the stern one of the discipline of the person to the voluntary option of the objective value in the face of the pressure and demands of the self. The application of this norm or ideal is to be seen in a remarkable chapter, "The Moralization of Power through Self-Limitation," in Aranguren's *Ética y Política*. A more classical title and theme could hardly be conceived. It is the direct application to the realm of public power of the private principle of character. Morality in the private and public arenas alike is generated by a formative act of self-limitation in the light of an objective value.

We may close these brief animadversions on the present scene in philosophy in Spain by mentioning the work of a man who would in all probability deny that he is a

philosopher. But this is a transparent ruse of philosophers, observable since Socrates, and we cannot take his word for it. This is Luis Diez del Corral. The book on which his reputation in the English-speaking world must for the present rest is called *The Rape of Europe*. It is a most arresting effort to carry out a most exigent speculative and historical task: the formulation of a philosophy of contemporary history. The theme needs only to be mentioned to be recognized as one on which modern man needs urgently to reflect. We have a plethora of philosophies of history which illuminate the past. It is the present which remains unenlightened as to its own character.

The nub of Diez del Corral's reflection

is that the great civilizing force of the contemporary world is Europe. But in its extension to the global theatre, only the technological dimension of European culture has proved exportable. The real creative springs of that culture and its really spiritual achievements remain indigenous, impossible to translate into that larger theatre. As a result, what is being created in the image of European culture is really a hollow double, the technological double unsupported by the spiritual insights and values of Europe. The theory has a boldness and a sweep which are arresting in themselves. It is also remarkable because it exhibits a typical Spanish mind showing itself easily master of a cosmopolitan range of problems.

The Last of the Red Hot Heroes

JOEL M. VANCE

THE MORE I look back at our neighborhood gang, the more obvious it becomes to me that we weren't tough at all. We tried to be, but we weren't. In our undeveloped minds, we were just as mean as the tough guys portrayed at that time by George Raft and Edward G. Robinson on the screens of our dirty neighborhood theaters.

But our brand of toughness had a peculiar kind of bravado about it which led us to break out streetlights and then run, rather than stealing or committing major acts of aggression.

We really weren't old enough to be hoodlums—we were ten—but we wanted passionately to be big and strong and mean like the boys we sometimes saw around in Jackson Park or down from 85th Street.

They were our ideals. They had long hair, thin, sardonic faces, and a studied slouch which seemed to me menacing and catlike. They spoke with a quick, sharp accent and there seemed to be no humor about them. They were icy-eyed, with flared nostrils. They represented ready passion and quick violence. They were exactly

what we wanted to be when we grew up to the exalted age of sixteen.

For some reason, our particular neighborhood didn't have its young gang, possibly because of a lack of boys of the right age to fight and join in what later became known as rumbles and gang wars.

So we lived in an isolated island in the middle of Chicago, looking out at a sea of teenage violence and clapping our hands excitedly.

Pete Zahorik was my best friend. He also was a sort of minor deity to me for he had a brother who had been sent to a training school in Michigan after a number of youthful exploits which promised to land him in Joliet as soon as he reached his majority—if he did.

This brother, Sam, was to both Pete and me a symbol of all we longed to be. I had never met him, but through Pete's tales, he loomed as large in my dreams as did Luke Appling, the Chicago White Sox shortstop who was another particular hero of mine.

Thus it was that when I heard he was