

THE LIVING AGE

Founded by E. LITTELL in 1844

NO. 3889

JANUARY 18, 1919

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

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IN the first year of the war, when the great Russian steam roller was believed to be moving slowly but surely towards Berlin, when it was difficult to find words to do justice to the heroic exploits of Russia's army and to the services which she was rendering the Allied cause, one of our greatest statesmen and orators, after reviewing all that was being done by our other Allies, exclaimed: 'But what shall I say about Russia?' That is the question that I am asking myself to-night, for it is still more difficult to do justice to her now that she has fallen from her high estate and drifted into anarchy and chaos. How sad it is to look back and to recall the expectations raised by Russia's early victories; how tragic to trace the stages of her downward course and to contemplate the transformation of a powerful and united nation into a helpless mass of warring atoms.

To the outside observer Russia had presented the appearance of a country that would bear the strain of a protracted war better than any other of the Allies. She disposed of an inexhaustible man power and she possessed territory so vast that loss of ground, which in the

West would have involved disaster, was not in her case of such vital importance, as her armies, if only they remained intact, could always retire further into the interior. These territories, moreover, were so rich in corn and oil, in timber and in minerals, that she was virtually self-supporting. The financial position was sound, and she had a gold reserve of £150,000,000. To those, however, who were better acquainted with the working of her administrative machinery and with the conditions of her economic life, the weak points in her armor were too apparent to justify such an estimate of her staying powers. All authority was centralized in a bureaucracy which even in normal times had shown itself incapable of administering the affairs of so vast an Empire, with its population of 180,000,000, while there was a complete absence of coördination between the various Government departments. Each Minister was directly responsible to the Emperor and to the Emperor alone, and was under no obligation to impart to his colleagues information respecting the affairs of his department, though he might do so as an act of courtesy. The President of the Council was

but *primus inter pares*, and though he could press his own views on the Emperor on all matters of State, he had not the right to control the action of his colleagues, who resented any interference on his part as an encroachment on their prerogatives. So much was this the case that M. Sazonoff once took me to task for having during his absence abroad addressed myself to the President of the Council, and for having obtained from him certain assurances with regard to Russia's policy in Persia, on the ground that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or in his absence the Acting Minister, was alone responsible to the Emperor for Russia's foreign policy. On my reminding him that the Russian Ambassador in London appealed from time to time to the Prime Minister on questions which were of vital moment to the maintenance of our understanding with Russia, M. Sazonoff replied: 'You forget that Russia is not a parliamentary country and that the President of the Council has no right to interfere in the conduct of foreign affairs.'

A Government so constituted — without either collective responsibility or coördination — could not under the most favorable circumstances have stood the strain of a world-war. But Russia, unfortunately, was heavily handicapped in other ways — her transport services and industries were so deficient that they were unequal to the task of manufacturing and distributing the goods required by the army and the civil population. She was cut off from the outside world save during a few months of the year when Archangel was no longer icebound, for the construction of the Murman railway, which had been planned in the reign of Alexander III, was not taken in hand till after the first year of the war. With incredible lack of foresight the Government had neglected to connect the capi-

tal with their only ice-free port at Alexandrovsk, though they must have known that in the event of war with Germany the Baltic would be closed to them as a channel of communication with the outer world. Nor can they plead that they were taken unawares, for they had had ample warning that unless Russia was prepared to renounce her historic rôle in the Balkans such a war was no remote possibility. They had seen how during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 the Kaiser had donned his shining armor in support of the pretensions of his Austrian ally, while during the two Balkan wars the spectre of war had more than once hovered over their own country. I remember on one of these occasions asking a distinguished member of the Duma, who was advocating the adoption by the Entente of a firmer and more energetic policy, whether Russia was ready to face a European war. He replied at once in the negative, but added: 'She never will be ready.' He was right.

The Government relied almost entirely on Russia's inexhaustible manpower, and based their calculations as regarded war material and equipment on the experiences of the Russo-Japanese war, and it was only by a reckless sacrifice of life and by the dogged courage of her soldiers that Russia won her early victories. No finer men ever marched to battle than those who fought under the Russian flag at the commencement of the war, but they had soon to face the enemy on terribly unequal terms, as guns and shells, rifles and ammunition, all ran short. You have read, no doubt, how during the disastrous retreat from Galicia a large percentage of the infantry were without rifles and cartridges, how the supports had to wait unarmed to pick up the rifles of their fallen comrades, and how many of them fought with sticks and stones. Let us pay a tribute of ad-

miration to the memory of these brave men, and let us not forget that it was the Russian army that gave us breathing time wherein to create that wonderful army that has saved Europe from German domination. But, after all its losses and sufferings, the fighting spirit of the Russian army was almost broken, while its loyal devotion to the Emperor was cooling fast, and already in the autumn of 1915 officers and even generals returning from the front voiced the feeling prevailing among all ranks, as they openly declared that as soon as the war was over they would sweep away the whole gang of bureaucrats who had left the army defenseless before the enemy. The army, however, as a whole did not wish to compromise the success of the war by taking immediate action, and Broussiloff's brilliant offensive in the following spring was proof that it was still a factor to be counted with. Thanks, moreover, to the action taken by patriotic Russians throughout the country, a great improvement had been effected in its equipment, while large consignments of artillery and war material had been received from France and Great Britain. As a matter of fact the Russian army had never been so well equipped as it was at the beginning of 1917, and preparations for a spring offensive were in active progress. These preparations were stayed by the revolution, and though Kerensky once assured me that Imperial Russia would never have rendered the Allies such assistance in the war as, according to his forecast, revolutionary Russia was about to give them, he was, as subsequent events have shown, grievously mistaken.

While the fighting spirit of the army had thus been impaired by the lack of munitions, the ardor of the civilian population was damped by the scarcity of food and of all articles of clothing. In the larger towns, where the popula-

tion had been doubled by the influx of refugees from the provinces occupied by the Germans, the most elementary necessities of life could only be obtained by standing for hours in queues in the bitter cold of a Russian winter. There is a limit to the powers of endurance of even the most long-suffering race, and it was the scarcity of food and the looting of a few bakers' shops that gave the signal for the revolution.

I had been present at Moscow when, in August, 1914, the Emperor read the War Manifesto, and as I watched the huge crowd in its loyal devotion prostrate itself before His Majesty as he left the church, I wondered how long the war enthusiasm would last, and what would be the attitude of the masses should the war be indefinitely prolonged. On the very eve of the war there had been serious strikes and considerable social unrest, but, contrary to what the Germans had expected, the war had united the nation as it had seldom been united before. The strikes ceased as if by magic, and the whole nation responded to the Emperor's call to arms and shared his determination to see it through. Unfortunately, however, for himself and Russia, the Emperor had from the outset declared that the nation's energies must be concentrated on the war, and that all questions of internal reforms must wait till after the conclusion of peace. The Emperor and the Orthodox Church represented the two great symbols of the political and spiritual creeds of the mass of Russian peasants, and, fortified with the blessing of their church, they willingly laid down their lives for their Little Father. But these sacrifices merited some return, and afforded the Emperor a unique opportunity of drawing closer the bonds which the war had forged between sovereign and people. I more than once in the course of the next two years endeavored to impress

this fact on the Emperor's Ministers, and to urge that it is easy to concede as an act of grace for services rendered what it might be humiliating to grant out of fear of a popular rising. There were among the members of the Government liberal-minded men, like Krivoshein and Sazonoff, who fully understood this, but they were in the minority. Before taking over the command of the army, after the retreat from Galicia and the fall of Warsaw, the Emperor had added to their number by selecting Ministers who, like Samarin, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, enjoyed the nation's confidence. But these appointments did not go far enough to appease the uneasiness caused by reverses in the field and the growing scarcity of supplies, and in an audience at the commencement of 1916 I made a personal appeal to the Emperor to mark his appreciation of his people's sacrifices by concessions. As he still maintained that reforms must wait till after victory had been won, I urged him at all events to give his people some sign that would encourage them to hope for better things to come. I do not know whether he was influenced or not by what I said, but two weeks later he appeared unexpectedly at the opening sitting of the Duma. His presence there produced a profound impression, and marked, as my dear friend Sazonoff said to me at the time, the happiest day in Russia's history. The hopes and expectations founded on it were short-lived. As the military situation, which had been so critical in the preceding year, improved, the reactionaries once more gained the ascendant, and one after another of the more liberal Ministers were sacrificed. Polivanoff, the popular War Minister; Samarin, against whom Rasputin had vowed vengeance for having exposed certain abuses in the church; and Sazonoff, to whose place as Foreign Minister

Stürmer aspired, all went. Sazonoff's loss was irreparable, for he had been one of the master builders of the Russo-British understanding, and was a loyal and devoted friend of the Allies, who saw in the adoption of a more liberal policy the best hope of carrying on the war to a victorious finish. Stürmer, on the contrary, was a reactionary with pro-German sympathies, who was afraid that an alliance with the democratic governments of the West would serve as a channel through which liberal ideas would penetrate into Russia.

The Emperor was too absorbed by military matters to give that close attention to the questions of internal policy which the growing gravity of the situation demanded, and the Empress, who remained at Tsarskoe Selo, whence she paid occasional visits to headquarters, was treated by Stürmer as a sort of regent. It was through Her Majesty to whom he paid assiduous court, that he endeavored to impose his views and policy on the Emperor.

Incompetent reactionary Ministers succeeded each other in quick succession, and fanned the flame of disaffection and revolt that was smouldering underground. The Duma met in November and Miliukoff in an historic speech denounced Stürmer as a traitor, while Puriskevitch, who but two years before had been an ultra-reactionary, called on the Ministers in impassioned language to throw themselves on their knees before the Emperor, to tell him that things could not go on as they were, and to beseech him to liberate Russia from Rasputin and from all the occult influences which were governing and betraying her. Even such a conservative body as the Council of Empire protested, though in more moderate language, while members of the Imperial family, both collectively and individually, made urgent representations to the Emperor. Russia, indeed,

with the exception of the extremists, was once more united, but not as at the beginning of the war. Between the Emperor and his subjects an insuperable barrier had arisen, and in all parts of the Empire voices were raised in condemnation of the dark forces behind the throne which made and unmade Ministers. Rasputin's assassination did but harden the Emperor's heart against all those who were advocating concessions. Protopopoff — a renegade from Liberalism, whose unbalanced mind had been turned by his appointment as Minister of the Interior, and on whose shoulders Rasputin's mantle had fallen — was now all-powerful, and the measures which he took were directly calculated to provoke disturbances. The Duma met at the end of February, but its opening sitting passed off so quietly that I thought I could safely go to Finland for ten days' rest. It was, however, but the calm before the storm, and on my return, by almost the last train that was allowed to enter Petrograd, I found the revolution in full swing. The revolution was not the work of any secret political society, nor was it carried out on any carefully thought-out plan. It was the spontaneous act of a people worn out by sufferings and privations whose patience and power of endurance were at last exhausted. It began with the looting of a baker's shop, and ended with the mutiny of one after the other of the regiments of the Petrograd garrison. Had the Emperor at once come to Petrograd and made timely concessions he might have saved his crown, even at the eleventh hour. But, kept in ignorance by his entourage of the gravity of the crisis, he prorogued the Duma and ordered troops to be sent to repress the mutiny, and by so doing he sealed his own fate and that of the dynasty. When he at last left the Stavka it was too late. The revolution was an accom-

plished fact, and the old régime had ceased to exist.

I have so recently vindicated the Emperor's memory as regards certain unfounded charges and misrepresentations that I need not repeat what I said on that subject at the Russia Club dinner. I should like, however, to say a few words about the Empress, who, if the reports which we have received are confirmed, has suffered so cruelly that we can only think of her with pity and commiseration. The Emperor, it is true, was so entirely under her influence that history will hold her responsible for having inspired a policy disastrous alike to the dynasty and to Russia, but in spite of all that has been said to the contrary, she was not a pro-German working in Germany's interests, nor did she, any more than the Emperor, contemplate the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. She had a strong personal dislike for the Emperor William, and it is quite untrue that she ever acted as his agent. She was a reactionary, who wished to hand down the autocracy intact to her son, and she consequently persuaded the Emperor to choose as his Ministers men on whom she could rely to carry out a firm and unyielding policy, quite regardless of their other qualifications. There were, however, German agents in the background, who pulled the strings and used Her Majesty as well as others in the Emperor's entourage as their unconscious tools for the purpose of inducing the Emperor to pursue a reactionary policy, while they themselves preached revolution to his subjects, in order that Russia might be so rent by internal disorders as to be forced to make peace. The Empress believed to the last that the army and the peasantry were on her side, and that she could count on their support, as Protopopoff was in the habit of having bogus telegrams dispatched to her

from all parts of the Empire, signed by fictitious persons, assuring her of their love and devotion. I would merely add that the scandalous stories circulated about her relations with Rasputin are absolutely unfounded. She regarded that impostor, incredible as it may seem, with feelings almost of adoration, as a holy man, whose prayers would keep her son in health, and she believed that Rasputin's fate, as he had himself so often told her, was indissolubly linked to that of the dynasty — a prediction that, curiously enough, was subsequently fulfilled.

In his book entitled *The Eclipse of Russia*, Dr. Dillon speaks of the Bolshevik offensive having been supported by the British and the French, and I should therefore like to take this opportunity of correcting a misapprehension that may perhaps owe its origin to certain words used by me in an interview which I gave to representatives of the Russian press last December. Those words, 'without our coöperation,' if read in connection with the context, can only refer, as was clearly understood by the Russian press at the time, to our coöperation with Russia in the war, and not to some imaginary part which I am supposed to have played in the revolution.

My one end and aim throughout was to keep Russia in the war, and, like the leaders of the Duma, I was above all things anxious that the course of the military operations should not be compromised by any grave internal crisis. It was in order to avert any such catastrophe that I repeatedly warned the Emperor of the danger of the course he was steering; and that I told him that to regain his people's love and confidence was an essential condition of victory. Apart, moreover, from purely military considerations, I personally believed that it was by a gradual process of evolution that Russia would

have the best chance of finding salvation. Before my last audience, in January, 1917, when I explained to the Emperor all the dangers of the situation with absolute frankness, I had asked the President what would really satisfy the Duma, in order that I might advise His Majesty accordingly. Rodzianko replied that all that the Duma asked for was that the Emperor should appoint as President of the Council a man who commanded both His Majesty's confidence and the confidence of the nation, and that he should give him a free hand to choose his own colleagues. This was the advice which I pressed on the Emperor. It was such a small thing to ask — such an easy thing to grant — but the Emperor, unfortunately for himself and for Russia, thought otherwise.

I have dwelt at such length on the genesis of the revolution that I can take but the briefest possible survey of its course and of the events that led up to Russia's final collapse. On its prorogation by Imperial Ukase on March 12 the Duma had formed an Executive Committee for the provisional conduct of affairs, and on the same day the Socialists met and founded the Council of Workmen's Deputies. This council was, a couple of days later, enlarged so as to admit representatives of the soldiers, who had played such a prominent part in the revolution, and was converted into the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. As a result of a compromise between the Soviet — the name by which this council is best known — and the Duma Committee, a provisional Government was formed to carry on the administration of the country till the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The Soviet, which was represented in it by Kerensky, made no secret of its determination to control the Government's action and to be master of the army; and the whole his-

tory of the next eight months is that of a struggle between those two rival bodies, one of which emanated from the Duma, the only legally constituted organ in the country, and the other a self-constituted assembly, which possessed no legal status, but which had behind it a strong party organization and was supported by the local Soviets that it had set up throughout the country. For the Allies the chief interest in this struggle was the effect that it might have on the war. It was to secure a more efficient conduct of the war that the Duma leaders had opposed the old régime, but now that that régime had fallen, the first act of the Soviet was to destroy the discipline of the army by its famous Prikaz forbidding soldiers to salute their officers, and transferring the disciplinary powers of the latter to committees of soldiers. It was in vain that I warned Prince Lvov and his colleagues, when I recognized the provisional Government officially in the name of His Majesty's Government, that, unless discipline was restored in the army, and unless order was maintained in the interior, Russia's newly acquired liberties would soon be a thing of the past. By the majority of the Socialists a well-disciplined army was regarded as a dangerous weapon that might one day be turned against the revolution, while the Bolsheviki foresaw that the break-up of the army would place at their disposal a mass of armed peasants and workmen with whose help they hoped to rise to power. The moderate Socialists, moreover, who entered the Government at the end of May, believed that the war could be ended by detaching the German proletariat from their Government without our first defeating the German armies. Though Kerensky made an heroic attempt to galvanize the army into new life, and succeeded in inducing it to take the July

offensive, which was attended with a short-lived initial success, the demoralization of the army continued apace, and disaster followed on disaster. Had the Government had the courage, after the abortive Bolshevik rising in July, to stamp out Bolshevism when it was still in their power to do so, the army might perhaps have been saved. But repressive measures were repugnant to Kerensky, and after the ill-starred Korniloff episode the Bolsheviki once more raised their heads. That Kerensky purposely set a trap for Korniloff, as some persons contend, I do not believe, but the true story of that unfortunate affair has still to be written. There were undoubtedly behind Korniloff men who were working for the overthrow of the provisional Government, just as there were behind Kerensky others whose object was to get rid of Korniloff, and it is by no means improbable that the strings were being pulled by German agents. Thereafter Kerensky ceased to control the situation, and though he succeeded, with the help of the moderate Socialists, in forming a new coalition Government, that Government had no power, and was but a Government in name. Up to the very last, however, he believed that he was strong enough to quell any Bolshevik rising that might take place. He was utterly mistaken, and when the blow fell, the provisional Government collapsed as the Empire had collapsed, with no one to defend them but a small body of cadets and a few women soldiers.

The supreme power was now in the hands of the Bolsheviki, who had won over the soldiers, the workmen, and the peasants by the magic words 'Peace, Bread, and Land.' How, I would ask, have these deluded dupes profited by these vain promises? The treaty, which was to have given Russia a peace without annexations or contribu-

tions, has placed under German control some of her richest provinces, and has imposed on her an indemnity of £300,000,000. The army, it is true, has been disbanded, but there has been no peace for Russia, rent as she is by class war. The land hunger of the peasants has been satisfied by a decree proclaiming the confiscation of all private estates and of all church and Crown land, but, as no legal machinery was set up for its partition, villages and individual peasants fought one another for its coveted possession, and the land went to whoever could seize and hold the most. The workmen, on the other hand, to whom the control of the factories was entrusted, did not know how to manage them, and as nobody cared to work, most of the factories have been closed and the workmen thrown on the streets. As there are, consequently, no manufactured goods in the country, the ruble has lost its purchasing power, and the peasant, who has stocks of grain, refuses to part with them. The promised food has not been forthcoming, and famine is claiming thousands of victims. Workmen and peasants alike have realized too late by bitter experience what Bolshevism means, and how it has spelled ruin both for themselves and their country. Liberty, the watchword of the February revolution, has long been a dead letter — it is the monopoly of a single class, of a minority which through its Red army terrorizes the majority of the nation. All who do not subscribe to the articles of the Bolshevism creed are disfranchised, all papers which do not support the Government are suppressed. Justice is unobtainable, or only to be bought, and corruption is rampant. Never since the days of Ivan the Terrible has Russia suffered from such tyranny; and when, some weeks ago, the Bolsheviki feared that their power was on the wane, they indulged in an

orgue of massacre and pillage, in the hope of overawing a helpless people with the Red Terror. Nobody's life is safe — all their political opponents, whether belonging to the Socialist or non-Socialist parties, to the working classes or to the aristocracy, are styled counter-revolutionaries, and as such are judged guilty and sentenced to death. The process of passing sentence on individuals is even found too slow, and they are massacred in batches, the Red Guard or the Chinese mercenaries employed as executioners being free to choose their victims from the list of the proscribed. Such are the methods by which those pseudo-democrats, Lenin and Trotzky, have attempted to found their Socialist State, and such are the precepts of the Bolshevism gospel which they vainly would see preached in this and other countries. They have voted money for Bolshevism propaganda abroad, and, though I have too much faith in the common sense and patriotism of the British workman to believe that he would ever listen to their insidious pleadings, it would be well that he should be on his guard and that he should realize the ghastly suffering and ruin which Bolshevism has brought on Russia.

The sympathy felt in certain quarters for Bolshevism is due entirely to ignorance of what Bolshevism really are. They are not democrats as we understand the meaning of that word. They are anarchists, and I am convinced that, were any of our so-called Bolsheviki to go to Russia and see with their own eyes the crimes that are being committed there in the name of liberty, they would never call themselves Bolsheviki again.

I am often asked how Russia can ever emerge from the chaos in which she is plunged, and how the present anarchy is to end. This is no easy question to answer, and I can only say that

I firmly believe in Russia's eventual regeneration provided that the Allies will help her to cast off the Bolshevik tyranny which is sapping her vital force, and that they will further with all the means at their disposal her political and economic reconstruction. Dark as is the present outlook, it is, let us hope, that darkness which precedes the dawn, for in the East the first rays of light are already breaking through the clouds. The success that Siberia has achieved in the war of liberation which she is waging against the Bolsheviks and their German masters will, if it be sustained, inspire the other nationalities of Russia to rise and overthrow their oppressors. There are signs moreover, of a revival of the national spirit — of a tendency, which all Russians should encourage, to sink old party differences and to unite to save Russia from permanent disruption. The great victories won by the Allies in the West must also, sooner or later, react on the Russian situation and force Germany to relax her grip, for the Allies, I trust, will not forget Russia when the moment comes for settling accounts with Germany. Perhaps the most hopeful sign of all is the re-awakening of the national conscience

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and the growing tendency of peasants and workmen alike to revisit their deserted churches. After the revolution, in which she had taken no part, the church lost her hold over the masses, who, left to themselves, turned liberty into license and indulged in every kind of excess. Now that their sufferings and privations have awakened in them feelings of remorse for the ruin which they have wrought, their old faith and their old beliefs are moving them to make their peace with God through the Orthodox church. The church may, in time form the rallying point of a great national movement. Moscow will then be purged of the Bolsheviks, who have desecrated the glorious churches in the Kremlin with sacrilegious acts and who have reddened her streets with blood. She will again become the centre of Russian political and religious life, and, as she gathers her erring and repentant children around her, she will once more be, as she was in the past, the historic shrine in which the great heart of the Russian people lives and beats. God grant that, when that day dawns — when a new, free, and united Russia arises from the ashes of the old, her heart will ever beat in unison with ours.

INTERVENTION: A BRITISH PROTEST

OUR present relations with Russia are about as indefensible as can be imagined. The Foreign Office, or those who control the policy of the Foreign Office, can hardly be ignorant of that — how should they be? — but, so far as appears, are preparing to cover one error with a greater error and to make bad worse. In the midst of the pre-occupation of a great war the little war with Russia has received comparatively little attention, and it is hardly realized that, though the great war is over, the little war goes on, and, moreover, that if it is not stopped now or soon it is likely to become a very much larger war and a more and more intolerable and indefensible one, so intolerable and indefensible, indeed, that it is capable of producing grave reactions here, extending to the overthrow of a government. We originally embarked on this Russian adventure under wholly different circumstances and for reasons — so far as reasons were given — which have no present application whatever. After the intervention by Germany in the civil war between 'Reds' and 'Whites' in Finland and her virtual occupation of the country there was a real, if somewhat remote, danger that she might strike through Finland at the narrow strip of Russian territory which divides the north of Finland from the Arctic Ocean and establish for herself a naval station on the Murmansk coast giving her access to the Arctic and a new outlet for her submarines. At a moment when the submarine war was at its height and Russia lay helpless and subservient there was reason, if not very urgent reason — since the district was extremely inaccessible and a long railway would have had to be built

guarding against this peril. That was the extent of the danger and the extent of the need for our occupation. Its extension to Archangel, which is not ice-free, and to a large stretch of country inland had no such justification. The occupation of Vladivostok, Russia's ice-free port in the Pacific, five thousand miles away, followed by the advance, with the coöperation of Japan, westward into Siberia, was as a military measure equally unjustified. Both these extensions of the original intervention were defended on quite other grounds. It was said that Russia had become the mere tool of Germany, and that it was necessary, first, to prevent the further extension of Germany's influence and her increasing exploitation of Russian resources and, secondly, to 'reconstitute the eastern front.' In this connection the happy discovery was made of scattered bands of Czecho-Slovak prisoners who, it was urged, must in the first place be rescued and in the second place utilized in this process of reconstituting the eastern front.

So matters stood at the time of the collapse of Germany and the conclusion of the armistice. Obviously every reason hitherto alleged, whether for the original occupation of the Murmansk coast or for the subsequent expeditions to Archangel and Siberia, had now disappeared. They were all in the nature of defenses against the attack of Germany, and there was no longer any attack or possibility of attack from Germany. Germany as a military Power was dead. But were the defensive measures, the counter-attacks, dead also? Not at all; they continue in full force. There is quite a prospect