

as that tradition actually existed or as Mr. Hoggart somewhat naïvely defines it. (For surely it is naïve to interpret puritanism as a reliance upon one's own uninstructed conscience, without reference to God's teaching as revealed in the Holy Bible? Puritanism without the Book is not merely Hamlet without the prince; it is Hamlet without Shakespeare, without its creator. Without the Book, Jomo Kenyatta is a Puritan.)

No, *Lady Chatterley* is a novel in a far older and darker tradition, in a tradition which since the coming of Christianity has been half-submerged, emerging in the West only fitfully and surreptitiously in the guise of "the Old Religion." *Its tradition is the tradition of witchcraft.* The orgiastic rites it celebrates bear precisely the same relationship to the Holy Communion as the Black Mass does to the true Mass. Tam O'Shanter was at least drunk when, carried away by the young witch's ample charms, he suddenly roared out, "Weel done, Cutty-Sark!"

Nor is *Lady Chatterley* only a novel: it is a tract also. It does not merely depict: it preaches. And what it preaches is this: that mankind can only be regenerated by freeing itself from the tyranny of the intellect and the soul, from the tyranny of Jesus Christ, and by prostrating itself before its own phallus; in other words, by reducing itself almost to an animal level (almost, but not quite: for animals are mercifully incapable of the morbid cerebrations—"sex in the head"—which alone could generate such fantasies). If this is not a doctrine calculated to deprave and corrupt, I do not know what is.

"DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT"—was the jury's verdict confirmation of what many have long suspected, that these words have pretty well lost all meaning? Along with belief in original sin we seem to have discarded any belief in the original innocence which the verbs "to deprave and to corrupt" presuppose. And certainly it is slightly ridiculous to talk of a *book* corrupting a society in which, if present tendencies are maintained, it may soon be quite usual for a schoolgirl to have an abortion before she can read.

Nor is *Lady Chatterley* likely to deprave and corrupt *many* people. It is unlikely to corrupt anyone who reads it with as little attention and understanding as that displayed by most of those who spoke up on its behalf at the trial. Nor is it likely to corrupt those millions who are now going to read it for what are laughingly called "the wrong reasons," just skimming through looking for the dirty bits. There is nothing particularly depraving in the mere description of the sexual act, nor corrupting in a mere four-letter word, and the skimmers are unlikely to find much more in the book than that.

No, the people it is most likely to corrupt are those few who are going to read it "for the right reasons," the earnest ones who will read it carefully with sympathy and respect, and who have sufficient intelligence and knowledge to grasp the point. Heaven knows, it is difficult enough to keep one's sanity under the impact of Lawrence's torrential eloquence, his proud solemnity and poetic gifts. Was ever spring more tenderly or beautifully described than in this book? It is only too easy to surrender to his warlock spells and incantations, to his hallucinatory repetitions and variations, to his dithyrambic rhapsodising. Was ever book less boring? It is about as boring as the explosion of a moral H-bomb. To compel assent Lawrence has arts enough of his own. He hardly needed the full weight of clerical and academic approval to make him well-nigh irresistible.

A book which Christians *ought* to read? A book, rather, which Christians may read, or some Christians anyway—those, perhaps, with long spoons.

## A World With Arms Without War

**Arms Control.** Special issue of *Daedalus* (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Fall, 1960). Edited by GERALD HOLTON and DONALD BRENNAN. \$2.00.

ONE of the worst effects of the administrative confusion in Washington, which was the consequence of Eisenhower's dilettante leadership in his second term, has been an equal confusion in European—and indeed American—minds about the aims of American policy. With no strong hand in the White House to deter Congress and the Press from needling the Chiefs of Staff into making impossible claims for different Services and weapons, and posing improbable forms of Soviet threat to justify them, the impression has naturally gained ground that the United States is determined to push the arms race to the limit. It has even given colour to the belief, fostered by Bertrand Russell and others, that "the conscience of the West" has been transferred to the guardianship of the British Left, merely because there is more noise made on this side of the Atlantic about the problems of international security than on the other.

In fact, nothing could be a more complete distortion of the truth. It happens that there is a great deal more serious, dispassionate, and

imaginative work being done on the problems of disarmament and the control of the arms race in the United States than in Britain or anywhere else in the free world. In terms of quantity alone I could enumerate upwards of one hundred Americans of repute—in the universities, the research organisations, and the government—who are at work on various facets of the problem, where I would be hard put to it to get the figure above a dozen in this country. (As often happens with new disciplines in the United States, there are if anything too many people working in the same field.) Hitherto most of this ferment of intellectual energy has seen daylight only in monographs: now for the first time the work of some of the best minds has collected together in a special issue of *Daedalus*, and the non-American reader can judge for himself the credentials of the new American school of thought that is developing.

In Britain and Europe a strong flavour of idealism still adheres to discussion of disarmament. The two great experts on the subject on this side of the Atlantic—Philip Noel Baker and Jules Moch—have been heavily influenced by the history of the League of Nations and the failure of the Great Powers in the early 'thirties to construct a system of arms control and an institutionalised pattern of order too strong for Germany to break out of. Noel Baker has always insisted that the only sane road to peace is comprehensive disarmament, though the exigencies of the French position have lately led Moch to experiment with more limited proposals. In the eyes of most Europeans arms control is synonymous with permanent, formal treaties and some form of universal and supra-national instrument of enforcement. Moreover, the European incentive for disarmament is provided as much by the economic burden of armaments as by their danger, so that emphasis is very clearly on quantitative reductions, an emphasis heightened by the widespread European belief that the nuclear stalemate is now unbreakable. Whatever time-table or method is suggested, and whatever the motive—pacifist, idealist, or economic—the common assumption is that the end-product will be a disarmed world with a more beneficent set of political forces at work.

THE EUROPEAN APPROACH still has its adherents in the United States. Jerome Wiesner, one of the senior scientists at M.I.T. and likely to hold a high scientific post in the Kennedy Administration, is ready to argue in terms very similar to Noel Baker—that not only is comprehensive disarmament the only worthwhile goal, but that if East and West have any disposition to profit by the mistakes they have made in the negotiations of the last ten years, multilateral agreement

is not beyond their grasp. Similarly, Edward Teller, the great extremist, can envisage arms control only in terms of world government and an "open world."

But this is now a minority view among American thinkers, for a new sense of realism and urgency has been imported to the study of arms by the entry into the field of a number of men who have hitherto been concerned principally with strategy. There are many shades in the new school of thought on arms control, but the unifying principles appear to be the following:

1. Total war has not only not been ruled out by nuclear weapons, but is likely to occur unless both sides take hard and urgent thought to identify the measures needed to avoid it. American strategic thinkers, more sophisticated perhaps in the shortcomings of their own weapons systems, find the European assumption that the danger of total war is a thing of the past dangerously unreal.

2. The dynamic of military innovation is now so great that it is impossible to assume that permanent stability can be achieved solely by the unilateral action of either side. Certain developments such as the *Polaris* submarine and the mobile land-based *Minuteman* of three years hence promise, it is true, greater stability than the present generation of vulnerable static missiles; but this promise could be offset by new techniques of detection and new forms of destruction such as "third generation" radiation bombs recently disclosed by Thomas Murray. Herman Kahn of The Rand Corporation contributes a spine-chilling projection of future weapons developments to destroy any illusion that there is a plateau of stability which can be achieved by technological development alone.

3. This technological dynamic makes the progress of the arms race only partially related to political tension. In the words of Robert Bowie (Director of the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard, which is the *fons et origo* of much of this new thinking): "*Military instruments, while still related to political conflict, have taken on a life of their own and have become a separate source of tension and danger.*"

4. Since absolute national security is no longer attainable, and total nuclear disarmament is unenforceable, the proper aim of policy, including both strategic planning and efforts at multilateral negotiation, is to enhance the security of *both* sides—whether by measures of disarmament, rearmament, or a mixture of both, depending on closer examination of the technological facts of life.

THE WIDEST DEFINITION of this concept of "arms control" and its relation to disarmament is pro-

vided by Donald Brennan of M.I.T. (who has edited this volume of *Daedalus*):

To begin with, it includes the possibility of an actual reduction in arms, that is, disarmament, either in limited or extensive ways. It also includes the possibility of constraints on armament that may or may not entail a reduction of forces, of the sort sometimes described as "arms limitation;" for example, a weapon-test ban and deployment restrictions (*e.g.*, disengagement) are "arms limitation" measures but not "disarmament" measures. And there is nothing in the concept of arms control to prevent the increase of certain types of armament, if it appears in the interest of national or world security to do so. Nor does the concept require the "co-operation" involved to be explicit or to be set forth in detail in a formal agreement; the co-operation may be tacit, partial, nebulous, or even grudging.

The central aim is to identify, at least as far as the Soviet Union and the United States are concerned, those fields of action or possible action where the interests of both coincide, in order to create that strategic balance which public opinion (in Europe, at any rate) has too readily assumed to have been developed merely by the existence of thermonuclear weapons. It is improbable that this would involve any large-scale measure of nuclear disarmament at first: it might, indeed, involve an increase in some specialised forms of armaments, and it is very unlikely to be cheap. But as Thomas Schelling, in the most seminal essay in the book, points out:

There is a vast new area to be explored once we break out of the traditional confinement of "disarmament"—the entire area of military collaboration with potential enemies to reduce the likelihood of war or to reduce its scope and violence.

It is not true that in the modern world a gain for the Russians is necessarily a loss for us, and vice-versa. We can both suffer losses, and this fact provides scope for co-operation. We both have—unless the Russians have already determined to launch an attack and are preparing for it—a common interest in reducing the advantage of striking first, simply because that very advantage, even if common to both sides, increases the likelihood of war. If at the expense of some capability for launching surprise attack one can deny that capability to the other, it may be a good bargain. We both have a common interest in avoiding the kind of false alarm, panic, misunderstanding, or loss of control, that may lead to an unpremeditated war, in a situation aggravated by the recognition on both sides that it is better to go first than to go second. We have a common interest in not getting drawn or provoked or panicked into war by the actions of a third party (whether that party intends the result or not). And we may have an interest in saving some

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money by not doing on both sides the things that, if we both do them, tend to cancel out.

This common interest does not depend on trust and good faith. In fact it seems likely that unless thoroughgoing distrust can be acknowledged on both sides, it may be hard to reach any real understanding on the subject.

Schelling (also of Harvard) brings much the most supple and subtle intelligence to bear upon the problem of identifying areas of mutual interest with the Russians. He and others are not overly concerned with the success of formal multilateral negotiations as a test of the existence of such a common interest. He believes that by our own unilateral actions, notably by subjecting new weapons or technological advances to a much more searching scrutiny as to their effect on the Soviet state of mind and preparations than has been the case in the past, and by making more explicit the limits which both we and the Russians recognise at this moment, we can take the first steps towards such identification without waiting for the fruition of multilateral negotiations which must inevitably be protracted because the technical material is so complex. Schelling, like myself, may have had cause somewhat to modify this view after a week we both spent recently in Moscow discussing disarmament with Soviet intellectuals and officials, and discovered how patchy, out of date, and distorted is their picture of developments in Western strategic thought and policy.

It is interesting that the American case for unilateral disarmament, represented by Erich Fromm, the eminent psychologist, is not inspired by moral protest against nuclear weapons so much as by the desire for a forceful psychological initiative to convince the Soviet Union and the rest of the world of American good faith in trying to avert war.

THERE ARE SOME WEAKNESSES in the new approach. For one thing, Schelling and others tend to see the problem of the arms race too exclusively in Soviet-American terms, and to ignore the problem of creating a position of mutual stability to which there are more than two parties. However, this may have less relevance as America's allies become, as they will, more not less technologically dependent on her.

For another, there is *nothing* to indicate that this concept of stabilising the strategic stalemate at the lowest possible level by a mixture of unilateral action in the developing of relatively indestructible weapons systems and multilateral agreement to perfect tactical and strategic warning or prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities, makes *any* appeal to the Russians at present. Clearly, for the time being a policy of possessing and multiplying the big weapons while

reaping the *kudos* of being the greatest enthusiasts for Total Disarmament, suits them admirably. But this may not always be the case, and the West must do its home-work—that is, develop a doctrine of arms control that it can really live with—against the day when the traditional factor that has caused the end of the arms race in the past comes into play, namely, the discovery of a common enemy. If China is really going to become a great military power and the balance of world tension is soon to shift from “East-West” to “North East-South West,” it would be a major tragedy (which the new American approach seeks to obviate) if the United States and Russia were to remain locked in a position of implacable hostility because of their inability to overcome the barriers raised by competing military technologies after the political basis of that hostility had become attenuated by the need to make common cause against greater dangers.

When this point is reached, and the seriousness with which the Russians have taken the negotiations on the nuclear test ban is probably a sign that it is approaching, the merit of the concept of a position of agreed and minimum mutual deterrence between Russia and America is twofold. First, it would enable both sides to shut off those technological developments, such as the anti-missile missile or space weapons, aimed at upsetting the balance, which both heighten tension and are formidably costly. Second, it would bypass the great stumbling-block in all past negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament—the need for detailed inspection over every inch of the Soviet Union. With each side working unilaterally to create the most invulnerable form of deterrent, and with agreement confined to its size, inspection becomes a matter of inventory control which is much less onerous, while warning becomes a matter of political reassurance rather than such hopelessly unnegotiable ideas as “open skies.” Once the Russians can be brought—by the West or by the Chinese—to see the political advantages of stabilising mutual deterrence, the process of negotiating its components could be very much more rapid than the unhappy history of past negotiations might suggest.

TO THE IDEALISTS who envisage arms control in terms of a sweeping reduction of armaments, the new American school of thought may seem dangerous and repellent. But given the barriers which attempts to negotiate disarmament have met with in the past ten years, they may find it hard to dispute Schelling's logic.

Compared with a *peaceful* world disarmed, schemes to stabilise mutual deterrence are a poor second-best; judged against the prospect of war,

measures to make it less likely may be attractive. This point of view will not appeal to any who believe that war results from the sheer existence of arms and the temptation to use them, or from the influence of militarists in modern society whose prestige increases in proportion to the arms budget, and who believe that distrust is only aggravated by people's acting as though distrust exists.

History shows, it is said, that man cannot live in a world with arms without using them. History rarely shows anything quite that universal; but even granting it, the question is not whether it is asking much of man to learn to live in a world with arms and not to use them excessively. The question is whether it takes more skill and wisdom for man to learn to live in a world with arms and not to use them than it does for man to disarm himself so totally that he can't have war even if he wants it (or can't want it any longer).

If modern social institutions are capable of achieving disarmament in the first place, and of avoiding arms races in perpetuity thereafter, perhaps they are capable of supporting a world with arms without war. Those who argue that peace with arms is impossible but act as though peace and disarmament are not, may be using a double standard.

*Alastair Buchan*

## A Great Historian

**Men and Ideas.** By JOHAN HUIZINGA. *Eyre & Spottiswoode.* 25s.

TO A YOUNG student who began to study history in the years that followed the first World War the appearance in English in 1924 of Johan Huizinga's *Waning of the Middle Ages*, published in Holland five years earlier, came as a revelation and a delight. Here was a book which suddenly, with a charm of presentation and with a clarity of insight that was at once convincing, made sense of the puzzling and confusing period when what we call the Middle Ages passed into what we call the Renaissance. Huizinga knew that he was breaking new ground, that his conception of cultural history as the portrait of an age opened up a new field of historical interpretation. His desire was to paint the picture of an age; and, as Mr. Hoselitz acutely suggests in the introduction to the book now under review, the *Waning of the Middle Ages* may be likened to one of the great canvasses of the brothers Van Eyck. All the details

are there, lovingly depicted, the shepherds and angels, the kings and sages, the fools, the burghers, the maidens and the clerics; yet the central theme remains clear and dominant. It is a simile that Huizinga would have liked, for he believed that an age is best understood by a study of its finer forms of self-expression.

Little else of Huizinga's work has been translated into English. We must therefore be grateful for this English edition of some of his more important lectures and articles. (The Americans beat us to it; the collection was made and translated for Meridian Books, and published in New York a year ago.) The collection contains three essays on general history, four on the Middle Ages, and four on the Renaissance. The first article is the most important of all; for in it Huizinga defines the path of cultural history as he sees it, and states the standards by which he would wish historical writing to be judged. His own work should be seen in this light. There were five points which ought in his opinion to be kept in mind.

1. History suffers from the defect that the issues are insufficiently formulated. Historians too seldom know what they are looking for. The discipline of history is an objective spirit, a form of understanding the world, which exists only in the minds of countless people taken together, and of which even the greatest scholar has received only a spark. Any impulse towards the past is therefore to be commended. The justification of the researcher in detail lies not in the preparatory nature of his work, but deeper, in the living contact of his mind with the small but vital truths of the past. The digging itself develops historical insight; it demands analysis. But to begin an analysis there must already be a synthesis in the mind. The material itself only yields history once questions are put to it. The point of departure for sound historical research must be the aspiration to know a specific thing well. Where no clear question is put, no knowledge will give response.

2. The theory of evolution is of little use in the study of history and is often obstructive. Evolution is of service in understanding certain clearly delimited phenomena; it can be of help in history in the study of institutions or commercial forms or state agencies, or in the history of science and technology. But it is useless when we come to philosophy and religion, literature and art. Historical phenomena cannot be turned into organisms with inherent tendencies that give direction to their evolution. They cannot be isolated from their environment. There are no closed historical organisms. Even causality cannot be treated as strictly closed; it always depends on an understanding of contexts.

3. Culture suffers if history falls into the