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Why the U.S. Occupation is Faring Better in Iraq

By Patrick Cockburn

Some 19 U.S. soldiers were killed in December 2007, the lowest number of American military fatalities in a single month since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. As recently as May this year, 135 U.S. soldiers were shot dead or blown up by Iraqi guerrillas.

The fall in U.S. casualties was one of the most surprising events of 2007. At the beginning of the year, the U.S. occupation in Iraq seemed to be clinging on by its fingertips, as more and more of the country came under the control of Sunni and Shia warlords. Twelve months later, U.S. units were peaceably patrolling districts of Baghdad, where once they faced ambushes at every street corner.

Viewed from the White House, events in Iraq seem to be one of the few optimistic developments in the series of crises facing the U.S. in the central core of the Islamic world, as the fragility of the U.S. position is underlined by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, one of its main allies, in Pakistan.

Iraqis and the outside world are equally perplexed as to what this means. Are we seeing the beginning of the end of the fighting in Iraq, a conflict, which has now gone on for longer than World War I? Or is it a lull in the violence that is bound to end because Shia, Sunnis, Kurds and Americans are as divided as ever?

Significant changes have taken place in Iraq in the last twelve months. The most important is that part of the Sunni Arab community, the core of the insurgency against the U.S. occupation, has changed sides and is now fighting al-Qaeda in alliance with the U.S. military. This dramatic switch in allegiance occurred primarily because the Sunni Arabs, only 20 per cent of Iraq's population, were being

Hogwash

Fecal Factories in the Heartland

By Jeffrey St. Clair

I grew up south of Indianapolis, on the glacier-smoothed plains of central Indiana. My grandparents owned a small farm, whittled down over the years to about 40 acres of bottomland, in some of the most productive agricultural land in America. Like many of their neighbors, they mostly grew field corn (and later soybeans), raised a few cows, and bred a few horses.

Even then farming for them was a hobby, an avocation, a link to a way of life that was slipping away. My grandfather, who was born on that farm in 1906, graduated from Purdue University and became a master electrician, who helped design RCA's first color TV. My grandmother, the only child of an unwed mother, came to the U.S.A. at the age of 13 from the industrial city of Sheffield, England. When she married my grandfather, she'd never seen a cow. A few days after the honeymoon, she was milking one. She ran the local drugstore for nearly 50 years. In their so-called spare time, they farmed.

My parent's house was in a sterile and treeless subdivision about five miles away, but I largely grew up on that farm: feeding the cattle and horses, baling hay, bush-hogging pastures, weeding the garden, gleaning corn from the harvested field, fishing for catfish in the creek that divided the fields and pastures from the small copse of woods, learning to identify the songs of birds – a lifelong passion.

The farm, which had been in my mother's family since 1845, was in an unalterable state of decay by the time I arrived on the scene in 1959. The great red barn, with its multiple levels, vast hayloft and secret rooms, was in disrepair; the grain silos were empty and rusting ruins; the great beech trees that stalked the pasture hollowed out and died off, one by one,

winter by winter.

In the late 1960s, after a doomed battle, the local power company condemned a swath of land right through the heart of the cornfield for a high-voltage transmission corridor. A fifth of the field was lost to the giant towers, and the songs of red-wing blackbirds and meadowlarks were drowned out by the bristling electric hum of the power lines.

After that, the neighbors began selling out. The local dairy went first, replaced by a retirement complex, an indoor tennis center, and a sprawling Baptist temple and school. Then came a gas station, a golf course and a McDonalds. Then two large subdivisions of upscale houses and a manmade lake, where the water was dyed Sunday cartoon blue.

When my grandfather died from pancreatic cancer (most likely inflicted by the pesticides that had been forced upon him by the ag companies) in the early 1970s, he and a hog farmer by the name of Boatenright were the last holdouts in that patch of black-soiled land along Buck Creek.

Boatenright's place was about a mile down the road. You couldn't miss it. He was a hog farmer, and the noxious smell permeated the valley. On hot, humid days, the sweat stench of the hogs was nauseating, even at a distance. In August, I'd work in the fields with a bandana wrapped around my face to ease the stench. How strange that I've come to miss that wretched smell.

That hog farm along Buck Creek was typical for its time. It was a small operation with about 25 pigs. Old man Boatenright also ran some cows and made money fixing tractors, brush hogs and combines.

Not any more. There are more hogs than ever in Indiana, but fewer hog

overwhelmed by the Shia, the branch of Islam to which 60 per cent of Iraqis belong.

The U.S. and British armies have examined many past guerrilla wars, looking for parallels, which might prove useful in combating the Iraqi insurgency. British generals were once particularly keen on proudly citing their actions in Malaya and Northern Ireland as providing rich experience in anti-guerrilla warfare. Most analogies were highly misleading. "Basra was the exact opposite of Northern Ireland and Malaya," a British officer told me in exasperation. "In the latter we were supported by the majority communities while we fought the Roman Catholic and Chinese minorities. In southern Iraq our main problem is that we had no real local allies."

The Americans suffer from a similar problem in central Iraq. Outside Kurdistan, it is difficult to find an Iraqi who supports the U.S. occupation for more than tactical reasons.

Seldom mentioned for obvious reasons is the one recent anti-guerrilla war, which has many similarities to that being fought by the U.S.A. America in Iraq. This is Russia's successful re-conquest of Chechnya between 1999 and the present.

In a similar way to al-Qaeda in Iraq,

the Islamic fundamentalists in Chechnya, invariably called Wahabi, played an increasingly central role in the armed resistance to the Russian forces. But the savagery of their fighters alienated many anti-Russian Chechens and eventually split the insurgency. I remember being astonished that Chechen human rights workers, who usually denounced Russian atrocities to me, were prepared to cooperate with the Russian army to attack the Wahabi. Often, their motive was a blood feud against a Wahabi commander who had killed their relatives.

The parallels between Iraq and Chechnya should not be carried too far. The U.S.A. has effectively raised a

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Sunni militia force, which may soon total 100,000 men, many of them former insurgents. They are armed and paid for by the U.S. but regard the Shia-Kurdish government with deep suspicion. Many Sunni commanders speak of taking on the Shia militia, the Mehdi Army, which has been stood down by its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr.

It is a bizarre situation. One experienced Iraqi politician told me that al-Qaeda in Iraq, which never had much connection with Osama bin Laden's organization, had effectively split last year. A sign of this was when somebody betrayed the location of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to the U.S. military, which bombed his hideout and killed him. Some of the so-called "Concerned Citizens" militiamen, now on the U.S. payroll, are former al-Qaeda fighters, though the U.S. is still holding hundreds of men in dire conditions in Guantanamo, accusing them of being associates of al-Qaeda.

The U.S.A. has had real operational successes on the ground in Iraq in the last year, but there is little sign yet of Iraq being pacified. Local warlords in Sunni

areas have switched from attacking U.S. forces to working with them, but they might easily switch back tomorrow. As with the British in Basra, the Americans lack long-term allies who can stand on their own feet without U.S. assistance. The war could rekindle easily enough. The Shia will never accept their political dominance being eroded by a U.S.-backed Sunni resurgence. Iran has eased off its support for Shia militias, but it will likewise want to keep the Shia religious parties in power and make sure that Iraq will never become a potential platform for a U.S. attack on Iran.

This is one of the dangers of the continuing U.S. presence. The longer it goes on, the more the government of Iraq becomes incapable of existing without U.S. support. The government in the Green Zone is a hothouse plant, which would wither and die without the American military presence. Although Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki complains about the way in which the U.S. controls the Iraqi army, he makes little practical effort to move out of the Green Zone or establish his practical independence. The U.S. may say that it will leave when the Iraqi government can stand on its own two feet, but the continuing occupation makes sure that day does not come.

Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are very different countries, but they are the terrain in which President Bush chose to test the United States' status as a superpower. They are also countries where it is difficult to win a decisive victory because power is so fragmented. Successes often turn out to be illusory or exaggerated. For instance, the Taliban was so swiftly overthrown in 2001 because the local warlords, whom the Taliban had bribed or intimidated into supporting it, found that the U.S. offered bigger bribes and its bombers were more intimidating. They changed sides once again, though very few of them went out of business.

The same is true of Iraq today. Iraqi parties, movements and communities have an extraordinary ability to withstand outside pressure. Most of them survived Saddam Hussein and are not going to buckle under anything the U.S. can do to them. CP

Patrick Cockburn's forthcoming book, *Muqtada! Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia revival and the struggle for Iraq*, will be published by Scribner in April 2008.

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The Cassandra Industry

By Alexander Cockburn

Many on the left spent a good deal of 2007 predicting that a U.S. attack on Iran was imminent. Their confidence in this prophecy was absolute. They used the word “will,” as opposed to the mealy-mouthed, timorous “might”. Some of them confidently asserted that the Bush administration would accompany this onslaught with the imposition of martial law in the United States and the suspension of elections in 2008.

The anticipatory fever was fanned by bulletins from Seymour Hersh in the *New Yorker*, disclosing supposed plans for shock-and-awe bombings of Iranian nuclear labs and test facilities, along with assertions that U.S. special forces were already active inside Iran’s borders. The London *Sunday Times* told its readers that the Israelis were poised to drop nukes.

Such alarums have been a staple of the Internet over two years. Here’s a fairly typical report from December 2005, from a seasoned doomsayer, Michael Chossudovsky, on the Global Research site:

“The launching of an outright war using nuclear warheads against Iran is now in the final planning stages.

“Coalition partners, which include the U.S., Israel and Turkey are in ‘an advanced stage of readiness’. Various military exercises have been conducted, starting in early 2005. In turn, the Iranian Armed Forces have also conducted large-scale military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf in December in anticipation of a U.S. sponsored attack.

“Since early 2005, there has been intense shuttle diplomacy between Washington, Tel Aviv, Ankara and NATO headquarters in Brussels... Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has given the green light to the Israeli Armed Forces to launch the attacks by the end of March... The U.S.-sponsored military plan has been endorsed by NATO, although it is unclear, at this stage, as to the nature of NATO’s involvement in the planned aerial attacks.”

Then, at the start of December 2007, came disclosure of the long-heralded coup, but it was of an unheralded nature.

Sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies contributed to a National Intelligence Estimate [NIE], asserting that Iran stopped trying to build a nuclear weapon in 2003, thus flatly contradicting Bush and Cheney’s clamorous invocation of the Iranian nuclear threat.

One could draw some immediate conclusions. The NIE represented a carefully crafted onslaught on Bush, Cheney and the war party by the intelligence bureaucracies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other institutional opponents of an attack on Iran. For those reluctant to discard long-held confidence in the malign omniscience of the Bush administration, there was the optional theory that Bush and Cheney had decided to ratchet down any war plans and cleared the NIE as a way of getting the administration off the hook. Against this theory one could point to

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the anger of the White House at the CIA, visible in the White House’s fanning of the uproar over the Agency’s destruction of its tapes of CIA torturers in action.

But whatever way one looked at it, the war party and the Israel lobby had clearly sustained a humiliating reversal. Read as a judicious assessment of the balance of forces in the region, rather than as concrete “intelligence” of overheard conversations, the NIE was an acknowledgment of imperial weakness.

Oddly enough, the left doesn’t care for good news – i.e., manifestations of imperial weakness. It prefers the somber monochrome of imperial invincibility. It’s the mindset that fuels the conviction that only the American government could have engineered the successful 9/11/2001 attacks. After brief inspection of news stories about the NIE, the doomsayers sped back to their laptops to reiterate their predictions of an imminent attack on Iran. Remember those dogs in Konrad

Lorenz’s *Man Meets Dog*, who run up and down, day after day, barking at each other through the fence. Finally the fence is removed. After a moment’s hesitation, the dogs continue their drill, patrolling the imaginary fence.

Back on September 9, 2007, Michael Neumann, valued CounterPuncher and author of *The Case Against Israel*, published by CounterPunch Books, dropped me a note at a moment when predictions of a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran were particularly strident. Michael wrote thus:

“Purely for fun, I want to go on record here and say what I’ve said for a couple of years now. The U.S. will never, ever, ever, mount any serious attack on Iran. More than that, I doubt they will mount a single air strike.

“Why? The U.S. is much too weak. This is what the whole West just can’t get into its head. Iran understands this, and it understands that, push come to shove, American policymakers know it too, brave words to the contrary. These days, the U.S. speaks loudly and carries a little stick. That’s why Iran treats the West with contempt.

“The U.S. can no longer even contemplate incurring the causalities that result from fighting an enemy, neither microscopic nor crippled by years of sanctions. America would be utterly unequipped to deal with anything Iran cared to dish out by land, and utterly incapable of protecting oil supplies in all sorts of places Iran could reach. True, much of Iran’s threat advantage has to do with irregular warfare, but only a frat-boy analysis of military capacities would lead anyone to claim that irregular warfare ‘doesn’t count’. Lebanon provided an oblique glimpse of Iranian capacities in this area.

“The hysteria about Iran is the best, most current indication of how left-wing thought is crippled by the same delusions of American power that affect other Americans.”

One could argue that the main purpose of the Bush administration’s thundering about bombing Iran was to indicate to its leaders that the cost of continued arms supplies by Iran to the Shi’ite forces in Iraq would be billions in damage to Iran’s infrastructure by high explosive from US planes and missiles. It’s obvious that those supplies have been curtailed. But beyond that, the weakness is profound. These recent years have been a disaster for the U.S. strategically. CP