

Kazan required, but he wasn't a tenth of the actor Brando was, at least not when Mr. Mumbles was fully engaged in a part.

The young Brando's line readings are as compelling today as when the film was released, especially in his close-up shots. That is where you most notice his habit of looking out past the actor he is talking to as if he were casting in the wind for the words that are always eluding him. Actually, Brando had his lines written on placards and held up by crew members just outside camera range so he could read them while performing. This may seem like self-indulgent laziness; if you watch his performance, however, you will realize it was genius. Rather than making his acting seem awkward as one might suppose, the placarded script makes him seem utterly spontaneous. That is not to say he could not be genuinely spontaneous. Consider that he improvised the better part of a key scene with Eva Marie Saint without knowing in advance he would have to do so. In the park outside Father Barry's church, he talks to Saint, who plays Joey Doyle's sister, Edie. When she drops one of her girlish white knit gloves, an unscripted accident, Saint, as any trained actor would, begins to play through the "mistake," staying in character. She bends to retrieve the glove, but not quite fast enough. Brando gets to it first. Holding it up, he begins to examine it, and then, to Edie's—or perhaps, Saint's—visible annoyance, he pulls it over his own hand. It is an inspired moment—not only because it seems so natural but because it adds such a layer of meaning to the film. This is the moment that Malloy begins to go beyond being physically attracted to Edie. As they talk, he asks her about her attendance at a Catholic col-

lege, and she tells him of her aspirations. Having put on her glove, he is entering her world, her vision of what is important, and, above all, her commitment to uncovering the men who took her brother's life.

Brando could not possibly have foreseen the implications of his split-second reaction to the dropped glove. Indeed, it may never have occurred to him afterward. But he had an uncanny grasp of the theatrical moment. This is the reason he so thoroughly impresses his characters upon us. We cannot turn our eyes from him, because he is at once so instinctive and so controlled, so spontaneous and so deliberate. It is the complexity of Brando's performance in this scene, shot in both medium and tight close-up, that makes us believe in Malloy as the individual who finally refuses to stay submerged in the gang ethos of his corrupted working-class colleagues, the man who stands up for himself and, thereby, everyone else.

Kazan had a political message to deliver; Brando gave us much more. He gave us its breathing, personal incarnation, the principle of hope in our lives, both alone and together.

We should take solace in the formal conservatism of film. It means we do not have to risk a stroke getting exercised by George Clooney's next cinematic lecture. What if Clooney's next film has more to teach us about the rapacity of Americans, the nobility of Middle Eastern sheiks, the decency of communists, the saintliness of Edward R. Murrow? Think of Tyrone Power, and count handsome George's close-ups. If there are enough, relax. It will be the personal, not the political, that viewers remember.

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## Why the Vikings Rejected America

by John Nixon, Jr.

Scouting the suburbs  
Of what was not to become New Scandinavia,  
They slaughtered the welcoming committee  
(A sorry group),  
Used friendly weapons on a few squaws  
(Who couldn't, however, compare  
With the girls of Dublin and Bordeaux)  
And set fire to the town.

Ever try to warm the North Atlantic night  
With a dozen flaming wigwams?  
That was frustrating enough;  
But when they found the local exchequer  
Contained nothing but wampum,  
They hightailed it, highsailed it back  
Across the great pond. All clammed up when  
Interrogated by reporters  
From *The Stockholm Rune*.

# Unification Issues in Asia

## Rethinking U.S. Policy

by Edward A. Olsen

The United States' strategic policies toward Europe and the regions of Asia—East, South, Southeast, and Central—have often reflected the prevailing cultural ethnocentrism of most Americans, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. For example, Europe and Asia are routinely defined as separate “continents,” even though they are obviously parts of the same land mass. Given American concerns about the uncertainties associated with the rise of China as a competitor, Russia's increased geopolitical assertiveness, and the European Union's struggle to develop a pan-national identity, there are growing reasons for the United States to pay careful attention to the balance of power among the different parts of what really is a Eurasian continent. While most Americans are inclined to play their European cards in this strategic game (as they should), a strong argument can be made that the United States should pay more attention to the Asian subregions of the Eurasian continent in order to increase our ability to foster a better balance of power among them. This will, in turn, enhance the United States' position in global affairs.

Since the late 19th century, U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Asia-Pacific region have been dominated by American concerns about regional stability and rivalries. The United States was involved in several major wars—notably, the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902); the Pacific theater of World War II from Pearl Harbor to the atomic-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the Korean War, from 1950 to its armistice in 1953, followed by decades of armed deterrence; and the Vietnam War. As important as all of these wars were, both when waged and in terms of their legacy for U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region, overall, the U.S. role in the region was shaped by the ability of regional states to cope with one another and with external pressures from hegemonic Western powers. These pressures ranged from formal European empires exploiting their colonies to Soviet communists claiming to spread anti-imperial Marxist harmony—and Americans coping with both of these over time in the name of guiding the spread of liberty, democracy, and capitalism.

U.S. policies toward Asia—as well as the policies of the European Union's member states and of Russia toward Asia—have had to contend with the problems caused by territorial frictions. Three places in Asia continuously cope with the

problems associated with the division of their formerly united ethnic region. Two of them remain major contentious issues: Korea's division into the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK); and the two states that are formally identified as China—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The third is the former state of the Indian subcontinent that separated into two major states after the British Empire withdrew in 1947—India and Pakistan (East and West)—and into three states after the two sides of Pakistan waged war, yielding Pakistan and Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971. Today, there is little expectation that the Indian subcontinent will unify as one nation-state. India and Pakistan remain deadlocked over who owns Kashmir.

There is much expectation concerning the peaceful reunification of Korea. This is not to suggest that there is no longer serious concern about the possibility of renewed warfare between the two Koreas, which would likely result in North conquering and absorbing South. Nor have worries disappeared about a North Korean implosion or explosion scenario leading to a weak and vulnerable united Korea. Both Koreas share these worries and desire the means to negotiate a resolution of their problems. If such a resolution becomes more plausible over time, it is likely that the PRC and Russia will try to play a constructive role. Even Japan, hampered by her imperial legacy in Korea and by concerns about what a unified and strong Korea might contemplate doing *vis-à-vis* Japan and Japanese relations with Korea's other neighbors, is pragmatically adjusting to the possibility that a unified Korea may be on the horizon.

Although Washington could and should be doing far more than it is presently to support Korean efforts to reunify, U.S. policy is quietly adjusting to the possibility that the two Koreas may be able to work out their differences. This approach was underscored by a front-page article in the *Wall Street Journal* (July 9) outlining U.S. efforts to encourage the two Koreas to prepare for a formal end of the Korean War to replace the long-standing armistice. The United States has adapted to these circumstances, in part, because the potential for China becoming a *de facto* broker for Korean negotiations is serious—despite Beijing's concerns that a unified Korea could cause problems for China by seeking to reclaim territory in far northeastern China across the Yalu River where an ancient Korean kingdom—Koguryo—had its roots. The more that issue gains traction, the more reason China has to play a constructive role with the two Koreas so that they will become grateful for China's assistance and obligated not to cause post-unification problems for China.

For Beijing to help Seoul and Pyongyang resolve their differences while the PRC and ROC remain divided would be so awkward that it could conceivably yield one of two undesirable

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