

Since the European Union allows the free and unlimited movement of peoples among member states, the admission of Turkey would be a disaster for Europe. Millions of Turks, including Islamic extremists who would use Turkey as a conduit, could then move freely into any of the 25 European member-states. Under E.U. law, Europeans would be unable to stop this invasion of their homelands.

Already, the Turkish military has returned to the Balkans, if only with a symbolic presence, for the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In 1994, as a result of pressure from the Clinton administration, the United Nations agreed to deploy 1,500 Turkish troops in Bosnia despite objections from Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. Turkish troops have also been deployed to Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

Most revealing was the justification officially given by the "secular" government of Turkey for its interventions. Appealing to both irredentism and Islamic fundamentalism, it declared: "Turkey is [the] spiritual and cultural inheritor of the Ottoman Empire which had ruled the region for centuries." This neo-Ottomanism was institutionalized in the Southeastern European Cooperation Process, the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative.

U.S. foreign policy seeks to deny the legitimacy of European nation-states. Gen. Wesley Clark, former commander of NATO, declared that "There is no place in modern Europe for ethnically pure states. That's a 19th century idea and we are trying to transition into the 21st century, and we are going to do it with multi-ethnic states."

Paraphrasing Marxist theory on the withering away of the state, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott decreed (in a speech delivered in 1999) that

The old Westphalian system of nation-states — each sovereign exercising supreme, absolute, and permanent national authority — is giving way to a new system in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their neighborhoods to make a virtue out of porous borders and intertwined economies and cultures.

Our foreign policy also acts to undermine European nation-states by creating a series of Muslim states in the Balkans, the

"Green Highway" linking Turkey to the heart of Europe. This has the further advantage of crippling Orthodox Christianity, an ideological threat to U.S. "benevolent global hegemony," by devastating and fragmenting the Balkans, an historic homeland of Orthodoxy, through wars, sanctions, and military occupation.

It started with Bosnia. Although Christian Croats and Serbs constitute 51 percent of the population of Bosnia, their right to national self-determination — for their areas to secede from Bosnia as Bosnia had seceded from Yugoslavia — was vehemently opposed by the Clinton administration. The U.S. government entered into *de facto* alliances with Islamic jihadists, Iran, Afghan *mujahideen*, and Lebanese Hezbollah to arm Bosnian Muslims, in violation of a U.N. arms embargo, to preserve a united and Muslim-dominated Bosnia in the heart of the Balkans.


Next was Kosovo. Here, Washington reversed its position on political legitimacy: In Bosnia, it was multiethnic statehood; in Kosovo, it became national self-determination. The Clinton administration, in alliance with the KLA, an Albanian paramilitary listed by the State Department as a terrorist organization, engineered a war in Kosovo as well as the expulsion of 200,000 Serbs and the destruction of their homes, churches, convents, and monasteries.

The stage was set for Macedonia. Replicating their successful war in Kosovo, the U.S. government and the KLA won Albanian "autonomy" in Western Macedonia. Next on the list for "liberation" are southern Montenegro, southern Serbia, and northwestern Greece.

It does not end there. Turkey, asserting its neo-Ottoman prerogative, claims to be the protector of Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece and, by implication, to have a right to intercede on their behalf. In pursuit of empire, Washington embraces neo-Ottomanism as it seeks to impose an Islamic ascendancy over parts of the Balkans.

Empires are expensive and ephemeral. It is madness to acquire them. Yet that is the objective of U.S. foreign policy. It is madness to punish allies and reward enemies, for that imperils our national security. Our foreign policy validates Euripides: "Whom the gods destroy, they first make mad."

Joseph E. Fallon writes from Rye, New York.



## Global Democracy, Ideology, Empire

by Joseph R. Stromberg

Today, as state-sponsored American corporatism is being extended around the globe, we are witnessing a gross overproduction of official ideology — the rhetoric of human rights, democracy, and free trade — which conceals some sordid realities. With the state replacing God as the source of all values, human rights and democracy have become key justifying themes for our overseas activities. There is a growing din of criticism regarding the human-rights shortcomings of other states, and many even suggest that the right to live in a democracy is universal and must be enforced.

Democracy as an item for political export is not entirely new. During World War I, following the lead of President Woodrow Wilson, the Cleveland Americanization Committee called for "carrying democracy . . . to all peoples . . . in order that the world may have a greater industrial, educational, economic, and political freedom."

For insights into global democracy, we may turn first to political scientist William I. Robinson, who crossbreeds world-system theory with Gramscian Marxism. Under globalization, he writes, "capitalist production relations are displacing . . . all residual pre-capitalist relations." How this is coming about is significant: The new order "is unfolding" under the aegis

of U.S. power. This has involved a practical change of strategy.

U.S. policymakers once employed local strongmen, writes Robinson, to ensure “U.S. and core access to the raw materials, markets, and labor power of the Third World.” Now, democracy—“an essentially contested concept”—takes center stage, while U.S. policy actually fosters “polyarchy,” in which “a small group actually rules and mass participation . . . is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed.”

In fact, for builders of sheer state power, democracy has been a happy discovery. People who believe that they “are the government” do not threaten states. As Robinson notes, “consensual domination” has advantages, including greater legitimacy won through “ideological co-optation.” Coercion still exists but seems more acceptable, and domination becomes “transnational.” Thus, polyarchy is stable, with the popular role “limited to the right to vote,” with “no legitimate mechanisms between elections for holding elected officials accountable . . . since accountability is defined as nothing more than the holding of elections.”

The Reagan administration set up Project Democracy in 1981, but the decision had a long prehistory. The notion of stable overseas control through “democracy” came near the end of long-running Cold War debates among American political scientists and policymakers. The point was to foster modernization and nation-building as antidotes to communism.

In the 1970’s, Samuel Huntington took the authoritarian side, while William Douglas championed polyarchy. As Robinson observes, “Douglas held that Third

World nations required ‘tutelage,’ ‘regimentation,’ and ‘social control,’ but that ‘democracy’ could achieve these goals more effectively than authoritarianism.” From this premise came the invention of U.S. “political aid.” Accordingly, Washington now bankrolls, advises, and trains “political parties, trade unions, business groups, mass media, and civic organizations.” The new approach “is more sophisticated than earlier forms of intervention.” Its Gramscian purpose is thoroughly to “penetrate not just the state, but civil society . . . and *from therein* exercise control over popular mobilization and mass movements.”

The U.S. government already organizes its own civil society—“including U.S. business groups, branches of the AFL-CIO, the Democratic and Republican parties, and other private and quasi-governmental civic groups.” Outwardly private, these sectors are

intermeshed with branches of the formal state apparatus through a variety of mechanisms, including interlocking directorates, joint decision-making processes, and private dependency on government funds.

The United States can use these bodies overseas to “support existing groups, or create new groups . . . in the civil society of the target country, in synchronization with U.S. state operations at the level of political society.” Initiatives include “education and training, institution building, social projects, information dissemination, visitor exchanges, political action, and so forth.” Using tools from its own captive civil society, the U.S. government undertakes the thorough colonization of *entire societies*.

In the Philippines, the United States worked with youth clubs, women’s groups, the National Movement for Free Elections, and so on to bring down the Marcos dictatorship. This operation successfully both defined and restricted “the anti-Marcos movement.” In Nicaragua, the United States kept the Contras in play while inventing “an internal ‘moderate’ opposition . . . organized and trained through large-scale U.S. political-aid programs . . . to undermine Sandinista hegemony.”

While policymakers tried out the new strategy, other players deepened the theory. In *The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and International Order*, Nicolas Guilhot tracks the genealogies of human

rights and export-worthy democracy. He subjects the bearers of the new consensus to the rigors of the sociology of knowledge. He detects an emergent ideology of global mercantilist republicanism whose high-minded patricians aspire to fix the world’s problems.


After the Soviet implosion, American leaders determined to drag smaller states into a New World Order. Announcing new “global standards,” they decided that democracy had “become a commodity that can be exported.” Weighing the claim that pure democratic idealism, unattached to any wider agenda, is sweeping the planet, Guilhot traces such claims back to the anti-Stalinist Old Left.

He begins in the early Cold War, when math-prone social scientists—behaviorists, modernization theorists, “cyborg” scientists (with their “rational expectations theory”), and game theorists, supported by the usual foundations—began serving the American state. In this mixed environment, ex-Trotskyists proved skillful at outflanking Cold War rivals. For the ex-Trots, “democracy” became an ethical end instead of a means. Seymour Martin Lipset (for one) re-fiddled social class, concluding that, as Americans were already egalitarians, and given the welfare state, “middle class” democracy *was* the revolution. Overseen by non-ideological managers, America embodied history’s goal, fulfilling sundry prophecies and giving post-Marxist social theory a new historical ending.

Application of modernization theory to the war in Vietnam served to undermine the theory. Thereafter, the Ford Foundation subsidized certain Latin Americanists, hoping the latter could accurately describe the Third World’s structural problems. These scholars, as quasi-Marxists, dealt with classes, capital, dependency, *etc.* They studied “transitions” to democracy, and their research agenda, once hijacked, proved useful to the gathering project of global democracy.

Meanwhile, under Reagan, Cold War leftists, who had derided Jimmy Carter’s “human rights” initiatives, deployed their own version, which was both counterrevolutionary and revolutionary. So it was that a former CIA publicist for the Contras “supervised the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy” in 1983.

The new line licensed interference with other states’ political forms. Imposing democracy loomed as a “moral crusade.” “[M]oral and disinterested actors”



Elizabeth Wolf

were shaping new global norms. Even the World Bank heard the new gospel of the millennial reign of worldwide corporatism. Quickly converted, it redefined itself as “a normative agency” furthering “political participation, transparency, accountability or the rule of law.”

Guilhot’s work suggests that these themes amount to a state-led paradigm shift, in which neoconservatives were both medium and message.

Antiwar journalist Jonathan Schell observes that, while some “civil society” movements away from authoritarian rule got *themselves* going in the 70’s and 80’s, things have changed:

Civil society groups in the more prosperous societies began to lend welcome assistance in poorer ones. But governments also joined in. Unlike private civil groups, governments are in their nature interested in power, and the civil society movements clearly exercised it.

Schell mentions the National Endowment for Democracy and some of the usual NGOs.

John Laughland, writing in the *Guardian* (May 19, 2005), notes that, because “President Karimov of Uzbekistan is presented as a pro-US tyrant,” liberal journalists want him out. They fail to see

that Uzbekistan is home to precisely the same network of US-funded non-governmental organisations, human rights activists and media outlets that helped to engineer pro-US ‘revolutions’ in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

Liberal critics of the “pro-US tyrant” thus miss the core of U.S. strategy—namely, “to try to *support and control all sides* in any political equation.” In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are

scores of western-backed NGOs that agitate politically for the opposition. . . . Freedom House—a notorious CIA front and the main architect of the orange revolution in Ukraine—has an office in Tashkent.

Laughland concludes that to anticipate

anything other than the consolidation of American power in this strategically crucial region near Chi-

na’s border is to fail to understand how much US foreign policy under the neocons owes to the theory of permanent revolution.

In this fashion, the soft revolutions firm up President Bush’s own Warsaw Pact. Perhaps Uzbeks, Ukrainians, *etc.*, will be happier under U.S.-NATO stooges (rather than Russian stooges), but mentioning the fact of NATO stooge-hood should not be scandalous; nor does it seem wrong to ask precisely how the U.S. Constitution authorizes the current struggle.

And here is the genius of the new “democratic” strategy: By colonizing the “target’s” entire civil society, U.S. influence is meant to become not only stable but permanently rooted. It is indeed handy to have a lock on both government and opposition in any country. Our rulers have aspired to this at home since the 1890’s and finally perfected it after World War II. Give the people few choices, and no “bad” choices—such as “isolationism”—are made.

I begin by observing that U.S. policymakers want what they have always wanted: access to every possible foreign market on agreeable terms—*i.e.*, open-door imperialism.

Robinson thinks that this has all been about money and profits from the very beginning. He must believe that “capitalism” already includes modern states, cruise missiles, WMDs, and everything deplorable as parts of the capitalist superstructure. But what if we are witnessing, instead, the globalization of the U.S. state apparatus? In this light, globalization is political-economic control, with “stealth and lethality” thrown in for the

overgrown Boy Scouts; it is also about justifying ideology, humanitarian meddling, and reconstruction; finally, for some, it is indeed about ensuring that *certain capitalists*, in a politically ordered corporatist system, make a buck.

If it were really about money, narrowly, we could save time and trouble by sending our checks directly to Halliburton, Bechtel, KBR, various oil companies, and defense contractors. But such a payment plan leaves out the state, depriving bureaucrats, brass hats, and court intellectuals of their “psychic income” from power, prestige, and (yes) loot. They wouldn’t stand for it. And while some capitalists do well, any one of them could, singly, be squashed in the interest of the state or the overall system.

So let us consider that globalization is not about trade. There is trade, a lot of it, but trade is not exactly new. Nor would greater trade and a more complex world capital structure and division of labor, by themselves, need the massive ideological output and state-financial support we see before us. Globalization today seems the overseas march of American corporatism; but it is not mere free trade, and not even “capitalism”—not without some qualifying adjectives. It is, however, profitable for some.

Thus, the claim that U.S. leaders are fulfilling History’s Will serves some practical realities. Today’s fighting faith fast approaches full-blown “non-recognition of reality,” as imperial planners wield abstractions about human rights, democracy, and “democratic peace.” The last item asserts that, democracies being peaceful, peace would reign if democracy were universal; hence, whatever

## LIBERAL ARTS

### DEVIL WORSHIPERS OF TITICACA DON’T WEAR TIES

“In the ancient temple of a lost civilization far from the capital, Evo Morales will ask Andean gods for help and guidance Saturday on the eve of his inauguration as Bolivia’s first Indian president.

“Tens of thousands of people are expected to converge on the archaeological remains of the Tiawanacu civilization that flourished around 5,000 B.C. near the shores of Lake Titicaca, 40 miles outside of La Paz. . . .

“In another proletarian touch, Morales—who will be surrounded by dignitaries and heads of state dressed in suits and ties—plans to wear something more casual, although details have not been revealed.

“‘Most Bolivians don’t wear a tie and I’m part of this majority,’ said Morales, who wore the same striped sweater to meet presidents and royalty on his preinaugural world tour. ‘It would bother me, it’s so tight around your neck I would feel like I was being hung.’”

—from “*Morales to Seek Blessing From Andean Gods*,”  
*the Associated Press* (January 21)

speeds this outcome is justified, including wars and subversion. Adding to this, the United States—inspired by the British record—must selflessly provide much-needed “global collective goods.”

It becomes hard to track all the allies, satraps, imperial collaborators, NGOs, U.S.-trained “local” civic groups, p.r. flacks, World Bank fixers, civilian contractors, *etc.*, but rest assured that they help structure that special “free market” that arises *spontaneously* after the United States bombs and invades, removing pre-existing obstacles to free growth.

Earlier aspirants to the job, even the Soviets, were more modest, whereas U.S. planners believe they *can* have it all. Where foreign states stand athwart the millennium, they will have to be fixed. Washington has “fixed” its opponents—from Native Americans and Confederates to Philippine “insurrectionists.” Such words as *reconstruction* routinely fall from U.S. policymakers’ lips. Currently, one historian advises the Pentagon on “reconstructing” Iraq, while granting that it did not work in the South!

Under the new doctrines, America must furnish bourgeois-democratic revolutions where they have failed to appear. This resembles Trotskyism, mi-

nus some stages, but looks equally like Schlesinger’s and Rostow’s Cold War liberalism; from another angle, it could be Chicago School law and economics, with the United States as common-law judge, fighting “excessive” transaction costs with cruise missiles and commandos and adjusting global property titles to maximize social efficiency, utility, and growth. Here the policymakers follow, unwittingly, Karl Polanyi, who, holding that markets had been imposed by force, opposed markets. U.S. leaders accept the premise, claim to love markets, and are willing to provide the force.

Before crusading for democracy, perhaps we should assess that form of rule. Experience of it so far—here, in Canada, and elsewhere—is hardly inspiring. For John Lukacs, it simply disguises the rule of standing bureaucracies. Pareto, if he were here, would have to speak of “pluto-demo-bureaucracy.” And if most conflicts arise *within* the “extended state”—*i.e.*, the formal state apparatus plus all the interests allied with it—we begin to grasp the old Marxist swindle: The state “withers away,” but only because all *distinction* between state and society disappears as the state becomes omnipresent.

It is the role of ideology to articulate

interests. And what is the ideology of modernity? It is the modern state itself. There is even a team of sociologists (Boli, Meyer, Ramirez, and Thomas) who specialize in making this point. Under current U.S. doctrine, states must be proper ones, trained, financed, and certified by U.S. overlords. Accordingly, today’s ideological discourses are mostly about what the American state is, does, and wants. Power begets power and those who praise it.

U.S.-led world revolution is the ideology and practice of “late” American statism rather than “late capitalism.” Even the supposed postmodern “erasure” of the inside and the outside—domestic *versus* foreign—rests on an accumulation of specific decisions made by specific political actors. It is also the role of ideology to make the contingent and willed seem inevitable.

Only a great disaster could discourage the practice and dampen the regnant ideology. Even disaster might not be enough. The armed Emersonians have shown a lot of staying power.

*Joseph R. Stromberg is an independent historian and writer.*

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
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# Can't Get No Satisfaction

An enlightened colleague recently asked me what I thought of director Ang Lee's film *Brokeback Mountain*. When I told him I thought it a dreary, sappy soap opera, he smiled pityingly as if he had checkmated me in three moves. "I knew you wouldn't like it," he chirped. He, of course, had liked it very much, as any decent, in-step liberal would. Rather than get into a fruitless discussion, I got off the elevator we were sharing a floor earlier than I had intended, thinking, *That does it. Brokeback's off my list of reviewable films. If I say what I think, I'll be charged with homophobia, the crime that dare not speak its name. Who needs it?* Since then, *Brokeback* has won three Academy Awards and proved itself a veritable American phenomenon. *There's no choice*, I decided. *It must be addressed.*

As I sat down to compose my thoughts, however, I was still hesitant. I have had many homosexual acquaintances and friends, some quite close, over the years. Four have been lost to AIDS, including two cousins, all at piteously young ages. Many of these people were and are highly accomplished individuals, men and women you could and can rely on for their perceptive assessment of current events and their willingness to support you in times of need. I had decided long ago I had no business commenting on what they did in their homes. I had no wish to give offense to people I admired and respected by prattling on moralistically about how inadvisable I found the homosexual lifestyle. Given all this, *Brokeback* posed a serious difficulty. How could I inoffensively say that I think Lee's adaptation of Annie Proulx's clueless *New Yorker* short story a sanctimonious bore? Wouldn't it be unkind to say that I think it panders embarrassingly to the homosexual activism currently shaping America's attitudes toward sexual deviance? In a word, I was stuck.

Then stage and screen actor Nathan Lane came to my rescue.


Lane has never hidden that he is homosexual, and, when he appeared recently on the *Today* show, he drew on his personal experience of the homosexual lifestyle to mock Lee's film for the sentimental twaddle it is. A précis of the movie will put his remarks in context.

The film concerns two young men who take a job herding sheep on a mythical Wyoming mountainside during the summer of 1963. The days are long; the nights, cold; and there is precious little amusement other than boozing. So, after drinking a bit more than usual one night, the aptly named Jack Twist (Jake Gyllenhaal) initiates a surprised Ennis Delmar (Heath Ledger) into the mysteries of anal sex in a pup tent, an activity the film graphically displays just in case we were wondering what it looks like.

The next morning, each denies the obvious. "I'm not queer," says Ennis.

"Neither am I," Jack replies.

Ennis then concludes, "This is a one-shot thing we got going here." Soon, however, they are shooting whenever the urge takes them—which is quite often—whether under canvas or *al fresco*. The one-shot thing turns into a sporadic 20-year affair. Despite being separated by 1,200 miles after they each marry and start families, Jack and Ennis manage to get away once every year for fishing trips during which their reels stay dry while their rods . . . but never mind. While Ennis resigns himself to this periodic arrangement, Jack won't. Soon, he's proposing that they leave their wives and play house together permanently. Ennis nixes the idea, citing his responsibilities to his daughters. When, after 19 years, the now-divorced Ennis still rejects Jack's offer of domestic bliss, his forlorn lover sulks, "I wish I could quit you." But Ennis is immovable. Proulx has saddled her cowboy, improbably enough, with a paralyzing fear. When he was nine, we're to understand, his father showed him the mangled body of a man slaughtered for being a homosexual, a sort of well-meaning object lesson. This experience supposedly traumatized Ennis for his entire life, yet Lee gives it a scant five seconds as if he had decided that to dwell on it longer would risk revealing its essential implausibility. At any rate, it is supposed to have left Ennis in dread of being found out. "This thing gets hold of us the wrong time, the wrong place," he warns Jack, "we're dead." It's just here that Lane came to the rescue. After provoking impolitic giggling among Katie Couric and her



### *Brokeback Mountain*

Produced and distributed

by Focus Features

Directed by Ang Lee

Screenplay by Larry McMurtry

and Diana Ossana

from a story by Annie Proulx

crew by mimicking the lovers' woe-begotten lines, he went on to say,

I thought, "What do you mean the wrong time, the wrong place—like the A&P? You're in the middle of nowhere! Get a ranch with the guy! Stop torturing these two poor women and get a room! What's the problem?"

In a comically inspired moment, Lane nailed it. Get a room and stop bothering everyone else. You're not Cathy and Heathcliff, after all. But this admirable, if amoral, solution will not do for Proulx and Lee. They are committed to believing that homosexual relationships are no different from the heterosexual variety. It follows that same-sex unions are just as emotionally and spiritually binding. To suggest otherwise would be to admit that homosexuals are far more likely than heterosexual men to be opportunistically promiscuous. Proulx and Lee prefer the notion that two homosexual gentlemen would pine for each other like forlorn schoolgirls across two decades of lengthy separations. This strains credulity. Proulx clearly does not understand homosexuality—or male sexuality, for that matter. Lee certainly should, but he has nevertheless followed her lead.

The truth is that sex is a supremely unruly force in men, driving them to all manner of reckless disregard of the propri-