

DEFEND AMERICA NOW

by The Editors

No one today outside the Kremlin—and possibly not there either—knows where Soviet forces will strike next. An attack on Pakistan, in alleged support of an oppressed separatist minority, is one possibility. Intervention in Yugoslavia, by invitation of pro-Moscow elements in the aftermath of President Tito's death, is another. Most menacing of all, an invasion of Iran upon the slightest hint of U.S. military action against the crumbling, lunatic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini is a virtual certainty. And let us not forget that Soviet troops are within striking range of the Iranian oil fields.

Any one of these Soviet moves would constitute a devastating blow to Western security interests, leaving us no reasonable option but to go to war. And that is precisely what we are presently incapable of doing with any hope of success, including an all-out nuclear exchange, which would be a far greater catastrophe to the United States than to the Soviet Union, given the USSR's much wider dispersion of population and production facilities and its incomparable civil defense system.

The fact of the matter is that two decades of progressively lower military expenditures by this country in the interest of a "reordering of priorities" has left us with a defense establishment unable to defend our vital security anywhere outside the Western hemisphere. Add to this a demonstration (in Moscow's eyes) of pusillanimity on the part of our present leaders unmatched by anything since Munich, and it must be clear to the Russians that the time to throw down the gauntlet is *now*, before an alarmed West can bring its heavy economic superiority to bear in a redressing of the military balance.

It is clear that Moscow is positioning itself, militarily and politically, to do just that.

Can anything be done to prevent it? As a practical matter, once the gauntlet is thrown we are lost. We cannot win a war any time this year against the Soviet Union. We must either bow politically or go down in ruins militarily. That is the legacy of two decades of—for all practical purposes—unilateral disarmament.

Our only hope today lies in deterrence. Not in the fatuous academics' doctrine of nuclear deterrence that Robert McNamara bequeathed to us, but in a demonstration of renewed

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will so immediate, so unambiguous, and so massive as to persuade Soviet leaders that the cost to them of military victory would be higher than they care to pay.

For it is reasonable to assume that the Russians are almost as eager to avoid all-out nuclear war as are we. Though they would undoubtedly sustain a lower level of destruction in such a war, that is still only a comparative measure; the lowest conceivable amount of damage they would surely suffer would set their society back by decades.

What then motivates them to offer us the sort of challenge that might impel us to resort to nuclear war? It is their present confidence that the United States would not risk annihilation for the sake of Pakistan or Yugoslavia or Iran—or, for that matter, Western Europe. And that confidence could be shaken if, and only if, the United States moves at once to a

program of rearmament unprecedented in our post-Korean history.

First, we must reinstitute the draft—and this time on a no-exemption basis. Only the severely handicapped among our young men should be excused from military training. The scandal of college deferments must never be repeated in a democratic society.

Second, the President must demand of Congress a supplemental appropriation to the FY 1980 budget large enough to allow us to procure all the matériel that can be produced and all the personnel that can be trained on a crash basis. The services today are desperately undersupplied in virtually every category of their weapons inventory, from tanks and naval vessels down to artillery and rifle ammunition. According to one authoritative report, U.S. forces in

Europe have only enough ammunition for 36 hours of combat. If that is true it must rank as the worst scandal in American military history. To properly equip our forces, we should increase our defense spending to 6 percent of the GNP (we now spend under 5 percent, while the Soviets spend over 12), which would provide approximately 22 billion dollars more for defense in FY 1981 than the amount proposed in the President's new budget.

Third, the administration must restore and accelerate development of new strategic weapons systems—the B-1 bomber, the neutron bomb, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the MX intercontinental missile.

Fourth, the bill for this massive rearmament program must be paid through new taxes, not deficit financing. An income tax surcharge of, say, 10 percent would yield something on the order of 16 billion dollars in the remaining eight months of this fiscal year. A demonstration of willingness on the part of the American people to pay the price of national security will impress Soviet analysts as nothing else can that this is truly a national determination.


Fifth, the President must clean house in his own administration. Not only every one of the swarm of McGovernites who currently infest the State and Defense Departments and National Security Council must be dismissed, but also such top policy makers as State's chief Soviet "expert," Marshall Shulman, still mouthing the witless Henry Wallace platitudes of 1948, and Secretary Vance as well, who, for all his basic decency and patriotism, has never understood the implacable nature of our Russian adversaries.

Sixth, the ABM treaty must be abrogated. As matters now stand, we will have to wait until 1989 for the security then promised by Carter's Rube Goldberg-basing of the MX missile. ABMs promise cheaper and earlier security.

Once these steps are taken President Carter should declare—and will have a chance to be believed—not only that we are committed to the defense of areas vital to our security but that we will not accept a defeat by conventional arms. For it is only when the Soviet leadership comes

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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AT THE *TIMES*

by Tom Bethell

I was glad to see that the Center for Ethics and Public Policy in Washington has published its study of foreign intelligence, *The CIA and the American Ethic*, by Ernest Lefever and Roy Godson. I mention this not because I was briefly involved with the project (the Center in the end decided, no doubt wisely, not to use my somewhat subjective and nonacademic contribution), but because in these times of renewed cold war, the role of the CIA is worth talking about.

My assignment was to examine media coverage of the agency by the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the television networks, which was actually relatively simple until about 1971. Thereafter a rather large army of researchers would have been needed to scrutinize, for bias, the square miles of newsprint dedicated to CIA activities, most of them of a seemingly reprehensible nature. In 1975 in particular the *Times* wrote about almost nothing else for weeks on end.

I had hardly bothered to read these stories, beyond glancing at their headlines, when they first came out. It must have been clear to even the drowsiest of readers in the mid-1970s that the then relentless attack on the CIA told us less about the Agency than about the leadership class that had got us into a war, lost it, and then turned on itself in self-disgust.

Some of these newspaper stories may well have been written by bright, eager young journalists who actually believed that by denigrating the CIA they were building a more glorious future for America by improving its moral standing in the world—the Third World in particular. (I have yet to discover where that benighted place is.) Others were possibly written by journalists with less admirable motives, or so I concluded after winding my way through miles of microfilm.

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Particularly unappetizing—a journalistic nadir of sorts—was a series in the *New York Times* by John Crewdson in late 1977. Following the lead of Carl Bernstein in *Rolling Stone*, he set out to hunt down various individuals (whose existence, but not identity, had earlier been disclosed by CIA Director William Colby) who had over the years maintained a dual role, working for newspapers while maintaining CIA connections of an unspecified nature. Not KGB connections, mind you. The *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and, therefore, the television networks preserved an indulgent silence about the KGB throughout the 1970s. No, let's face it, the intent was to inflict the maximum damage on one's own institutions, one's own country—all in the name of the Nobility and Integrity of the Press.

Crewdson (with additional legwork provided by Joseph Treaster) duly tracked down some of our culprits and published their names. But the names of others were not published. The following explanation for this appeared in an unsigned article in the same series. Let us record that the *New York Times* here unashamedly reassumed the mantle of the House Un-American Activities Committee of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although "a score of these individuals [with CIA ties] have been identified in other articles in this series," the anonymous author wrote, "a dozen others" were not identified be-



cause they had "provided information on a confidential basis." In HUAC language, they had cooperated with the inquiry.

I have never met Crewdson and Treaster, and do not for a minute wish to imply that they are anything other than God-fearing, patriotic Americans who pledge allegiance to the flag every morning at the breakfast table. But it would be nice to know that, in recompense for their brief lapse into McCarthyism, they are busily at work on a series dealing with KGB activities in Washington, not excluding the possibility of KGB contacts with news media personnel in recent years. Perhaps they could enlist the covert support of the Soviet embassy in such a project.

Incidentally, it was interesting to read recently the British accounts of the unmasking of Anthony Blount as the "fourth man," assistant to Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, and Soviet spy. The words "traitor" and "treason" were unashamedly used in print, and they somehow jumped off the page when you read them.

It occurred to me that a similar exposure in the U.S. in recent years would not have elicited such harsh epithets. Of course, the "post-Watergate morality," with its "freedom of information" and climate of "openness in government," has made it unnecessary for anyone harboring anti-American or pro-Soviet sentiments to take the uncomfortable step of actually decamping to Moscow. The pages of the *New York Times* and many other newspapers were flung open, so that one was not obliged to defect in the flesh—merely in print. One could take a stand as an upholder of press freedom, a Jeffersonian, not so much a disliker of America as a lover of the First Amendment. Sometimes I think that all the ballyhoo about openness was nothing more than the groundwork for such camouflage.

But let us say someone *had* been unmasked, in Blount fashion. He would, I think, have most likely been characterized as "an American dissident," just as Philip Agee—the renegade CIA agent whose lifework it has become to publish the names of CIA agents around the world, blowing their covers and subjecting them to the reprisals of the KGB—has on occasion been characterized. To call such a person a "traitor," guilty of "treason," would have raised entirely too many questions as to the existence of an "enemy."

No such doubts arose in the early years of the CIA's existence, as my perusal of the *New York Times*' coverage of the agency disclosed. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the paper's correspondents and editorial writers described the CIA as "America's first line of defense in the Atomic Age" (1948), as a "vital security agency" (Arthur Krock, 1950) with an "enemy" (1954) and "an obvious need for secrecy regarding intelligence operations" (1955, editorial) in the "worldwide fight of democracy against Communism" (1954, editorial-page article). At that time the *Times* even wrote of America's "national destiny," a phrase that one would hardly have expected to find in the paper 20 years later—or today.

By 1972, of course, we were in the throes of losing a war and beginning to conclude that the best way out of the problem was to put up the elaborate pretense that our enemy, the Soviet Union, was really our friend after all. This was called *détente*. Seeing a golden opportunity to exploit the gullibility that weakness had brought in its wake, the Soviets encouraged the deception mightily.

It is worth considering the devastating effects of *détente*, not just on the CIA but on the nation and, perhaps history will conclude, on the world. The essential point about *dé-*

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