

view that any other creature is man's moral superior. Technology, in this view, is the most dangerous of gifts, and the possession of an intellect the gravest of temptations. The Cree share neither of these views. For better, for worse, the Indian recognizes that man has an intellect, and the gravest temptation is to avoid the trouble of using it. Its function is to make distinctions, to perceive realities not immediately at hand, and to try to eliminate the inadvertent.

To the extent that self-styled American environmentalists use their intellects and energies for these purposes, they help on a grand scale to arrive at a fruitful and lasting balance between human life and the capacity of the rest of the biosphere to renew itself. But the movement rarely troubles to make distinctions: It values the furbish lousewort with the porpoise; an insignificant change in air quality seems to it as significant as massive poisoning of the water supply; a change in the shape of a reservoir, now to be used for pumped storage of potential energy, becomes as degrading as the flooding of the Cree's ancient hunting lands.

The movement overlooks what is not at hand. It never considers the inadvertent destruction that results from its restrictions on the acts of others, though it is quick to denounce their inadvertencies. Exploiting to the full the deadly power of delay, the movement has played an elaborate, tricky game with "rehearings," "environmental impact statement" reviews, "hearing reopenings," and tardy requests to expand the lists of intervenors in license proceedings. The devastation of the Cree lands is the indirect result of these graceless procedures.

Finally, it must be emphasized that there is nothing moral or immoral about the natural drive of a species to multiply and to use the natural environment to sustain its membership. It is pointless to expect the human species to recoil in horror from what its members have no reason to feel is bad. But if population growth and relief from hunger, cold, and disease are to be reconciled with nature, the flight from intellectual analysis that distinguishes the real from the trivial threat must somehow be stopped. □

Stephen Rosen

Will We Throw the Arms Race?

Even more than the first SALT agreement, the arms treaty now in prospect will constrain the United States while permitting the Soviet Union to build weapons at full speed.

There is a tendency for intellectuals to base their judgments of strategic weapons and arms-control agreements on what they perceive to be the intentions of the Soviet Union. It is decided, perhaps, that the Soviet leadership has no real desire or need to quarrel with the West, hence a few missiles held in reserve are more than adequate to insure our safety. Or it is divined that Brezhnev intends to attack the West if the cost is thirty million Soviet casualties, but not if the cost is forty million, and therefore we only need weapons sufficient to inflict that higher level of damage. Or it is concluded that the Soviet leadership has a peasant mentality combined with a Bolshevik ideology and thinks it can fight and win a nuclear war; so we need a nuclear war-winning capability.

This tendency is understandable. Intellectuals, after all, think about what the enemy thinks; soldiers think about what he can do. Still, this preoccupation is slightly wide of the mark, if only because the Soviet government has gone to a lot of trouble to make sure we never find out what its intentions are. The intellectual preoccupation with the psychology of our enemy gives the literature on nuclear war and SALT a faint resemblance to the worries of an adolescent girl anticipating her first sexual encounter. Is the man nice? What does he want? If he tries something, what will I do? Both the girl and the intellectual forget that we may begin with honorable intentions, or no intentions at all, and still finish by trying to do what we find we can do. Both forget that how one acts before the crisis has something to do with how much we think we can get away with when push comes to shove.

In terms of our relationship with the Soviet Union, therefore, we should also be concerned with understanding what the objective

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military and political realities on both sides have been, what effect arms control has had on these realities, and what effect the SALT agreement now in prospect is likely to have.

I

Nuclear arms and nuclear arms-control agreements share the objective of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war without spending intolerably large amounts of money. Starting in the late 1950s, the United States took steps to insure that we would always have the ability to retaliate against a nuclear attack. Our bombers were dispersed and kept on alert, our land-based ICBMs were buried in hardened silos, and a large number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were put out to sea. Before the arms-limitations talks began, there was no doubt in anybody's mind that our deterrent was secure. It is an interesting question, therefore, whether the first SALT agreement deserves more praise than the Strategic Air Command. Our weapons, not our diplomacy, may have been the best guardians of our security.

And the cost of this security was not high and rising, but low and declining. From a high point in 1952 of \$32.6 billion (in 1976 dollars), the cost of our strategic forces had come down to \$7.7 billion in 1976. In that year Henry Kissinger said that failure to reach a new agreement would require the United States to spend an additional \$20 billion on weapons over the next five years. To be sure, \$20 billion is a lot of money, but can SALT promise nothing more than a saving of one percent in the annual federal budget? Is that what arms control has to offer?

The first SALT agreement (1972) might have been valuable if the ban on further ICBM silo construction and the limit on anti-ballistic missile defenses (ABM) had prevented a competition in strategic weaponry that would have forced both sides to spend a great deal more money to preserve their deterrent forces. It is true that the ABM Treaty did save us some money. As a direct result of

the treaty, we kept only one ABM site at Grand Forks Air Force Base, dismantled a partially constructed site at Malmstrom AFB, and scrapped the plans for a continental system that would have included ten more sites. The one ABM site we allowed ourselves was removed from operational status in 1976 because it was decided that one site with one hundred interceptor missiles was of relatively little value. Beyond that, the agreement did not materially affect any American weapons program or save us any money. It must be remembered that we could not have spent a lot more money on strategic systems during the treaty period (1972-1977) even if there had been no agreement. There was simply nothing ready to buy. The B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine system, and the M-X mobile ICBM would not have been ready until 1979 at the earliest. Even the speedup actually ordered in the development of the Trident system left the United States without a weapons system that would be ready before 1979. It is therefore incorrect to credit the SALT I agreement with a reduction in military expenditures on offensive systems.

Then did the agreement increase American security or prevent the erosion of the nuclear balance? One could begin by asking whether the agreement constrained Soviet construction of ICBM silos. The Soviet Union had begun construction of hundreds of silos prior to 1969. But between 1969 and the signing of the offensive arms freeze in May 1972, only 80 new silos were begun, although during this period, and indeed afterwards, operational Soviet ICBM strength grew as silos were completed. Why did the Soviets essentially stop all new construction? Would they have started again if there had been no agreement? Putting the question another way, what keeps the Soviet Union from violating their agreement to cease the construction of new silos? Commitment to the principles of *détente* is one explanation. More convincing is their knowledge that additional silo construction would give them little advantage over the United States. Such construction would be detected by the United States and met by programs that would prevent the Soviet Union from gaining any usable superiority. But this logic would constrain the Soviet Union *even if there were no SALT negotiations or agreement*. The Soviet leaders formalized the rough parity in ICBM strength in 1972, and adhered to that agreement, for the same reason they stopped new silo construction in 1969 and would not have renewed it even if there had been no agreement. To suppose otherwise is to suggest that the Soviet leaders believed they could have continued to grind out ICBMs while the United States sat back and did nothing.

In itself, the formal limit on ICBM strength was almost trivial. It was the actual military balance, supported by the political knowledge that the United States would do whatever was necessary to preserve that balance, that stabilized the strategic relationship between the two superpowers around 1970.

But there are stable relationships and stable relationships. Parity can exist when both sides possess roughly equal numbers of ICBMs, but it can also exist while both sides add hundreds of missiles to their forces every year. An agreement would be useful if it established stability at the existing levels instead of permitting a dynamic stability based on an open-ended arms race to continue. Such a competition could begin if American leaders had reason to believe that increases in the Soviet missile force endangered the survivability of our Minutemen, reducing our capacity for assured

retaliation. We would then increase our own forces, prompting a Soviet response, since they might believe that our buildup was aimed at getting a usable superiority.

Did the 1972 accord get us out of this cycle, or keep us from falling into it? It could not have gotten us out of this cycle because we were not in it to begin with. To repeat, both sides had already stopped essentially all new silo construction three years before the agreement was signed. Both sides had hundreds of missiles in silos and submarines, and correctly believed they could afford to relax. The fear of falling dangerously behind was removed by the quality of the weapons in each arsenal, not by diplomacy, and with that fear went the impetus for an arms race. An agreement to freeze our forces was safe because no violation could pose an immediate threat to either side. Because our weapons were hard to destroy, we would have time to take counteraction in the event of a violation, before that violation became dangerous. It was the change in the character of the Strategic Air Command, and not the death of Cold War rivalries, that avoided a competition in silo construction.

In justifying the 1972 accords, Henry Kissinger referred most often to the limit on submarine-based missiles. The Soviet Union, he claimed, was building eight or nine missile-carrying nuclear submarines (SSBNs) a year.

We were building none, and would not be able to do so for seven or eight years. In 1972, the United States estimated that the Soviet Union had 22 modern SSBNs, with 15 more under construction. Unchecked, they could have had over 80 SSBNs by 1977. The agreement limited them to 62 modern SSBNs and 950 SLBMs, and required the retirement of one old (pre-1964) ICBM for every SLBM beyond the 740th. This seemed a genuine achievement. New Soviet SSBN construction would be cut almost in half, even if it were not frozen. It was wondered, however, where the ceiling of 62 SSBNs and 950 SLBMs had come


from. John Newhouse, in his self-designated "definitive" account of SALT, denied that this was a question of great relevance, but acknowledged that "probably no one in government could say for sure [where these numbers had come from] other than Kissinger." Since his book was written with no little cooperation from Kissinger, curiosity, if not suspicion, was aroused.

Five years after the event, the origin of this provision was revealed. Raymond Garthoff, the senior State Department Advisor and Executive Officer at the SALT I negotiations, wrote that

the price for Soviet agreement to include SLBM launchers was to place "limitations" at a very high level—indeed, at the very highest level then estimated that the Soviet Union might deploy in the five-year period of the interim freeze even without any SALT limitation! (Theoretically possible higher SLBM levels for 1977, developed *after* the April Moscow meeting [where the SLBM deal was worked out] were later cited as support for the value of the limitation [emphasis in original].)

In confirmation of Garthoff's claim came a report in the fall of 1977 by columnist William Beecher that the 63rd Soviet SSBN had just been launched, though it was not yet operational. The SALT agreement, it seems, was limited by the Soviet construction schedule, rather than the other way around. This provision was not dangerous, since it did not result in a threat to our retaliatory force. On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to claim that the agreement increased our security or decreased our need to spend money on armaments.

Was it the case, then, that the SALT I agreement was neither



better nor worse than no agreement at all? Its accomplishments can be summed up as follows: an end to ABM deployment, with the attendant financial benefits; and the retirement of 210 old Soviet ICBMs that otherwise would have been modernized or replaced. The agreement did not measurably improve or diminish the quality of our deterrence, at least in the short run. Nor did it end the general competition in strategic arms. Rather, it channeled the arms race, if one wishes to call it such, into directions that were more dangerous, rather than less so.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union must guard against the possibility that its enemy might develop a weapon that could neutralize its strategic forces. As long as that is true, it is unreasonable to demand that arms-control agreements end the search for new weapons, which is the only safeguard either side has against a technological surprise developed by the other. Research and development of new weapons continue, and should not be limited by treaty, because it would be irresponsible for either country to rest the physical safety of its people on an instrument of international law. Yet competition need not be completely anarchistic or unlimited. Agreements can channel energy into the development and deployment of weapons which do not increase the incentives for a surprise attack, or which decrease the destructiveness of war.

Without an agreement in 1972, there probably would have been some sort of competition between the deployment of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and ABMs. The unregulated development of these two systems was potentially dangerous. One MIRVed missile can destroy several ICBM silos, depending on the size and number of the warheads and the accuracy and reliability of the system. Though ABM systems can protect ICBM silos, as well as cities, MIRV technology enables the attacker to multiply cheaply the number of offensive warheads until they outnumber the defensive interceptors. In fact, it is theoretically possible with MIRVs to wipe out the land-based forces of your enemy with just a portion of your missile force, if you attack first. Since a sudden increase in the offensive forces of the Soviet Union might not be detected if they could substitute MIRVed missiles for un-MIRVed ones in silos hidden from reconnaissance satellites, MIRVs were inherently destabilizing.

In this context, several sorts of agreements could have been useful. Paul Nitze has advocated a treaty that would limit both countries to ICBMs too small to carry more than one small warhead. An agreement which limited the deployment of MIRVs and verified it by on-site inspections, but which also allowed ABM deployment, would have encouraged a race between defensive systems, rather than a race between offensive and defensive systems. The winner of this competition would be the country that could best defend its population, thereby reducing the number of civilians who would be killed in a nuclear war.

But the irrational fear of an "arms race" did not give us this kind of agreement. It had been thought that we would build ABM systems, the Soviets would build MIRVs to counteract them, and nobody would be better off. But the consequence of the first SALT agreement was that ABMs were limited, MIRVs were not, and everybody was *worse* off. Nobody expected the agreement to end qualitative improvements (e.g., MIRVs) in the two missile forces, but merely to limit their numbers. Business as usual would likewise have resulted in qualitative improvements, but also in the construction of more silos, perhaps containing the small, cheap missiles advocated by Mr. Nitze (if it would not have produced more silos, what was the advantage of having a formal limit?). More silos would have reestablished some of the stability lost by MIRVs, and made the enemy build more missiles if he still wanted to gain an advantage. Alternatively, the increased danger to our silos would have been countered by the construction of ABM sites protecting our ICBM fields.

Instead, both sides were allowed to develop their offensive capabilities, but not the defensive systems that would have nullified them. As a result, the ICBM forces of both sides became more vulnerable, not less, thereby increasing the incentive to strike first.

Reflection on the first SALT agreement naturally leads us to wonder whether its successor will remedy its weaknesses. A brief recapitulation of the provisions of the new agreement as they have been revealed so far is therefore in order, although we should be aware that all the newspaper accounts of the SALT II terms are based on leaks by both hawks and doves who each have their own political purposes to serve.

1) Both sides would be limited to 2,160-2,250 strategic delivery vehicles—heavy bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs—for a period of eight years. The Soviet Backfire bomber is not included in this limit, although increases in its production may be banned by separate agreement.

2) Both sides would be permitted to deploy 1,320 MIRVed missiles. Heavy bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) would be counted toward this limit. Within that overall limit, there would be sublimits of 820 MIRVed ICBMs and 1,200-1,250 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. These limits would also last eight years.

3) ALCMs would be limited to ranges of less than 2,500 kilometers, while the testing and deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles would be limited to ranges of less than 600 kilometers, all for a period of three years.

4) Heavy ICBM deployment would be held to 308 for a period of eight years.

5) The deployment of new strategic weapons other than tested SLBMs would be banned for three years. It is said that this will ban the deployment of mobile ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-16, which has been tested, produced, and stockpiled in some numbers.

Will this treaty reduce the threat to our ICBMs that was left undiminished, if not actually increased, by SALT I? Let us assume that the limit on MIRVs can be verified by our national technical means, even though the official American position in 1969 was exactly the opposite. The point remains that even if the Soviet Union scrupulously adheres to the agreement, they will be able to deploy 500 SS-19 ICBMs and 308 SS-18 heavy ICBMs with MIRVed warheads. The SS-18 has been flight-tested with ten warheads, the SS-19 with six. The SS-18 can carry as many as 45 warheads in the 50-kiloton range. The Soviet Union, if it so desires, could have over 6,000 warheads on its MIRVed ICBMs alone and could target six warheads on each of the 1,000 American ICBMs, while holding their SLBMs, Backfire bombers, and un-MIRVed ICBMs in reserve. Whether that attack would succeed depends entirely on how accurate and reliable those missiles can be made. It was precisely to limit such improvement that the United States proposed in March 1977 to restrict the flight-testing of ICBMs and SLBMs to six each, every year. Since roughly that many tests are necessary to check up on the reliability of existing systems, this limit would have slowed down the development and testing of more accurate missiles. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union.

Missiles become more accurate as machine-tooling techniques, computer software, heat-resistant materials, mapmaking, and other mundane and exotic technologies improve. While no agreement can permanently halt the application of these advancements to missiles, the American proposal of March 1977 was constructive, and would have limited the danger to our Minutemen, not forever, but for the eight years it would have lasted. In addition to limiting flight tests, the U.S. proposed that both sides be restricted to 150 heavy ICBMs and 550 MIRVed ICBMs. But this was also rejected by the Soviet Union.

Having found stable deterrence unobtainable through negotiation, we might reasonably turn our attention to technological innovations which could serve the same purpose. Dedication to arms control, however, will hinder such innovation. Mobile missiles hidden in tunnels, such as the proposed American M-X ICBM, could not be located precisely, and would improve the security of our land-based forces. But missiles that cannot be located by satellite in order to attack cannot be counted by satellite in order to verify compliance with a treaty limit on their number. On-site inspection of launcher complexes could solve this problem,

but is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Those who favor an arms-control agreement therefore oppose this kind of system. But certainly this zeal for a negotiated agreement is misplaced if it cannot decrease the very real threat to our ICBMs and only denies us the weapons that can.

If our ICBMs will become increasingly insecure as a result of the SALT agreements, we will have to rely more and more on the other components of our strategic force, our bombers and our submarine-launched missiles. It is therefore notable that the United States bomber force will be sharply limited by the terms of the proposed agreement. President Carter cancelled production of the B-1 bomber, arguing that B-52s or cargo airplanes carrying ALCMs would be cheaper vehicles for the delivery of nuclear warheads on the Soviet Union. But heavy bombers carrying long-range ALCMs are to be counted towards the 1,320 MIRVed vehicles each side is allowed. If we build 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, we will be able to deploy only 120 heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles. We had planned to buy roughly twice that many B-1s. We have right now roughly three times that many B-52s.

The tight limit on our bombers becomes even more significant when we realize that it is in no way matched by limits on the Soviet anti-bomber defense force, which now includes over 10,000 anti-aircraft missiles. This asymmetry is illogical and offensive to American interests, which was why the United States declined to include heavy bombers in the 1972 agreement. In the following negotiations, the USSR stuck to its position and, not to put too fine a point on it, the United States collapsed. The Soviets did not convince us they were right, nor did they offer us a deal. They simply outlasted us. This failure would be less disturbing if our ICBM force were not also in some danger. But if we will have to rely more on our bombers and submarines, we should recognize that a defense against ALCMs is possible, and is permissible under the proposed treaty.

Enough has been written about the supposed invincibility of ALCMs to make some explanations necessary. It is true that they are small, low-flying, and hard to shoot down. It is also true that they are carried by airplanes that are big, high-flying, easy to find, and easy to shoot down. Something as big as a Boeing 747 carrying cruise missiles could be detected and intercepted long before it reached the borders of the Soviet Union, perhaps before it got close enough to its targets to launch its cruise missiles. The longer the range of the ALCM, the farther our bombers can "stand-off" and still be within range of their targets. The Pentagon's objections to the 2,500-kilometer range limit on ALCMs are not arbitrary. Longer range for the ALCM translates into an added margin of safety for our diminished bomber force.

ALCMs are hard to shoot down primarily because they fly so low—radar on the ground will not see the missile until there is very little time to respond. But by putting radars up on towers or on airplanes it would be possible to see low-flying objects much farther away. And a very fast interceptor missile does not need much time to shoot down its target.* The Soviet Union has all three kinds of systems under development, and they could prove quite useful in defending against cruise missiles.

Verification of range-limits is inherently problematic. Verification of the number of ALCM carriers would be equally difficult. The United States has about 400 B-52s. Some may be converted to carry cruise missiles, but all potentially could carry ALCMs. Should all 400 count toward the 1,320 MIRV limit? Both sides may use converted cargo planes to carry ALCMs. When does a Boeing 747 (or an Antonov 22) stop being a cargo plane and start being a heavy bomber carrying ALCMs? All the alterations can be completed in a hangar under an opaque roof and need not show on the outside of the finished airplane. Yet a strict count is to be kept of heavy bombers carrying ALCMs. On the other hand, precisely because their carriers can be seen coming a long way off, ALCMs are poor weapons with which to launch an attack on the strategic forces of another country. So violations of treaty limits will not seriously endanger the United States. The problem is that *we* will observe the limits, and disarm ourselves to that extent, without any hope of enforcing the same limits on the Soviet Union.

Inevitably it will be wondered whether any of this matters if both sides retain their invulnerable submarine-launched missiles. This is an honest doubt shared by many people. They have consciously or unconsciously rejected the idea of a strategic triad in which our security is based on three separate systems, each capable of independent retaliation if the others should be destroyed. This rejection is justified if it is correct to assume the continued invulnerability of our strategic submarines. The problem is that no weapon is invulnerable forever. One day it may be possible to locate and track submarines with reliability sufficient to permit a coordinated attack on all combat submarines on patrol. We cannot do so now, although the United States Navy claims it is able to keep relatively good track of Soviet submarines because they are noisy and easy to find.

What is disturbing is that if the Soviet Union were able to trail all our submarines at sea, how would we know? A system that locates submarines by passively listening for them cannot be detected. It may be an array of microphones on the seabed similar to the American fixed undersea surveillance system. A system that actively searches out submarines by emitting some form of energy and then listening for echoes could be tested first against Soviet submarines, in order to prevent Americans from "hearing" the broadcast energy. Or different physical principles entirely could be utilized for the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission. Who can say? Those who would place all our retaliatory forces out at sea are literally betting the survival of their nation that we are and will continue to be technologically superior to the Soviet Union, and that an effective ASW system can never be secretly developed and suddenly deployed.

The actual provisions limiting the deployment of MIRVed SLBMs will have some impact on the building programs of both countries. We now have 1,046 MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs and Poseidon SLBMs, none of which is scheduled for retirement within the time period of the proposed agreement. We had

* The Soviet Union has now begun to deploy a new ground-to-air missile, the SA-10, which travels five times the speed of sound—possibly fast enough to destroy incoming, low-altitude cruise missiles.



planned to deploy a new SSBN system of Trident submarines, each equipped with 24 longer-ranged SLBMs with MIRVed warheads. At a minimum, we had programmed the deployment of ten of these submarines at the rate of three every two years, starting in 1979 or 1980. We mean, however, to limit ourselves to 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. Consequently, we will have to reduce our deployment of Trident submarines or prematurely retire another MIRVed system. Without this retirement, the last Trident permitted will be the sixth, deployed in 1983 or 1984. We would be held at that level until the treaty runs out in 1986.

The Soviet Union has tested the SS-N-18, an SLBM with three independently-targeted bombs, but as of 1977 had not deployed any MIRVed SLBMs. If the SS-N-18 can be retrofitted into older submarines that do not now carry MIRVed missiles, verification of the MIRV limit will prove interesting. How will we know whether all or some of the 63-plus Soviet submarines are carrying MIRVed missiles? On the other hand, if the missile cannot be launched from existing submarines, we will be able to verify the limits on its deployment by counting the number of new submarines built to carry it (the treaty will allow such a new fleet of submarines to be built). In this case, the limits will indeed be verifiable, but rather loose. Arithmetic reveals that they will be permitted to deploy at least 380 MIRVed SLBMs, if they wish. If new Soviet SSBNs carry 24 SLBMs, as do our Trident submarines, the Soviet Navy will be permitted 15 or 16 boatloads of new MIRVed SLBMs. We will be permitted six. We appear to have negotiated a limit that gives the Soviets considerable freedom to proceed with their construction program while requiring a 40 percent cutback in our own. The equal limits do not cut equally. This rankles, but there is no immediate danger in the provision, since it does not endanger our own SLBMs.

Advocates of arms control, recognizing the burden that has been placed on our strategic submarine force, might take this opportunity to urge a treaty limiting ASW research or deployment. This is a thoroughly bad idea. To note only one problem, the United States works hard at improving its tactical ASW capability. If a war starts in Europe or the Middle East, we will want to send troops and supplies and not have them sunk by the large fleet of Soviet attack submarines. A limit on strategic ASW systems intended to protect our strategic forces will interfere with the development of tactical ASW systems, since there is no substantial difference in the hardware used in each. If it were decided to go ahead anyway with a ban on all ASW research and development, the problem of determining what was going on within Soviet military laboratories would immediately arise.

To review, the new SALT agreement will not help us preserve the security of our land-based ICBMs. We will instead witness a period in which they become increasingly vulnerable. The agreement will permit the development of Soviet air-defense systems which could blunt the effectiveness of our bomber force. Our bomber force itself will carry ALCMs, and so will be limited to one-third of the existing bomber levels and to one-half of the proposed B-1 fleet. Thus, the agreement will make our capacity for assured retaliation more heavily dependent on our submarine-based missiles. A secondary effect of the agreement will be the tension created by limits which cannot be verified by our national technical means. The number of ALCM-carrying bombers, the range of cruise missiles, the exact number of MIRVed missiles possessed by the Soviet Union will all be uncertainly known quantities, and will be sources of contention between American hawks and doves, as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union.

But the most important consequence of the agreement will be the effect the continued commitment to arms control has on ourselves. It will be remembered that the basic check on the Soviet

military has been the American ability to answer any Soviet buildup with a response adequate to destroy any nascent superiority. In the recent past, the United States endeavored to instruct the Soviet Union in American resolve and ability. In order to do so, it directed our chief SALT negotiator to include the following unilateral statement in the offensive arms limit:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis the threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces....If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

A follow-on agreement has been negotiated, but it conspicuously does not constrain the threat to our retaliatory forces. Yet it is impossible to believe that we will abrogate the ABM Treaty. For one thing, we could do little to construct an ABM system tomorrow if we broke the treaty today: Work on ABM technology has stagnated because few scientists with careers to make are going to work in a field the treaty has made a dead end. But we would not break the treaty in any case. That would mean a new arms race, and for twenty years or more the arms-control lobby has been pounding it into the public mind that an arms race is the literal threshold to the end of the world. Well, it is not. An arms race is the process which produces the substantial military equality and stability on which strategic harmony rests. And it is a race that can be lost by those who choose not to run.

The counsel of the arms-control lobby has led us to conduct ourselves so as to teach the Soviet Union to make excessive demands on the United States. President Carter's March 1977 SALT proposals would have put tight limits on heavy ICBMs, MIRVs, and the development of new missiles. The Soviet Union rejected them, and our determination to have some kind of agreement induced us to back down. Concessions that were tolerable in themselves also revealed our desperate attachment to arms control and our futile hope of avoiding the dreaded arms race. The willingness to have unverifiable limits, the constraints that restrict us but allow the Soviet Union to build at full speed, the collapse on the issue of anti-aircraft defenses, the omission of the Backfire bomber from the proposed limits—these are not disastrous individually. Collectively, they do give the impression of a country which is unwilling to fight for its positions if fighting means doing without an agreement, or increasing its defense budget.

We are cultivating a reputation for being eager to please. Our concessions might eventually lead us into a position of genuine strategic inferiority. Long before that happened, however, we would be faced with the danger that the Soviet Union, accustomed to our easy ways, may one day go too far and meet not accommodation but unlimited outrage. Trying too hard to please the Soviet Union may produce the hostility and military buildup that détente hopes to avoid.

I do not doubt that the arms-control lobby believes itself to be working to create a world in which our safety lies in treaties rather than weapons. This is an alluring goal, so much so that officials within the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are quite willing to acknowledge that they believe their worst enemies sit in the Pentagon, not the Kremlin. It is a foolhardy idea nonetheless, as much today as it was in the 1920s and 1930s. The reality is that the Soviet Union has not acted in good faith towards or lived in peace with even its own subjects and fraternal socialist countries. What it does with us depends on how well we guard our strength and reputation. □

Capitol Ideas

Undoubtedly the most entertaining event of recent weeks has been the publication of H.R. Haldeman's memoir, *The Ends of Power*. This has occasioned a good deal of comment, publicity, and vituperation from the press who believed most unwisely after President Nixon's resignation that complete victory lay with the media, with the enemy at last routed and the monster himself finally buried at the crossroads with a stake through his heart.

But things haven't quite worked out that way. More and more of Nixon's lieutenants keep handing manuscripts out the jailhouse door, and, dammit, the books seem to be selling quite well. We know these fellows so well now—thanks to all the publicity they got a few years back in that wonderful televised soap opera that was conveniently dressed up as a “national crisis”—that all the latest scraps of gossip by and about them are turning out to be of absorbing interest.

Poor old Haynes Johnson, who writes a column for the *Washington Post*—a column noteworthy for its ritualistic support of all current shibboleths—is utterly distraught about the whole business. One day in February he caught sight of the dread specter of Haldeman “hype” down the road, and threw up his hands in despair. “When will it all end?” Haynes sighed. Here were David Frost, Nixon, and Haldeman, “all of them cashing in on each other—and, in the end, from us.” You get the subliminal message? There ought to be a law against it.

Watch what happened next. The very day that Haynes Johnson's column appeared, the *Post*'s intrepid gossip writer Nancy Collins returned to the newsroom with the bulk of Haldeman's memoir under her arm, thus putting the *Post* in a position to “scoop” its ancient rival, the *New York Times*, which had paid good money for the book. Haynes Johnson was immediately put to work to write the *Post*'s article on the book, and he went at his task with such verve that a gigantic front-page, three-column headline story appeared the next day, and it ran over onto all six columns of page two, and then onto page three, where it covered two more columns.

This must have been more than H.R. Haldeman could possibly have hoped for from his somewhat confined quarters inside the Lompoc, California, jail; and if he did not send Haynes Johnson and Nancy Collins a thank-you note, then he was an ungrateful author. He might also have gotten a chuckle from the realization that the *Post* and the *Times* emerged from the affair growling at one another like yard dogs.

Scoopage dictated coverage in the *Post*'s case. Not the first time this has happened, of course, nor will it be the last. But the resulting moral could hardly be plainer, and it might well have been noted at some point by such moralistic folk as our media oracles: He who lives by the media must die by the media. “When will it all end?” Not yet. Next: Nixon's memoirs. The media made this Frankenstein, which now so mortifies them. Unfortunately, they are going to have to live with it.

Edward Jay Epstein's remarkable book, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, comes as a ray of light in the murky and highly politicized field of assassinations studies.

The most interesting part of this prodigious piece of research—Epstein had four assistants and *Reader's Digest* funding—deals with Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet citizen who either defected or “defected” to the United States early in 1964, less than two months after the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Nosenko was important because he had worked for the KGB and claimed to have personally supervised the KGB file that was opened on Oswald after *he* defected—as a former U.S. Marine, with experience as a radar operator working at a U-2 base in Japan—to the Soviet Union in September 1959.

The great problem for the CIA was to decide whether Nosenko was a genuine defector or a dissembler still working for the KGB. Nosenko claimed that the KGB had in fact displayed minimal interest in Oswald and was glad to get rid of him (and his Soviet wife Marina) in 1962, when Oswald returned to the U.S. However, Epstein presents persuasive evidence that Nosenko was lying all along, which, if true, meant that he had been sent over by the KGB specifically to cover up Oswald's Soviet connection. Epstein never establishes what this connection was, but he and almost everyone else who studied the question—including the CIA—were persuaded that Oswald's “mission” was not the assassination of the President. It seems certain that Oswald committed this act on his own initiative. If so, it would not be surprising if the KGB became anxious to cover up some *other* connection that it may have had with Oswald, on the grounds that if this connection became public knowledge, the American public might well be irreversibly persuaded that the Soviet government had also engineered the assassination of Kennedy.

If that was all there was to Nosenko, his role would be understandable, and he would not deserve to be regarded as a particularly important figure in this very complex story. However, Epstein presents evidence suggesting that Nosenko was additionally playing a far more sinister role, unconnected with the Oswald case.

Early in 1962 another Soviet defector, Anatoli M. Golitsin (given the code name “Stone”), who was regarded by the CIA as both a genuine defector and an important one, told the CIA that “the KGB had already planted an agent within the highest echelons of United States intelligence.... This penetration agent would be assisted by ‘outside’ men—other Soviet-controlled agents masking themselves as defectors or double agents—who would supply pieces of disinformation designed to bolster an ‘inside’ man's credibility.”

It appeared to James Angleton, then head of counterintelligence in the CIA, that Nosenko was playing just this supporting role. Witness, for example, Nosenko's explanation of how the KGB caught one Peter Popov, a lieutenant colonel in Soviet military intelligence who was arrested by the KGB in 1959 and subsequently executed as a spy for the CIA. Nosenko claimed that the KGB “had developed a method of painting a chemical substance on a subject's shoe which left an invisible trail that could be followed.” Thus Popov had been caught. But there was another possibility: that he had been betrayed from within the CIA. As Epstein notes: “The information provided by Nosenko deflected from the idea of a betrayal within the CIA.” There were other such leads by Nosenko, as a result of which CIA officers “became increasingly suspicious that Nosenko was painting “false tracks” away from some high level agent (or agents) inside the U.S. government.”

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