

House. Amid the prospect of spoils, what had happened to the New Politics?

The Eagleton affair soaked up fully half of the McGovern campaign. With each step he took in those days, Senator McGovern lost some of his "credibility," some of his fair claim to decency. His last attempt at graceful self-extrication from the morass may have been his greatest mistake. He attempted to lift the issue out of the gutter of mere electioneering, and to raise it to the level of institutional criticism. In a statement delivered before the television cameras, the Senator asked rhetorically how anyone receiving his party's presidential nomination one evening after midnight could be expected to make a creditable choice of a running-mate by mid-afternoon of the same day. The problem with that excuse, of course, was that no one believed that his midnight nomination was any surprise to George McGovern. People began to wonder if it were a McGovern habit to defer planning and decision-making until the last minute.

The fatal flaws, in the end, were in the Senator's treatment of the issues.

Incumbents often are easy targets, but it is difficult to assail some productivity, however inconstant, without suggesting alternatives. George McGovern spent too much time running against himself, living down his excesses of the happier spring. McGovern supporters admired him for his open-mindedness. The majority thought him a little silly, scurrying about after popular positions. Finally, in the week before the voting, the Senator huffed that, if he were to lose, he could not perform the loser's ritual call for national unity. Such a statement might well be honest, but, coming from George McGovern, it didn't sound decent.

Decency and majority are the necessary elements of good government. Mr. Nixon's orderly pursuit of executive business earned him re-election. Senator McGovern's decency evaporated.

The lesson of Election Year 1972 merits some reflection: a campaign, like a nation, must have an agenda, a set of objectives, and plans for their attainment. Without such provisions, the worth of the enterprise may be lost. ●

cessant struggle of men and groups for as large a share of sensate values—wealth...pleasure, comfort, sensory safety, security—as one can get. Since one can get them mainly at the cost of somebody else, their quest accentuates and intensifies the struggle of individuals and groups." (*The Crisis of Our Age*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1941, p. 174.)

When a person goes to a Chinese restaurant for dinner and decides to eat chow mein instead of fried rice, he is thereby exercising his natural freedom of self-determination. Reflection upon our common experience will yield many such instances in which we exercise our free judgment and free will by choosing between alternatives or goods. (Good in a neutral philosophical sense means any object of desire.) For example, a young mother must choose between having an abortion or giving birth to a retarded child. All the medical evidence indicates that the child born to her will be deformed, and she is tempted to have an abortion in order to save her and her husband from future emotional pain. Nevertheless, the young mother decides to have the child; and by so doing, she has both manifested and exercised the freedom of self-determination.

Now this second meaning is, I believe, of central importance. For if, as some (e.g. Skinner) allege, man is not self-determining, but rather is determined by processes beyond his control, then I am unable to see how one can legitimately maintain that man should be morally accountable for his deeds. (Traditionally in the West, motives behind a person's actions are part of the morality of the actions.) Among those who would negate man's dignity by denying that he has a natural power to make free judgments are the positivists and behaviorists.

The positivist claims that the only valid knowledge is that kind revealed by, and verifiable in terms of, the methods of laboratory science. Since the techniques of the laboratory are unable to reveal that man is free, i.e., self-determining, the positivist holds that man *therefore* is not free, that freedom and dignity are merely figments of our imaginations. The assertions of the positivist are untenable, however, for physical science, because of its own limitations and restrictions, can neither affirm nor negate the freedom of man. And if the fact of man's freedom cannot be ascertained through the methods of the laboratory, it is not because freedom and dignity do not exist, but rather because freedom and dignity exist beyond the laboratory. Besides, as Will Herberg has written, positivism has never been intellectually defensible, since: "it is notorious that positive science itself, its methods and results, depend upon metaphysical postulates and attitudes that cannot, in their nature, be established by way of science, but must be presupposed if the scientific enterprise is to get under way or mean anything at all." ("Modern Man in a Metaphysical Wasteland," *The Intercollegiate Review*, Winter, 1968-69.)

The positivist needs to remember

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Haven Bradford Gow:

In Defense of Freedom

In civilized discourse it is essential that proper distinctions be made. This, I find, is especially true in discussions regarding freedom lest, in attempting to explain it to others, we end up with merely explaining it away.

Dr. Mortimer Adler tells us in his two-volume work, *The Idea of Freedom*, that there are three basic senses of the term "freedom." First of all, there is the circumstantial freedom of self-realization which equates freedom with the absence of external impediments. It is a freedom that the individual possesses only under certain favorable circumstances.

There is also the natural freedom of self-determination—a freedom which is possessed by all men, by virtue of a power inherent in human nature, whereby man is able to transform his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he will become or do. In this sense man's choices are self-caused and are not determined by processes beyond his control. Circumstances may affect the way men exercise this inherent capacity, and so may moral and mental traits that they do or do not acquire. However, neither requirements nor circumstances of any sort are able to confer or deprive this freedom.

Lastly, there is the acquired freedom of self-perfection, which identifies freedom with the emancipation from moral sloth and from the slavery of certain mental habits and attitudes. It is a freedom which depends upon an individual's attainment of a certain excellence of mind and character, which, in turn, emanates from his capacity to live as he ought in accordance with the moral law or in an ideal befitting man. For

those who believe in this meaning of freedom, a person is not born free, but rather acquires freedom when he has become virtuous.

What I would like to do in this essay is (a) illustrate these senses of freedom by presenting both the views of philosopher and examples from common experience; and (b) focus attention on the second meaning of freedom, since the publication of B. F. Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* has revived such an avid interest in the question: Does man have the inherent ability to make free choices and judgments or are they determined by forces outside of his control?

A man is not free, Hobbes held, if he is either externally constrained or coerced. For example, were the state to compel every citizen to bow down before the president whenever he walked by, freedom in Hobbes' sense simply would not exist. And neither would it exist if the state, instead of indulging in coercion, constrained individuals from, say, building churches in which they could worship their God.

Now it is, I think, imperative that a distinction be made here between the freedom of self-realization and what Pitirim A. Sorokin terms "sensate liberty." Freedom in the former sense would still imply a recognition that there are, to be sure, legitimate rules and authorities, and that these rules and authorities are needed to keep us from conflicting with the rights of others. On the other hand, sensate liberty is a decadent form of self-realization, since it suggests that external restraint is both unnecessary and bad in itself. Moreover, it leads, as Sorokin rightly observes, to: "an in-

What Is To Be Done?

An Agenda for the Second Administration

Jeffrey Bell:

Nixon and Realignment

(WASHINGTON) — In the wake of the November 7 election returns, by far the oddest in American history, political observers here were left with a feeling of numbness. There was little jubilation among Republicans — aside from the narrowly focused group associated with the Committee to Re-Elect the President. There was little despondency among Democrats — excepting the narrowly based group behind the Democratic nominee. For most, the presidential aspect of the election had been over for months. For many, it ended last June, in the final week of the California Democratic Primary, when none other than Hubert Humphrey mounted the most effective anti-Left attack of recent American politics, reversing overnight the upward trend of George McGovern's campaign and starting an irreversible decline in the fortunes of the "Prairie Populist." For other observers, the election ended in Miami, at the "open" convention that turned out to be closed, when McGovern became the first candidate ever to have suffered at the polls as a result of the convention that nominated him. When the Eagleton affair followed closely on the heels of the Miami disaster, few were left who thought the presidential election had not ended. And in any sense that mattered, it had.

All that was left, then, was to see how far the Nixon tide carried. Most professionals, Democratic and Republican, agreed that if Nixon received over 60 percent of the vote, his party would have at least a decent chance of winning both the Senate and the House. This aim would be helped by a light turnout, in which the probable stay-at-homes would be anti-McGovern Democrats likely to vote Democratic for lesser offices.

The turnout was light — only 55 percent, the lowest since 1948. Nixon won the popular vote, 61 to 38 percent, a margin within a single point of those predicted by Gallup and Harris, and the biggest Republican popular victory since 1920. Nixon won 49 of the 50 states, the best any Republican has ever done, and carried the Electoral College 521 to 17, also an easy Republican record.

But in the races for the House and Senate, and even for lower offices such as state legislator, it was as though the presidential election had never occurred. The Nixon tide was not a tide at all, but a kind of political laser that obliterated one target and no others. The new Senate, 57-43 Democratic instead of 55-45, will be about three votes more liberal

than the one Nixon found so refractory in 1971-72. The new House, 244-191 instead of 256-179, will be a shade more conservative, but Nixon won all his first-term House votes anyway. Republicans lost a net of one governorship and suffered a slight erosion in control of state legislative bodies. The two-seat Senate loss was the first GOP Senate erosion since — 1964.

Adding to the impression of nothing having happened, of things having returned to Square One, is the fact that the Congress is a virtual carbon copy of the one that faced Nixon in January, 1969, following his 43 percent first-term victory. That House was 243-192, one seat more Republican than now, and that Senate was 57-43, exactly the same as now.

What, then, of realignment? Well, a realignment did occur in one region — the South. McGovern did not get more than 33 percent in a single Southern state. It was the first time in history that the Republicans had won more than half the Southern states — and they won them all. In presidential races for the foreseeable future, and barring a comeback by third-party conservative populism, the South is once again "solid" in presidential elections — for the Republican party.

The pattern for lesser offices is of course less dramatic, but there is a trend and it is clear. The Republicans have 7 of the 22 Southern Senate seats (10 of 26 if Oklahoma and Kentucky are included), 2 more than before. They have 34 of 108 House seats, 7 more than before and easily an all-time record. The figure after the 1960 election was 7 House seats and no senators. The GOP gained one governorship in North Carolina, for a total of 3 out of 11, and nearly added the governorship of Texas for the first time. The first Southern GOP governor in this century was elected in 1966. Republicans increased their numbers in every state legislative body that had an election; the party has a long way to go, but it has history on its side. This becomes particularly evident when the three Upper South states — Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina — are examined. If realignment is in process throughout the South, in these northernmost Southern states it has already occurred. Republicans now govern all three states. They have four of the six senators, and the other two are conservative Democrats, one of whom was elected as an independent. With a 1972 gain of 2, Republi-

cans now have 16 of the region's 29 House seats, with solid majorities in Virginia (7-3) and Tennessee (5-3). Only the Democratic-controlled state legislatures and courthouses have managed to withstand the realigning tide.

Incumbents, particularly in the House and Senate, remain as difficult to defeat in the South as elsewhere, but there is no further question that the GOP Southern Strategy, culminating in the Nixon Administration with the symbolic appointments of Haynsworth and Carswell and the opposition to busing, has worked. In the future, Democratic presidential nominees will have to win by taking 270 of the 388 electoral votes beyond the South, Kentucky, and Oklahoma. It can be done, but it won't be easy.

The other major element of the 1972 returns that has a whiff of realignment about it is Nixon's showing among Roman Catholics. According to post-election estimates, Richard Nixon became the first Republican since well before the New Deal to win a majority of Catholic voters. In his first term, Nixon helped this process along significantly with his social conservatism, his opposition to abortion and busing, and his firm if belated support for tax credits for parents of private-school children. But at least equally responsible for his remarkable showing were the views of his opponent and the life-style of his opponent's supporters. The trend of Catholics toward a more conservative stance in the socio-political spectrum is not a new development and is likely to continue, but the more recent Catholic-Republican trend is more problematic. If Edward Kennedy is the Democratic nominee in 1976, Republicans will have trouble holding their Catholic gain unless President Nixon delivers on his promise of parochial school aid, keeps taxes down, and makes considerably greater progress in reducing street crime. Another desideratum is more Catholic appointments to visible administration jobs, with the jackpot being a non-Irish, Catholic Republican on the Supreme Court.

Realignment in presidential elections is important, but true realignment — the kind that enables a party and its philosophy to govern effectively — is something else. That it did not occur in 1972 is at least partly the fault of the kind of campaign run by Nixon and his aids. First, there is the obvious failure of the campaign to devote more than token assistance to Republicans running for lesser office. If, as is widely believed