

# DANGERS, DILEMMAS *and* DULLES

By PATRICK McMAHON



**N**OR since John Jay took the oath of office as the first Secretary of State of the newborn United States of America, has this nation been confronted with such an intricacy of foreign problems as those now being taken on by John Foster Dulles.

The situations faced by Jay and Dulles are comparable only in their seriousness. Secretary Dulles must realize, as did Secretary Jay more than a century and a half ago, that the very destiny of the nation hangs upon his day-to-day decisions. A single false move can bring irreparable damage, possibly disaster.

Jay's greatest handicap was that he had to play from weakness. The infant republic was a military and economic weakling in a world dominated by hostile, land-hungry, imperialistic powers, all of them fanatically wedded to the principle of the Divine Right of Kings—a political dogma which had been so boldly challenged by this fledgling upstart in the New World in a heresy that was soon to spread to France. Jay's foreign problems were further complicated by powerful political factions in each state, which

opposed a strong federal government, and deeply resented the surrender by the states, to the federal government, of their sovereign rights in the field of foreign policy.

His two great assets were the formidable barrier which the Atlantic Ocean presented to a would-be European aggressor, and the fact that the European powers themselves were split into warring factions which were quite evenly balanced in power.

The policy he evolved, and which his successors followed, was based on the avoidance of any involvement, direct or indirect, in the struggles between the European nations, and, by exploiting to their fullest the arts of diplomatic adroitness and persuasiveness, convincing the foreign rulers that they could not take the risk of diverting from home the substantial military and naval strength necessary for imperialistic adventures in America.

The policy of Jay and Washington purchased 15 years of peace, during which the 13 weak and divided colonies were welded into a nation strong enough to stand off the British in the War of 1812. And

for another century we avoided clashing with a major power by holding aloof from European quarrels.

As Mr. Dulles takes over the direction of foreign policy, however, he faces a radically changed situation. The policy of Jay and Washington was abandoned by Woodrow Wilson during the first World War — and again abandoned a generation later by Roosevelt, Hopkins and Hull, by Truman, Stettinius, Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson. This time abandoned so completely it is doubtful that it could ever be restored — at least during the lifetimes of living Americans.

Today we are not only embroiled to the hilt in the quarrels of Europe; we are bound in a dozen treaties with more than two-score nations scattered all around the globe — in the Middle East, the Far East, in Latin America, in Australasia and the Pacific Islands. We have pledged our honor, our blood and our fortunes, all of our economic and military resources, to defend their political and territorial integrity from the most ruthless, grimly determined, imperialistic force in the History of Man.

Whereas Jay had the supreme advantage of a divided enemy, the opponents faced by Dulles are tightly knit into a Communist bloc, with each member government blindly responsive to the will of the Kremlin. It is among our allies,

not the enemy, that Secretary Dulles finds division and discord, deep-seated hatreds and grievances, sharp conflicts of interests and aspirations.

Even more serious is the widening rift between our allies — singly and collectively — and ourselves; a rift which is extending into every phase of international affairs, which has already seriously impaired the effectiveness of our entire foreign policy, and which will certainly destroy it completely — at least in its present shape — unless the trend is quickly reversed. The rift is manifest not only in the growing opposition of governments to United States policy; it is even more evident in the alarming growth of anti-American sentiment among the “friendly” foreign peoples. Today we are undoubtedly the most hated nation in the non-Communist world. Tomorrow, if the present drift continues, we have an excellent chance of displacing the Soviet Union as Public Enemy No. 1 in world opinion.

THESE rifts among our allies, and between our allies and ourselves, must be quickly resolved by Mr. Dulles before they plunge us all into disaster. Or else he must evolve an entirely new approach to the Soviet menace — an approach based on unilateral policy, unilateral objectives and unilateral action.

However, any such change in foreign policy has been firmly rejected by both President Eisen-

hower and Secretary Dulles. They have reaffirmed their faith in a united front of non-Communist nations, working through the NATO and similar military and economic alliances; they have reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations as the principal vehicle by which world peace may eventually be reached.

So on the sagging, elderly shoulders of John Foster Dulles falls the almost superhuman burden of uniting the non-Communist world into an effective coalition, in which each member nation — frequently at great sacrifice — is willing to subordinate its own nationalistic interests to the common objective. That, of course, applies to ourselves, and, while we certainly cannot be accused of shirking sacrifice thus far, the American public is becoming very, very weary.

To achieve such a coalition, Mr. Dulles must first find the answers to as perplexing a set of dilemmas, paradoxes, enigmas and plain ordinary riddles, as ever have plagued a statesman.

**H**IGH UP on the list, if not at the very top, is the paradox propounded by President Eisenhower and affirmed by Dulles, himself, in rejecting as “inadequate” and “defeatist” the Truman-Acheson policy of containment. In one of the few departures from the foreign policies of their predecessors, the new President and his Secretary of State announced their intention

of adopting a program to liberate, by “peaceful” means, the slave nations behind the Iron Curtain. Although the details of the program are yet to be revealed, the objective, itself, would seem to contain a contradiction. It is true that *ineffective* programs to stir up unrest and aid subversive elements in the Soviet sphere have already been undertaken, and could undoubtedly be extended without plunging the world into full-scale atomic war — as long as they continue to be *ineffective*.

However, any such program that shows promise of becoming *effective*, which might, in time, accomplish the objective of liberating the Soviet satellites, must in itself increase the *risk* of war. It is doubtful that the Soviet leaders will again be caught napping as they were by Tito in Yugoslavia (and there is considerable question whether the people of Yugoslavia have yet attained *liberation*). It is doubtful that they would hesitate to embark on the disastrous adventure of atomic war, if they felt it necessary to avert attention from internal troubles. It is even doubtful that any subversive scheme can approximate the scope and organization essential to success, before it is detected and ruthlessly stamped out by the secret police and — if necessary — the Red Army.

It is equally doubtful that we ourselves could sit idly by and watch the slaughter of hundreds of thou-

sands of people, and carry in our conscience the knowledge that their deaths and tortures were the direct result of their response to our bidding.

There is, of course, the possibility of an internal collapse behind the Iron Curtain resulting from a split within the Kremlin itself, with different individuals and factions vying for power after the death of Stalin. Such a split, however, if it comes at all, will be the direct result of the lust for power of the surviving Communist leaders, and not from any outside influence. Such a split, if it is to achieve the objectives we desire, must extend through all ranks of the Red Army, and possibly the secret police as well. For once the iron discipline of the Kremlin collapsed under discord, a united Red Army would rule Russia, and name the new dictator.

IT is not the purpose of this article to challenge either the essentiality or the desirability of the Eisenhower-Dulles "liberation" objective. It is solely to point out that it would be both foolhardy and dishonest to attempt to disguise the dangers manifest in such a policy.

And in recognizing the dangers, Dulles' paradox becomes Dulles' dilemma. For not a single major ally (unless you would regard Nationalist China as "major") is willing to support any policy that is likely to enhance the dangers of all-out war.

Our allies in the United Nations are adamant against any action in Korea that is likely to achieve a decision. And decisive action in Korea is another Eisenhower-Dulles pledge, and another dilemma for Mr. Dulles to resolve. His predicament is to unite the allied countries into a firm coalition, and at the same time effect policies that the governments and publics of virtually every other country are firmly convinced spell only disaster. He must either abandon his objectives, or convince our friends, and neither is going to be an easy task.

And in every quarter of the free world, in every area of national and international affairs, Secretary Dulles is faced with a series of equally awkward problems which must be resolved before a strong, workable coalition can be effected.

In Western Europe there is the primary problem of unification. Every European statesman agrees in principle that a substantial degree of economic, military and political unification is necessary to survival. They agree that the alternatives are continued dependence upon U. S. protection and economic largess, continued low living standards, continued vulnerability to Soviet aggression — and very probably, the eventual extinction of their civilization. Those things they agree to, in principle. And in practice, the Western European statesmen and publics alike seem equally agreed that the slightest infringement of

their national sovereignty is just as abhorrent as the inevitable results of continued disunity.

CLOSELY involved in the unification problem is the Franco-German paradox. If France is to be appeased — and France is the key to Western European unity — Germany must be kept so weak that she will never again become a threat to French security. Yet, if the over-all objective is to be attained, Germany must be made sufficiently strong to bear the major burden of withstanding a sudden thrust by the Red Armies, which in a matter of weeks could hurl 100 to 150 divisions across the Polish-German frontier.

Equally involved in the unification problem is the British dilemma. Britain is reluctant to participate in European military or economic unification schemes, because she fears it would weaken her control over the British Commonwealths. At the same time she is unwilling to remain entirely on the outside, because she fears that a strong continental coalition would soon surpass Britain in economic, military, and political strength, and the United Kingdom would gradually sink from the status of a second-rate to a third-rate power. So the British seek a dominant voice in continental unification proposals, without participating, or sharing the responsibility and risk. To which the French, Germans, and Italians quite naturally object.

Inextricably linked with these problems is the threatened collapse of NATO, into which we are pouring billions of dollars in military and economic support, while the European NATO countries are whittling away their commitments and scuttling plans. Unless Secretary Dulles is able to persuade the British and other European governments to spend more for defense, and possibly less for social welfare, he is certain to encounter increasing difficulty in pushing multi-billion-dollar foreign aid programs through Congress.

Turning to North Africa and the Middle East, Mr. Dulles must find a way to eliminate the violent clash between the nationalistic aspirations of the Moslem countries, and the imperialist dreams that are still nursed in that area by the British and French (not to mention the imperialistic programs and plans of the U. S.-supported state of Israel). In no other area of the world is the dilemma of Mr. Dulles more clear-cut — and dangerous — than in this one. The situation has been permitted to deteriorate so far that it is extremely doubtful that any compromise acceptable to both sides can now be worked out. Dulles must either give all-out support to the British and French, including troops and planes and battleships, or he must tell them politely but firmly to get out, and then concentrate on a quick build-up of Iran and the Arab states, possibly into some sort of a Moslem

coalition. The first alternative would certainly enrage the Moslem world and greatly increase Soviet prestige in the entire area; the second would equally enrage the British and French, although their ire might be slightly appeased if the protection of their remaining economic interests can be negotiated.

A SIMILAR explosive situation is developing in the Far East, where Winston Churchill, in a maneuver to restore British prestige and insure the retention of Hong Kong and Malaya, is seeking U. S. support for a Southeast Asia "security" alliance, which would be securely under the domination of the Western and British Commonwealth powers. The members proposed by Churchill would be the United Kingdom, France, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

The Churchillian plan evoked immediate protests of every Asiatic nation, from India and Pakistan to Japan and the Philippines. The one issue on which all of Asia — even including Red China — appears united, is opposition to Western domination (Chiang Kai-shek was even more insistent on the return of Hong Kong, when his Nationalist government was in control, than is Mao Tse Tung, who could have it for the taking).

In facing up to the situations in the Middle and Far East, Dulles must recognize that any policy

which we adopt that weakens French and British prestige, will not only strain our diplomatic relations with those two countries but is also certain to aggravate — at least temporarily — their already critical economic difficulties. And we have already poured out billions in a thus far fruitless effort to strengthen the French and British economies.

In Latin America, right next door, Dulles faces another set of problems. Although not as immediately urgent as those in Europe, the Middle and the Far East, these may in the long run be even more important. Throughout the entire area Communist activities are being stepped up, anti-Yanqui sentiment is increasing among all classes, U. S. investors are being subjected to continual harassment, and our sources of supply for numerous vital raw materials are being threatened. In Guatemala, the government is virtually dominated by avowed Communists, and is openly responsive to the direction of Moscow. And herein is another of Dulles' many dilemmas. If the Communists are permitted to continue control of this strategic Central American republic, it constitutes a serious threat to the security of the United States and the entire hemisphere. On the other hand, the feeling throughout Latin America against outside intervention in domestic affairs (particularly from the U. S.) is so deep-seated, that any direct action by our government in Guatemala

would almost certainly cause serious repercussions.

THE difficulties of Mr. Dulles are all the more complicated by the fact that even if he finds the answers to all of these complex problems in the specific fields of foreign policy, there is very little he can do about them until he corrects two very serious deficiencies in the application of policy that confounded the efforts of Acheson and his predecessors.

He must build up here at home a genuine respect in Congress and among the American public for the Department of State and the U. S. Foreign Service. And he must create among all segments of public opinion, and among both political parties, a solid support for the basic foreign policies he intends to pursue.

And abroad, he must build up among peoples and governments respect for and confidence in U. S. leadership in the long-range fight against Red imperialism.

Until he and his department can command the respect and solid support of their own people, he can hardly expect the confidence of foreign nations. And unless he can command the respect of the foreign governments and peoples, he can hardly make appreciable headway in inducing them to undertake radical and risky departures from their traditional political and economic policies both at home and abroad.

The embittered former Secretary of State and his zealous followers blame all of his foreign-policy failures, and particularly the failure to obtain the respect and support of the U. S. public, on Senator Joe McCarthy.

Nothing could be further from the facts. The failures of Acheson, Marshall, Byrnes and Stettinius in the all-important field of public opinion, can be attributed directly, and solely, to Messrs. Acheson, Marshall, Byrnes and Stettinius. Each in his own way flagrantly disregarded the fundamental principles of sound public relations. It was not "McCarthyism" that created distrust and opposition to the Department of State and its policies; it was the widespread distrust that created "McCarthyism." Senator McCarthy simply gave vigorous voice to the views of a substantial and already outraged segment of the American people.

THE errors of Acheson and his predecessors in the sphere of public and congressional relations are too numerous to list here. Some of the more important ones — errors which Dulles must avoid — were:

1. They retained in important posts, from motives that can only be speculated upon, officials who had been clearly established as poor security risks, at the best, and outright traitors, at the worst

2. They persisted in policies long after they had been proven unsound,

rather than admit they had made a mistake, at a time when foreign relations were so complex that serious errors were inevitable. The public was, and still is, fully aware of the difficulties involved. While a frank admission of error will always bring down the criticism of opponents, it is likely to evoke an even greater volume of approval from the impartial. But Acheson and his predecessors chose to cover up, to twist and distort facts, to compound blunder with new blunder — and the inevitable result was increasing suspicion on all sides.

3. They made the fatal error of bombarding Congress and the public with intensive propaganda barrages, in an effort to obtain the necessary legislative support for foreign policy proposals, instead of relying upon straightforward, logical presentations of fact. The propaganda was deliberately designed to mislead; it was based on exaggeration, distortion, omission and frequently on outright misstatements of fact. For instance, in 1946 Congress was asked to approve a loan of \$3.5 billion to Britain, and to increase the loaning authority of the Export-Import Bank by \$2 billion, for loans to France and other continental countries. In presenting these requests Acheson, then Under Secretary of State, and other top administration officials told Congress and the public that the loans would put Britain and Western Europe on a strong, self-supporting eco-

nomics basis; would make them bastions of strength against Soviet encroachment; would result in the elimination of trade barriers, and would lay the foundation for profitable trade with Europe. Yet at the very time the British loan was being debated in Congress, State Department planners were working on a \$25 billion "loan" and gift program (later to be known as the Marshall Plan) which they knew would be necessary when the British loan was dissipated. And while the Marshall Plan was being discussed in congressional committees, the department's economic experts were working on a second Marshall Plan to submit to the Hill when the first Marshall Plan ended (and that one is now known as the Mutual Security Program). After the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, the public was literally deluged with propaganda, almost delirious in nature, presenting the United Nations as the machinery that would settle all international conflicts, and eliminate war for all time. And every informed officer in the Department of State knew, and admitted privately, that the very most that could be expected of the new organization was the settlement of disputes between minor nations, and the provision of a forum from which the major powers could debate their differences, and propagandize their views. The worst aspect of the State Department's propaganda was that it was not only dishonest

in its conception, but that its mendacities were such that they were, sooner or later, certain to be disclosed to the public.

4. They followed the practice of "leaking" information on new policies and diplomatic negotiations to friendly newspapers and reporters, who could be counted on to give them the most favorable interpretations. Thus they not only aroused the wrath of the opposition press, but also antagonized the great majority of correspondents who sought only to do an honest, objective job.

5. It was Dean Gooderham Acheson, himself, not Senator McCarthy, who introduced into our foreign policy debates the techniques he now refers to as "McCarthyism," and "smear tactics." As far back as the Lend-Lease discussions, and continued on through the hearings of the various foreign-aid programs and tariff bills, Acheson sought to silence the opposition by branding it as "isolationist," sometimes with a broad inference of "pro-Fascist," or "pro-Nazi." Even the most amateurish public relations expert (and "amateurish public relations expert" is not a contradiction in Washington) could have told him that his resort to smear tactics against the opposition was not only inviting but justifying retaliation in kind.

6. The department has frequently resorted to "pressure" tactics of the baldest type, in efforts to whip Congress into line, particu-

larly on appropriation measures. It held periodic "confidential" foreign policy forums, to which the representatives of labor unions, business organizations, farm, veterans and civic groups were invited (these representatives were usually referred to by State Department cynics as the "do-gooders"). Leading department officials gave extremely able and interesting presentations of the problems and policies in various critical areas. And while the presentations were always slanted sharply in favor of the department, the more realistic representatives in the audience recognized the fact, and discounted the effects. However, somewhere along the line, one of the more eloquent officials invariably would describe the department's difficulties with a recalcitrant Congress, particularly their difficulties in extracting tax dollars in the desired quantities. And at the conclusion of this phase of the presentation either the official himself, or a stooge planted in the audience, would invariably suggest that these difficulties would be quickly overcome, "if you good people, if you *right-thinking* people, can prevail upon your members to write or telegraph their Senators and Congressmen, and let them know your views." It was a tactic that won few friends among the "do-gooders," and many enemies on Capitol Hill.

7. They frequently used the cloak of "security" to shield from the public view developments which

were simply embarrassing politically, and contained no security element whatsoever. The State Department's public relations will always be complicated by the necessity of conducting certain operations and negotiations in absolute secrecy, lest their success be jeopardized. Which makes it all the more important that the withholding of pertinent information be kept at an absolute minimum, and the label of "security" be never abused.

Of course, the best public relations program conceivable by man will hardly build up public respect and support, unless Mr. Dulles' policies are such that the people can understand and support. Nevertheless, no matter how sound his policies may be, it is equally true that they are likely to meet only frustration, unless his public relations are also sound.

**I**N EXERTING U. S. leadership abroad, Mr. Dulles must first solve the enigma of a Western Europe that has repeatedly, and in desperation, urged us to accept the leader's role, but has consistently refused to follow in the direction we sought to lead. There is a growing suspicion in Congress that the answer to this is that Western Europe did not really want us to lead at all; they simply wanted us to reach for the chit.

However, this interpretation may not be altogether fair. For we matched the European paradox with

one of our own. The U. S. government, as Acheson so frequently and eloquently expressed it, "reluctantly accepted the mantle of leadership which the free world has thrust upon us"; and then hesitated to lead. In our relations with the European Marshall Plan organization (OEEC), with the NATO, and in our individual relations with the member governments, our diplomats took the role of advisers, not leaders. We gave counsel and exercised tact and patience, when the situation called for direction, firmness and action. Never before in history has a great power been so sensitive of the sovereignty of others, and less conscious of its own sovereign rights. We have permitted our allies to ignore flagrantly the commitments they have made under the Marshall Plan, the NATO, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements, the United Nations, and various other pacts, often on the ground that insistence upon their compliance would somehow infringe their sovereign rights. The facts were that the nations involved had already waived the sovereign rights in question, in formal treaties, usually as *quid pro quo* for U. S. dollars. And by ignoring continuing violations of treaty commitments, the State Department was actually infringing our own sovereign right to grant or loan our dollars under conditions of our own choosing.

If Dulles seeks to lead, he must recognize one fact his predecessors

missed: that in foreign, as in human relations, weakness does not beget respect, either of friends or of enemies.

**T**HERE is another important requisite to successful leadership — not appreciated by former secretaries — which Mr. Dulles must recognize if his policies are to achieve following abroad. That is, the leader who plays favorites among his followers quickly becomes distrusted. If we want the respect of all free nations, we must treat them all with something approaching impartiality. We must abandon the Acheson practice of negotiating with Britain alone problems that equally affect France. We must avoid working out agreements with Europe that are bound to concern Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. We must stop giving aid to one country of a sort that will injure another. We must learn to view each problem in a global aspect, weigh the effects of each proposed solution on all friendly countries.

To illustrate, Secretary Acheson agreed with Britain and France to set up an international organization to control the distribution and pricing of certain vital raw materials, without even consulting the Latin

American and Asiatic nations that produced the materials. We loaned vast sums to India, under generous terms, to increase the production of manganese, thus rendering unfeasible the exploitation by private capital of even more promising deposits in neighboring Brazil. We have encouraged the continuation of discriminatory trade practices among the British Commonwealth countries, among the Western European countries, and between various colonial powers and their empires. But we have repeatedly warned Latin American nations that resort to similar practices would be regarded as violations of our Reciprocal Trade Agreements.

These are only a few of the errors of omission and commission that the State Department has made in its domestic and foreign relations. Probably the greatest consolation that Dulles finds, as he shoulders his tremendous burden, is this:

Although he faces problems more critical and complex than have ever been faced by a Secretary of State before; nevertheless, if there is any truth whatsoever in the adage that men can learn from the mistakes of others, no Secretary in American history has had such a wealth of valuable study material on hand to guide him in his decisions.



» Man is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to. — *Mark Twain*

# The Federalist Papers

JAMES MADISON



*To the People of the  
State of New York:*

In reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work of the conven-

tion, without examining it on all its sides, comparing it in all its parts, and calculating its probable effects.

That this remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this place be indulged, which candor previously suggests.

It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the act of the convention, which recommends so many important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and interests, should find or excite disposi-

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*Probably the finest commentary on the principles upon which our government was founded, is the group of essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, known as the Federalist Papers. To the Editors of THE MERCURY, they seem as appropriate today as they were 165 years ago, when the debate over the adoption of the Constitution was at fever heat. THE MERCURY will reprint selected essays from the Federalist Papers in its coming issues.*