

What EISENHOWER Has Learned In EUROPE

A political analyst
appraises the man
who may be President

ROBERT INGRIM

IN WESTERN EUROPE, more than in America, it is assumed that General Dwight D. Eisenhower will campaign for the Presidency of the United States. Therefore, there is in Europe even more speculation as to the General's political views. Is he a "Liberal" or a "Conservative"? Will he lend America's aid to the conservative forces in Europe or to the European Socialists? And, because of his experience, will he drive harder bargains with America's allies?

Eisenhower has had the oppor-

tunity for profound political education since 1943. He has been a party to grave political errors and those of us who have observed him closely believe that he has profited from the experience.

For Americans who wish to understand what Eisenhower may have learned in Europe, it is necessary to realize that America — and to some extent, Eisenhower — has passed through three easily identifiable stages in dealing with postwar Europe.

1. The 1945-46 — the "Cooperate-with-Russia" — stage.

2. The 1947-50 — the "Protect-Europe-with-Economic-Aid" — stage, and

3. The 1951-52 — the "Protect-Europe-with-Arms" — stage.

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In Eisenhower's role and attitudes during each of these stages may be found the key to what he has learned.

When Eisenhower arrived as a conqueror in Europe in 1944-45, there is little doubt that he was as naïve as his political mentor, Harry Hopkins. He certainly evidenced none of the realistic thinking that was being done by James Forrestal or George Kennan or William D. Leahy or, for that matter, General George Patton. Eisenhower obviously believed that the way to build a free and better Europe was to *cooperate* with the Russians.

He didn't hesitate to pull back his armies and allow the Russians to sack half of Germany; he drank toasts with, and pounded the backs of, the Russian generals; he seemed convinced that any Russian so recalcitrant as not to have already succumbed to the Roosevelt smile would certainly succumb to the Eisenhower smile. It is, of course, unfair to "blame" Eisenhower for pulling back his armies and allowing the Russians to occupy half of Germany plus the Danube basin. That unhappy decision had been made at Yalta, and he was carrying out orders. But if we are to appraise Eisenhower, we must note that he expressed no objection to the decision, and has, in fact, publicly protected those who made it.

As a matter of fact he gave it his whole-hearted approval. He en-

couraged the Morgenthau-Planners; he joked with Elliott Roosevelt about "thinning out the Germans"; he did not oppose State Department suggestions that the Russians be conceded bases in the Mediterranean; he was, in fact, one of those most peculiar Westerners who advocated giving the Russians the atomic bomb.

THERE WERE OTHER EVIDENCES of political naïveté. Eisenhower appeared to swallow, without question, the American "Liberal" explanation that National Socialism in Germany had been a Rightist movement, in all respects the opposite of Communism. He accepted the theory of German collective responsibility for all the outrages committed by their Nazi masters.

Contrast these views of the naïve Eisenhower with the following thoughtful statement of Mr. Kennan:

Totalitarianism is not a national phenomenon; it is a disease to which all humanity is in some degree vulnerable. To live under such a regime is a misfortune which can befall a nation by virtue of reasons purely historic and not really traceable to any particular guilt on the part of the nation as a whole. Where circumstances weaken the powers of resistance to a certain crucial degree, the virus triumphs. If individual life is to go on at all within the totalitarian framework, it must go on by arrangement with the regime, and

to some extent in connivance with its purpose. These realities leave no room for our favored conviction that the people of a totalitarian state can be neatly divided into collaborators and martyrs and that there will be none left over.

Had Eisenhower only looked more closely into the philosophy and actions of National Socialism, he would have understood that it came from the Left, not from the Right. Hitlerism was Socialism bureaucratically planned and enforced by the police; it was Socialism enforced within national boundaries; and thus it was hardly distinguishable from state Communism. National Socialism and state Communism are all progeny of the same ancestor: Jacobinism. And the idea of "democratic socialism" has roots in the same soil.

This, however, was much too complex for Eisenhower in 1945. Influenced by American "Liberals" and British Laborites, he preferred simpler reasoning. Nazism, as well as Fascism, he had been told, was of the Right; therefore, Rightists were the enemies of America and Leftists were friends. But Communists were of the Left. Therefore once the Russian honeymoon was ended and Communists had become enemies, this reasoning had to be revised. The Leftists were still the only friends of America, but not the extreme Leftists, only the medium Leftists — the Socialists.

The European Socialists became

Eisenhower's pets. He helped them to acquire newspapers and to become teachers and heads of local governments. He was the willing instrument of American "Liberals" and the protector of their friends, the European Socialists, and he continued in this role until he left Europe in 1946.

EISENHOWER WAS NOT directly connected with the second stage — the Marshall Plan stage, the "Protect-Europe-with-Economic-Aid" stage — but he favored it, he was aware of it, and he was the inheritor of its mistakes. So its lessons can not have been lost on him.

The Marshall Plan has, in some respects, been successful. For instance, it stimulated agricultural and industrial production. But in other respects it has been a failure. Look back to what it promised. On September 22, 1947, the conference of sixteen nations held in Paris declared:

The maximum use will be made by the participant countries of their own . . . productive capacity. This process will be stimulated by measures to be taken to secure progressive relaxation of import restrictions, to improve payment arrangements between the various countries. . . . A customs union study group will make its first report within three months. The French government is ready to commence negotiations with all European governments who wish to enter a customs union.

These good intentions were conveyed to the United States Senate by General George Marshall, then Secretary of State, on February 17, 1948:

For the first time in modern history representatives of sixteen nations collectively disclosed their internal economic conditions and frailties, and undertook to do certain things for the mutual benefit of all. These commitments . . . will produce in Western Europe a far more integrated economic system than any in previous history.

The Marshall Aid Plan, then, was undertaken with many promises and good intentions, but very little has come of it. There have been tariff reductions, but all the beneficiaries of Marshall aid have stuck to their quota systems. Nothing has come of the weak attempts to set up customs unions.

Despite the Marshall Plan, Europe is still crying for American dollars for two reasons, both of which must be apparent to General Eisenhower.

First, the plan fell short because of the weakness of American diplomacy: America did not insist that the European countries keep their pledges. America offered the aid in return for a fundamental change; the change was promised, but America gave the aid without exacting the change.

This has been the basic and disheartening weakness of America as

a world power. World managers bear the responsibility for management. Yet, repeatedly, America's "Liberal" diplomats have bestowed vast aid without assuming any responsibility, without making sure that they will receive something for what they give.

In several private conversations I have heard responsible statesmen in Europe bemoan America's forbearance. There are moments in history when nations, like children, must be coerced for their own good. America has thus far failed in the art of beneficial coercion. An opportunity has been missed in Europe, one that will never return, because the interests vested in the protective market are much more influential after recovery than before it. And this is as true of the workers involved as it is of the business men.

THE SECOND ERROR which led to the disappointments of the Marshall Plan was even more the fault of the United States. The "Liberals" in the American government, who had been rebuffed in their efforts to cooperate with Russia, concluded in 1947 that the serious threat to western Europe was Communist subversion, not imperialist aggression. What Europe needed, they decided, was not protection from Red Army invasion but protection from economic misery. For some reason, they overlooked the close connection between prosperity and security.

Without protection from the Red Army in 1947-50, most European capital was on its way to a safer haven. And here is one of the ironies of our times: the dollars the Marshall Plan sent across the Atlantic to Europe were met in mid-ocean by European capital fleeing to the Americas.

The European capitalist asked this question: "Why should we whet Stalin's appetite by getting fat?" And every peasant knows that the fatter the goose, the higher must be the fence to keep the fox away.

If, during 1947-50, Europe's military necessities had been considered along with her economic ones, the economic effect of the Marshall program could have been much more hopeful.

IN THE THIRD STATE — the 1951-52, the "Protect-Europe-with-Arms" stage — Eisenhower has returned to Europe, not as a conqueror, but as defender and umpire. And what has he learned? What are his thoughts?

First, what can he think about the old cooperate-with-Russia policy, the policy he implemented? What can he think of Yalta and the New Dealers who ordered him to restrain General Patton and to pull his armies back and deliver central Europe to the Communists? Is it possible that Eisenhower can contemplate this tragic policy and the men who were responsible for it with anything but painful regret?

Where are the Morgenthau-Planners today? And what does Eisenhower think of them? Instead of wanting to "thin out" the Germans, he is now struggling to find more Germans for his army.

What about his policy of making the German Socialists his pets? Where is his neat explanation that the German Rightists were America's enemies and the German Leftists America's friends?

Eisenhower has learned much about Socialists. First, he now understands that to the Socialist, the Communist will always be only an erring brother. Secondly, how can you expect enthusiastic support from a Socialist who is in the dilemma of having to choose between Communism and the world of free enterprise? Thirdly, how can any Socialist cooperate freely with other countries when he knows that any merger of economies will destroy the national framework in which his hoped-for Socialism can operate.

Where are the German Socialists now? Are they cooperating with Eisenhower? Like every other Socialist party in Europe, they are either outright anti-American or else are flirting with neutralism.

Kurt Schumacher, leader of Germany's Socialists, is Eisenhower's most dangerous antagonist. Schumacher says he is for rebuilding Germany's military strength, but he is opposed to a merger of armies. And it is Schumacher who has the

support of the German neutralists.

Who then are Eisenhower's friends in Germany? They are Konrad Adenauer and the Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger. Eisenhower knows that it was Adenauer who, as early as August, 1950, offered unconditionally a German contribution to the common defense. For this, Eisenhower's former pets, the German Left, derided Adenauer as the "chancellor of the allies."

But Adenauer and Speidel and Heusinger are conservatives! These are the men that Eisenhower's old "Liberal" mentors warned him against! Yet these are the men who want to cooperate with America against the Russian menace and build a united Europe.

It is no longer Russians or Communists or Socialists or Leftists of any hue that Eisenhower is pounding on the back in Germany. His smiles are reserved for his friends on the Right.

And elsewhere in Europe, where are Eisenhower's friends? In Britain the Socialist Labor Party is divided into three parts: a Left, the Bevanites, who are blatantly anti-American; a Center who are neutralists; and the followers of Attlee, who favor cooperation with Eisenhower and a degree of preparedness, but who called Churchill a warmonger and who preferred not to renounce the Bevanites. Even among the British Conservatives, Anthony Eden, who has founded his career

on catering to Leftist sentiment, has admonished the West to relax and not get excited — a somewhat less than courageous concession to British anti-Americanism.

Eisenhower has learned that his only dependable friends in Britain are men who stand solidly on the British Right. And he probably hasn't forgotten that it was British Laborites — along with American "Liberals" — who urged him to bet on European Socialists in 1945.

In France there is every indication that Eisenhower has mastered the intricacies even of the French political mind. Neutralism runs deeper in France than anywhere else on the continent. The neutralist tradition runs back to 1940 when the French had resolved to let "them" do the fighting, meaning by "them" the British.

The French now know that Europe cannot be defended without defending Germany, and that Germany cannot be defended without the Germans. But note how the neutralist sentiment works. Jules Moch, the Socialist leader, claims to be a militarist, but it was he who as Minister of Defense delayed Germany's rearmament with the irrational proposal that German units must not exceed 800 men. At present Eisenhower's experts are insisting on German national units of 12,500 men. It is questionable that Moch and his Socialists will ever agree to such an arrangement.

Eisenhower knows that the rearmament program has lost at least a year because of Moch's obstinacy; and he knows, further, that the only group in France on which he can rely are the Conservative supporters of Robert Schuman.

In Italy there is no possibility of support for America or Eisenhower anywhere Left of Center. The Communists are pledged never to do battle against the fatherland of Socialism. And the leader of the Socialists, Pietro Nenni, is an unshakable fellow-traveler, the loudspeaker of Italian neutralism, the arch enemy of his nation's participating in the Atlantic Pact. Only the Italian Rightists, led by Alcide de Gasperi, offer Eisenhower any hope of co-operation.

WITH AN EXPERIENCE such as this, how can Eisenhower be anything but anti-Socialist and anti-Left? The Socialists have betrayed him — and he knows it.

How can he feel anything but resentment for the American "Liberals" or New Dealers or Fair Dealers who either led or accompanied him into such costly errors? Surely he remembers which groups of Americans it was who advised him to support the European Socialists — and surely he now must distrust the advice of these groups.

With the disillusionments he has suffered, Eisenhower, if he becomes President of the United States, is likely to be a hard taskmaster for western Europe. And it seems unlikely that any European groups on the Left can expect any favors from him.

There may still be doubts in America as to whether Eisenhower is a "Liberal" or a "Conservative." But judging from what he must have learned in Europe, it appears likely that he will now prefer the company and counsel of Conservatives and that he will regard American "Liberals" with distrust.

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The newest challenge to the sacro-iliac——

Mambo:

the afro-cuban

dance craze

WALTER WALDMAN

A NEW DANCE does not simply start, grow popular and wane in these United States in a fairly normal, orderly fashion. It begins instantaneously, flashes through the population like an electric discharge and vanishes leaving its vast mass of spent disciples just enough time to recuperate before the switch is thrown again.

The dance craze habit began in the twenties with such relatively

Walter Waldman works in the New York office of Paramount Pictures. He has also been on the staff of the Morning Telegraph and Variety. He claims he can do a Mambo imitation that will deceive almost everybody but the experts.

simple, athletic affairs as the bouncing, twirling Charleston and the Black Bottom. Since then the Shag, the Big Apple, and the Conga have had their brief hectic heyday. The Lindy — single, double, and jitterbug variety — has arrived and apparently stamped its nervous, stiff-jointed pyrotechnics permanently on the outlines of American “ballroom” dancing. Whether the strange Mambo, the first genuine hybrid to enter the field, will be as short-lived as the Big Apple or have a vogue as sustained as the Lindy is a bit uncertain. In sheer expenditure of energy and single-minded devotion to its intricacies, however, the disciples of America’s latest dance