

make a quick buck selling drugs or mooching off their current girlfriends and family. The women are resigned to their partner's infidelities. Of her philandering, controlling boyfriend, Patricia, a young black woman with a two-year-old son, sighs, "I think the fool is just like that. He's never going to change." Or as one woman more succinctly put it: "Motherf---r not faithful."

Many women see single motherhood as a rite of passage, as proof of one's maturity. They take pride in bringing up their children by themselves, on not depending on a man for support or a paycheck. On hip-hop and R&B stations, paeans to female independence and self-reliance abound. "I see ya payin' ya bills, I see ya workin' ya job," enthuses "American Idol" star Fantasia Barrino—herself a teen mother—in her single-mom anthem, "Baby Mama." Likewise, Destiny's Child, the pop trio headed by Beyoncé Knowles, gives props to "all the honeys who makin' money. ... all the mommas who profit dollas" in their hit "Independent Women." Never mind that few of the proud "baby mamas" singing along with Beyoncé can afford basic necessities let alone the "rocks" the diva boasts of buying herself or that despite Barrino's assurance that "we can go anywhere, we can do anything," few teen moms will escape the poverty of the inner city.

So devastating is the portrait Hymowitz paints of the inner city that it's hard to accept the giddy optimism of her last two chapters. "It's morning after in America," Hymowitz exclaims, pointing to surveys showing the return of young Americans to traditional values and the slow slide of the feminist movement into irrelevance. She also makes the rather dubious assertion that American culture is becoming less sexualized. "Miss Prim is in," she declares. (Paris Hilton must not have gotten the memo.)

But how have things improved among the underclass? Not much is the answer. Teen pregnancies have declined but only as pregnancies to single women in their twenties have gone up. And Hymowitz makes no mention of the situation in Hispanic communities, where, as her col-

league Heather MacDonald reports, the out-of-wedlock birthrate is now highest in the country—over three times that of whites and Asians and nearly one and a half times that of black women.

Hymowitz advocates marriage counseling programs and parenting classes for unwed couples. She also argues that schools need to teach young women and men that it's in their self-interest (and their future children's) to postpone childbearing until after marriage. "We haven't appealed to people's rational self-interest," she told the *Wall Street Journal*. "They don't know that they're ... limiting the prosperity of their children's future." This seems likely to meet the same success as one anti-teen pregnancy measure Hymowitz describes in which a school required students to carry around sacks of flour as if they were babies. The next day several of the girls showed up with their sacks clad in newly purchased outfits from Baby Gap.

The problem can't simply be that no one is talking about the "M-word" as Hymowitz claims. Many of Hymowitz's unmarried interviewees cherish white-picket dreams of marriage and children, and more than a few know from bitter experience what it means to grow up without a father. Yet for all their good intentions, they just can't seem to live up to their own ideals.

These couples exhibit what political theorist William A. Galston calls "magical thinking." It's as if they see no connection between their present actions and their future plans. When Hymowitz asks a group of women about their career plans, they answer that they are going to be doctors, lawyers, chefs—much like, Hymowitz notes, a four-year-old says that he wants to be an astronaut when he grows up. Hymowitz then asks the women if they think having a baby will get in the way of their dreams, and the women are adamant: "No. Not at all."

It's not that these couples don't understand the importance of marriage. It's that they lack the life skills to plan for it. Hymowitz may have fallen into the age-old problem of the chicken and the egg. Is the marriage gap the cause—or just a

symptom—of social breakdown among America's working class?

The contrast with Europe is illustrative. Unlike in the U.S., unwed, cohabiting unions in Europe are not associated with higher rates of poverty and family disruption. In fact, although Sweden's out-of-wedlock birthrate is almost double that of the United States, two-thirds of all 15-year-olds live with both of their biological parents—a figure similar to those in France and Germany. If marriage is so important to the cultivation of bourgeois virtues, why haven't Europeans experienced the kind of social dysfunction found in America's inner cities?

With *Marriage and Caste in America*, Hymowitz provides an arresting diagnosis of American social ills. But to find a cure, we'll need to look deeper. ■

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[*The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life*, Michael Lind, Oxford University Press, 304 pages]

Real Kantian

By Michael C. Desch

ACCORDING TO THE New America Foundation's Michael Lind, the "American way of strategy" has consistently provided the United States with the surest means of maintaining our external security without compromising our domestic liberty. "For more than two centuries," he writes, "mainstream American foreign policy has sought to protect two elements of American Republican liberty—the freedom of the American state from other states and the freedom of Americans from their own state—by means of the American way of strategy." No other conceivable grand strategy—not isolationism, off-shore balancing, empire, or appease-

ment—can square this circle, in his view. Not surprisingly, he concludes that, to the country's peril, George W. Bush has abandoned the American way of strategy, and future administrations would do well to return to it.

In Lind's account, America has managed to balance security and liberty through its unique synthesis of liberalism and realism. Liberalism establishes the objective of American grand strategy (to protect our domestic way of life via international co-operation), while realism, in the form of a shared hegemony established through a concert of great powers, is the instrument through which the United States can remain secure without becoming a "garrison state." Lind's argument is hard to categorize: it is a mixture of Wilsonian idealism and hard-headed power politics.

Lind is not the only one trying to synthesize realism and liberalism these days. Writers like Charles Krauthammer ("democratic realism") and Francis Fukuyama ("realistic Wilsonianism") also seek to marry these two very disparate approaches by arguing that American power can be used to spread democracy around the world. Even some liberals like Hillary Clinton now want to blend realism and liberalism in their post-Bush grand strategy. It seems as if everyone is some sort of realist now.

But what makes Lind's approach so interesting is that his particular synthesis is similar to the system laid out by the 18th-century Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant in his seminal treatise, "Perpetual Peace." To characterize Lind as a Kantian is not, by any means, to dismiss his argument out of hand. Kant was a very subtle thinker whose influence spans both modern liberalism and modern realism.

Most of us, and apparently Lind himself, regard Kant as the wellspring of what Lind rightly dismisses as "democratic revolutionism": the notion that the United States will make itself more secure simply by spreading democracy around the world, either unilaterally and by force or multilaterally and through diplomacy. The truth is that Kant was no

partisan of democracy. He regarded it as a dangerous and unstable system of government. Kant's preferred political system was republicanism, in which sovereign states whose authority was divided between executive and legislative branches of government on a domestic level co-operated with other states on an international level.

Kant's system of perpetual peace is compatible with some types of modern realism. He argued, for example, that balance-of-power dynamics would play a key role in making international republicanism viable. Indeed, anyone who doubts Kant's influence on modern realism should read Kenneth Waltz's 1962 essay on Kant to understand how significantly Kant influenced Waltz's seminal realist work, *Theory of International Politics*.

Lind shares with Kant more than just an affinity for republicanism and some tenets of realism. Like Kant, he thinks

that an anarchic international system is extremely dangerous. "It is futile to expect freedom and democracy to survive unimpaired, if they survive at all, in prolonged conditions of acute national danger," Lind writes.

Lind also believes that the grave peril of an unregulated international system will motivate the United States to eventually exit the international Hobbesian state of nature: "The only certain way to preserve civil liberties in the United States is to make ... moments of peril rare, and that can only be done by promoting a less dangerous international environment."

Furthermore, Lind offers a republican solution that, if implemented, could provide us with perpetual peace. Kant proposed a "republican league" as the basis for global republicanism. Similarly, Lind advocates a republican great power concert. "The purpose of a great power concert," Lind maintains, almost channeling

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Kant, “is not to produce liberty, democracy, and the rule of law in every country, but to provide every country with the shared public good of peace and basic order, so that the need to prepare for war does not impair the ability of particular nations to establish liberty, democracy, and the rule of law by their own efforts inside their own borders.”

Lind’s neo-Kantian system stands or falls with two key propositions. The first proposition is that the only way to reconcile domestic liberty with international security is to replace anarchy with hegemony. Unless the United States reduces the external threats it faces, it cannot preserve its internal freedoms. The second proposition is that enough great powers will see the merit in such a system that they will come together voluntarily to impose order internationally. Unlike the unilateral hegemony that Bush and his neoconservative allies advocate, Lind envisions a collective hegemony that will provide peace and security.

Both of these propositions are debatable. Like Kant before him, Lind overstated the danger that international anarchy poses to the great powers. As Thomas Hobbes, the most influential theorist of the political consequences of anarchy, pointed out in *Leviathan*, life in the state of nature is very different for individuals and states. For the former, it is a matter of life and death to sign the social contract and get out of it. For the latter, it is more often a matter of convenience.

Lind also suggests that whereas the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans once reliably protected the United States from attack, in today’s world of airplanes and missiles, the United States is now as vulnerable to devastating attack as if its enemies were right next door. This, however, ignores the fact that America’s own bombers and missiles, many of which are equipped with nuclear bombs and warheads, deter attacks from other great powers. Distance, as Lind claims, may no longer afford the protection it once did. But the same technologies that make us vulnerable to other great powers also make it possible to protect ourselves from them through mutual deterrence.

Lind admits that the United States can probably defend itself against all comers but fears that it can only do so at the cost of its domestic liberty. It’s true, as he says, that war and preparation for war have eroded domestic liberty in the past. But such erosion is not inevitable. For example, nuclear weapons, among the most devastating engines of war known to man, are also among the cheapest and least manpower-intensive parts of modern great power arsenals. The U.S. spends a mere 13 percent of its defense budget on its nuclear deterrent and for that relatively small sum has purchased nearly absolute security against attack from other great powers.

Of course, the United States cannot use its nuclear arsenal to protect all of its interests abroad. But it doesn’t need to rely solely on conventional military forces to protect them either. It can, for example, depend upon the international system’s inherent balancing dynamics to protect many of its interests. If those balancing dynamics fail to operate, as they do on occasion, America, like Britain in the 19th century, can intervene from beyond the horizon using limited military power to re-establish the international balance of power in its favor without having to curtail civil liberties at home. It is not inevitable, therefore, that under conditions of international anarchy, America will become a garrison state unless it joins a great power concert.

Lind characterizes his concert as “an alliance without permanent enemy.” But such a view neglects the role of a common threat in facilitating great power co-operation. Indeed, alliances have seldom operated without one. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union co-operated reasonably well against Nazi Germany during the Second World War. But with Germany’s defeat, that cooperation quickly broke down. Similarly, in the face of the Soviet threat, the United States and its allies in Europe achieved remarkable unity. That unity, however, did not survive the Cold War’s end, as America discovered in 2003 during the Iraq War.

Since he has written a book about Alexander Hamilton, Lind, not surprisingly, is much taken with the American Federalists. In fact, to undergird his argument that the great powers will find a concert to be in their mutual interest, he employs the logic of Hamilton’s arguments in *The Federalist Papers* for a stronger union among the 13 colonies. It is true that part of Hamilton’s rationale for greater unity of the states was to avoid conflict among them, but Lind ignores the role, identified by John Jay in “Federalist No. 3” and “Federalist No. 4,” that the threat from other great powers played in forging this union.

Lind expects that his great power concert will provide order and stability—what economists refer to as “public goods.” But ironically, the great power co-operation that Lind assumes will be part of the foundation of his concert can only come about if one hegemonic power is willing to bear a disproportionate share of the concert’s costs.

In the end, Lind admits that there is one area of the world where his great power concert will not work: the Middle East. The region’s plethora of radical states, enduring rivalries, and deep distrust of America make Lind think that a strategy of offshore balancing is the United States’ optimal approach there. But given that the same is true of many other areas of the world, why not embrace that strategy globally, as realists like Christopher Layne, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt have long advocated? Moreover, if America’s international interests and domestic liberty are fully compatible with a strategy of offshore balancing in such an important area as the Middle East, the logic of Lind’s argument that we need a different strategy for the rest of the world seems less compelling. ■

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Foreign Affairs Advice



Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is in hot water with women in general and his wife in particular, but don't feel too sorry for him. He's

got 25 million Italian men behind him, plus a large majority of Latin males throughout the world. As some of you may have read, Berlusconi's wife of 20 years and mother of three of his five children has publicly demanded an apology from him for chatting up other women. By chatting up, I mean flirting in public with ladies and paying them compliments. Mrs. Berlusconi wrote an open letter to the left-leaning *La Repubblica* newspaper, which was published on the front page. In choosing this particular paper, Veronica Berlusconi was quite naughty. *La Repubblica* has been her husband's severest critic: the paper has treated him not unlike the *Washington Post* treated President Richard Nixon a generation ago.

Needless to say, Europe's cheesy tabloids have had a field day. They've quoted Berlusconi ad nauseam, including his corny lines like "If I wasn't married I'd marry you straight away," and "I have 70 billion dollars and don't know how to spend it." (The latter, I admit, somewhat of a no-no, but extremely effective under any and all circumstances.)

Berlusconi, a man I've never met but approve of very much, is no chauvinist pig. Like all Italians, he loves women, and flirting with a woman is considered every red-blooded Italian male's birthright. By dallying with any *bel-ladonna* in sight, an Italian thinks he is doing womankind a favor. Yet Berlusconi's wife thought that his amiable flattery was "damaging to [her] dignity." (She must have American friends to be so touchy.) It was not meant to. Nothing

in Italian eyes should be taken too seriously. The secret of *la dolce vita* and *la bella figura* is that of form over substance. History, from Roman times until the present, has taught the Italians to steer clear of getting in too deep.

Anglo-Saxon mothers teach their children discipline; Jewish mothers teach guilt. But Latin mothers offer undiluted love and support. Italian men live with their mothers even after they're married, so they tend to remain somewhat childish. I know what I'm talking about. I stayed with my parents until late in life, with the predictable results. But back to flirting.

About three years ago, I was rung up by Rachel Johnson, an English writer who was researching her novel, *Notting Hell*, about a rich London borough where a lot of hanky-panky takes place. She asked for my advice, and I gave her my ten commandments about having one's cake and eating it too. She shaped her novel using my ten tips as a guide. (It became an instant bestseller.) Here they are, and I hope all loyal *TAC* readers put them to good use:

1. Always remind your wife that you love her and will never leave her for anyone else, ever.
2. Always remind your prospective lover that, if she gives in, you will never leave her and that you love her more than your wife.
3. Always promise marriage. Promising marriage has served me well these last 50 years, although if one is past 60—or 70 like me—he should also promise that his last will and

testament will look very kindly upon anyone who has had carnal knowledge of the soon-to-be deceased.

4. Never raise your voice or show anger. Always fake jealousy with both your wife and your lovers.
5. Deny, deny, deny. Never admit the slightest indiscretion. Confessions are for amateur adulterers and devout Catholics.
6. Be very generous before and after the affair. Women talk, and word that one is generous gets around quicker than bad news.
7. Marry a beautiful woman, preferably upper class and sure of herself, and cuckold her with lesser, uglier beings. She won't mind, and they will be flattered to cuckold someone superior to them.
8. Be romantic. Whisper, write notes to both the wife and the lover.
9. Make love to everyone concerned regularly. Well-serviced women do not go looking for trouble.
10. Always be in a good mood, and always make women laugh. Show me a man who makes the fairer sex laugh, and I will show you a man who scores a lot.

There is, of course, a word of warning. In Italy, Greece, and in South America, flirting and seduction may be considered masculine virtues, but they are also considered feminine vices. We have been petted and flattered for much too long by our mamas to give equal rights to our wives. Only gringos are capable of that. Anyway, if you are so inclined, feel free to use Taki's top tips, but if you get caught and taken to the cleaners, do not expect any compensation from yours truly or this magazine. ■