

into three parts, Voivodina in the north, Kosovo in the south, and Serbia proper in the middle, Greater Serbia was a myth that Tito was well able to keep under his control. In turn, however, Tito rewarded the Serbs with leverage in the two most important nerves of the Yugoslav government: high diplomacy and the Yugoslav army.

The targets of Serb rage are not just the proverbial Croat Nazis and Muslim fundamentalists. All other neighboring nations, ethnic groups, and minorities are being put in the category of fascist world conspirators. Ironically, Croats and Serbs probably hate each other most because they resemble each other. Is it not true that racism is always directed at the Other, who psychologically and morphologically always represents the travesty of the Same? One does not discriminate against beasts; one discriminates against his likes. Following the logic of the cursed Other, a great number of Serbs, both in Serbia and Bosnia, are deeply convinced that ethnic cleansing is the rightful way to pursue a noble struggle against Croatian fascism and Muslim fundamentalism, for which all military means and tools are morally justifiable. The destruction of Croatian Catholic churches and Muslim mosques, the killing of thousands of non-Serbs, bears witness to the never-ending logic of the worse. Tomorrow, times may change and political constellations may alter. Who will prevent tomorrow's Albanians or nearby Hungarians from similar mythical aggrandizements

The Brownings

(For Katherine McAlpine)

by Richard Moore

Metaphysical dread
made their spirits so restive!
Confined to her bed . . .
he found that suggestive.

But her father loathed art.
So—cleverly, wittily—
they out-foxed the old fart
and eloped to Italy.

To accomplish these ends,
they had many to thank—
their servants, their friends
and their pounds in the bank.

Taint art with no penny!
No, 'taint; but for the true
and the beautiful, any
old trust fund will do.

and ethnic cleansing of Serbs? Permanent peace has never meant much in Europe; peace has always been seen by the Other as punitive. Alas, European laws of the tragic are timeless, and their meaning lies only in the bowels of wild geese, or in the rhymes of the Greek chorus . . .

The Serbian government does not deserve all the blame for the carnage in the Balkans. Western governments, particularly the United States and France, preached for decades the "unity and integrity" of Yugoslavia, as if Yugoslavia could be held together by some French decree or State Department *ukase*. The U.S. State Department (and especially its year-long chief *apparatchik* Lawrence Eagleburger), with its decades-long support of "Yugoslavia's integrity," gave a decent alibi to Serbia's war of aggression. Hybrid Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, two virulently anti-German countries, fit geopolitically into the NATO doctrine of "double containment": on the one hand, they contained the Red Bear in the East; on the other, they contained the mythical and unpredictable German in the West. Small wonder, therefore, that nobody in Washington or at Quai d'Orsay was ecstatic with the sudden unification of Germany; nobody was too ecstatic with the sudden disintegration of Yugoslavia, either. In the supreme irony of history, this time around it is not the proverbial "ugly German" who is destroying the Versailles architecture. This time, the Versailles architecture is falling apart due to its surreal Potemkin Hollywood-like facade. Woodrow Wilson and his progeny have suffered a serious defeat in Europe.


The whole holy story of the Balkans has just begun to unravel. The Serbian leadership in Belgrade shows great concern for Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia, but ignores the rights of the swelling tide of Albanians within its own house. Albanians in Serbia, like the Palestinians, have perfectly learned an ancient wisdom, which Christian Europe forgot long ago: demography is the continuation of politics by other, more enjoyable means. Any cohabitation in the Balkans, any brand of federalism or "power-sharing," which Western pundits preach until their dying breath, is out of the question. Endless wars seem to be the only answer. At some point, some outsider from a distant galaxy may reassemble bits and pieces of the scattered Berlin Wall and fence off different versions of the ethnic truth here. Multiethnic countries are like prisons, in which citizen-inmates communicate with the Other only after each is granted his own territorial imperative. Crammed into one promiscuous cell, all hell breaks loose. Short of a giant mine field separating Serbs and Croats today, or Poles and Russians tomorrow, Europe will be entering another chapter of the Hundred Years War. When different historical destinies clash, when different national mythologies collide, and when different geopolitical tectonic plates start rattling under Eurasia, then the myth of a united Europe will sound like a titanic joke.

Today it is the turn of ex-Yugoslavs to live the violent beauty of their congested multiethnic laboratory. Tomorrow it may be the turn of multiracial Marseilles, Frankfurt, or Brussels. The West is moving full-speed ahead into its own Yugoslav pathology. Last year's events in sunny Los Angeles have shown that no paradigm, no academic model, no formula, and no single truth can supply an answer for our multicultural future. The multicultural daydream functions nicely in soft, sunny, "cool," consumer society; with the first heavy clouds it spells chaos of unbelievable proportions. Emile Cioran was right when he wrote that if we knew what the future holds for us, we would immediately strangle our children. 

Shades of White

Russia's New Right Opposition

by Wayne Allensworth



Anna Mycek-Wodecki

“Mankind is in crisis . . . a long crisis which began 300, and in some places, 400 years ago, when people turned away from religion. . . . It is a crisis which led the East to Communism and the West to a pragmatic society. It is the crisis of materialism.” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

Following the collapse of communism, Russia finds herself an orphan of the disintegrated Soviet Empire. She has embarked on a course of reform that is essentially a search for a new identity. Boris Yeltsin’s “team” of Westernizing reformers had hoped to integrate Russia into the Global Village through the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank and through the embrace of democratic ideology. The government’s program has been met with opposition not only from the old *nomenklatura* and the neocommunists, but from a nascent “national-patriotic” movement. This amorphous movement opposes not just specific points of the government’s policy, but the general cultural direction of integrationism. Its battle with the government is a struggle over Russian identity, and much of its criticisms echo those of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who may well become the intellectual and spiritual center of a movement that has yet to adequately define itself.

At the April 1992 Congress of People’s Deputies, Boris Yeltsin and his partisans encountered staunch opposition from a group whose primary goal was to block the continuation of “team” leader Egor Gaydar’s “shock therapy” approach to economic reform. The pro-Yeltsin press was quick to brand the opposition “red-brown,” meaning neocommunist or chauvinist-fascist. What this political tar-brushing missed was the

“white” element inherent in the opposition.

Russia’s whites, led by the Christian Democrats and Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets, are traditionalists who fear, among other things, the secular Westernizing of Russia by the youthful cosmopolites of Yeltsin’s “team” and the concomitant loss of what remains of Russia’s national identity. It is a mistake to dismiss all of them as extremists, for other government critics such as Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, who have not stained themselves with choosing the “red-browns” for bed-fellows, are espousing a similar line that stresses Russia’s unique cultural identity.

The “national-patriotic” opposition composed of “whites” and “center-rightists” such as Rutskoy has struck the chord of national identity, and its resonance is being felt across Russia. Recent polling shows that Russians are reluctant to follow the “Western model” wholesale, that interest in traditional religion is growing, and that the growing phenomenon of keen interest in, and sympathy with, the deposed and murdered (some would say martyred) Czar Nicholas II denotes a people thirsty for the sustenance that only the elixir of national identity can provide. The national-patriots’ lack of a philosophical standard-bearer may soon be assuaged by the return to Russia of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who could become the moral compass of a patriotic movement too often associated with the spiritual stain of anti-Semitism and imperialism.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, the peasantry, clergy, nobility, and middle class provided the pillars on which the patrimonial czarist state rested. Russia’s new national-patriots see themselves as the inheritors of this tradition, but not without the reservations that come from the passage of time, the historical impossibility (and undesirability) of reconstituting the *ancien*

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